The
fact that translating operates according to texts
and usage rather than rules and analysis has been
widely recognised in many recent approaches to its
theorisation. However, this insight has not come
from translation theory itself. It has instead been
little more than a series of attempted applications
of developments within linguistics, particularly
after the limitations of structuralist semantics
led, in the 1970s, to serious empirical and theoretical
interest in pragmatics, sociolinguistics, text linguistics
and numerous uses and abuses of the term discourse.
Historically, these latter terms have entered translation
studies from strictly non-translational concerns.
Why then should they be immediately important or
pertinent to a coherent theory of translation?
I believe
that most existing forms of discourse analysis are
fundamentally inadequate to the problems of translation
and therefore potentially misleading for the development
of translation theory. My arguments will take the
form of three general points: 1) Contemporary use
of the term discourse is in a mess and probably
deserves to be abandoned; 2) The only kind of discourse
analysis strictly pertinent to translation is that
which sees translating as discursive work; 3) Far
from passively receiving externally derived analyses,
translation itself should become a discovery procedure
for the location and delimitation of discourses.
That is, the limits and frustrations of most forms
of discourse analysis might profitably be overcome
through a judicious application of translation analysis.
Two
basic questions to be answered
Let
me begin with two minor frustrations. First, there
are peculiar approaches like Jean Delisle's L'Analyse
du discours comme méthode de traduction
(1984) which never actually get around to saying
what a discourse is or might be, and thus do little
more than misuse a stupidly modish title. Second,
there are equally misleading texts like Hatim and
Mason's Discourse and the Translator (1990)
which present a glossary of functionalist linguistics
relating terms like discourse, genre, speech act,
text act, text type, register and the rest, but
never actually find room to define what translation
is or might be (their glossary omits the term),
thus leading to confusion or suspicious collusion
between descriptive and normative theory: "Discourses
are modes of thinking and talking," says Hatim quite
reasonably on the level of description, but then
comes the normative rider: "...which have to be
preserved in translation" (1990, 85). This normative
application is problematic to the extent that it
discounts translation itself as a significantly
variable mode of discursive work (don't translators
think and talk?) and uses the notion of discourse
merely to add to the authoritative commands mystically
enshrined in and around the source text, independently
of whatever particular communicative situation might
correspond to the translation itself.
I suspect
that what Delisle has to say about translation could
be said without any reference to discourse at all.
Hatim and Mason, however, have so much to say about
discourse and associated terms that the "translator"
of their title is merely an occasion for a theoretical
performance that could equally have been provoked
by any literary or political text and in fact has
very little to do with any specificity that translation
might be able to claim.
These
minor frustrations lead to two fundamental questions.
First, from the descriptive point of view, how might
the term discourse be defined in a way useful and
pertinent to translation theory and practice? Second,
with respect to the normative application of such
definitions, should a source text and its corresponding
target text form or conform to one or two discourses?
In other words, should the notion of discourse be
limited to only the source side of the translator's
task, or should the before and after of translational
labour be seen in terms of two distinct discourses?
Exactly where are the limits of a discourse as it
affects translation?
Ideally,
the answer to the first question (how might a definition
of discourse be useful?) should implicitly or explicitly
answer the second question (one or two discourses?),
just as, inversely, the clarification provided by
application of a definition should then justify
its initial selection. The result could even become
a pertinent application of discourse analysis to
translation. But where might such illumination be
found?
Use
and abuse of the term discourse
Does
the relation between a source text and a target
text involve one or two discourses? This is a fairly
simple question of definition. But if a definition
of discourse cannot provide a fairly simple answer
to it, this alone may be sufficient basis for declaring
the defining theory impertinent to the problems
of translation. The question could thus become a
fairly radical device for clearing the field of
inadequate approaches.
