

Interculturality in French-German Translation History

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For some years I have been looking for a sociology of translation between French and German at the end of the nineteenth century. Such at least is my research project. It has to do with translation history. It could thus involve putting a series of French-language texts on one side, a series of German-language texts on the other, and supposing there are translational relationships between the two sides. If the texts have been selected according to clear criteria or hypotheses, actual translational relationships will presumably affirm or deny the initial criteria or hypotheses. And when such affirmations and denials are mapped onto a chronological axis, over and above the archaeological problems of text location and identification, we can perhaps start talking about translation history. That's how you do it. Or so it seems. Yet does this kind of translation history have much to do with interculturality? Does this basic method lead to anything worth calling "intercultural translation history"? The method is clearly bilateral. We can see the two sides: French here, German there. Translation works between the two, French to German, and German to French. This could be a story of bilateral exchange. But is bilateralism enough to make this project intercultural?

My question is quite practical. Here we have my desk. A French text here on the left; a German text on the right (I follow the directions of cartography). Since translation is supposed to go from one side to the other, I train my eyes to move from one to the other, and back again, since I have no desire to exclude reciprocity and exchange. My reading apparently imitates the movements of translation itself. In a sense, I retranslate, or even detranslate, to coin a term for the critical deconstruction of translative constructs. Yet my doubts lie elsewhere. Neither here nor there, nor even in the fleeting movements between here and there. My concern, a concern befitting an interculturality worthy of the prefix "inter", is what lies in the middle, in between here and there, in between the two texts so neatly arranged on my desk. What lies between these texts? Empty table space, perhaps, an emptiness that my eyes are trained not to see as they move from one side to the other. Yet what might the emptiness represent? A border, certainly, or a frontier space ensuing from a definitional difference: here French, there German, and thus a line somewhere between. My eyes don't see the line; standard translation history rarely touches the borders it jumps over. Yet it presupposes and depends on the line that is there, somewhere, between French and German, between France and Germany. After all, if there were no line, would there have been any translating?

Most histories are written of individual cultures or cultural orders: French history, Germany history, European history, labour history, church history, and so on. But borders could have their own kind of history, organized in terms of their own cultural space. If so, translation history might be a part of their story. Instead of describing the history of translations in French or German, we might seek the history of the line between French and German. We might even say something about the empty space between our two sides. The first step in this direction would be to ask how the space became a border in the first place.

The Strasbourg oaths

The difference between French and German, if a lineal distinction between languages, requires a moment of contact, traditionally attached to the Strasbourg Oaths of 841. On the left we have Charles (the Bald), on the right Ludwig (the German). Or Karl and Louis, if you prefer. They are both sons of Louis the Pious, Ludwig der Fromme, in charge of the Frankish empire. In the presence of their troops they promise to unite their interests. They swear an oath. But they do so in two languages: Ludwig in Romana lingua (the text is widely considered the first document in French), Charles in theudisca lingua (Teutonic, or diutiska zunga, hence Deutsch, German). Two languages, "a sure sign," says Zeller, among other nationalist readers, "that some of their troops did not understand Romance" (1954: 3). Or, we should add, that not everyone understood Old German. Two languages and total coverage for neither. Hence, technically, translation so that warriors otherwise excluded by language might yet participate in the pact and its consequences. One translates so that the power bases know what's going on.

Interestingly, each king swore in the language of the other's troops: Charles in German, Louis in French. Each translated himself so the other's power base could understand. This was certainly translation as exchange. This was translation in history, communicating between languages at the same time as it marked a difference between languages. But was it fully translation history? Surely something is missing. Where, for example, was the translator? Can translation have a history without translators?

