



The European Legacy

Toward New Paradigms

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Book Reviews

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The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II.

By Gabrielle Hecht (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009), xxiii + 461 pp. \$25.00/£18.95 paper.

Modern history offers several examples of the special significance of culture and science for augmenting national identity of powerful states, after humiliating defeats in war and severe pruning of their former greatness. One famous example is how after the First World War Germany highlighted the country's intellectual potential and how its science was mobilized. Gabrielle Hecht presents the case of France after WWII and its focusing on nuclear technology as the road to regain power and grandness. Notice the title of her book: the phrase "the radiance of France" was much in use together with "the grandeur of France."

The book explores how nuclear technologies are interwoven with politics and national identity. It studies technologists, institutions and working places. It makes use of extensive written sources and a substantial amount of interviews. The concept "technopolitical regimes" is developed and put into action in studies of central institutions such as "Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique" and "Électricité de France." Hecht analyses how the programmes were designed and the role of nuclear workers, thus elucidating the relations between technology, national grandeur and the actual work being done. Two chapters are devoted to the popular representations of nuclear technology—part of their performance can best be described as spectacle; the Chinon-reactor even entered on the wine label of the local wine producers. One chapter analyses opinions on nuclear energy generation.

Hecht's work should be highly ranked. In social research on nuclear power and nuclear waste there are certain dangers. One is to delve into narrow studies of certain projects, losing sight of contexts. Another is to get stuck with

research questions that are set by industry, led by the need to obtain legitimacy for nuclear facilities. Hecht skilfully avoids such dangers. This is a qualified and critical study of nuclear power in its cultural context.

As this is a reprint of the 2009 original, it is helpful to find an afterword that brings up issues of the trans-nationalisation of nuclear power in the last decades. The study is of great value for understanding the expansion of nuclear generation in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. It is unique in its thoroughness in exploring the relations between nuclear technology and national identity. This factor is of much significance for the growing interest in nuclear generation in developing and newly industrialised countries. Hecht's book stands out as an important case for further comparisons.

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A Reader's Guide to Proust's *In Search of*

***Lost Time*.** By David Ellison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), xiv + 214 pp. \$78.00/£45.00 cloth; \$45.00/£14.99 paper.

David Ellison's *A Reader's Guide to Proust's 'In Search of Lost Time'* (1913–27) is an analysis and explanation of one of the most famous and lengthy novels in French literature. The author provides a careful examination, close to the original text, of each volume of *In Search of Lost Time* and thus offers key interpretations to readers who may be more or less familiar with Marcel Proust's work.

As the author states in his Preface, the study's aim is to clarify the French text without using jargon or specialized vocabulary and without focusing greatly on the abundant

critical work which has been published continuously since the novel's publication. After an introduction which presents significant outlines of Proust's life and career, the following six chapters are devoted to the sequential volumes of *In Search of Lost Time*, namely, *Du Côté de chez Swann* [The Way by Swann's], *A l'ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs* [In the Shadow of Young Girls in Flower], *Le Côté de Guermantes* [The Guermantes Way], *Sodom et Gomorrah* [Sodom and Gomorrah], *La Prisonnière* [The Prisoner] and *Albertine Disparue* [The Fugitive], and finally *Le Temps retrouvé* [Finding Time Again].

Written in a clear and engaging style, the study thoroughly explains the main characters, themes, concepts, places and their symbolic interpretations while grounding them in numerous relevant quotations from Proust's work. The quotations presented with the original French followed by the English translation will be greatly appreciated by readers who can read French and are thus able to sense the beauty of Proust's language.

By succeeding to encompass Proust's extensive novel in a readable, delightful, and concise study, David Ellison offers us a book that proves useful and appealing for students of literature, and a stimulating introduction for any reader who would like to understand one of the masterpieces of French literature.

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Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities. By Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), xv + 158 pp. \$22.95/£15.95 cloth.

In the opening pages of her new book, Martha Nussbaum refers to the ongoing "world-wide crisis in education" as "a cancer" (1–2), echoing John McMurtry's classic critique of late-modern capitalism in *The Cancer Stage of Capitalism* (Pluto, 1999), in which he identified an ongoing cancer-like "value war"—the title of a later volume by him—between the fundamental requirements of human life, both individual and social, and the defining pursuit of profit in the global free-market economy. Consistent with this pathological picture,

Nussbaum states: "the humanistic aspects of science and social science—the imaginative, creative aspect, and the aspect of rigorous critical thought—are...losing ground as nations prefer to pursue short-term profit—and skills suited to profit-making" (2). What is more, at stake today is the survival of humanistic education as such, given its underfunding, marginalisation and even "fear" of it (23) in the world's schools and universities.

Nussbaum's dramatic assessment is not the jeremiad of an old-fashioned bibliophile, but the cry for help of a committed proponent of human freedom. As she repeatedly remarks in the first three chapters of her book humanistic education has not solely underpinned for centuries "citizenship...employment and...meaningful lives" (9) but has also played an essential role in "cultivating humanity"—the title of her 1997 world-famous book—thus allowing for the establishment and continuation of national communities delivering "health, education, a decrease in social and economic inequality...political liberty...democracy" (15).

In the short-term-oriented business-dominated world of throat-cutting self-maximising pleasure-machines, less humanistic education means less humanity *tout court*. Our communities, deprived of those restraining sentiments that Adam Smith regarded as the necessary antidote to capitalism's intrinsic cruelty, are bound to become and, in many ways, have already become, more unjust, ordinarily brutal, and replete with "greedy desire, aggression...narcissistic anxiety [...] enslavement and subordination [...] fear and hate" (29, 38 and 43). According to Nussbaum, the current global crisis of capitalism has further exemplified how "achievements in health and education, for example, are very poorly correlated with economic growth" (15). Such achievements, as shown by scores of studies in the social sciences, depend primarily upon the culture and dispositions that emerge from the cultivation of proper "moral emotions" (27) across the community's youth.

In the fourth and possibly superfluous sixth chapter Nussbaum surveys several intellectual mentors of Western and Indian humanism, from the ever-important Socrates to Tagore, via Pestalozzi and Dewey, so as to substantiate her claim on the centrality of humanistic education for collective wellbeing.

Her conclusion is that the humanities possess the ability to nurture “skills that we all badly need to keep democracies vital, respectful, and accountable” (77). The fifth chapter of the book reinforces this conclusion, as Nussbaum criticises the “thin norms of market exchange in which human lives are seen primarily as instruments for gain” (80). In the age of globalisation, a global community needs a global humanity, which alone can overcome ignorance, stereotypes, fanaticism, parochialism, and provide “a useful foundation for the public debates that we must have if we are to cooperate in solving major human problems” (94).

In the last chapter Nussbaum shows “how close we are to the collapse of the Socratic ideal” (77). She discusses mainly the case of her native country, the United States of America. Yet sadly, the same collapse is looming in many other countries. From Britain to China, over the last ten to thirty-five years, the transformation of academic faculties, departments and research centres into tools for the generation of profit for private money investors and/or managers has been pursued incessantly. Typically, this process has involved increased private-public “partnerships” in research and teaching; outright privatisation of educational institutions; selective privatisation of management, teaching and research positions; market-oriented selection of research programmes and curricula; and the use of schools, campuses and their inhabitants as business opportunities. In the very cradle of Western parliamentary democracy, the United Kingdom, educational institutions have been required to “justify themselves to the government... by showing how their research and teaching contribute to economic profitability” (127). If Nussbaum is correct in her analyses, this approach altogether misses the fact that democracy and the economy’s very profits are made possible by a substratum of learning that humanistic education itself makes possible in the first place. It may be worth recalling the words of Edmund Burke, one of Britain’s greatest political thinkers, from his *Reflections on the French Revolution*: “Even commerce, and trade, and manufacture, the gods of our economical politicians, are... themselves but effects, which as first causes, we choose to worship. They certainly grew under the same shade in which learning flourished. They too may

decay with their natural protecting principles” (par. 134).

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Chronicles of Consensual Times. By Jacques Rancière. Translated by Steven Corcoran (London: Continuum, 2010), x + 156 pp. £14.99 cloth.

This slender new book contains an invaluable selection of works by one of today’s most distinguished French political thinkers, Jacques Rancière. The thirty-four short essays collected in it were all published between 1996 and 2005 in the *Folha de São Paulo*, in Brazil, which Rancière depicts amiably as “the land of sociology” (31). The contents of these are diverse, ranging from hardcore philosophy (“Philosophy in the Bathroom”) to a discussion of artistic realism (“Beyond Art?”), via an appraisal of Foucault’s legacy (“The Difficult Legacy of Michel Foucault”) and of contemporary cinema (“Is Cinema to Blame?”). Nevertheless, as the book’s title suggests, one common thread ties them all together: the creation and continuation of public consensus in contemporary societies.

In particular, Rancière discusses how Western governments and business elites have endeavoured to attain a broad and enduring acceptance of the allegedly peaceful and desirable regime of liberal capitalism under which we live. Typically and relentlessly, this regime has been depicted as “the rational government able to make the demands of justice coincide with economic necessity” (75), as manifestly demonstrated “in the 1990s” by “the collapse” of “the Soviet empire... the weakening of social movements” and “the liquidation of the utopias of real democracy” (83).

In this Panglossian political and economic reality, the notions of class struggle and transformation are quite simply erased, as today’s “advanced capitalist state... take[s] the heat out of conflicts and... divest[s] values” (111). Given these circumstances, nobody should be asking for more liberty, more justice, a better economic system, more peace.

We have them all already—peace itself included—despite the conflicts in Bosnia (4–7), Iraq (44–48; 106–9), George W. Bush’s war on terror (74–77), democratic states’ undeniable past use of torture (66), and the endless depictions of violence and warfare by the media industry (20–23; 40–43; 49–52; 114–19; 137–40).

As a matter of political and media praxis, those who ask for anything other than this are labelled nostalgic proponents of some “ideological archaism” (12) or delusional nihilists “who dream of radical and political social change” (89). Their very act of questioning the *status quo est* clashes with superior governmental expertise, which specialises in “explanation and derision” (13). People may vocally disagree and begin “to protest,” taking to the streets by the millions, yet they are not to be taken seriously by “governmental candidates . . . journalists, political scientists, sociologists or other intellectuals assigned to explain the former’s lack of success” (89). On the contrary, these protestors are to be explained away and derided as the victims of “two major forms of illness: old age and youth” (89). Only the notion of “sickness” or “ill-being” (132) is acceptable to the powers that be, since liberal-capitalist societies have attained the highest possible level of perfection (141–44).

“Consensus” is thus defined by Rancière as a “machine of vision and interpretation” (viii). For him, consensus under liberal capitalism is not a matter of reaching agreement by public debate, but of swallowing the truths that governments and their ever-reinventing plethora of expert bodies have carefully ascertained by technical means. Consistent with Habermas’s notion of the technical depoliticisation of politics, Rancière argues that so long as capitalist and liberal institutions are not challenged in a radical way, politics is reduced to the rule-complying computing of the relevant conditions—as though no liberty or deviation could ever be feasible. If no radical critique is pursued, the human mind is bound to remain imprisoned within the given forms of consciousness.

This mind-lock extends beyond the spheres of government, media, and the natural and social sciences; art, which was once “keenly wed to the project of constructing new forms of life,” now seems condemned to repeating what has already been as the money-

making “property of an inventor’s patent” (104) or as the “art-archive, art-school” self-seclusion (57). History itself is being “rewritten and re-evaluated” (93), as, for example, the debates over the proper interpretation of the Holocaust (62–65). The systemic aim of this process is to erase from the Western mind all notions that are unfriendly to governments and business elites, such as “revolution . . . emancipation . . . the promises of a hypothetical future” (65). The complex Soviet experience, for example, has been reduced to “a meticulous inventory that turns the whole history of communism into a long list of crimes, minutely detailed in thick ‘black books’” (121).

Rancière’s articles are replete with eerie echoes of Margaret Thatcher’s “T.I.N.A.” (there is no alternative). Confronted with his analysis of the most diverse social, political, economic and cultural phenomena of the past fifteen years, all official political and economic discourses are shown to be busy dictating legislation and policies out of a seemingly strict logic of utter necessity that embodies the full realisation of the “1920s . . . great utopia of machines” (21). As Rancière writes, “not only . . . the state is legitimate, but more profoundly . . . it claims no longer to want anything, to be no more than the humble executor of an impersonal necessity” (34–35). Stripped of the civil commons conquered after centuries of social struggle, entire populations are told that they must “become realists” and accept that which governments tell them to be “possible” (9), for governments alone know what is possible. Today’s “managers of disenchanting realism” are turned into the “prophets of the new millennium” (10).

Yet, Rancière has not forgotten that genuine “democracy consists above all in the act of revoking the law of birth and that of wealth” (6) and aims at “emancipation” (27). Much more can be done and achieved, then. Under a truly democratic regime, for example, cinema would “return to the streets and render politics to all” (73), whilst the media would actually tackle difficult questions and defy the power structure, instead of focusing exclusively upon the titbits of “fishy business . . . and scandalous secrets of power . . . that they are given” by the governments and business elites themselves (55–56). Besides, genuine democracy knows that the conditions for the

life-enhancement of the people depend on the social organisation that has been chosen and that keeps being chosen by all, for “an individualism is always the other face of a collectivism” (99).

What is more, looming behind all necessity-driven governmental decisions is the paramount concern that the “Stock Exchange” react well (3) and that “the cyber-market, the euro and the grandiose mergers of the giants of planetary communication” (80) may also fare well. It is apparently on this demand that “our societies rest” and therefore “the smallest wage rise, the smallest drop in interest rates, the slightest unforeseen market reaction is, in fact, enough to disrupt the acrobatic balance . . . and plunge the planet into chaos” (18). It is not science or God that determines our present and, if unchallenged, our future reality; it is the desire of the rich to get richer and the desire to maintain “the security of rich countries” (113).

Rancière’s essays should appeal to the widest audience. Although those who are familiar with his work will not find anything new or unexpected in them, thanks to their poignancy and topic-specific character, they will no doubt interest and appeal to a new generation of readers.

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France’s New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era. By Philip Nord (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), xiii + 434 pp. £27.95 cloth.

This very wide-ranging and informed book looks at the social and economic transformation of France in the context of the politics of the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. An ambitious project, it takes in three regimes—the Third Republic, the Vichy regime, and the Fourth Republic—bringing their history up to the beginning of the Fifth Republic itself. In addition to relating the intricacies of political, economic and social (crucially, including cultural) interconnections, the book looks at the French elites and at the continuities of argument and outlook from the Third Republic to the Vichy regime and then

the new Fourth Republic. This is more than the usual drawing of a line from Colbert to de Gaulle via Napoleon and the Second Empire, it is an examination of how and why the social upheaval that transformed France was managed. In this the argument, as it reads, is less an attempt to forefront the Resistance generation than to show what the modernizing model was—it was not the modernizing transformation of France into an American model, but then nor was it the creation of a social democratic paradigm.