I should
stress that the criterion of translational pertinence
does not mean that impertinent definitions are automatically
wrong or misguided. Nida and Taber, for example,
transgress no divine law when they gloss "discourse"
as:
A specimen
of linguistic material displaying structural and
semantic coherence, unity, and completeness, and
conveying a message; also called text. [The entry
"Text" says "see Discourse"] (1969: 200, 208)
I can of
course say that I am more interested in the level
of "coherence, unity and completeness" than in the
"linguistic material" itself; I can suggest that the
above definition forecloses possible categorisation
by allowing for as many discourses as there are pieces
of coherent language in the world; I can point out
that the assumption of a kind of completeness that
is at once semantic and material is an ideologically
self-serving negation of progressive interpretation
("the Bible says it all" contradicts the historicity
of discourse as a temporal approximation to identity
or truth), but none of these objections can make the
definition wrong. These factors do however make the
definition fundamentally inadequate to translation,
since they cannot determine whether two non-identical
texts-source and target, or indeed any pair that manifest
the same coherence and unity-belong to the same discourse
or to two different discourses. This argument would
of course apply to all simple equations of the terms
"discourse" and "text".1
The
need to distinguish between discourses and texts
is of theoretical as well as pragmatic importance,
since the necessary singularity of the latter items
raises doubts about the generality of the conclusions
that can be drawn from their study. To see why this
should be so, it is perhaps worthwhile going back
to the reasons why discourse was originally excluded
from structuralist linguistics.
It is
well known that Saussure considered parole to be
non-collective, heterogeneous and thus unavailable
for scientific study (1916, 19 ff.). More precisely,
he considered manifest language to be no more than
a sum of speech acts (actes de parole), represented
as:
(x
+ x1 + x2 + x3)
Such
series, like series of material texts, were considered
unable to attain the mode of existence of tongue,
in which Saussure saw all items as identical replica
of a common collective item:
i
+ i + i + i = I (collective pattern)
The
fundamental problem posed by discourse analysis
would then be whether it is possible to describe
concatenations of manifest language in terms that
do not imply the base identity (I) of the tongue
but do exhibit a rational organisation on a level
somewhere between the above formulae, somewhere
between the absolutely individual item and the normatively
collective tongue. Saussure seems to have believed
that there was no such level: "As soon as we give
the tongue first place amongst the facts of speech,
we introduce a natural order that lends itself to
no other classification" (1916, 9). But surely the
very notion of discourse relies on the existence
of other levels of classification?
The
problem with theories of discourse is not that they
have failed to locate any other level, but that
they have located far too many non-Saussurean orders,
both natural and artificial, on every level from
the individual to the collective. Since the beginnings
of discourse analysis towards the end of the last
century2, there has been an accumulation of different
approaches on different levels, none of which appears
to exclude any other: to my knowledge, no partial
theory (such as "discourse = text") has ever been
explicitly rejected. The resulting terminological
and pedagogical chaos has provided ample fodder
for intellectual fashions, becoming in itself a
process of unarrested addition (x + x1 + x2 + x3)
which has remained remarkably resistant to identity
equations. A brief log-book of French, English and
German approaches might demonstrate the point:
- In
French or French-inspired tradition, "discourse"
has come to mean rather more than mere dissent from
the primacy of the tongue. Theoretical usages of
the term may be grouped according to at least five
problematics: 1) the relation between the persons
represented in linguistic utterances (Benveniste
1966; Joly 1988); 2) the relation between utterances
and texts (Derrida 1967, 149ff.; Metz 1970; Barthes
1970); 3) the definition of literary voice or speech
modes as opposed to "story" (from Benveniste; but
also Todorov 1971, 1978; Chatman 1978; and Todorov's
translations of the Russian Formalists, especially
Shklovski 1917, 6); 4) the correspondence between
language and social structures (Pêcheux 1975);
and 5) the nature of semiotic processes in general,
increasingly associated with degrees of use-related
competence (as noted in Greimas and Courtès
1979). But from none of this does there emerge any
clear consensus as to whether translation involves
one or several discourses: as much as one might
suppose that traditional categories such as "discours
direct / indirect / indirect libre" would allow
both source text and target text to share the same
mode, increasing awareness of the interrelatedness
of discourses has led to the theoretical construction
of things like "discursive formations" as sociocultural
units (Pêcheux 1975; Cros 1983, resting on
Foucault 1969), which would seem to imply that any
translation that goes to another sociocultural unit
must enter another discursive formation, and thus,
possibly, become another discourse. But no one seems
very sure about the point.