For Renée Balibar (1985), the effective translators of the piece were the Latinist clerics who brokered the oaths, ritualistically sanctioning the linguistic division of states. Church Latin, says Balibar, was the language that set up the vernacular states, in accordance with strategies that subsequent centuries of history would have veiled from our eyes: "...nationalist mentalities have outlawed the idea that the German sovereign cofounded national French on the initiative of international clerics" (45). The power bases would have little to do with it. Latin was certainly the language of Nithard's history (ca. 1000), which nevertheless transmits the oaths to us in the Romance and Germanic versions. Yet Balibar's argument goes further. The division of French and German drew on something that happened some twenty-eight years earlier, at the 813 Council of Tours, where it was declared that all pronouncements and homilies from the pulpit would be in the language of the people, "...in rusticam romanam linguam aut theotiscan." This earlier move towards the base vernaculars had been supported by Charlemagne, grandfather of Charles and Ludwig. The French and German kings, Charles and Ludwig, would thus simply be adopting for the state a move that had previously been made by the church. The clergy, says Balibar, was significantly gratified by the division between national vernaculars. Being bilingual or even trilingual, the church gained the role of mediator not only between the international order and the states (between Latin and the national vernaculars) but also between the state and the people (between national vernaculars and the local "rustic" languages, the rusticam romanam linguam aut theotiscan of the Council of Tours). As mediators across institutionalised three-tiered "linguistic apartheid" - Balibar's term -, the clerics gained considerable power. They became the internal translators of a certain Europe.

Without real reasons to doubt the importance Balibar gives to the church, I would like to suggest a further factor, similarly excluded by nationalist history, that might make the Strasbourg Oaths pertinent to our current history. It concerns geography, the kind of places where translators, clerics or otherwise, might have carried out their commerce.

The Strasbourg Oaths enabled Charles and Louis to unite their forces against a third brother, Lothar. Whatever the role of cunning clerics, the strategic function of the oaths was to exclude the third. Although the French-German border appears to be a decidedly bilateral affair, its formation through translation was not simply a question of twos, not even geographically. There was space for Romance, space for German, and then something else. What happened to this third brother, Lothar?

When two unite against one, the outcome is clear. Lothar lost. And yet, in 843, the year following the oaths, the Treaty of Verdun divided Charlemagne's empire into three parts, not two. On the left, Francia Occidentalis (France, more or less) for Charles the Bald; on the right, Francia Orientalis (Germany, more or less) for Ludwig the German; and in the middle, not quite a border but a space called Francia Media, for Lothar the excluded. According to McKitterick, "the decisions taken at Verdun largely determined the future shape of Europe" (1983: 172). This is one of the reasons why I am particularly interested in the middle kingdom thus formed.

Francia Media took in regions of what we now know as Holland, Belgium, Lorraine, Alsace, areas west of the Rhine, Switzerland, northern Italy, more or less. A series of bits and pieces somehow between France and Germany (see Fig. 1). One easily forgets that the European Union, which would be no union without France and Germany, also depends on these fragmented pieces of the middle kingdom. There is French culture, there is Germanic culture, and there is something in between, a ground for intercultural. But we run ahead of ourselves.



Figure 1. Western Europe in three parts

The middle kingdom did not last long as a political entity. In 855, just twelve years after its creation, Lothar partitioned Francia Media between his sons: the elder, Louis II, received Italy; the younger, named Lothar like his father, got the northern area, thereafter known as Lotharingia, Lorraine. When the younger Lothar died without heir

in 869, this northern area was much fought over, eventually going to the German kingdom, along with Alsace, accorded to Ludwig the German in the Treaty of Meersenn in 870. The middle ground, in this case Strasbourg, went one way and not the other. As for the southern middle, Italy and the imperial title floundered until Charles the Bald went to Rome and got both in 875. And so the middle kingdom was liquidated. The two translated brothers took just about everything. The third brother, initially excluded, had returned to the middle only to see history exclude his legacy.

What does this have to do with translation history? Lothar, the excluded brother, was probably not a translator. Yet his middle kingdom has occasionally returned as a space for translators. Some cases are merely interesting hypotheses, such as the role played by Lorraine in the transmission of Islamic science in the tenth century (Thompson 1929). Other evidence, however, is strangely suggestive. Consider, for example, a map (Fig. 2) showing the professional domiciles of conference interpreters, members of the Association Internationale d'Interprètes de Conférence (AIIC). The dots curiously concentrate along the middle kingdom. No doubt due to a geography of communication - rivers, roads and the rest -, this concentration is also a fact of cultural geography, based on the need for mediation between major cultures, notably between French and German. Could it be that, more than a thousand years after the Strasbourg Oaths, the middle kingdom still exists, as a place of translators?




Figure 2. Professional domiciles of conference interpreters (AIIC, 1992)

Before trying to substantiate this claim, let me make a few general points about the middle kingdom and its history.