France’s New Deal argues for the central role of the technocratic elite that dominated policy making and hence modernization. This recasting of French life started, so it is argued, in the Third Republic and in fact continued under Vichy before becoming legitimized in the Fourth Republic by the Resistance generation at the Liberation. Liberation politicians thus came not to a *tabula rasa* but to a well prepared scene. By the same token, the Liberation generation came with ideas that had developed before they entered the Resistance, drawn from numerous sources including the Catholic intellectuals and crucially the Vichy regime itself. Many figures came to the Resistance by way of a dalliance with Vichy and in any case the book argues that the Vichy technocracy was effective in key domains. Thus the idea of a radical break with the past is dismissed in favour of a view of the movement of outsiders of the 1930s into positions of power, over a longer period than just the period of the Liberation movement. However, the Liberation was an opportunity that the elite that emerged from the Resistance used to transform France, but pushing it in a direction it had already started on rather than setting it on a completely new path. This thesis is examined and illustrated with some striking examples. Above all the book strips away the rhetoric of modernization (mostly socialist in form) and tackles alternative views of French modernization.

This is a very thought-provoking work, which will be a point of reference for the discussion of French modernization in the future; it is also very well written even though it deals with daunting technical issues and is a work of primary research. It is rare to find such reader-friendly work at such a demanding level. One caveat: UK Labour

remains 'Labour' (not 'Labor') even in an American work.

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Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Communism. Edited by Silvio Pons and Robert Service (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), xxxvi + 921 pp. \$99.50/£69.95 cloth.

This is a huge and useful enterprise: 160 authors have written more than 400 entries taking up more than 900 pages. Most of the leading figures of the history of communism, the communist parties, important institutions, ideological concepts, and political events are included in a well-selected and concise form. This timely and important dictionary offers a broad historical and historiographical overview of twentieth-century world communism. This is a significant step toward achieving the difficult task of encompassing communism as a historical phenomenon in its complexity. Most of the entries are correct, informative, and balanced. Their level, however, is uneven. Some are excellent and dramatic, such as the entries on Bukharin, Preobrazhensky, and Shostakovich, while others fail to reflect the controversial character of communist leaders such as Imre Nagy or János Kádár; and others contain minor mistakes or are not comprehensive enough.

The editors define their central goal as the moral condemnation of the mass crimes and the historical understanding of communism (xi). Can they fully realize this goal? Only partially. The main weakness of several key entries is their lack of a proper historical understanding of communism's role in twentieth-century history. Although it is true that communism's "memory cannot be separated from one of the worst tragedies and most infamous crimes against humanity perpetrated in contemporary history"—as the editors state (xii), the historical role of communist dictatorships in modernization is not convincingly presented in the volume. Communism was brutal and ruthless, but it also destroyed caste-like, petrified social relations and exploitative societies, which paved the way for modernization. Collectivization was inhuman, but it eliminated

archaic social and economic relations and thus opened the door for industrialization and urbanization. One may compare its role to the ruthless and inhuman English enclosure system that preceded the Industrial Revolution.

The entry on "modernization" basically rejects its impact on Eastern-European communism. Chinese modernization remains also an unsolved problem. Similarly, the discussion of economic reform is misleading. Unimportant technical changes in the Soviet Union are presented but the issues of market socialism in Hungary and China are mostly neglected, and the question whether the regime was reformable is not even raised.

Whereas communist industrialization was questionable, seeing that the Soviet Bloc reproduced backwardness in a different way as a result of it, social modernization was unquestionable. The educational revolution was a historical achievement. Although it is true that Stalinist crimes were horrible and that millions of people were annihilated during the 1930s, this was nevertheless the time of the successful industrial preparation for the future war against Hitler, crowned by the victory in Berlin. Similarly, although the Soviet attempt to widen communist influence belonged to Cold War competition, it had a positive historical role in decolonization.

Thus the remnants of Cold War simplifications are still present, including the entry on "The Cold War" itself where it is presented as merely the consequence of Stalin's actions. The mutual misunderstandings, suspicions, and mistakes that have been documented in excellent studies of the Cold War are not even mentioned. It would seem therefore that more time and more work is still needed for a truly comprehensive historical understanding of twentieth-century communism.

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The Apologetics of Evil: The Case of Iago. By Richard Raatzsch (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 124 pp. \$26.95/£18.95 cloth.

Richard Raatzsch's *The Apologetics of Evil: The Case of Iago* begins with something of an

anachronism: “If there is any reason why Iago is called ‘Iago’ . . . it could be because of the resemblance between the word ‘Iago’ and the word ‘ego’.” While of course “ego” is Latin for “I”, the definition of “ego” as a conscious thinking subject only came into being in the late eighteenth century. Even so, this possible anachronism suggests the timeliness of Raatzsch’s meditation on one of Shakespeare’s most popular characters, the villain of *Othello*. How are we, where “we” stands for scholars interested in the philosophy of literature, Shakespeare, and/or the study of evil, to understand Iago, who says of himself “I am not what I am”?

Raatzsch’s philosophical exploration of Iago is divided into two parts: “The Concept of Iago” (occupying three-quarters of the text) and “Apologia for Iago” (occupying the last quarter). Early on Raatzsch lays out his argument: while they are not justifiable, Iago’s actions are defensible. Raatzsch would not have us misunderstand this formulation. The moral evaluation of Iago’s actions is not to be given short shrift; Iago’s actions are to be understood within the context of *Othello*’s moral complexity.

In the course of his argument, Raatzsch shows how Iago defines, in effect, becomes, the measure of evil. Iago is “a logically self-destructive being” (50). Without motive and consumed by scheming, he proves to be not simply an “extramoral” character (75), but “the absolute amoralist” (99). He “embodies the concept of evil” (80). Precisely for these reasons, Iago’s actions cannot be justified. Evil serves as a standard for evaluation; so evil can not evaluate itself. In this sense, Iago’s actions escape evaluation (81).

The Apologetics of Evil is a fine book, and it teaches me much. Even so, perhaps because I am a literary critic and not a philosopher, I find myself wondering about two moments, one at the beginning and one at the end of the text, when the author foregoes opportunities for productive self-consciousness. The first is that early moment in the argument when Raatzsch tells us how we are *not* to construe his argument: “The risk involved . . . is the ease with which it can be misunderstood—*Aside, sotto voce*: Iago is a character whose actions cannot be justified; but *aloud, to the audience*: they can nevertheless be defended” (12). Rhetorically this caveat recalls Iago’s dramatic

“put money in thy purse” exchange with Roderigo. Iago is a compelling, even irresistible speaker. The issue of *Othello*’s moral complexity, in other words, extends to the reception of Iago on the part of the readership and audience and particularly Raatzsch himself. It would seem that both because of Iago’s function as an (im)moral absolute *and* his rhetorical appeal, Raatzsch needs to consider why the character’s actions cannot be justified.

The second moment regards Raatzsch’s last point, the irony that Emilia, Iago’s wife, discovers his plot:

Emilia . . . is truthful, or normal, because she is attached to others, and she is attached to others because she is faithful to herself. Indeed, she is attached to others with her whole heart. That is the human standard. But it is an inherent part of that standard that it be potentially transcended. The standard is validated by what conforms to it as much as by what transcends it. In this conceptual connection lies the possibility of a defense of Iago that is not a justification. (107)

I would have had Raatzsch make more of this powerful (perhaps nascent Romantic?) reading, in part because I would have him say more on how he understands his argument within the context of our own post-9/11 time. Emilia’s actions disclose not only how Iago effectually defines and validates belongingness and commitment to human community but also, *ironically*, how human community inevitably turns to meditate on evil in order to define . . . who we are.

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Metaphors, Narratives, Emotions: Their Interplay and Impact. By Stefán Snævarr (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), viii + 398 pp. €80.00 cloth.

Stefán Snævarr’s “(un)holy trinity” used in his concluding chapter to describe his own book, bears a twofold significance: on the one hand, it refers to the three parts of the book—“Metaphors and Masks”, “The Rule of Narratives” and “The Poetic of Emotions”—and on the other, it refers to his critique of metaphors, narratives, and emotions, which can

be interpreted either as stylistic devices, thus becoming an unholy threesome, or as bearing a cognitive content, thus becoming a holy threesome. Snævarr is in favor of the latter: metaphors, narratives, and emotions, he argues, perform cognitive functions, provide rational explanations, and have cognitive content (1).

In building his theory on these three elements, Snævarr follows a rigorous structure: each part begins with a critical analysis of the major approaches to the given element and ends with the author's own perspective on it. The elements of the (un)holy trinity, metaphors, narratives, and emotions, are closely linked by the "unifying thread" abbreviated as ENAL (*emo-narra-ana-logic*). Rejecting formal logic, Snævarr promotes an informal logic based on the "as-if approach" that we use in our everyday life (155).

Part 1 starts with a critical evaluation of three major theories of metaphors (29-30): the *iconoclasts*, including Donald Davidson, Jerrold Levinson, and John Searle, for whom metaphors have figurative meaning; the *interactionists*, Max Black, Paul Ricœur, and I. A. Richards, among others, for whom the meaning of a metaphor is the outcome of the interaction between the topic and the vehicle; and the *iconodualists*, including George Lakoff and H. Hesse, for whom metaphoric meaning is the primordial form of meaning. Inspired by this threefold perspective on metaphors and by Heidegger's notion of *aletheia* as "disclosure," Snævarr proposes the alethic theory of metaphor (71). This new approach centers on the truth-like value of metaphors that bears a disclosure function. The "truth-like value" or "ur-truth" (72) clearly entails the "as-if approach," which, in the case of metaphors, becomes a "seeing-as" or a twisting of the things we see (83). Snævarr points out that this twisting of reality must be linked to the concept of "T-correctness" (transformative correctness), which implies certain conditions under which a metaphor becomes T-correct while at the same time the decoder knows "the kind of indirect understanding it would give" (85). Thus the twofold function—transformative and informative—of metaphors endows both the coder and the decoder with metaphorical competence (161).

Part 2 provides a critical perspective on various forms of narratives and stories—historical, fictional, and non-fictional. Snævarr

introduces his key concept—*narra-logic*—to his analysis of each narrative form. This term shares important features with *ana-logic* (applied to metaphors): the minor role played by deduction, the importance of enthymemes in decoding narratives, informal reasoning, and the use of imagination.

Part 3 argues that emotions, unlike sensations, bear a cognitive moment (303), and automatically have a degree of E-correctness. Just as there are storied metaphors, constituted by implicit stories (246), emotions have a storied and narrative structure (321) that becomes a tool for their identification, justification, constitution, and understanding. This *emo-logic* is closely related to the *ana-logic* in that it deals with "our knowledge about emotions" (353).

Snævarr's book is challenging for two reasons: for its critical evaluation of different theories of metaphors, narratives, and emotions, and for its thought-provoking approach that stipulates that in our attempt to understand the world we impose several unifying concepts—*emo-narra-ana-logic*, aspect-seeing, and correctness—on the reciprocal elements of the (un)holy trinity examined by the author.

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Conflict and Difference in Nineteenth-Century Literature. Edited by Dinah Birch and Mark Llewellyn (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), x + 257 pp. £50.00 cloth.

The nineteenth-century literature discussed in this collection of fifteen essays is English in a narrow sense: Browning, Eliot, Wilkie Collins, Dickens, Beardsley, Matthew Arnold, Empire fiction and New Woman novels. Though the label "Victorian literature" would fit, the editors rightly opt against this corset, for the range of the collection is rather wider. Indeed, either of the lead terms would offer ample scope for fifteen essays. Here close cooperation among contributors—several of whom are associated with the School of English at Liverpool University—has lent much-needed cohesiveness to the collection.

The tendency to diffusiveness is not entirely contained, however. Malcolm Chase's article on children in Chartism, though a fascinating piece of social history, is irrelevant to literature's postulated "particular claim and function in the exploration of issues that stimulate conflict and in the interpretation of 'difference'" (3).

The volume's strength lies in its breadth, which is reflected in the wealth of critical approaches. Perspectives from postcolonial, gender and disability studies complement close textual work (Herbert Tucker on Browning; Melissa Raines on Eliot's syntax) and socio-historical readings; micro- and macroscopic views alternate satisfyingly. Thorough documentation and a useful index make this wide-ranging collection a valuable guide for the non-specialist, while the lucid and accessible style will appeal to undergraduates.

The intersection of literary activity and colonialism receives an appropriately-weighted consideration, with three essays (O'Conneide, Flint, Weltman) dedicated to the negotiation of ethnic difference in government dispatch, private memoir, popular fiction, and ethnography. The part played by conflicts among literary actors, writers and critics in constituting the nineteenth-century literary field is suggested, but not directly addressed. It is hinted at in Natalie Ford's essay on the discourse on reverie—which shows literature and science on the cusp of separating into C. P. Snow's "two cultures"—and in Laurel Brake's contribution on the tension between literature and journalism in Matthew Arnold's writing.

The collection's breadth consists partly in the European intellectual coordinates of some of the essays. Hegel's historical dialectic is as important for the liberal theology of progress as are J. S. Mill's ideas on reasoned dispute as a proving-ground for ideas. Europe is also the source of the historical bible criticism that loosened the grip of damnatory eschatology, which then resurfaced in *fin de siècle* literature—a displacement described by Matthew Bradley. Such openings onto continental thought will interest readers beyond English Studies.

Helen Small moves back and forth between criticism of Amanda Anderson's valorization of a Millian contest of ideas as a means to explore shared forms of rationality,

and a nuanced reading of antagonism in Trollope's *Phineas Finn*. Small advises against equating the resolution of philosophical conflict with resolving real social and political conflict, which may require that tolerance and mutual respect be prioritized over a notionally shared rationality. Small does not say so, but it is surely here that the "particular claim and function" of literature lies, namely, in its capacity to put the discourses of reason and unreason (including myth) into dialogue.

ANDREW CUSACK

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English Modernism, National Identity and the Germans, 1890–1950. By Petra Rau (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2009), x + 233 pp. £55.00/\$99.95 cloth.

This study explores the multiple, changing, and often contradictory responses to Germans and "Germanness" in British literature from 1890 to 1950. The approach is as wide-ranging as one could wish. It covers not only a full spectrum of literary texts and cultural and literary theory but also history, travel writing, memoirs, sociology, and psychology.