- In
English-language research, it has become very difficult
to separate adaptations of French usages from similarly
generalised notions of "code" (Bernstein 1970, reinforced
by Eco 1976) "system" (often from Lotman) and "text
grammar" (especially van Dijk 1985). The latter
tendency has considerably strengthened the identification
of discourse with text, although, in view of our
comments above, there is clearly some justification
for maintaining the general distinction proposed
by Widdowson, for whom text analysis investigates
"the formal properties of a piece of language",
whereas the object of discourse analysis is "the
way sentences are put into communicative use in
the performing of social actions" (1979, 52). This
distinction benefits from Austin's analysis of performatives
and their subsequent drafting into theories of speech
acts (Searle 1969). However, later associated with
a mystique of deconstruction, these apparently benign
terms were then grouped around "discourse" to present
an epistemological challenge to the notion of grammar
itself: as Hopper puts it in his summary of discourse
analysis in the 1980s, "...if meaning is bound to
context, and contexts themselves are unbounded,
in what shall linguistics (or any other endeavour,
of course) be anchored?" (1988, 22). Saussure already
had one answer prepared, and a good second answer
to this question would be the sociological readings
of unequal "discursive formations" as found in Bernstein
or Pêcheux. But none of this can unambiguously
answer our questions about translation, nor am I
able to cite any convincingly exhaustive classification
of codes, systems, texts, speech acts or discourses.
- German
theory appears not to indulge in excessive notions
of speech or discourse. Instead, it seems particularly
focused on the material presence of text. For instance,
Lewandowski's dictionary (1985) correlates the French
discours with Sprechen, which correlates
with the English speech, which is also used
for Rede, of which the classifications or
Redearten are glossed as Textsorten.
One cannot escape the notion of text! Something
similar happens in Reiss's approach to translation
criticism, where Bühler's three language functions
are quickly reduced to "text types" as if the transition
were scarcely problematic (1971, 33). Reiss's approach
thus shares the blunt morality we have noted in
Hatim: if the translator has worked correctly, the
source and target texts should ideally belong to
the same text type. Which is to say that translation
itself is not a text type or series of types, nor,
of course, a discourse.
Remarkably
enough, throughout the above profusion of terms,
none of the projects willing to propose classification
systems are immediately of discourses: almost all
of them concern "language functions". Yet one need
only refer to the wide variety of attempted classifications-mainly
derived from Ogden and Richards (1928), Bühler
(1934), Austin (1955), Jakobson (1956) or Halliday
(1973)-to suggest that the categories concerned
are as yet not demonstrably derived from the object
of study itself. Why should Jakobson's six or Austin's
five categories be preferred to Bühler's or
Halliday's three? Why should there only be five
(as available as the hand), or three (as mysterious
as the Trinity), or a lucky seven (according to
Hymes 1968), or as many as sixteen tentatively universal
speech-act components conveniently analysable in
terms of the eight letters of the English word SPEAKING
(Hymes 1974)?
More
importantly, how sure can we be that Saussure was
entirely wrong in rejecting the possibility of a
systematic discourse analysis when, in the cited
approaches, all manifest language is generally recognised
as fulfilling several if not all language functions,
the actual classification then being based on the
relative dominance or focus of attention (Jakobson
says Einstellung) on one function or another? This
effectively begs the question of who or what is
focusing the attention (the researcher or the "native"?)
and overtly admits that linguistic material can
always furnish substantial complex examples able
to straddle and thus annul the theoretical distinctions
proposed. It might be concluded that these categories
by no means contradict Saussure's belief that language
itself resists such classification. Indeed, a similar
although more practical conclusion might be drawn
from Bakhtin's late essay on "speech genres" (1952-53),
where the existence of such categories is forcefully
asserted, but not one is actually named or delimited.