First, Lothar got not only Francia Media but also the imperial title. He was the emperor, at least for a while. Yet he was by no means an emperor like Charlemagne. As McKitterick puts it, "the position of emperor became a nominal overlordship [...] with little power in the Frankish kingdoms apart from his own" (1983: 381). Since that moment, the emperors of Europe - or of the Holy Germanic Empire, the European Union, or whatever - have mostly been peculiarly powerless, having to depend on those

with true weight, notably France and Germany. The French and German kings agreed to let their brother have the middle and be called emperor, just as today the effective kings of France and Germany meet every so often to decide who will be the new emperor in Brussels. In 1994 their candidates for head of the European Commission were from Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, weak fragments of a weak middle kingdom, with the job eventually going to the weakest, from Luxembourg.

Second, translation has long been attached to the use of officious or symbolic power by emperors. Translators were at the court of Frederick II (but he had too much real power in Italy to use them as mere translators), and translation was an important element in Alfonso X's bid to take Frederick's place. If not always of the physical middle, translation can be a way of gaining the middle ground, or at least the symbolism of its empty title. The modern emperors, be they heads of the European Commission or UN Secretaries General, are no different. If we then stretch the symbols into the period that most concerns me, the emperors of the second half of the nineteenth century - emperors of Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary - concluded their Triple Alliance as a weak defensive pact so that French-German relations would involve no active third party. That was all Bismarck asked of the emperors: that they stay excluded and keep other thirds excluded. And yet the middle returned. The world's largest ever translation bureau is now in the middle kingdom, in Brussels, with its satellite interpreters in Strasbourg. The translators are not working for effective powers but for relatively weak emperors, moving words instead of troops or merchandise. The history of translation is not necessarily a history of directly efficient or even rational actions.

Third, to explain this association of translation with symbolic titles, the Strasbourg Oaths excluded not only the third brother but also Latin as a potentially common language, not to mention the possible development of a passably bilingual power base, a French-German Eurocorps *avant la lettre*. In a sense, what was excluded was not translation - Lothar was not a translator as such - but non-translation, the use of a lingua franca or multilingual communication on the level of the state. When armies of French and German translators gather in Brussels and Strasbourg, what they are fighting against is not a divided Europe but the power of alternative intercultural strategies: international English, or generalized multilingualism. The middle would be the place for all these forms of non-translation. As the place of those who do not need translations, the middle is the place of translators.

By excluding non-translation, one excludes the place of translators. This is important. On a purely discursive level, the structure of the excluded third is like that of translation, where the translators, deprived of a first-person pronoun while translating, efface themselves in interests of communication between source and target, attaining the illusory bilateralism of an individualist contact situation, Charles perpetually facing Louis. If a sociological approach is to give substance to the third, if it is to insist that interculturality belongs to a properly human place, it must thus go beyond the structure of translation. It must force recognition of viable non-translation.

A further general perspective should be opened here. If Francia Media were extended northwards and southwards, where would it go? In the 1890s, it perhaps extended to the Scandinavian countries, to their literatures, neither properly Germanic nor indecently Francophile. To the south, Italy, Spain, Morocco and Tunisia, the latter as colonial pawns to be negotiated over. When France wanted diplomatic exchanges with Germany at the turn of the century, one of its main go-betweens was the Danish-born journalist Jules Hansen, and then the prince of Morocco and the Spanish ambassador. A whole line of countries could be exchanged for the middle kingdom. Yet the point of contention in the negotiations remained the middle. From 1871, the Franco-

Germanic third that could be excluded or returned was of course Alsace-Lorraine, part of the middle kingdom once again attached to the German side. Any improvement in relations had somehow to bypass this problem. Bismarck knew the third should remain excluded, one way or another. He encouraged France to expand its colonial interests so as to look beyond Europe and forget about revenge (although he also encouraged French arguments with other non-central thirds, notably Britain and Italy). Clemenceau knew this; he argued against colonialism precisely so that France would remember that Alsace-Lorraine should be returned. Forgetting or looking elsewhere is also a kind of exclusion. And then Bismarck's strategy, which involved giving France Tunisia on a platter, could be turned back against itself: In 1898 the Alsatian-born politician Lalace actually proposed that France give Germany a colony in exchange for Alsace-Lorraine (Poidevin and Bariéty 1977: 167). In strategic terms, this is perhaps what happened as attention turned to Morocco after 1905. The middle kingdom can return in many forms, and a series of those forms were colonial.