Chapter 1 looks at the problematic nature of identity in Joseph Conrad's works, with a focus on *Lord Jim*. Corporate identity ("one of us") is contrasted with the German reduction of "the spirit" of racially inspired ethical progress to a stateless, offensive materiality and blunt materialism. Chapter 2 examines the "largely positive" representations of Germans found in Ford Madox Ford's *England and the English*, which argues for the "Prussianization" of English schools, the army, and laboratories if the country is to become part of the "modern Germanized world" and E. M. Forster's *Howard's End*, in which the Schlegels represent "the Germany much loved by Carlyle, Thackeray, and George Eliot." A major theme of popular fiction of the time develops Ford's anxiety. Saki's "radical dystopia," *When William Came*, argues that unless the English overcome their "effeminacy, complacency and degeneration" they risk suffering the shame of colonization. John

Buchan, in his Richard Hannay novels, emphasizes the need to engage in a battle of wits if the English hope to get the better of the ever-ambivalent Germans.

In the middle of Chapter 3 Rau shifts the major focus of her argument from modernity measured in terms of efficiency and progress to one in which modernity is coloured by attitudes towards the body. Chapter 4 focuses on how the European spa at the heart of Ford's *The Good Soldier* becomes the site for a dislocation of identity, especially in its hesitancy about the significance of the body in English literature. Chapter 5 explores this dilemma in the works of Virginia Woolf, for whom it springs from the problem of defining the boundary between the body-under-control and the body-out-of-control, and in the works of D. H. Lawrence, for whom it stems from the boundary between the body and the machine. Chapter 6 focuses on the lure of Fascist corporeality and ambivalent English responses to it in travel writing and fiction of the 1930s. Chapter 7 pursues this ambivalence with a focus on the wartime novels of Graham Greene and Elizabeth Bowen.

Many of these issues have been explored elsewhere: the strength of this study is not in the originality of its individual analyses but in the determination to explore the theoretical implications of broader patterns of concern than usually emerge from studies of individual writers. Rau is interested in the traumatic nature of the English encounter with modernity and modernization and in why the Germans became a necessary part of England's difficulty in entering the modern world. Better contextualization could have been provided by a brief consideration of the historical conditions that made Germany such a threat (the Prussian military successes in the 1860s and 1870s, and the vertiginous pace of industrialization) and the changing nature of this threat. But in all other respects Rau's study provides an illuminating and very accessible overview of English anxieties about their changing place in the world between 1890 and 1950 and can be strongly recommended.

TERENCE DAWSON
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Jack Kerouac and the Literary Imagination. By Nancy M. Grace (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), x + 263 pp. £18.99 paper.

Nancy M. Grace has written a very lucid and scholarly analysis of the works of Jack Kerouac, the youngest child of working-class French-Canadian parents in Lowell, Massachusetts. Kerouac's roots are located in the rituals of Catholic mystery and the myth of America as the promised land. His thinking always had as its focus questions about the existence of God, the Creator's purpose for all forms of life, the concept of mind as well as the nature/existence of sin, a hostile/indifferent/benign cosmos, including self and others, and the definition of time, care, compassion, and salvation. In essence, Kerouac sought to study the human condition.

Kerouac wrote with the goal of achieving salvation for himself and others. In fact, in 1958 he characterized the term "beat" as in "beat generation," as derived from the Italian for beatific, i.e., loving all life and being authentic with everyone. In pursuing his goal, Kerouac followed several intricate literary paths that via his imagination transformed spiritual, cultural, and aesthetic materials into a personal mythology. He was able to integrate Buddhism, Catholicism, and his professional development as a writer. Kerouac found himself in the paradoxical position of being a writer whose faith attachments taught him that personal salvation was beyond the word and may partially rest in the sound of words.

One of the primary persons whom Grace uses as a lens to explicate Kerouac's work is Nicholas Berdyaev, the Russian political philosopher and propagandist who developed a mythic view of human history. Berdyaev saw myths as socially derived narratives grounded in both fact and fiction. Humans carry within themselves the whole world, and so history is really a development of self-consciousness. Kerouac, therefore, could read his personal experiences into the master American narrative and so could actually formulate a critique of the past and present. Grace's chapters trace the threads of Kerouac's wisdom and the warning that Americans must recognize their Edenic roots if the promises of the "dream" are to be fulfilled. A loving and non-violent individualism must be grounded in a type of

innate godliness. Through his literary works, Kerouac sought spiritual wisdom. Grace does a fine job of dissecting the paths that Kerouac took to accomplish his task.

Well read in western and Buddhist culture, Grace has aptly plumbed the depths of Kerouac's mind. Her description of Kerouac as an Augustinian is masterful. Both Augustine and Kerouac tried, while living in arenas of great transition, to connect the inner consciousness with the concrete outer world. The tension in both authors is palpable. Grace also points out that as Kerouac matured he gradually became disillusioned with institutional forms of religion, especially those of Catholicism.

Grace offers her readers the landscape of one of the most fertile minds of the twentieth century, a man at home with the great philosophers, theologians, and literary figures of our global culture, and her work reflects the exuberant spirit of Kerouac's vision of life.

DONALD J. DIETRICH

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Little Rock: Race and Resistance at Central High School. By Karen Anderson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), x + 330 pp. \$35.00/£24.95 cloth.

Prima facie, the story of Central High School's begrudging admittance of African-American students in 1957 is a chronicle of racial conflict. Like many other scholarly accounts of American racial integration, Karen Anderson's appropriately describes the racial context of Central High School's response to the Supreme Court's 1954 ruling against segregation as one in which African-Americans seeking equal treatment were met with virulent hostility by segregationists. Meanwhile, the Little Rock School Board, the Arkansas state government, and the United States federal government expressed a willingness to promote integration while simultaneously inhibiting desegregation via informal foot-dragging. Were this all that Anderson brought to the table, readers would be left with a well-written and serviceable—though perhaps somewhat uninspired—window into the implementation of the

Warren court's decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*. However, Anderson's keen attention to the dynamics of gender and social class at play in the desegregation process distinguish her book as a particularly fresh and worthwhile read.

Concerning gender, Anderson highlights the prominent role of patriarchal world-views among segregationists. White women facing integration were characterized as victims in need of white, male saving, whether it be from gun-toting, bayonet-wielding federal troops (74), who allegedly even followed them to their dressing rooms (107), or from African American men framed as "violent sexual predators" (73). Gender dynamics also played a role in integrationist organizing; Anderson notes how members of the Women's Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools (WEC), for example, often responded to men rather than initiating action themselves given their precarious gender position (219).

Social class provides another example of how clashes over integration were characterized not only by ideological divergences but also by contention over status position differences. The segregationist Mother's League of Central High School was primarily composed of working-class women. In contrast, the WEC, which positioned itself as interested in maintaining the viability of Arkansas's public schools but informally encouraged integration in the pursuit of that aim, drew its membership from the middle class. As a result of its membership, the WEC typically worked toward goals from the standpoint of a middle-class agenda, opening it up to criticism for looking down on working-class segregationists as "white trash" (57). Thus, the WEC found it difficult to recruit working-class members (180).

Although no written work is impervious to criticism, and this book is no exception—for example, I would have preferred a greater incorporation of direct quotes from Anderson's rich oral history interviews—*Little Rock* contributes much to our understanding of southern American desegregation. In *Little Rock*, Anderson embodies Patricia Hill Collins' useful reminder that oppressions—whether based in gender, race, class, sexuality, or other socio-demographic bases—are interconnected. One cannot be fully understood divorced from the others. By acknowledging the connections

between multifarious oppressions, *Little Rock* usefully contextualizes what could otherwise be taken for granted as only a story about race without downplaying the obvious racially-based elements of conflict surrounding educational integration.

STEVEN L. FOY
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To Know Where He Lies: DNA Technology and the Search for Srebrenica's Missing. By Sarah E. Wagner (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), xxvii + 330 pp. £12.95 paper.

Sarah E. Wagner offers a penetrating analysis of the genocide at Srebrenica in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, and—especially—of its aftermath. The victims were 8,000 Moslem Bosniak men and boys who were summarily killed in a manner that bore a close resemblance to the mass murders of the SS on the eastern front in World War II. Serb military and paramilitary forces were the perpetrators. The two communities—Bosniaks and Serbs—have responded differently to the memory of these atrocities. According to Wagner, the ceremonies inaugurated when the victims of the 1995 massacre began to be reburied on 11 July 2003 and the annual commemorations thereafter, forged a new Bosnian nationalism. At the same time, Serb nationalism was also enhanced as a result of the commemorations that inspired the local Serbs to generate counter-narratives of their sufferings in the war. They started to use the following day, July 12, for their own counter-ceremonies. July 12 happens to be the Orthodox holiday of Petrovdan, so by conflating the two events the Serbs managed to adumbrate the Bosniak manifestation on July 11 and to overcome divisions in their own ranks “about how (not) to commemorate the Srebrenica massacre” (238).

Tombs of Unknown Soldiers are part of the cultural legacy of Europe's two World Wars. As the epithet says, these soldiers are an anonymous collective. However nowadays, as Wagner observes, biotechnology in the form of DNA-based identification of victims of war “renders the missing legible, thereby allowing

the state to account for and respond to the manner in which they died” (261). Thus the recent use of DNA-analysis of the physical remains of victims has resulted in a restoration of personhood. As a consequence the dead can be mourned as individuals and their deaths can be contextualized in space and time. They may be viewed as victims, and once victims are known the perpetrators can be defined.

To Know Where He Lies is a highly readable forensic-detective story which combines historical source criticism, the social-anthropological method of oral history, and a DNA-analysis technology. Wagner demonstrates how this recent analytical tool, which has already been put to fruitful use in archaeology, can be used in fact finding missions in politically relevant cases. In the special case of genocide this tool has far-reaching consequences in allowing identification of disparate and haphazardly dispersed remnants of victims that were dumped in mass graves by their murderers. When the earthly remains of victims are reburied in individual graves their relatives can mourn them. Moreover, in contrast to the anonymous dead soldiers of the World Wars who are commemorated as universalized victims of military conflicts between states, commemorations of individual civilians—murdered in a civil war, in a certain place and at a certain time—point to the category of recognizable perpetrators.

Wagner underlines that DNA-based analysis of this kind raises ethical and moral questions. While the search for historical evidence and the establishment of facts rehabilitates the dignity of the victims and their surviving relatives, the distinction between victims and perpetrators becomes evident and as such may further sustain national enmity.

KRISTIAN GERNER
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Beowulf: A Reader's Guide to Essential Criticism. By Jodi-Anne George (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), viii + 190 pp. \$68.00/£40.37 cloth; \$20.95 paper.

Beowulf has become such a hot commodity in the public sphere (owing in part to the runaway

success of the Seamus Heaney translation, the surprise popularity of several recent movie versions, and the indirect spinoff from the whole Tolkien phenomenon) that it is now taught, read, and written about more than ever before. In 2007 alone, eight new monographs, two dissertations, eighty scholarly articles, and a Portuguese translation of *Beowulf* appeared, adding to the ever-growing treasure-heap of publications on this magnetic but enigmatic Old English poem, which has had a commanding presence in the study of medieval English literature since its existence was first brought to light in Humfrey Wanley's 1705 catalogue of Anglo-Saxon manuscripts. Keeping up with the rising mountain of *Beowulf* criticism is an increasingly difficult challenge for even the most dedicated scholar of Old English literature, but the task is eased by Jodi-Anne George's summary digest of the most influential readings of the poem from the beginnings to essentially the present. In eight chapters arranged chronologically, George surveys major phases and themes in the history of *Beowulf* criticism, prompted by an initial goal of probing the question of "why *Beowulf* remains a literary and cultural 'phenomenon'" (7). The result is a useful and entertaining resource for anyone interested in what has been said about the poem.

Key to the book's success is George's accurate and detailed knowledge of hundreds of books and articles that reflect the most influential statements about the poem since the early eighteenth century. In summarizing the core arguments of each of these publications, George shows how readings of *Beowulf* have aligned over the years with mainstream philological, formalist, structuralist, feminist, postcolonial and postmodern criticism, and how the poem has found its niche in recent popular culture. The summaries of critical arguments are amplified throughout by substantial quotations from the critics under discussion so that the book functions in part as an anthology of important statements by *Beowulf* scholars. The book ignores studies of language and the manuscript and concentrates exclusively on works published in English, but the representation of English-language literary criticism is quite full and reliable, and the cumulative bibliography at the end is itself a valuable resource. George assumes a novice readership with no previous exposure to

Beowulf and limited familiarity with premodern literature or history, so that names, dates, historical events, and even basic critical concepts such as "discourse" are given and explained, and phrases in Old English are translated. George knows the territory well, and readers of her book will come away with a richly informed understanding of the poem's critical heritage.

THOMAS N. HALL

University of Notre Dame, USA

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'Verwisch die Spuren!' Bertolt Brecht's Work and Legacy: A Reassessment. Edited by Robert Gillett and Godela Weiss-Sussex (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008), 359 pp. €72.00 cloth.

Since the 1989 revolution everything to do with Brecht appears in the Anglo-American mindscape freighted with a cargo of puzzle and paradox. The theatre has chosen to speak of Brecht in reassuring tones likely to appeal to a mainstream audience bothered by his politics and baffled by his practice. Scholarship will account for a mismatch between theory and practice by claiming that Brecht the dramatist has vanquished Brecht the dogmatist. So, bury Brecht the Marxist and cheer the humanist, they say. Dump the peddler of abstract nostrum and embrace instead the practical backstage wizard, who always insisted to his actors that (as one of his theatre poems puts it), "this is not magic but/Work, my friends."

This volume of twenty-one essays, which originated in a conference held at the University of London's Institute of Germanic and Romance Studies in February 2006, rejects such uncritical opportunism. It offers instead a cross-section of mostly current British Brecht studies, reflecting a variety of approaches and perspectives ranging from detailed exegesis of particular texts to cultural criticism in the broadest sense. It provides analyses of Brecht's work and investigates his pervasive influence on twentieth-century literature. The studies cover the whole of Brecht's career, from the early one-act play *Kleinbürgerhochzeit* of 1919 to the *Sinn und Form* years immediately preceding his death in 1956, as well as his use of tradition and

his legacy. By way of redressing a tendency in Brecht reception to regard him mainly as a dramatist, the volume covers novels, poetry, film, photography, journalism and theory as well as plays.

The editors remind us in their introduction, that “even fifty years after Brecht’s death, the complexity of his personality and the sheer richness of his work have lost none of their power to fascinate” (11). As someone who has worked on Brecht all his professional life I strongly agree with this conclusion: I experienced it for nearly fifty years in directing his plays and in teaching his dramaturgy.