What
is the basic problem with these approaches to discourse
and associated terms? From the perspective of our
fairly brutal questions concerning translation,
it is that there is no general agreement about the
limits of a discourse, nor about the intersubjective
level on which its identity should be located. This
is why there is no general consensus on whether
translation involves one or two discourses.
A
notion of discourse that seems pertinent to translating
As much
as the term discourse might mean all things to all
theorists, our initial questions require the formulation
of at least a working definition. Moreover, such
a definition should say something more than Hatim's
description of discourses as "modes of thinking
and talking", which says nothing about limits and
remains unclear as to the discursive status of the
translator's thinking and talking.
A more
fruitful approach would seem to be of the kind that
sees discourses as sets of constraints on the process
of semiosis. This means, first, that discourses
are not to be confused with signifiers or utterances,
and second, that they can be related to a level
of meaning where something happens: "semiosis" is
Peirce's term for the dynamic displacement of meaning
from symbol to symbol (we would perhaps say signifier
to signifier) through the capacities of the interpretant
(usually taken to to be a further symbol itself).
A simple application of this theory is Jakobson's
statement that "the meaning of any linguistic sign
is its translation into some further, alternative
sign" (1959). A more practical application of semiosis
might be what we have done in our commentary on
Lewandowski, looking up the dictionary definition
of a term, then the definitions of the defining
terms, and so on until, according to certain theories,
the exercise will exhaust the entire dictionary
and take so long that the language itself will have
changed, the dictionary will have to be rewritten,
and the process should begin again. Or at least,
such is the endless process that might be projected
by a naïve reading of Saussurean tongue as
a synchronic system in which "tout se tient", everything
holds together. To say that something called discourse
is able to constrain semiosis is thus to posit that,
in practice, nobody in their right mind would exhaust
an entire dictionary to interpret an isolated term,
and that the "holding together" must thus occur
at levels of lesser dimension than the tongue. In
the case of Lewandowski's dictionary, our short
burst of semiosis was effectively terminated by
the return to the base term "text". Discourses are
perhaps not as open-ended as some theories would
like, but they may certainly direct the potentially
unlimited process of semiosis in one way or another,
and do so with a certain fidelity to the term's
etymological value as dis-currere (3) By
incorporating at least a nominal notion of translation
into the very definition of discourse (for Jakobson,
semiosis is translation), this view moreover posits
that discourses can bridge the frontiers between
different tongues, extending themselves or finding
their limits through processes of translation.
The
reason why such a general notion of discourse could
be crucial in the context of translation studies
may be appreciated through approaches like Werner
Koller's:
The
study of translation investigates conditions of
equivalence and describes the coordination of utterances
and texts which are in two languages and to which
the criterion of translational equivalence applies;
it is the study of parole. Contrastive linguistics,
on the other hand, investigates the conditions and
preconditions of correspondence (formal similarity)
and describes corresponding structures and sentences;
it is the study of langue. (1979, 183-4)
This
distinction is of strategic importance in that it
detaches translation studies from the search for
semantic universals and thus from the obverse problematics
of linguistic relativism. But the borderline thus
drawn suffers from being equated with langue and
parole. The risk with these terms in this context
is not only that Saussure declared parole to be
unavailable for systematic analysis, but that they
might be aligned with something like the more dangerously
precise concepts of Chomskyan "performance" and
"competence", ultimately reviving the universalist/relativist
problematic originally to be avoided. Koller's terminology
specifically tends to defeat his strategy when the
above categories are used to distinguish between
bilingual competence and translational competence
(1979, 40ff, 185), implicitly taking something from
langue and placing it in the field of parole. Yet
parole cannot be equated with the "coordination
(Zuordnung) of utterances and texts", nor with the
"conditions (Bedingungen) of equivalence". There
are thus good reasons for preferring the term discourse.
Koller's
contribution is useful to the extent that it opens
a space where discourses, as sets of constraints
on semiosis, may involve coordinations and impose
conditions of equivalence. It is clear that these
coordinations and conditions are not co-extensive
with tongues, but it remains to be discovered how
they might become pertinent to translation.