One condition of return is that the intermediary remain weak. The power of mediation must be subordinate. The middle kingdom was weak and could be liquidated. Yet it was scarcely territorial in the first place. A mirage object, it only fleetingly attached interculturality to geographical substance. And since its power is more mediatory than instigative, it can return whenever self-effacing mediation is of the day. Exiled and travelling Jews and bilinguals are mediators, distrusted but needed. So are spies. Dreyfus, a Jew accused of spying, was born in Alsace.

At this point I turn to my historical object of study, translations between French and German at the end of the last century.

French-German relations at the end of the nineteenth century

The late-nineteenth century strategies of exclusion occasionally returned on the cultural level. When an *enquête* of 1895 presented French-German understanding as a goal to be attained, the main point of contention was carefully excluded: "All politics aside...", begins the key question, understood as: let us talk as if Alsace-Lorraine did not exist. On these terms the *Mercure de France* and the *Neue deutsche Rundschau*, who jointly organized the survey, did indeed talk about *rapprochement* and *Annäherung*. But not for long. Two years later, in 1897, the *Mercure* conducted another *enquête*, without German assistance, this time squarely on the question of Alsace-Lorraine, which had returned to arouse responses that were this time far more nationalistic.

In the years that interest me here, the weak middle kingdom was variously the excluded third and disputed territory, with the latter role eventually becoming the more important. Yet was this necessarily so? Dispersed among the arguments about the third, especially in the 1890s, we find calls for extended mediation, for French-German collaboration, and even for a United States of Europe, mostly in order to exclude a further third, Britain. But cultural mediators were not up to the task, and Alsace-Lorraine repeatedly got in the way. When intermediaries fail to mediate, their place becomes disputed territory, a site for animosity and revenge. An intercultural history of the *fin de siècle*, beyond that of the medieval brothers, must lead tragically to the Great War, well before any triumphant modern Parliament of Strasbourg set about taking and translating oaths in many national European tongues.

When cross-cultural communication was made politically difficult by the defeat of France in 1870-71, many of the translators operating between French and German came from the intermediary cultures: Belgium, Lorraine, Alsace, Switzerland and associated bits and pieces. This has been observed by Duméril in his study of the

German Lied in France (1934: 253-255), where Swiss translators were the only ones prepared to bring Heine into French in the 1870s, followed by the French-speaking Dutch translator Beltjens. The strategic use of middle-kingdom translators can further be supported by a survey of those who translated two Germans of some significance at the time, Wagner and Nietzsche. Without going into excessive details, let me use these two cases - the French Wagner and Nietzsche - to indicate the way a logic of the excluded third can inform translation history.

As chance would have it, after 1871, Wagner's operatic poems were translated into French by a good number of middle-kingdom intermediaries. An anonymous *Walkyrie* was published in Brussels in 1878; the Fleming Victor (van) Wilder signed a contract with Wagner's publisher Schott in 1885 and proceeded to render the operatic poems into French rhyming verse; another Belgian, Henri La Fontaine, produced a prose *Walkyrie* in Brussels in 1886; the Belgian Maurice Kufferath translated Wagner in Brussels from 1890. There were certainly other translators in the mix, but the Belgian connection was strong and not at all accidental. In the post-1871 context, particularly in view of Wagner's celebration of the French defeat in his farce *A Capitulation*, national pride virtually prohibited the French from translating Wagner. Belgians thus took up the role of intermediaries. Yet the middle-kingdom was of more than geographical importance; it was also ground for debate. All the Belgian translators were criticized in Paris for either promoting populist understandings of Wagner or, often in the same breath, for not being able to write good French. Wilder and La Fontaine were belittled as "vulgarizing translators" in the Parisian *Revue Wagnérienne* of 1886, and Kufferath's French was ruthlessly ridiculed by the Parisian critic Willy, who described it as "the language of ragamuffins who spend their time picking up bullets from the battlefield of Beverloo" (1895: 42-43). Although Belgian interculturality was necessarily operative at this particular stage, it was quickly excluded in the name of a somehow truer, more centralized reception of Wagner.