Since conference proceedings generally do not appeal to very diverse audiences, one can only hope that this collection will find a readership inspired by Brecht’s “power to fascinate.” I trust that the question-and-answer-periods gave rise to animated discussion and even controversial dialogue, re-assessing its “use value” which the mere documentation of academic texts cannot reflect. It needs an audience “in need” as Brecht would say. After all, it was in London in 1956 that the Berliner Ensemble cast a longer shadow over British culture than the premiere of *Look Back in Anger* had done a couple of months before. Brecht’s famous advocate, Kenneth Tynan, sold Brechtian austerity to his readers as a recipe for artistic detox: “Raised on a diet of gin and goulash, we call Brecht naive when he gives us bread and wine” (“Brecht and British Theatre” *EpiSkini* 6.3 [2004]: 34). Over the past five decades, his “epic theatre” has often been stopped by the Anglo-American habit, as Boyd Tonkin points out, “to have its sharp theoretical objects confiscated” (“Bertolt Brecht: Was It All an Act?” *The Independent*, 30 June 2006). What passes through tends to be a box of stagey tricks hauled out by writers and directors time and again, but with their marks of origin removed. Careful readers will find ample proof of that, if they relate the texts to the dominant aesthetics of their fields of investigation.

The first three essays summarize the essence of Brecht’s achievement in the major genres: Klaus-Dieter Müller brings the anti-Aristotelian novel to our attention, Peter Hutchinson defines the *gestus* of poetry, and Martin Swales reflects on theatre. But the volume touches on Brecht’s whole oeuvre: Ernest Schonfield details Brecht’s debt to the picaresque; Martin Brady talks about Brechtian

film, and Karen Leeder follows the traces of Brecht as a person and a writer of contemporary poetry. Ron Speirs gives a detailed analysis of the *Svendborger Gedichte*; Tom Kuhn addresses the relationship between poetry and photography in the *Kriegsfiibel*; Michael Patterson revisits the question of Brecht’s debt to Expressionism and hence of the roots of theatre; Frank Krause draws connections between drama and prose; Marielle Sutherland focuses on *Die Kleinbürgerhochzeit*; Harald Müller re-examines the *Leben des Galileo*; John and Ann White explore the relationship between poetry and dramatic enactment in *Furcht und Elend*; and Robert Gillett discusses Grass’s *Die Plebejer proben den Aufstand*.

Ulrike Zitzlsperger and Andrew Webber describe the transformation that Berlin the metropolis undergoes in Brecht’s work. Steve Giles discusses Brecht’s concept of realism in relation to Kracauer and Benjamin. Erdmut Wizisla too reports about Benjamin’s influence on Brecht. The theme of Brecht and mortality is the subject of David Midgley’s contribution. Stephen Parker’s essay on Brecht’s role in the creation of the magazine *Sinn und Form* and its cultural-political fights is one of the most informative texts: Brecht, like Galileo’s earth, still moves in spite of what the powers-that-be decree.

In sum, all the contributions help to characterize Brecht’s aesthetic positions and their historicity for contemporary readers. Each is clearly distinguished from the reviewed theories and their implications, which aim at both discerning problems and suggesting possible alternative views. The wider perspective provided by this collection will no doubt result in new insights and further integration of Brechtian studies into today’s Anglo-American intellectual discourse.

As a theatre maker I would like to encourage the conference organizers to initiate a further exchange on Brecht’s influence on Western and World theatre that would explore the various connections between his rich legacy and new twenty-first-century philosophical, political and cultural processes.

In one of the most eye-opening conversations recorded by Walter Benjamin during his visits in the 1930s to the Danish island where Brecht hid from the Nazis, Brecht offered his artist’s maxim: “Don’t start from the good old

things, but from the bad new ones.” The same always goes for understanding—and performing—Brecht himself: “Truth is born of the times,” says Galileo prior to his surrender, “not of authority.”

HEINZ-UWE HAUS
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Revenge versus Legality: Wild Justice from Balzac to Clint Eastwood and Abu Ghraib. By Katherine Maynard, Jarod Kearney, and James Guimond (New York: Birbeck Law Press, 2010), xiii + 214 pp. \$125.00 cloth.

Ever since the Book of Genesis recounted the story of Cain and Abel, human beings have been commanded to distinguish the law from revenge. The modern social contract tradition of political philosophy built on this biblical foundation by placing the power of punishment in the hands of the state, which also forbade the practice of vigilante justice as a violation of basic civilized norms. Yet the line between the law and revenge is often murky, particularly if the guardians of justice practice revenge in the name of the law. For this reason, the authors of this study embrace a hermeneutics of suspicion that exposes the ambiguous difference between legality and revenge by turning to various works of western literature and popular culture. “We emphasize that justice and revenge are coded discourses whose keys and patterns may be discerned particularly well by narratives” (xi).

The focus of the authors on mostly literary works is legitimate enough, since a novel, a play, or a film can often capture the intense conflicts surrounding law and revenge that a dry text of philosophy may not. What is puzzling and disconcerting, however, is the *choice* of literary texts that the authors make in order to press their case that established states can misuse the law to exact revenge against their enemies. Why, for example, do the authors begin a sustained analysis of their theme with modern authors like Balzac or Sir Arthur Conan Doyle? Although they briefly cite famous biblical passages on an “eye for an eye” as well as the need to “love your

enemies,” there is a shocking lack of attention to the staggering influence of the Bible on the modern understanding of law and revenge. Without Christ’s condemnation of revenge in the forceful terms of universal love, it is impossibly hard to imagine why moderns feel compelled to condemn revenge. Besides largely ignoring the tradition of Jerusalem, the authors pay little attention to another great tradition of western civilization. There is no discussion of the classical Greek struggle with understanding the tragic reversibility of law into revenge, as dramatically represented by the great Greek playwrights Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. No work on law and revenge is complete without an analysis of Oedipus Rex or Cain and Abel.

The closest that these authors get to an understanding of biblical justice is their rather cynical dismissal of “redemptive violence” as a mere smokescreen for the abuse of power. To be sure, the authors are justified in questioning the attempts to portray the horrors of Abu Ghraib prison as exceptions to the rule of American benevolence, in light of the American imperial experience in the Philippines, Vietnam, or Central America. Yet the authors trap themselves in a self-referential contradiction when they conclude with the despairing message that the vigilante violence popularized in mass media is the dominant standard of discourse in our age. If that judgment is correct, why then should we condemn revenge as anything but an inevitable application of “might is right”?

GRANT HAVERS
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101 Great Philosophers: Makers of Modern Thought. By Madsen Pirie (London: Continuum, 2009), x + 204 pp. £9.99 paper.

The cover of *101 Great Philosophers* shows a pack of cards, with some cards faceup and a few facedown. Perhaps the author did, or perhaps he did not, endorse the cover, or perhaps the designer was being ironic, but I wondered, as any reader would, as to *who* were the philosophers *included*? (The assumption is that

101 is a *small* number for philosophers, though there is that marketable plenitude which seems to mean more than a hundred?) I understand, like most of us who read, that there is a market, and that people say that it has its own demands and supply. It took me a long time to understand, having read the book twice over, that it supplies rather than demands. This is not good for anything that has to do with *western philosophy*.

The list (which is what it is), shows that the author finds immanence in dates of birth, because that is how the list organizes the philosophers that the author *includes*: the earliest born, c. 624, Thales, is the first; the latest born, 1938, Robert Nozick, is the last. Published in 2009, and considering the immense amount of labour that must have gone into the book, individually or collectively, one can assume that the date of composition might have begun in 2007–2008, one must wonder if there were no other philosophers worth including in the list of 101? Why are there no philosophers at all from traditions other than the western tradition?

The arrogance evident in the title (it's *not* 101 great philosophers of the western world, western Europe, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Iberian peninsula, Mexico, Chile or Ghana, etc.), shows itself further when, in the account of Marcus Aurelius, Madsen Pirie writes: "Marcus Aurelius, the last of these [stoic philosophers], wrote down his thoughts in a journal as he went about the business of the empire, *much of it from military camps*" (emphasis added). The syntax, and this is generally true of the whole book, does now allow for any ambiguity. The business of the empire, the syntax states, was conducted (much of it at least) from military camps.

One can understand the author's problem: he has to write about 101 philosophers (not just any odd *thinker*), and each philosopher *can*, because this is a business proposition, only get a page and a half. That kind of writing requires extreme syntactic and semantic precision, and the more precise one wants to be the more elliptical the semantics must get, the elided details of the semantics will generate ambivalence, the ambivalence will generate suspicion, the suspicion will generate distrust in most discerning readers.

One also understands, however, that the task is an admirable one, much like the task of

writing an entry for an encyclopaedia. In view of the difficulty of the task, it should be said that the book makes for a good introduction to this line of western philosophy. There are some philosophers (e.g., Jacques Derrida) who get more misrepresentation than others, but inasmuch as a page and half can never give a satisfactory representation of *any* philosopher's work (let alone those whose collected works run into over 50 volumes), this is a minor criticism.

In fact, this book might be useful for any young undergraduate reader who has never before studied philosophy, because it gives an excellent overview of the sheer variety available under that heading of "philosophy."

ANIKET JAAWARE
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The Patron's Payoff: Conspicuous Commissions in Italian Renaissance Art.

By Jonathan K. Nelson and Richard J. Zeckhauser (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), xii + 234 pp. \$23.95 cloth.

"A modern-day visitor to Italy who sees a grand altarpiece, statue, or palace from the Renaissance era will conclude that the patron had ample resources. But at the time it was made, something more was almost certainly conveyed" (76). That "something more" is the subject of Jonathan K. Nelson and Richard J. Zeckhauser's book, an innovative examination of art, economics, and communication that should be required reading for all who admire Italy's grand masterpieces as well as those who have made the study of Renaissance art and architecture a profession.

The Patron's Payoff is divided into two parts. The first, written by Nelson and Zeckhauser, sets forth the economic theories of "market signaling" that are tested in the five case studies comprising Part 2, one written by the book's principal authors and the remaining four by contributing scholars. As Nelson and Zeckhauser note, their study is not the first to consider the spending behaviors and self-promotional strategies employed by the urbanized elite. "In his path-breaking study *Wealth*

and the Demand for Art in Italy, 1300–1600 [1993], Richard Goldthwaite concluded that, for affluent patrons in Italy, commissions ‘expressed their sense of what constituted noble status; their spending habits arose from what is perhaps the universal desire of the rich to utilize wealth to set themselves off from ordinary people.’” In Part 1 of their own book, Nelson and Zeckhauser advance Goldthwaite’s contribution to Renaissance studies with their own. The developing “penchant for luxury” tracked by Goldthwaite is here more specifically analyzed against concepts of “signaling”, “signposting” and “stretching.” Publicly visible and structured to be legible to the patron’s peers as well as to the omniscient God whose glory they honor, conspicuous commissions, specifically those within sacred settings, participated in the game Stephen Greenblatt dubbed “self-fashioning.” Not unlike the self-defining behaviors that courtiers, noblemen, and others consciously employed to project a desired self-image, the messages communicated by works of art were designed to emphasize certain characteristics (“signposting”) and exaggerate or misrepresent others (“stretching”) in their portrayal of a patron’s godliness and civic-mindedness.

One of the most flagrant examples of this is discussed by Molly Bourne in “Mantegna’s *Madonna della Vittoria* and the Rewriting of Gonzaga History.” Although much of the information here echoes that contained in her book *Francesco II Gonzaga: The Soldier Prince as Patron* (2008), its presentation within the theoretical framework of the “economics of information” illustrates clearly just how effective and affecting “signposting” and “stretching” could be. The other contributions testing the theories advanced in Part 1 are equally fascinating. Two of the five focus on Florence. Nelson and Zeckhauser’s “Private Chapels in Florence” as well as Thomas Loughman’s discussion of the Alberti family’s expenditures within Santa Croce point to savvy patronage practices by elites intent on signaling status and prosperity across generations. Like Bourne, Kelly Helmstutler Di Dio moves beyond Florence and the commissioning practices of its wealthy, mercantile oligarchy. She considers the ways in which the noted sculptor Leone Leoni designed and ornamented his home in Milan to advertise his relationship with his royal patron, who also granted him the

land on which his “signaling” Casa degli Omenoni stands.

Opening with the statement, “Even the best theory needs testing for validity,” Larry Silvers’ wide-ranging musings conclude the volume with a flourish. Although he considers topics one might expect—Rubens’ visual celebrations of Marie de’Medici and artists’ self-portraits—he also discusses the unanticipated: the collecting and patronage practices of Isabella Stewart Gardner and Bertha Honoré Palmer, thus extending conspicuous commissions to Gilded Age America. In expanding the parameters, geographical and chronological, Silvers’ essay suggests ways that Nelson and Zeckhauser’s thesis can and should be applied across the history of art.

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Remembering Scottsboro: The Legacy of an Infamous Trial. By James A. Miller (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), xii + 280 pp. \$27.95/£16.95 paper.

In 1969 Dan T. Carter published his massive and marvelous narrative, *Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South*. Fifteen years after the revised edition of 1979, yet another graceful writer, James Goodman, placed greater emphasis upon legal issues in *Stories of Scottsboro* (1994). In 2008 James R. Aker looked intensively at the sequence of trials that took place in 1931, 1933, and then the two Supreme Court rulings in his *Scottsboro and Its Legacy: The Cases that Challenged American Legal and Social Justice*, a work less effective on historical context than Goodman’s and Carter’s, but bringing to bear the perspective of a professor of criminal justice.

One might wonder whether there was anything more to say about this terrible yet stirring episode in American racial history. But indeed there is. Thirty years ago Carroll Van West published “Perpetuating the Myth of America: Scottsboro and Its Interpreters” in the *South Atlantic Quarterly* (Winter 1981), emphasizing that the American public perceives much of its history through a prism created by intellectuals. Now this splendid new book by the chairman of American Studies at

The George Washington University has expansively taken up the challenge of that notion and enriched our understanding of the ways that journalists, dramatists, novelists and others have used the tragic case of nine young blacks falsely accused of rape in 1931 as a wide window through which we can examine not only the politicized workings of American memory but also the process of creativity whereby fierce struggles involving the International Labor Defense (ILD), the Communist Party (CPUSA), the NAACP and their supporters all contended for control of the case in an unprecedented effort to achieve social justice. It's a tale of organizational competition that we already know a fair amount about. Each group wanted control of the case as a symbolic weapon for its own cause.

What's freshest about this book is its attention to writers like Langston Hughes, who gave "literary expression to the bodily suffering of the Scottsboro boys—producing an extensive body of poetry, essays, and reportage based upon their journeys to Alabama and the South." James A. Miller then devotes a chapter to plays and films about the episode and its implications, another chapter to a lesser-known group of novelists followed by an in-depth look at echoes of Scottsboro in the fiction of Richard Wright as well as his early poetry and short fiction. Chapter 6 concerns Haywood Patterson, the most complex and truculent of the "boys," who later became an iconic figure for those who hoped to politicize the black masses. Next we get a look at incidents comparable to Scottsboro during the McCarthy era when the case became emblematic (to many) of communist influence on the civil rights movement. The book culminates in a close examination of Harper Lee's widely celebrated classic, *To Kill a Mockingbird* (1960), perhaps the best-known American novel about the challenge of obtaining justice in a racist society.