If,
let us say, all discourses existed in all tongues,
such that the translator merely had to fill in the
linguistic material complying with the coordinations
and conditions, then discourses themselves would
present no problem for the translator and would
thus be impertinent to translation theory. So much
for Hatim's normative application. If, on the other
hand, discourses are considered to be of lesser
dimensions than tongues and entirely determined
within particular tongues, their existence must
deny interdiscursive translation and thus-since
cultures are presumably not equal discursive formations-the
very possibility of interlingual translation. Once
again, the categories are not useful and tend to
block translation theory in the same way as visions
of the tongue as a closed conceptual system once
did.
This
in effect means that neither of the simple answers
to our "one or two discourses" question is useful.
If a source text and a target text are equivalent
because within the same discourse, translation is
a banal phenomenon. And if they are different discourses
because in different tongues, then translation would
appear to be an unthinkable phenomenon.
The
only way to cut across this dilemma is to regard
translation as the active movement by which discourse
may be extended from one cultural setting to another.
What translation theory would then want to know
about discourses is the relative degree of difficulty
and success involved in their extension and the
degree to which they may undergo transformation
through translation. It is here that translation
could become a discovery procedure of some importance
to intercultural discourse analysis.
Translation
as an index of discursive constraints
There
are obvious cases in which the same discourse can
be extended across several tongues. To take the
example of formal letters, "Dear Sir" is not translated
by "Querido señor", but by "Muy señor
mío", or "Estimado amigo", or perhaps "Distinguido
amigo / colega" etc. The variants are not due to
lingual constraints but to discursive conventions.
In fact, one could say that even when literalism
gives a "correct" salutation (as for example the
Castilian "Estimado amigo" rendered by the Catalan
"Estimat amic"), the certainty of the translation
is due more to discursive constraints than to dictionary
equivalents, the choice of the language itself being
by no means neutral for the discursive force of
the utterance. More precisely, one could say that
translational uncertainty in such cases can only
be solved in terms of specific contexts-that is,
the interrelationship projected by the entire letter-and
not by the analysis of structures internal to any
one tongue. Although it is thus strictly impossible
to say whether exactly the same discourse is always
operative in both an original and a translated letter
(rules like "use Spanish expression X for English
expression Y" would be inadequate), it is certainly
by asking if the same discourse is possible that
conjectural solutions are reached and discourses
are extended one way or another.
The
relatively simple example of formal letters would
tend to suggest that translation works on the assumption
that the same discourse can indeed be manifested
in different cultures. It moreover suggests a fairly
simple two-part strategy for isolating pertinent
data determined by discursive conventions:
- First,
if translation according to lingual components fails
to give corresponding source and target terms, the
unit concerned is determined by discursive and not
lingual constraints. The fact that "Dear Sir" can
be rendered as "Estimado amigo" but not "Querido
señor" is thus indicative of potentially
equivalent discourses, and possibly of the same
discourse.
-Second,
if back-translation fails to attest the equivalence
of the pairs thus isolated, then the unit concerned
is determined by non-equivalent discourses. For
example, the possible circuit "Muy señor
mío" into "Dear Sir" into "Estimado amigo"
reveals that the Spanish and English discourses,
although potentially equivalent for the purposes
of a particular translation, are in fact non-equivalent
when no translation is involved (although they could
possibly become equivalent as a result of repeated
translation).
If discourse
analysis were applied to translation only at the
level of potentially equivalent discourses-the first
of the above steps-, its findings could not be expected
to go beyond those of any reasonable bilingual dictionary,
where various target terms are listed according
to the fields of knowledge and general situations
in which a given source term might be used. Moreover,
such attempts to categorise global semantic space
willfully overlook phenomena of cultural alterity
and historical change. That is, they cannot explain
why translation should be necessary, nor accept
that translation actually does anything as a discursive
act. It is for this reason that the second step
given above actively questions the idea that all
discourses are possible in all cultures, thereby
according translation a specific role in the discovery
and challenging of discursive limits.