The Parisian reception was not, however, as nationally centralized as it appeared. The *Revue Wagnérienne*, which placed Wagner on the French cultural map in ideologically difficult times, had among its main figures the Polish-born Wyzewa and the Anglo-Swiss Chamberlain, both translators and faithful Wagnerians to the bitter end. The periodical was formed when Wyzewa and Chamberlain met with Dujardin, not in Paris but in Bayreuth. These were people who moved backwards and forwards across the middle kingdom, presuming knowledge of both source and target cultures at a level somehow superior to that of mere intermediaries from the middle. Dujardin and Chamberlain not only criticized the popularizing translators but also produced their own highly literalist versions, designed for an elite, the true Wagnerians, implicitly those of Paris. Interestingly enough, Dujardin actually declared that Wagner required two translations, one to introduce the uninitiated to the work, and the other, literalist, so that just a few people ("quelques uns") might appreciate the German text without having to learn German. This double-translation solution was actually a commercial strategy at the time - the publisher Hachette was publishing a pedagogical series called "Les auteurs allemands expliqués d'après une méthode nouvelle: par deux traductions françaises, l'une littérale et juxtaposée, l'autre correcte et précédée du texte allemand" ("German authors explained according to a new method: by two translations into French, one literal and juxtaposed, the other correct and preceded by the German text"). Translations could be either literal or correct! The peculiar thing about the Wagner reception is that this distinction was mapped onto the difference between Parisian and middle-kingdom translators. Although one might suppose that people in the middle would suffer greater linguistic contamination and thus greater literalism as translators,

in this case the literalism was called for in Paris, precisely to oppose the domestication that came from the middle kingdom. In this way, middle-kingdom mediation allowed Parisian reception to claim the substantiality for its cultural centralism. The specific role of the middle was short-lived.

Or was it? Successful literalism of the kind sought by Dujardin was eventually brought in by Alfred Ernst from 1894, whose work aroused criticism from one Henry Bäuer (sic) of the *Echo de Paris* for breaking certain syntactic norms. According to Bäuer, "Ernst's translation follows the movement of the musical period at the expense of the French phrase, to the detriment of the rules and even the genius of the French language". Several paid-up Wagnerians then rose to the defence of Ernst's literalism. For Willy, the same Willy who had ridiculed the Belgian translator Kufferath, "It is really Wagner that one hears or reads in Ernst", none the least because archaisms and inversions were to be found in Wagner himself. The arguments used against the popularist Kufferath were not used against the elitist Ernst. In the latter case, the literalist translator was not an excluded third.

Yet the thirds return. Alfred Ernst himself cut a rather intercultural figure. His father was an Austrian violinist; his mother was a Jewish actress from Alsace who, in the 1870s, wrote best-selling patriotic verse under the title *Rimes françaises d'une Alsacienne*. The hero of elitist Parisian Wagnerians was also from the middle kingdom.

Nietzsche in France

The French Nietzsche followed hot on the heels of Wagner, arriving by remarkably similar routes, none the least because Nietzsche was first read as a critic of Wagner. The first translation was carried out by one Marie Baumgartner (née Koechlin), an Alsatian whose version of Richard Wagner à Bayreuth was published in Basle in 1877. Obviously a middle-kingdom effort. Other Alsacians involved in the reception of Nietzsche in the years through to 1910 included Charles Andler and Henri Lichtenberger. But the most influential of them all was Henri Albert, born as Henri-Albert Haug, an Alsatian of Germanic ancestry. Let me briefly sketch out his role as an intermediary.

Henri Albert was basically a journalist whose life mission was to translate and promote Nietzsche. From 1895 he was in charge of the *Mercure de France* project to publish Nietzsche's works in French, negotiating the translation rights with Nietzsche's sister and actually translating most of the texts himself. As such, he probably did more than anyone else to form the French Nietzsche. His status as an Alsatian, however, had two significant effects on this work.

First, as a native from bilingual territory, Albert worked as a two-way intermediary, publishing notes on French literature in German periodicals at the same time as he commented on German literature in French periodicals. In a sense, he was the complete intermediary.