The author, whose research is phenomenal, may overstep himself when he asserts that Scottsboro "has continued to function as a multivalenced reference in contemporary life" (3). If we were to conduct an interview with one hundred college-educated Americans, I'm not at all sure very many of them could place Scottsboro in time or place, never mind its implications. Nevertheless, I strongly agree with Miller about "the ways in which the

shifting lexicon surrounding the Scottsboro case sheds light upon shifting and enduring American attitudes towards race and justice." In the remarkable proliferation of books coming out of the "memory mill" in American studies and history for the past two decades, this is one of the best because it is not only about memory and "mis-remembering" (see G. W. Bush), it is about indirect parallels as well as patterns of influence, explicit and implicit.

In March 2010 an improbable "musical social critique" called "The Scottsboro Boys" opened Off Broadway in New York for an unlamented run of five weeks. It's set at the Scottsboro trials—as a minstrel show! It was later shown at the famous Guthrie Theater in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and re-opened on Broadway in October 2010. A tragedy dressed as satirical farce in American popular culture. Will surprises never cease?

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The Image of a Second Sun: Plato on Poetry, Rhetoric, and the Technē of Mīmēsis. By Jeff Mitscherling (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2009), 458 pp. \$55.98 cloth.

There are some interesting and important insights in this book, which sets out to show that the apparent attack on poetry in Book 10 of the *Republic* is actually a veiled attack on the *technē* of *mīmēsis* promoted by the Sophists in political rhetoric as well as in poetry. I was particularly glad to have read Jeff Mitscherling's accounts of how Plato seems to be sending up Sophistic arguments by mimicking passages from the Sophistic *Dissoi Logoi* in parts of the *Republic*, *Meno*, and *Protagoras*, and the "Platonic aesthetics" that the book gestures toward at its end left me with some productive food for thought. The book's index of quotations of and references to poetic works in Plato's dialogues should make it a valuable reference text for some scholars. However, the book suffers from a number of flaws.

The most trivial but immediately evident flaw is that the text evidently was re-formatted after the table of contents and index were prepared, so that each becomes progressively

more inaccurate as the book goes along. Less trivially, there are problems with the organization of the text, on both small and large scales. Smaller problems include repetitions and inconsistencies of style that sometimes seem to have resulted from stitching together bits of text written at different times, abrupt transitions between paragraphs, and long quotations from secondary texts that are not trimmed appropriately and/or integrated well. Related to the latter point, the readability of the book, especially in the chapters not dealing directly with Plato's dialogues, would have been improved if Mitscherling had written more in his own voice and quoted less. The flow of the book is sometimes interrupted by quibbling with the quoted authors, and sometimes by seemingly tangential corrections to quoted translations.

The most serious large-scale problem in my view is that the book never gets around to a full discussion of *rhetoric* as promised in the subtitle. This is disappointing, because the point the book seems to be driving at until the final chapter is that Plato's real concern in *Republic* Book 10 is with Sophistic rhetoric and its associated politically dangerous "relativism." ("Relativism", incidentally, does not seem like the right word for what Plato, according to Mitscherling, finds wrong with the Sophists, namely, that they think appearances are more important than realities; a relativist does not believe that there *are* realities as opposed to appearances. I would say that Mitscherling's Sophists are Machiavellians, not relativists.) But just when it seems that the book should culminate with this point and provide some sustained discussion of Sophistic rhetoric and its political effects, it rather abruptly moves in the final chapter to propose a "Platonic aesthetics," which, being rooted in a Gadamerian view of the artwork as a co-creation of artist and audience, might bring the reader to think that the book has gone off the Platonic rails, though I think this can ultimately be seen not to be the case.

The gist of Mitscherling's "Platonic aesthetics" is as follows. The "antidote" (*pharmakon*) that Socrates says will prevent the corruption of souls by mimetic art is a philosophical understanding of mimetic art, which allows the reader/listener not to mistake imitations of things for the things themselves. Imitation per se is not bad; it is bad only insofar

as it is *deceptive*, i.e., insofar as it is not recognized as imitation. For Mitscherling, to recognize art as imitation is to see that it points symbolically toward something other than itself. Imitation is a *good* thing insofar as it is recognized as imitation, because seeing *ourselves* reflected in artistic imitations allows us to reflect on and improve ourselves: what the artwork most importantly imitates is the audience member who co-creates it along with the artist. I think this account is very much worth thinking with and about, although frankly it took me some thinking to find it plausible, and it might be a hard sell to someone not already sympathetic to its Gadamerian roots.

This, I think, is representative of a general problem with the book: Mitscherling makes big claims about a variety of issues in a small space—the nominal length of the book is deceiving; appendices consisting of indexes and quotations take up 124 pages, and the text is printed in a large, generously spaced font—with the result that some arguments seem only sketched out. In particular, while Mitscherling is to be commended for actually examining the poets Plato would have had in mind in his discussions of poetry, the evidence that he provides for his main claim about them—namely, that poets leading up to Plato's time had moved from the view that they are inspired to the view that they are masters of a *technē*—seems too slight (though it may be all the evidence there is) to add much to its *prima facie* plausibility.

On the whole, while the various problems with the book make me hesitant to recommend it to a more general readership, some aspects of it likely would be interesting and worthwhile for readers with a particular interest in Plato and aesthetics, the relation between Plato and the poets, or the relation between Plato and the Sophists.

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Vesuvius: A Biography. By Alwyn Scarth (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), x + 342 pp. \$29.95/£20.95 cloth.

Volcanoes and related natural phenomena (hot springs, earthquakes etc.) have attracted the

attention of humans from earliest times. Of mysterious origin but with devastating power and danger to people's lives and artefacts, they were always viewed with awe. Prior to scientific enquiry, their might was attributed to the gods and the destruction they wreaked was often seen as punishment for wicked ways of life. This may best describe the relations between calculating humans and incalculable nature.

The Vesuvius in Italy is probably the best-documented volcano on earth as far as written testimonies are concerned coupled with the results of long years of geological and archaeological research. Although the early sources are not "scientific" in the narrow sense of the word, they provide us with valuable insight into the processes of volcanic eruptions and their consequences. The first written document, two letters by Pliny the Younger (reproduced in this book), are vivid accounts of the eruption of A.D. 79 that destroyed Pompeii and Herculaneum, among others. They are a testimony to Pliny's interest in the phenomenon and the fear he experienced, particularly given the fact that his own uncle lost his life in that event.

Alwyn Scarth's book follows the history of Vesuvius through the ages, starting with the earliest traceable signs of volcanic activity, and leading up to the question when the volcano might erupt again. The author looks at Vesuvius as part of the Campania volcanic region and includes the second major danger zone, the Campi Flegrei, in his account. This overview characterizes the first two chapters, where he presents the general historical and volcanologist background.

Chapters 3 to 12 contain the true biography. Scarth minutely describes the various eruptions, the earliest of which can only be detected through geological evidence. As noted the first witness who left a written description was Pliny the Younger, whose two letters to Tacitus provide a vivid report of the A.D. 79 catastrophe, albeit written from memory about twenty-five years later (Chap. 4). Pliny was no scientist, but his description helped volcanologists to understand and describe the events in scientific terms. The excavations of Pompeii and Herculaneum, among others, enabled the researchers to reconstruct the eruption also from the human point of view. Subsequent eruptions occurred throughout the centuries,

albeit with varying degrees of violence and of effusive material, including the eruption of Monte Nuovo in the Campi Flegrei. The 1631 outbreak occurred during the Counter Reformation. The historical record shows to what extent the Church used this event to remind the people of their sins and to identify Vesuvius' eruption as a punishment by God. Processions were held in Naples, the holy relic (the head) of San Gennaro (Saint Januarius, Bishop of Benevent and martyr under Emperor Diocletian) was publicly displayed to Vesuvius, and the people engaged in public confessions—in what was a "great Neapolitan show of piety and masochism" (149). Churchmen in Naples publicized the survival of churches as miracles, the Church using all available means to bring sinners back to the faith. Whether the sudden cessation of rain and appearance of the sun on December 17 was due to the display of San Gennaro's head or simply to a change in the weather cannot be determined, but the crowd of course believed in the miracle (156).

But it was even before 1631 that the first archaeological discoveries were made, though no excavations were undertaken at the time, which actually saved the ancient cities from spoliation. Systematic excavations started in the eighteenth century and were followed by scientific investigations on the Vesuvius. The pioneer in this field was the British Envoy Extraordinary to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, William Hamilton, who with his letters to the Royal Society laid the foundations of volcanology. As a consequence, Vesuvius also became a tourist attraction, in particular for members of the nobility who embarked on the Grand Tour.

Although in the late twentieth century, with the rising awareness of volcanology, the first evacuation plans were drawn up, Scarth warns that to implement them would be a logistic masterpiece, given the dense settlement all around the cone. Tests have been conducted, but in popular perception there is no imminent danger—there is a business-as-usual attitude.

The book raises two important general questions that apply to more than just volcanoes and earthquakes. First, there is the relationship between humans and natural forces, in particular, human perceptions of the environment. The history of settlement on Mount Vesuvius demonstrates a deficient level

of learning by experience: towns and villages have always been reconstructed more or less on the exact spot where former settlements had stood before devastation. This phenomenon is well known and has been documented by Gilbert F. White (1945), Robert Kates (1962, 1967), and Thomas Saarinen (1966): a disaster is only perceived as such for as long as the memory of the generation concerned lasts. Afterwards, any catastrophe tends to be thought of as something that occurs once in a century or a millennium. Twentieth-century society goes one step further: it believes in the superiority of modern technology and is convinced that such a catastrophe will not happen in our lifetime; if it should happen, however, we believe we have all the technical means at our disposal to prevent it. In his last chapter, Scarth shows, however, that “ordinary” people hardly ever believe in the safety and evacuation plans drawn up by the authorities (based on consultation with experts and reference to the past).

Second, there is the irrational factor, the role played by religion, or more precisely, the Catholic Church. The 1631 eruption of Vesuvius showed clearly how the population was manipulated by the clergy into confessing its sinful life. Even prostitutes had to be saved through forgiveness and by marrying them off hastily to save their souls (164). The impending Day of Judgement called for particular spiritual efforts, which, however, had little effect. At the end of the eruptive period, it seemed clear that the religious processions had not influenced the volcano—but they had at least calmed the population.

Scarth’s book may not be scientific in the narrow sense of the word, but it is based on scientific research and proves the author’s scientific background. Apart from the vulcanological aspect, he emphasizes the importance of Vesuvius for the local and the international society. The political background of Campania, its cultural evolution through the ages (Renaissance, Enlightenment), and religious fervour all find their adequate place in the history of Vesuvius. The book is a narrative, not a scientific treatise. There are no references to sources in the text, but this makes it all the more readable. Each chapter is accompanied by references to the literature, which are listed in the bibliography. It is well illustrated with maps, drawings, photos, and tables, and text

boxes with details on specific issues. The maps, however, are not always satisfactory. Place names quoted in the text do not always appear on the maps, and one has to search for the particular map that does contain the place names one needs. Since there is no list of illustrations, this can be quite time consuming. There are also occasional mismatches between text and map (e.g. the description of the lava flows on p. 247 does not correspond to those marked on the map on p. 250). But the narrative quality of the book far outweighs these shortcomings.

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Patterns of Creativity: Investigations into the Sources and Methods of Creativity. By Kevin Brophy (Amsterdam: Rodopi 2009), 203 pp. €40.00 paper.

The reflections on creativity that Kevin Brophy, poet and head of Creative Writing at the University of Melbourne’s School of Culture and Communication, offers us are not only informative by virtue of his scholarly reading of neuroscience, philosophy, and the theory of literature and arts, but most of all by virtue of his close reading of impressive, well selected examples from poetry and prose. Although he declares that he is “interested in what science and other ‘outside’ disciplines can do to inject deeper and more useful insights into human creativity,” his admission that he is “first a poet, and these essays are written with a working poet’s interest in understanding and developing a creative practice” (9), is the key to his thought. Thus the reader should not take the arguments, considerations, and thoughts presented as contributions to a scholarly debate but as a means to understand creative processes—first of all creative processes of writing—in order to improve them.

Brophy starts with the question of intention in creative work and expounds “the paradoxical monstrosity of art”: “that its practice forms an apparent separation of the human species from all other creatures while simultaneously returning us to our material and evolutionary lives as creatures” (11).

The human genus is the only genus that enacts actively what evolution does by natural processes: generating the new. This Brophy sees as “art mimics the processes of evolution”—but his book demonstrates that it is much more than mimicry. The possibilities of seeing the world are amplified by human creative activity, and this proceeds not only by “unpredictable variation tested against the survival demands of a complex environment” (21)—paradoxically, we can say that the capacity of producing art, which “is superfluous to survival” (25), is a contribution to the evolutionary success of the human genus. So it doesn’t help to survive—as Brophy shows in the revealing example of Elizabeth Bishop’s “The Man-Moth”—if one creatively chooses a false or at least an uncommon preposition (“temperature impossible to record *in* thermometers,” 99). But that this poetic choice allows “abstract qualities . . . [to] be perceived and treated as objects in this world” (101) generates or at least enforces the possibility to realise the world as world (*Welt*) and not only as environment (*Umwelt*), as which it is accessible to nonhuman genera. Starting off with Brophy but going beyond we see that creative variation as such not only generates a *formal* new, something differing from everything known until then, but that it implies also generating a *substantive* new, constituting a new gestalt, which not only differs from the past but gives the future a trail, which then must be proven. This means that there must be a *meaning* to the new. In biological evolution there is no meaning.

Reading Brophy’s examples and analyses carefully we can conclude that his reference to evolutionary theory allows him to grasp creative writing in a way that facilitates its practice. The same applies to his discussion of consciousness and of the findings of neuroscience. Starting off from the insight “that consciousness is . . . a belated event” (39), “a reconstruction of what has already been perceived, what has already been understood and what has already been decided” (40), Brophy leads us through the analysis of a poem to the practically relevant realisation that to be creative is to see the unusual. This, for example, can mean to perceive the sounds of language and their relationship before or at least at the same time as the meaning of the words. Consciousness represents the world given until now; creativity allows to amplify and to

transform it. Seldom do we read in the way emphasised by Brophy, which requires a specific “kind of trust in the self” (49) as a precondition for listening to consciously not yet approved meanings.

This leads Brophy to his work as a teacher: as trust in the self can’t be taught, it is “aiming to teach the unteachable when education in the creative arts is at stake” (56). The reader is not only confronted with this paradox but is given examples that demonstrate how it can be resolved practically. The last sentence of this third essay should not be mistaken for an argument, it’s practical advice: “Pointing and gazing. These are perhaps all that are needed for poetry to generate excitement and ideas” (65).