A further,
perhaps less banal example might illustrate this
critical potential and enable us to close on a suggestive
rather than definitive note.
The
Australian Aboriginal chant
Nabira-mira,
Dumuan-dipa, Namuka-madja, Aï-aïjura
has
been translated as
At
the time of creation, the Nabira-miras, a father
and son, tried unsuccessfully to fish with spears.
Their spears were transformed into cliffs known
as the Dumuan-dipa, and they themselves became the
cliffs of Namuka-madja, which are near the island
of Aï-aïjura. (Mountford 1956, 62-63)
On the
linguistic level, the chant is simply a list of
proper names: a pair of mythological characters
and three place-names, all of which are reproduced
in the translation. But these proper names evoke
an entire narrative that relates a mythological
event to some very specific geological features.
Blithe
application of the first of the above steps reveals
that the non-correspondence is due to discursive
and not lingual constraints. But what cannot immediately
be expressed in English is the specificity of these
features and the familiarity that allows the associated
narrative to remain unexpressed in the chant. The
need to explain thus manifests a previously only
potential discourse, that of the target text.
For
obvious reasons, back-translation in this case fails
to attest equivalence on the level of discourse.
But should one then consider these texts as representing
two different discourses, perhaps elaborating the
same narrative base in terms of two mutually exclusive
cultures?
If familiarity
is untranslatable, this does not mean that its modalities
and conventions are necessarily incomprehensible
for the translating culture: Australian army battalions
habitually hoist banners bearing series of toponyms
like "Gallipoli, Ypres, Tobruk", familiar names
able to evoke narratives as functionally complex
and institutionally pervasive as the Aboriginal
chant. Similarly, explanatory discourse exists in
Australian Aboriginal culture, albeit often with
social limitations for initiatory purposes. As difficult
as the translation might seem, it cannot be said
that the discursive formations concerned are mutually
exclusive. The point is rather that the translation
in this case functions as a bridge between initially
non-equivalent discourses, at once explaining the
chant and thereby, potentially, allowing the same
chant to be read as an English text in itself--since
it is nothing more than a list of proper names--,
the familiarity of which may then increase with
repetition. Moreover, since such a translation retrospectively
alters the discursive status of the source text,
it should clearly count as legitimate discursive
work on the same level as the source text, extending
the original discourse from tongue to tongue despite
quite massive initial non-equivalence.
If difficulty
in translation may thus be used as a general index
of non-equivalent discourses, it does not necessarily
follow that translations are simple mirrors of discrete
cultures. To take seriously Jakobson's statement
that "the meaning of any linguistic sign is its
translation into some further, alternative sign"--to
read the Aboriginal chant as an English-language
text--is to accept that translation may play an
active role in our understanding of discourses themselves.
NOTES
1. Ducrot
and Todorov (1972, 376) also refer "analyse du discours"
to the entry "texte"; discourse analysis as found
in van Dijk et al. is similarly freely described
as text linguistics, and van Dijk himself indeed
suggests that the term "discourse analysis" translates
the German "Textwissenschaft" (1985, I, xi). My
comments here do not exclude the possibility that
these usages be made pertinent to translation through
a reinterpretation of the material side, as found,
for example, in Robel's equation of "texte" with
"l'ensemble de toutes ses traductions significativement
différentes" (1973, 8).
2. Joly
(1988) claims that discourse analysis can be dated
from Tobler's study of free indirect discourse in
Zola (1887) and the debate that later developed,
after 1912, concerning the forms this discourse
may take in French and German. The contributions
of Vendryès (1923) and Bakhtin/Voloshinov
(1930) are also mentioned to offset Todorov's citing
of Malinowski (1923) as the first to posit the necessity
of discourse by describing language as action (1970,
4).
3. Greimas
and Courtès (1979) cleverly incorporate this
notion into their final definition of "discours"
as "une sélection continue des possibles,
se frayant la voie à travers des réseaux
de contraintes". If I prefer to describe discourse
as the constraints rather than the process of semiosis
itself, it is because I do not believe that human
work should be attributed to abstract concepts.
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