Second, as with the Belgian translators of Wagner, Albert was occasionally criticized because of his marginal status with respect to the French target language and culture. When the *Mercure* project was announced at the end of 1894 through a call for translators willing to participate, it immediately drew a negative response from one Hughes Rebell, who was outraged to hear that just anyone could be invited to translate Nietzsche's aristocratic thought. The translators should be of the same aristocratic order, and Albert implicitly wasn't. Indeed, Schockenhoff (1986) attributes Rebell's response to Albert's peripheral status as an Alsatian. Wyzewa, now an established conservative critic, conveyed the same distance in ironically referring to Albert as "the self-appointed

interpreter and faithful apostle of Nietzsche" (1896: 699). Later translators, notably Geneviève Bianquis, similarly regretted that Albert "did not have a "fuller and more subtle command of the French language" (1929: 5). Albert was a hack journalist whose efforts would eventually give way to more competent philosophical commentaries and more imaginative literary translations. Yet he opened the way for those who followed. Third, Albert's Alsatian origins were not a trace of neutrality but instead contributed to his genuine and generalized rejection of German culture, colouring his entire perception of Nietzsche. The origins of his anti-German reaction might be dated from 1887 when, after the banning of the anti-occupation student group Sundgovia with which he was associated, the young Albert left Strasbourg for Paris at the age of nineteen. One of his brothers also left for Paris because of the proscribed student group; another brother was banned from university; Albert's father died the following year, completing the break-up of the family centre. The German occupation of Alsace threw a long shadow over Albert's sentimental and professional life. Yet this did not hinder his attachment to a German-language writer like Nietzsche. The philosopher had, after all, lived in other parts of the same middle kingdom, in Basle, with sojourns in Nice and northern Italy. As a member of the same middle, uprooted like Henri Albert and similarly unmarried, Nietzsche could be characterized as a critic of German culture, indeed as a negation of all that Germany stood for.

Such was the image that Albert consistently propagated through his commentaries and choice of texts for translation. His Nietzsche became a French-inspired thinker, an adept of the French Midi, a philosopher whose anguish and final illness could even be attributed to his initial failure to find a receptive public in France. Schockenhoff (1986: 81) suggests that Albert's psychological attachment to Nietzsche owed much to the idea that the French public had indirectly been responsible for the philosopher's final insanity. The translator had to make amends. I suspect, however, that the relation between the two had more to do with a deeper attachment to a maligned middle ground. Albert's main point was not that Nietzsche was in some way French - although others would later take up the theme - but that he was above all not German. He represented the middle kingdom as pure negation of national culture, be it German or French. The surprising thing, however, is that the arguments over Nietzsche's cultural allegiance took place within an extremely intercultural context. The bilingual pro-rapprochement *Revue franco-allemande / Deutsch-französische Rundschau* had taken objection to Albert's denial of Nietzsche's Germanness, and Albert's reply, his insistence on Nietzsche as a non-Germanic German was clear: "I look at Germany, I look at Nietzsche, and the more I look, the more I understand that they weren't made for each other" (Albert 1900: 848). Whereas one journalistic undertaking sought to underline Nietzsche's Germanness as part of a rapprochement between France and Germany, Nietzsche's main translator and promoter in France insisted on precisely the opposite, implicitly arguing against any cultural union. Beyond the self-effacement of his translative discourse, Albert sought no European union. Alsace had to be returned.

A conclusion on interculturality

Translation is too easily idealized as a source of understanding between cultures, just as interculturality in general is too frequently conceptualized in terms of endlessly fruitful mediation. Historical case studies should put paid to such illusions. There is no automatic relation between interculturality and decentralization or literalism (Wagner), nor between the middle term and balanced perception (Albert). The translators operating between French and German at the end of the last century owed much to the transitory

substance, the imperial weakness, and the general suspicion attached to Europe's forgotten middle kingdom. But they did not owe the middle any great measure of political success. The European Union could have been formed in about 1895, when there was a real chance for some kind of treaty between France and Germany. Yet cultural factors prohibited any such political move. Further, the most prohibitive cultural factors were largely those operative in the French right-wing milieu that promoted translations of Wagner and Nietzsche, using translation as a source of distance rather than rapprochement. In wide historical terms, the middle kingdom separated minds just as much as it facilitated communication. As such, it further ensured its own periodical effacement and return, notably as the political pawn of European war. Translation Studies has systematically overlooked such problematics. Its dominant hypotheses of target-culture determination, like the declining ethics of source-determined fidelity, keep our eyes ricocheting from text to text so as not to see the borders that move in the middle. Yet the problems of Europe are now problems of borders, particularly the culturally claimed national borders along our southern and eastern flanks.

We cannot begin to address those problems until we understand the historical interculturality of the middle kingdoms and excluded thirds now within our apparent unity.

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