Heavily relying on T. S. Eliot’s essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent”, Brophy demonstrates that the poet who trusts in his self must fall neither into the trap of exaggerated romanticism (the poet as the unbound genius) nor into the trap of intertextuality (“to weigh every word so heavily with cultural netting and historical hooks that almost anything can be read into a text no matter what is written,” 81). The “writer is an agent of active transformation and reflection upon an existing culture” (81).

It is not only the limited space of a review that precludes a discussion of all of Brophy’s essays in detail; it’s the concreteness of the essays themselves. As mentioned, Brophy relies on different theoretical strands but what makes his book lively is that he does not discuss the arguments as such but makes them useful for understanding and facilitating creative practice. So the scholarly reader may miss the strictness of the arguments and may find almost no new theoretical insights, but he will find a lot of links between well-known theoretical insights and practical processes, which allow him to develop his notional framework further to more fitting explanations. Readers practising poetry or other creative work will gain tools to better understand what they are doing when creating works of art; and find examples to prompt and stimulate their attentive self-observation, which for its part will improve their creative practice.

If we take David Cohen’s definition of metaphor, which Brophy quotes, “Metaphors are invitations to see the world in a certain way” (165), we—readers, scholars, and poets—can take this book as a metaphor, accept its

invitation, and develop our seeing it in a “certain way” whether it be as an explicit argument or as our own poetic moments and situations that allow us to be “most alive” (156).

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Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?

By Galen Strawson *et al.* Edited by Anthony Freeman (Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2006), vii + 286 pp. £17.95 paper.

When it was founded in 1994, the *Journal of Consciousness Studies* (JCS) was advertised as unlike other journals devoted to the study of consciousness, and indeed as unique in its truly interdisciplinary intention to engage fields of research lying outside the natural and social sciences. Over the past sixteen years, the JCS has remained true to this intention, and it is now widely regarded as the most exciting and audacious of the many journals investigating the nature of consciousness. Since its inception, the JCS has published each year anywhere from two to twelve issues, and most of these issues have included contributions that focus on a particular topic or theme. On occasion, the editor has invited a “target paper” that has then been forwarded to numerous researchers working in the area, and their critical responses have been published along with the target paper and a reply by the author of that paper. These special issues have sometimes been published separately in book form. *Consciousness and Its Place in Nature* is one of these books.

The feature of these special issues that I have always found most illuminating is their presentation of the wide variety of approaches that are adopted by the respondents to the target paper. The expression “target paper” is most definitely apt, for the respondents invariably take aim at what they individually regard as the weakest points of the paper, and their responses do on occasion consist of little more than a critical destruction of the author’s position. But the collection of responses has never turned into the sort of feeding frenzy that one often witnesses at certain learned

conferences, and by far the majority of responses suggest ways in which the perceived weaknesses of the target paper might be overcome or avoided in such a manner as to strengthen the author’s position or, at least, to demonstrate how that position itself might most profitably be revised. The overall discussion of these collections has thereby tended to create an atmosphere of collegiality, mutual respect and shared inquiry. This is definitely a unique achievement for a journal, and this particular special issue is no exception.

Galen Strawson first presented a version of the target paper, “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism” at the Toward a Science of Consciousness conference held in Copenhagen in 2005. Anthony Freeman, currently Managing Editor of JCS, heard the paper and invited Strawson to offer it as the target paper for this special issue of the journal. Freeman then circulated the paper to possible respondents, and seventeen of their responses have here been included. Typically, each of the responses exhibits the particular approach of its author, and in this case we are in fact presented with seventeen different approaches. Sometimes, not surprisingly, the respondent seems less intent on fully engaging with Strawson’s position and more concerned with elaborating their own personal take on the subject and pursuing their own research agenda. This too is of value, however, for it offers the reader a concise presentation of the methods and assumptions of the respondent, and one sees how the different approaches to physicalism and panpsychism can only yield wildly different and sometimes radically opposed conclusions.

In his concluding essay, “Panpsychism? Reply to Commentators with a Celebration of Descartes,” after gracefully acknowledging the efforts of all of the respondents, Strawson deals at some length with points raised by one or more of the respondents that seem to be of particular importance to the position he has attempted to construct. His reply, ninety-five pages in length, offers a far more thorough treatment of the view he put forth in the target paper. This demonstrates the enormous value of such shared inquiry and academic collaboration. All of the authors represented in this book are to be congratulated for their individual contributions and their shared achievement, and the *Journal of Consciousness Studies* is to be

applauded for making this achievement possible.

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Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam versus Global Jihad. By Bassam Tibi (London: Routledge, 2008), xxii + 311 pp. £20.99 paper.

This excellent book asks a stark but necessary question: is political Islam compatible with democracy? The author of the book, Bassam Tibi, has the insight and the moral courage to recognise that, since almost the whole of the developed world is now democratic to some degree, the question of the compatibility of democracy and political Islam must also raise the question whether political Islam is compatible with peace at all. To answer these questions, Tibi examines the effects of the migration of large numbers of Muslims into Europe, and the varying degrees to which this population has been integrated into European civilisation. While Tibi understands the many modes and degrees of integration that have occurred and are possible in the future, he helpfully begins with the rather simplistic scenarios that characterise much of the debate about these questions. On the one hand, these new European Muslims may come to constitute what Tibi calls “Euro-Islam” (1), by which he means Muslims who retain their faith but also value and want to live by the pluralist principles of the kind found in European democracies. On the other hand, of course, is the possibility that Muslims in Europe seek to reinstitute and complete the medieval Islamic imperialism which ended with the Islamisation of Constantinople in 1453, and to use the demographics of migration to replace European democracy and pluralism with sharia law and a totalitarian Islamic thelogico-political state.

In contrast to these two scenarios, Tibi is clearly careful to begin his argument with the phrase “political Islam,” a phrase that should remind both those who hope for an integrated, democratic Euro-Islam, and those that fear an

imperialist, totalitarian Islam, that there is no such simple entity as “Islam,” that “Islam” is not and has never been a unified, monolithic movement. If we are to understand Islam in Europe, then, we must begin by understanding the historical divisions within Islam that precede the recent Islamic migration into Europe. It is on the basis of such understanding that Tibi asks which parts of Islam can be compatible with pluralism and democracy, and which cannot.

Tibi’s argument is very clearly organised into three main parts. The first part provides a historical and sociological analysis of some of the divisions within Islam, with particular emphasis on the division between Muslims who have sought to develop an Islamic and democratic civil society, and those who have (Tibi’s word) “invented” the tradition of global jihadism and totalitarian Islamic government. The second part continues these historical and sociological arguments to explain the ways in which distinct and opposing Sunni, Shi’ite, and other variants of global jihadism have developed, and to explain the different ways each of these movements opposes and fights against democratic ideas and parties. It is worth emphasising that these jihadist movements are not only—and not primarily—opposed to “Western” democratic ideas, but rather are opposed to democratic ideas and reformers within the Islamic world as a whole. Some of these jihadist movements also explicitly advocate and practice violence not against “American imperialism” but explicitly against rival Islamic movements advocating such ideas as equality for women, pluralism, or democracy, even when these ideas originated in Islamic traditions and communities. Too many Western academics and journalists simply fail (or refuse) to understand that it does not matter at all whether these ideas originate in the West or within Arabic Islam or somewhere else: the Islamists do not hate “the West” or “America” but rather hate and will attack *anyone* and *everyone* who advocates the democratic principles of toleration, equality for women, diversity, civil law, or anything else that they believe to be un-Islamic.

The findings of these two parts of Tibi’s book are then applied, in the third part, to contemporary Europe. Tibi argues that the conflicts between Islam and European civilisation are not merely, or primarily, conflicts

between Islam and “the West.” On the contrary, the primary conflicts we need to understand are long-standing historical conflicts between pluralist and totalitarian movements *within* Islam; in other words, Europe has become a battlefield for conflicting Islamic political factions. The results of this inter-Islamic conflict will largely determine whether, and to what degree, a pluralist, democratic, and peaceful Euro-Islam will be able to develop.

Tibi is cautiously, soberly hopeful and explains in detail why he believes that it is indeed possible for Euro-Islam to prevail and how we might contribute to that result. He begins with a renewed understanding of that fact that Europe and the Mediterranean core of Islamic civilisation have been interacting with one another for centuries, both in the violent modes of jihad and crusade, and in the more positive terms of economic and intellectual cross-cultural interactions. This historical understanding could provide us with some practical basis on which to develop a shared conception of civil society that is both a historical part of each civilisation and yet also an impetus for each to change in relation to the other. At the centre of such change, and guiding it, is the need in both European and Islamic civilisation for a new mode of education. This education, according to Tibi, can succeed if it deliberately brings together the distinct but compatible historical tendencies toward democratisation that are common to both Europe and to a part of the Muslim diaspora in Europe.

Despite the excellence of Tibi’s book, I must close with a pessimistic observation. Tibi may be correct to suggest that a new mode of democratic education will be a necessary part of any solution to the problems he describes (234). It is a common suggestion. In recent years, “education” is very often proposed as a solution to all sorts of social and political problems: violence against women can be solved by better educating men; discrimination against homosexuals can be solved by better educating those opposed to homosexuality; and so on. The problem, of course, is that those in need of such education are almost always those who see no need for it, who see such education as forced indoctrination, and do not willingly participate in it or at all. Bigots are hardly likely to seek anti-bigotry education; that is, indeed,

at the very heart of bigotry. Consequently, it is not surprising that there is very little evidence that “education” can in fact contribute to solving social and political problems of this kind.

In this context of the rather thin evidence of the efficacy of education as a method by which social and political problems can be solved, Tibi seems not to really address two problems that such education will encounter in practice. Firstly, on the Islamic side of the problem, he understands that some of the more radical or fanatical political Islamists will not welcome such education. He describes in very informative detail the ways in which Islamists use “educational indoctrination in the values of Islamism” to further the political objectives of that movement. He proposes that such Islamising education ought to be countered with a new education based on a reformed and enlightened Islam that is supportive of global liberal democracy (221). It remains very unclear, however, how we might persuade radical Islamists to submit their children to an education that seeks to reform the sacred creeds of their particular conception of Islam. We might, I suppose, consider compelling these parents to send their children to more enlightened schools, but such compulsion would be contrary to the very liberal political principles to be learned in those very schools. Such compulsion would seem hypocritical and would plainly be a recipe for further resentment.

The second problem is very much like the first but concerns the limitations of European and American education rather than Islamist education. While Tibi offers a nuanced account of Islamist education and the ways in which it is likely to resist any liberalising alternative, he seems not to understand that too many Western (and especially North American) academics simply *do not want to know* what he has argued so well. It is not that Western academics cannot understand what Tibi argues, it is that they refuse to understand it because it challenges (if I may put it this way) the sacred creeds of postmodernism and multiculturalism. From his own experience Tibi knows very well that too many North American academics will not only refuse to listen but will use every avenue of academic power to try to prevent others from ever hearing what Tibi wishes to tell us (xvii). In a series of books written over

the past twenty-five years, Tibi has been very careful to distinguish the religion of Islam from the politicisation of one sect of Islam, only to find himself denigrated for “Islam-bashing” (xxii). It is not enough to say that this accusation is intellectually preposterous, because it is not really intended to be an intellectual response; it is an exercise in political rhetoric intended merely to silence and vilify, i.e. to make into a villain, now the most common mode of *ad hominem* in the humanities. Although it is plainly a fact, even the slightest suggestion that there are non-European “Others” who are not motivated by “post-colonialism” and who say plainly that they violently reject the very ideas of democracy, pluralism, multiculturalism, feminism or any of the other products of “cultural modernity” is so distressing to the doctrinal academic mind that discussion of it must be banished from polite society. At my own university, a course entitled Islamic Political Philosophy was cancelled less than a month before it was to be taught, despite being very well enrolled. Students on the course were told in writing that the cancellation was due to low enrolment, but this was not true and they knew it. The course was cancelled because of the concerns of a small group of faculty that one book in the course, Sayyed Qutb’s *Milestones*, was sexist, anti-Semitic, and not sufficiently discussed in North American academic philosophy to be considered “mainstream” philosophy. As Tibi emphasises, Qutb’s writings are both very popular with Islamicists and arguably the single most important source for contemporary conceptions of “global jihad” (5–6). In the end, Qutb’s importance was not enough for my university, the course was cancelled and, in effect, teaching Qutb’s text has been forbidden for the foreseeable future. Even though we have erudite and humane guides such as Tibi to help us, we are not likely to make much progress in understanding the conflicts between European modernity and totalitarian Islamicism unless we first confront the conflict between academic freedom and censorious academic conformism within our universities.

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What Kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq. By Najde Al-Ali and Nicola Pratt (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009), xviii + 221 pp. £12.50 paper.

Soon after the invasion of Iraq, the two authors, one of Iraqi origin, one British, decided to undertake a study of women under occupation, the research for which took them three years, from 2004 to 2007. But as they encountered all the obvious difficulties of working inside such an insecure country, the book itself turned into something much larger, into what is in effect a history of the modern Iraqi women’s movement in a country caught between modern/universalizing and ethnic/sectarian pressures.

Their story, as might be supposed, is essentially an unhappy one, with the rights obtained under the revolutionary governments of 1958 and 1968 being watered down first by Saddam Hussein’s turn towards religious patriarchy in the 1990s and then again, in spite of initial hopes, when the American-led Coalition Provisional Authority connived with the Shi’i leadership in allowing the 2005 Constitution to replace centralized state authority over women by “the authority of Iraq’s communal leaders.” Hence, as in India and Israel, a communalized personal status law became an essential ingredient of the state-building project (115).

This is not to say, of course, that a small group of politicized and essentially middle-class women gave up the struggle entirely, as the authors faithfully record, standing for parliament, working to get out the vote in the 2005 elections, and trying to establish a cross-party women’s caucus in 2007. Nevertheless, the writing was on the wall. Abandoned by the Americans for the sake of a quick and easy military withdrawal, the women found themselves marginalized, pushed around, and often ignored by their male party colleagues. Conditions were even worse in Kurdistan where the prevailing patriarchy was enormously strengthened by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

Writing about women in general presents a difficult task, as the authors freely acknowledge, given their different class and political positions, not to speak of the other significant differences of religion, modern education and the rest. They do their best, however, and try

to approach the subject from a number of different angles, including a wonderful set of words and pictures from the Open Shutters project based in Syria—in what appears to be 2007—in which a group of Iraqi women were given cameras to record aspects of their own daily lives. Here you get a real sense of domestic life going on under severe constraints, the electricity on but mostly off, a severely injured man watching TV with his family in an overcrowded living room, the garbage piling up, and a sense of fear and foreboding as the women look out of their windows at the streets outside.

Figures too can be used to give some idea of the special problems with which women of all classes and confessions have had to cope on a more or less daily basis. As of the time of writing, 70 percent of the two million persons displaced by the war and the fighting were women and their children. And, even more chilling, according to a study of 147 of the women made widows by Saddam Hussein's murderous Anfal campaign against young Kurdish men in 1987–88, 96 percent were unable to re-marry as were 72 percent of their children.

ROGER OWEN
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Pat Barker. By Mark Rawlinson (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), viii + 189 pp. \$68.00/£42.50 cloth; \$14.95/£9.99 paper.

This book is part of a series entitled “New British Fiction,” here taken to include writing from the 1970s on. Intended for academic and general readers, the series aims to provide a readily accessible introduction to the work of individual novelists. Mark Rawlinson's study of Pat Barker's fiction fulfils this mission admirably.

The study is divided into three unequal parts. Part 1 consists of a timeline establishing the historical background and a brief introductory chapter that aims to define the general interest of Barker's work. Emphasizing that both Barker's historical novels and her contemporary fictions engage with current moral and intellectual dilemmas, Rawlinson provides

a general approach to her work. At the same time, he alerts readers to more technical/theoretical modes of conceptualizing her writing.

Part 2, much the longest section of the book, analyzes Barker's major works, proceeding chronologically from her first-published novel *Union Street* (1982) to her most recent novel *Life Class* (2007). Oriented to what Rawlinson terms “a historical appreciation” of Barker's writing (16), the discussion provides an excellent overview of the emergence and development of Barker's major thematic concerns and narrative techniques. Rawlinson's analysis underscores Barker's abiding interest in issues pertaining to violence and its cultural representation and her use of dialogic devices to delineate alternative perspectives, leaving contradictory elements unresolved. Interesting comparisons are drawn between Barker's work and that of other writers. For example, Rawlinson contrasts the portrayal of the First World War in Barker's celebrated *Regeneration* trilogy with earlier depictions of the war, identifying revisionist elements in Barker's novels.

Part 3 consists of a chapter discussing the critical reception of Barker's work and an interview with the author. Both are engaging. Rawlinson's chapter touches on a variety of interesting topics, including factors that influence a novelist's reputation. The coincidence between Barker's rise to literary fame and her re-classification from a feminist writer to a war novelist is noted, and film adaptations of her novels are discussed. Barker's comments on her work are quite fascinating. She confirms (174) Rawlinson's general point that although the focus shifts from working-class women in northern England in her early novels to the experience of war (and other national issues) and the construction of masculinity in her *Regeneration* trilogy, both sets of novels share many common concerns.

It seems a pity that no systematic biographical information about Barker is provided in this introductory text, and readers unfamiliar with her work would have found brief summaries of the novels helpful. However, altogether this is a valuable, attractive study, directing attention to many issues of contemporary concern such as whether it is possible to depict violence without becoming to a degree complicit in it, problematic aspects of

psychotherapeutic regimens, and whether it is legitimate to project a later generation's preoccupations onto an earlier era. Not only students of literature but also those interested in adjacent disciplines such as history and media studies will find Rawlinson's book stimulating and provocative.

JOYCE SENDERS PEDERSEN

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Civic Rites: Democracy and Religion in Ancient Athens. By Nancy Evans (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010), xvii + 272 pp. £16.95 paper.

This book, written on a very basic level, has the appearance of reworked lectures for undergraduate courses in Greek history. But it has a serious purpose, namely, to demonstrate how what we call "religion" (not a discrete conceptual category in antiquity) was woven into all aspects of the Athenian democracy. Religious belief and practice in antiquity underlie the standard demonstration of the *difference* between the ancients and ourselves, a difference which Nancy Evans acknowledges, but at the same time she finds that "the ancient world is good to think with" (xiv). She attempts to accomplish her purpose by interweaving chapters of straightforward, textbook-style but very general historical narrative, from Cleisthenes to Socrates, with more detailed chapters on religious practices, focusing—naturally—on Athena, Demeter, and Dionysus.

The intended audience of this book, published by a distinguished academic press, is rather unclear (at least to this reviewer). For undergraduates, the total lack of reference to either ancient sources or modern scholarship will be a hindrance rather than a help; there is a difference between an uncluttered text and one so general to the point of being vague. I would not assign this book either for general reading or for a writing assignment in an undergraduate course on Greek history. The repeated offhand allusions to discussions and debates by "scholars" or in "modern scholarship" is

bound to frustrate the curiosity of the modern reader, and the reference to opinions or facts in ancient authors—Herodotus, Thucydides, the tragedians, etc.—without annotation, will also cause unnecessary labor for any reader stimulated to read the source itself, which a good book on ancient history, however general the intended audience, should do (and so many good translations of all the basic texts are available). Finally, both students of Greek history and the general readers will find little if any help in the anemic "suggested further readings" (251–56). This is all unfortunate in a book written for readers "to think with."

JONATHAN PRICE

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Translation Practices: Through Language to Culture. Edited by Ashley Chantler and Carla Dente (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009), 279 pp. €56.00/\$76.00 paper.

This is a collection of essays from "interdisciplinary research activities which have developed for over a decade by a group of scholars working in the Universities of Pisa and Leicester," although there are also contributions from other institutions. As such, the book is a commendable example of international cooperation, enabling experts in at least two languages and two cultures to talk about a set of shared concerns. The articles include proposals from basic translation theory, contrastive linguistics, difficulties in translation practice (the problems of rendering slang and humor), literary translation history (Proust's translation of Ruskin, Romantic versions of Ovid, sainthood in Michèle Roberts, Dario Fo in Britain, John/Giovanni Florio as an intercultural figure), Lorna Hardwick on performative translation for the stage, plus creative reflections on editors as translators, the use of aliases as self-translation, photography and fiction as translation of landscape, two engaging and well-explained poetry translations by David Platzer, with many dalliances in between. The Italian-English focus is present but not

exclusive; the range of issues must be impressive to anyone wandering in from beyond Translation Studies.

So much for what is in the book. I now risk a reflection that concerns Translation Studies as a proposed “interdiscipline” of which this book might serve as an excellent and well-intentioned example. There is no way that straight contrastive linguistics is going to be of great interest to creative cultural studies, and vice versa. Do we really expect a comparative study of intensifiers in Italian and English, or lists of slang words and possible translations, to reach the same reader as a study of photography and fictions as translations of landscape? There will always be readers prepared to stay the course (the editors, a reviewer), but to what extent can we talk about this range of interests as being a common discipline rather than due to some intelligent passers-by?

The will to unity is a little forced. I note, for example, that the editors’ introduction overlooks the linguistic lists, and the article on editors only mentions translation at the very end, perhaps for inclusion in the volume. The book’s section divisions shed little light here: “Language as Means” includes the contrastive linguistics and the textual comparisons; “Culture as Target” has basically the same CompLit approaches; and “Languages of Culture” includes the Cultural Studies stuff, more or less, although the problems of translating for the stage, included here, could also have gone in any of the other sections. I cannot see how these three sections illuminate each other.

Interdisciplines like Postcolonial Studies or Women Studies undoubtedly suffer similar problems. They can, however, engage in basic central debates that potentially inform all the individual aspects being worked on (I would not say the same of Cultural Studies, but that’s another issue). Translation Studies has trouble doing that, as might be indicated by the range and structure of this volume. Although none of that is the fault of these editors and writers, it is still worth reflecting on.

ANTHONY PYM
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Maurice Blanchot et l’art au XXème siècle. Une esthétique du désœuvrement.

By Emmanuelle Ravel. Chiasma series 24 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007), 197 pp. € 40.00/\$54.00 paper.

There should have been reason to welcome an ambitious study like this of the relevance to visual arts of the poetics of Maurice Blanchot (1907–2003), the rather inaccessible author who theorized the death of the author. For “if it is true that nowhere does Blanchot directly broach the question of the existence of an aesthetics” (152) when he claims that a thing disappears at the appearance of the word for it, so that no-thing is ever said and every utterance is but a mute enigma, a ghostlike apparition pointing to the irretrievable elusiveness of meaning, and as such, an image, his literary theory begs to be transposed to avant-garde art. Emmanuelle Ravel aptly does this to Duchamp’s non-retinal, impersonal readymades, as well as to Malevich’s evanescent abstractions of undifferentiated vision, foregoing representation for bare presentation, also found in the impenetrably literal concreteness of Minimal Art. Why stop there and not mention Warhol, if “Blanchot’s work thus claims an absence of foundation such that the reign of the image is thereby established” (153)? All the more so as the book reads like a fraying serial screen print of Blanchot’s “obsessions” (7), far removed from the original’s crisp—if obscure—stylistic rigour: the relentless attempt to duplicate the arch preciousness of a certain “postmodern sublime” (Dominick LaCapra) constantly founders in pretentious clichés, clumsily cobbled together from garbled idioms and embarrassing malapropisms, generously laced with egregious errors in syntax and grammar. As the introduction candidly admits, “the reader or critic, disoriented by wandering, now recognizes her inability to say the Blanchotian universe without falling into facile mimicry” so that “given over to a rhetoric of the ineffable, the text is ceaselessly dispossessed of all potential [for] getting heard or power of signification” (8).

This reader and critic has to agree—regretfully—since this text holds much food for thought, however unpalatably prepared, about “all aspects of a certain religion of the absence of work” and narrative function (9) in

avant-garde art and letters, including the aesthetics of Greenberg and Adorno. Verbose, unfocused and inconclusive, it is complacently performative, “excluding itself from representation by allowing itself to be contaminated by death” (8); in less fancy words, it is unapologetically rotten! Coming across more as a problematic early thesis draft than as a monograph, it makes one wonder how it could be published as is by the distinguished editors of this series of interdisciplinary studies in modern French literature. Apparently unable to call the transparent bluff of Ravel’s knowing tone, Michael Bishop even includes the “elegance” (5) of her writing in the lavish praise of his foreword! Such a misbegotten publication does little to dispel unkind suspicions about the cultural politics of French theory’s Anglo-Saxon reception. Laboriously unfinished, this work is an all-too literal demonstration of Blanchot’s tenet that in literature there is no work but only ever disaster; for this book truly is a disaster, of no literary merit, however, despite the alibi of a final Blanchot quote, conveniently claiming that “this imminence of a revelation that fails to happen may be the aesthetic fact” (183).

CHRISTIAN ROY

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Flemish Paintings of the Seventeenth Century. By Arthur K. Wheelock Jr. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), xiv + 290 pp. \$74.00/£51.00 cloth.

To the memory of Anneke Wertheim (1965–2011), whose work as an art historian and editor enriched the book under review.

The National Gallery of Art in Washington has a reputation to lose when it comes to scholarly catalogues of its collections. This recent volume in the series of systematic catalogues fully meets the high standard that the Gallery has set for itself, a standard other museums would do well to emulate. The National Gallery of Art is even improving on itself. Compared to *Dutch Paintings of the Seventeenth Century* (1995) by the same author, curator of Dutch as well as Flemish painting, the Flemish volume is superior not

only in design and production but also in the completeness of the technical notes with which each entry opens. The entries are exhaustively researched and written in accessible and unhurried prose. The editing is impeccable, an ideal that is not always respected in complex publications of this sort. It speaks for the openness and generosity of the National Gallery of Art and of the author that full credit is given to the many individuals and institutions that contributed in one way or another to these exemplary catalogues.

The museum holdings in Flemish painting reflect in the first place the social aspirations of the main early donors, Peter Widener and Andrew Mellon, fed by the sales talks of their respective dealers, Knoedler and Duveen. Of the 56 paintings covered, 20 are portraits in the grand style, mainly of English and Italian aristocrats and rich Flemings with aristocratic airs, individuals with whom the collectors identified. Later acquisitions have been chosen with an eye to filling out the picture of Flemish painting to a more representative whole, down to two delightfully irreverent tiny heads that by alphabetical accident are the first (Adriaen Brouwer) and last (Gillis van Tilborgh the Younger) items in the catalogue. However, the starting point, all those grandiose van Dycks and Rubenses, is so skewed that true representativeness will never be obtainable on the Mall.

Graciously, even the phenomenally conscientious Arthur Wheelock has left room for improvement in future volumes. I limit my remarks to one methodological point, one interpretative, and one pertaining to style.

The invaluable technical notes end with an assessment of condition. In a certain number of cases, the surface of a painting has been abraded or paint loss has occurred, so that the upper layer that we see is the work not of the master alone but of restorers as well. In the body of the entries, Wheelock refers to these facts mainly in one context: when disputing the conflicting attribution of a colleague. He then suggests that his compeer has been misled by matters of condition, as he is not (e.g., see pages 63–64). All but a handful of the paintings in the catalogue are assigned unreservedly to the hand of a single master, despite doubts to the contrary by distinguished colleagues. None is labeled Master and Later Restorers.

Connoisseurs of old master paintings like Wheelock have a romantic weakness for the notion that a gifted master painted directly onto the canvas or panel without recourse to preliminary drawings or oil sketches. In the entry on a flower still-life by Jan Brueghel the Elder, Wheelock seizes on a passage from a letter by the artist to his patron saying that he “went to Brussels to portray a few flowers from life which cannot be seen in Antwerp” to embrace the unlikely conclusion that the artist took the entire large and heavy panel to Brussels to paint directly onto it a few of the more than 50 buds in a highly contrived composition (18). However, when Rubens in the same years wrote to a patron of his own that he painted the lions in *Daniel in the Lions’ Den* from life (171), Wheelock does not interpret his words to mean that he took his huge canvas to the zoo. This should have led the author to modify his statement concerning Jan Brueghel to allow for the use of the intermediate oil sketches that I am convinced the artist made.

Finally, Wheelock allows his love of art to color his scholarly writing a bit too much. He might have subjected his texts to a gratuitous-adjective and florid-prose check before going into print (see page 68, or any other page). He might also have avoided the dubious assumption that his own analyses of artistic choices coincide unproblematically with the artist’s intention (191–92).

These are faults typically associated with the strengths of self-assured old-school connoisseurship, of which Wheelock is a master. Despite my own conviction that this school is too self-assured for its own good and should admit more uncertainty than comes naturally to its practitioners, I admire its achievements in such consummate publications as this catalogue.

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Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference. By Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), xiv + 511 pp. \$35.00 cloth.

Empires in World History adds to the growing literature on empires and to comparative studies

that attempt to be global rather than Western. In many respects Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper have produced a fine example of both categories. The authors chronologically examine empires beginning with the Roman and the Qin/Han Chinese. They then look at many of the major empires since then: the Byzantine, Umayyad, Mongol, Ottoman, Russian, Spanish, the later European colonial empires, the short lived Nazi and Imperial Japanese empires, and the empires of the Soviet Union and the United States. All were chosen because they were distinctive and influential. For each empire they present a clear, concise analysis of the ways it devised its methods of rule.

While the authors discuss the forces of expansion, coercion and exploitation that create imperial entities they avoid the condemnation of empire common in many recent works such as Bernard Porter’s or Timothy Parsons’. Rather, empires are treated as a fact of history. Rulers, elites and peoples have created expansive political entities that governed diverse people in some sort of hierarchy. All share basic characteristics, however: empires are not static but have evolved as the repertoire of ideas and techniques have changed. The rise of monotheistic based empires in the first millennium C.E. and the oceanic based empires that emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are prime examples of how they have evolved in distinct ways.

One of the most valuable contributions of this fine comparative study is the way it highlights the importance of empire in world history. As Burbank and Cooper point out, for the past two thousand years most people have lived in empires. Even in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries much of world history took place within imperial frameworks. The authors provide insightful perspectives on familiar events such as the American and French Revolutions and the world wars by treating them as conflicts within and between empires. They also point out that our notion of nation-states with their theoretically equal sovereignty is a fairly recent phenomenon. Empires have been durable entities often lasting many centuries while the nation-state has come into existence only in the past two. Nor is there anything normal, natural or inevitable about nation-states. Empires may be about ruling various peoples separately and unequally but they deal with the reality of diversity while, in

contrast, nation-states have the “idea-illusion perhaps, that difference could be overcome by the appeal of the national idea” (458). Dismissing the notion of a post-imperial era, the authors point out that China and Russia are still shaped by their imperial traditions, and even the United States has many characteristics of empire. They repeatedly emphasize these themes: the prominence of empires and the recent and uncertain history of nation-states.

While specialists may quarrel with some of the thumbnail histories, *Empires in World History* is one of the clearest written surveys of empires available. It will serve well as an introductory text for university students and as a reference for scholars.

MICHAEL J. SETH

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There Is a God: How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind. By Antony Flew with Roy Abraham Varghese (New York: Harper One, 2007), xxiv + 222 pp. \$24.95.

This controversial book came out in bizarre circumstances. Since the publication of “Theology and Falsification” in Oxford in 1950, perhaps the single most penetrating dismissal of religious language and argumentation, Antony Flew has been one of the most vocal, celebrated, and scholarly atheists of the latter half of the twentieth century, often viewed as the intellectual successor to Bertrand Russell and A. J. Ayer, both visible and well-known in earlier generations for their powerful writings on the failures of religious belief. Flew was also the author of several famous books supporting the atheistic view, among them *God and Philosophy* (1966, reprint 2005) and the *Presumption of Atheism* (1984). But, in 2004, Flew was recorded on video as saying he had changed his mind about the existence of God. At the same time, a letter from Flew suggesting a change of view was published in *Philosophy Now*. And then, there was his lengthy interview with Gary Habermas in the *Philosophia Christi* (“My Pilgrimage from Atheism to Theism,” *Philosophia Christi* 6.2

[Winter 2004]). All of this was rather surprising, even shocking. Flew’s conversion stunned many proponents of atheism. Some took it with good grace, like Paul Kurtz, who wrote a very sympathetic and charitable preface to the reprint of *God and Philosophy*. Others didn’t take it as kindly, feeling betrayed, even intellectually vandalized. The appearance of the book was followed by a scathing article by Mark Oppenheimer in the *New York Times Magazine* (“The Turning of an Atheist,” 4 November 2007), where the reporter suggested that Flew didn’t write the book and that he had little knowledge of its contents. Oppenheimer even suggested Flew was in mental decline. When Flew died in 2010, every obituary mentioned this conversion, which in the summing up often overshadowed his other work in philosophy.

Well, rough stuff. Controversy galore. There have now been thousands of press reports and articles about Flew’s change of view. So many people who pick up this book already know a great deal about its context and may even have preconceived notions about its value. I suggest reading it straight up, not looking for more controversy (in which case the book will be nothing more than feeding time at the zoo), but instead evaluating the arguments on their own merits. If one does that, then the book itself is fascinating and compelling. It may not be convincing or persuasive, yet it certainly deserves a fair reading, which I would highly recommend.

Flew begins with an introduction that covers some of the tempest surrounding his conversion. Of note, he mentions his father was a theologian. I know from my own interaction with Flew that he grew up in a warm religious environment and that he is extremely well-read on theological matters. He was never ignorant or uninformed. He also mentions his Gifford Lectures, published as *The Logic of Mortality* (1987), suggesting that the resurrection of the body is impossible and that, if there is a soul, it could not continue the self as we know it without the body. This book is important in the development of Flew’s current views on deism (more about that below). He then explains his intellectual journey with autobiographical comments in the first chapter. There are some important comments about his schooling at Kingswood and Oxford, his military service in World War II, and his return

to Oxford after the War. There are some good stories about Ryle, Wittgenstein, C. S. Lewis, and others. He also explains his move from Oxford to Aberdeen, then Keele, Calgary, and finally Reading.

The second chapter details his early contributions to philosophy. In addition to “Theology and Falsification,” Flew gathered together articles on analytical methodology in two extremely influential volumes, *Logic and Language* I (1961) and II (1966). These were the first books to offer a collection of argumentative tools for use by analytical philosophers, and remain must-reads to this day. He then discusses the background to “Theology and Falsification.” As Flew sees it, the piece doesn’t eliminate the possibility of religious belief or religious language. Rather, it challenges the believer or user to “explain how their statements are to be understood, especially in the light of conflicting data” (45). He then takes up the theme of *God and Philosophy*, that the arguments for God’s existence based on design, cosmology, or morality are flawed, lacking consistency, coherence, understanding, and applicability. Hume is his hero here. There simply was no credible evidence for belief in God. But Flew also notes that the arguments against religion are not a conclusion; they are a challenge. In *The Presumption of Atheism* Flew sees this presumption as “at best, a methodological starting point, not an ontological conclusion” (56).

I think it is important to stop and draw on some of Flew’s other arguments not specifically covered in this book. In *Thinking About Thinking* (1975), Flew discusses the limitations of falsification. He is mindful of Karl Popper’s view of science, an inductive method which offers only probabilistic conclusions. All propositions remain open; available evidence is never enough. What we know is what we know “so far.” So nothing about the world is known with certainty. We must constantly re-examine our presumptions, arguments, evidence, and conclusions. We are surely allowed to change our mind if the evidence leads us in another direction. Flew claims that we must be motivated by a search for truth above all other considerations. I think that all this was on his mind while writing his new book. He was never going to allow himself to be backed into a corner, with consistency overriding the search for truth. And if he now

has evidence that leads him to think there is a God, then he followed that road with reason as his guide, still remaining open to the possibility that he may be wrong. And he may be wrong... he knows that!

So, with this background, it is interesting to read the next two chapters. In the third chapter he recounts his many debates on atheism and his thinking during the course of those discussions. He did “hold fast” to atheism, but never dogmatically, only until a more reasonable explanation came along. He then turns in the fourth chapter to his “pilgrimage of reason.” Here he employs the “falsification challenge,” a famous demand that in any argument both sides must explain what would have to happen for their arguments to be wrong. It is a demand for intellectual honesty and a celebrated part of “Theology and Falsification.” In Flew’s case, there is enough evidence to convince him that a version of the argument from design must now be correct. Therefore, because of his earlier arguments against Christianity and the limitations of our mortality, eliminating the resurrection of the body and the continuation of the self, Flew is compelled to accept a form of deism. The fact that nature obeys laws is evidence for the Argument from Design. So is the fact that life seems intelligently organized and purpose-driven. And the existence of life itself is evidence for him of God’s existence. Flew finds that the progress of science actually makes the Argument from Design more convincing, with each new discovery adding evidence about the complexity of the universe, thereby increasing support for his view. Far from rejecting science, Flew finds that rationality and science have led him on a “pilgrimage” to his present position. He still rejects a Christian, Jewish, or Islamic God. But he thinks that some kind of intelligent being gave order and structure to the universe.

The final six chapters give a history of the struggle of science and religious belief, championing the open-mindedness of Spinoza, Einstein, and others. For Flew, it makes more sense to account for the order and complexity of the universe through God’s will and agency than through the random actions of nature on its own.

Two appendices follow, one by Roy Varghese appraising arguments from Dawkins,

Dennett, and others, the other a discussion between Flew and N. T. Wright.

What to think? For myself, I found the arguments for God's existence traditional and unsupportable. For me, religion remains a matter of faith. But I can see that Flew's interpretation of nature is reasonable, and that science actually strengthens, rather than weakens, his view. I don't think this book will win any converts. But it is not wacky or ridiculous. It is sincere and thoughtful.

As I said, there is some speculation that Varghese actually ghost-wrote the book. Maybe he did. I'm not sure that matters. I personally think that could be true. Having read most of Flew's previous work, and knowing him personally for over twenty-five years, I thought some of the word choices, sentence construction and argumentation somewhat "un-Flew like," especially in the later chapters (I cannot believe Flew wrote the words in the sixth chapter, which talks about CD players, vacations, and the multiverse/blunderbuss theories of the universe). But also having known Flew for so long, I can't believe that he let anything go out under his name that didn't capture exactly what he wanted to say. In my own case, whenever I wrote about Flew, and I submitted drafts to him, he carefully, meticulously, painstakingly edited my own work to make sure I "got it right." I believe this book contains his thoughts, even if Varghese did do some of the writing.

There is also the worry that Flew has been hijacked by "the God crowd." I don't think this is true. Yes, he has thrown in with some of them, particularly Varghese and Habermas. But this doesn't mean that he is not a free agent. For reasons I've already covered, his change of mind is reasonable for him. If he turns to like-minded thinkers to share and disseminate his views, that is only natural. It doesn't mean he's been brainwashed or co-opted. Again, I can only think about the many, many times I've listened to his tough-minded analysis of philosophical or political situations. I must dismiss this possibility.

I don't know if there is a future for this book. I fear it will be "dissed" by Flew's old friends and overclaimed by his new chums. But it deserves to be a serious part of the discussions on the existence of God. It should be read

carefully and calmly. Under the hype and hysteria there is a very good book.

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Warsaw 1920: Lenin's Failed Conquest of Europe. By Adam Zamoyski (New York: Harper Press, 2008), xv + 160 pp. £14.99 cloth.

This is a very good book, written by an outstanding scholar. Adam Zamoyski is the best-selling author of *1812: Napoleon's Fatal March on Moscow* and numerous other works. He is a highly-regarded historian, with a specialty in the history of East Central Europe. His scholarship is in the "Norman Davis category" (with fewer words), which means he really knows what he is talking about, a researcher's researcher, comprehensive and encyclopedic. He is also well-known as an outstanding linguist, with an enviable writing style and a deep knowledge of European languages. Many people admire his ability to explain strategy and showcase key moments in the complexity and confusion of military conflict. So he brings a lot to any project.

He is the right guy for this particular project. Zamoyski has a terrific story to tell. In the aftermath of the Versailles Conference in 1919, Vladimir Lenin made a bold move. Despite civil war and economic disaster in his own country, still in the midst of revolution, or perhaps because of these problems, Lenin decided to attack Poland. One goal was the conquest of a reconstituted two-year-old Poland, hoping for territorial gain and the substitution of a hand-picked communist government for that led by Józef Piłsudski and Ignacy Jan Paderewski. Another goal was a socialist revolution in Germany and other European countries. Lenin knew that the European allies at Versailles were weak and exhausted from the Great War. Germany was a defeated nation. Hungary was leaning left. So was Italy. There were opportunities in Romania, the Balkans, and even the United Kingdom. The time was ripe for revolution.

Poland was the gateway to Europe. It was a new and uncertain country with a difficult

Russian past. The Soviet government viewed Poland with suspicion. And the Polish government was weak, with a disjointed, patchwork, ill-fitted army (one French military advisor in Poland, Major Charles De Gaulle—yes, that De Gaulle—wrote in the spring of 1919, “Literally everything needs to be rebuilt, from the bottom to the top.”) (18). Russia had already occupied Wilno (Vilnius) in 1919, although Piłsudski and some reserves expelled the Soviets three months later. A Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania-Belorussia was set up in that same year. Lenin increased the number of divisions facing Poland from five to twenty. Lev Trotsky had already been appointed Commissar for War (he was very effective). In January 1920, Lenin approved a plan for invasion. Operations were to begin in April, although they were delayed.

Piłsudski knew of the offensive. So, on April 25, he struck first in Ukraine. He caught the Russians off-guard and in two weeks was in Kiev. But it was too much, too fast. He was stretched out in a decimated country, with no alternative government ready for action. Even worse, the Poles were viewed as the aggressor by world opinion, which sympathized with the Bolsheviks. For example, the *New Statesman* said that it was “impossible for anyone who is concerned for the future peace of Europe to hope for anything but an early disaster for the Polish armies” (37). Dock workers in London and elsewhere struck in solidarity, refusing to load shipments of supplies bound for Poland. The British and French governments brought pressure on the Polish forces to withdraw.

Lenin appointed Mikhail Nikolaievich Tukjachevsky as commander of the Western Front. At twenty-seven years old he was a risky appointment. He had recently been successful in defeating the Whites in the East under Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak and in the South under General Anton Denikin. He now had the task of conducting the first international war under Bolshevism.

This is the war Isaac Babel told in the *Red Cavalry*. The Soviet Army’s attack drove the Poles out of the Ukraine and Belorussia to the suburbs of Warsaw, with the Poles in retreat for weeks over hundreds of kilometers of difficult ground. There were scenes of enormous casualties, savage brutality, and startling courage. By August 15 Warsaw was within Tukjachevsky’s grasp, but a stout and desperate

defense held. One Russian officer wrote, “The moment had come when not only individual units but the whole mass of the army suddenly lost faith in the possibility of success against the enemy. It was as though a cord that we had been stretching since the (River) Bug had suddenly snapped” (91).

The Poles had a plan for counterattack that went into operation. On August 16, Piłsudski’s divisions attacked the Russian army, not directly but from underneath their positions in a sideways, northeasterly direction, causing surprise, panic, confusion, and, ultimately, head-long frantic retreat to the Russian and East Prussian borders. Operational ability was lost. Communication between units was non-existent. Supplies were captured or abandoned. The Russian threat collapsed. Zamoyski’s concise assessment: “It was a rout” (109). De Gaulle wrote on August 17, “Our Poles have grown wings. The soldiers who were physically and morally exhausted only a week ago are now racing forward in leaps of 40 kilometers a day. Yes, it is Victory! Complete, triumphant Victory!” (101). By October 15 the Poles had captured Minsk. A peace agreement was signed in Riga on March 18, 1921. The Poles settled for a compromise that included parts of Belorussia and Ukraine, but did not extend to the historic borders of the eighteenth century.

Given the continental catastrophe that followed in 1939, this seems, in Zamoyski’s words, “irrelevant . . . almost quaint” (131). But the successful defense of Poland saved Europe, buying almost two decades of peace. In Zamoyski’s view, the Polish victory stopped the spread of Bolshevism through force of arms for twenty years; Poland and the Baltic States were able to develop as nations; Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania avoided invasion and survived as independent countries; Germany avoided revolution and maintained sovereignty and statehood; democracy established deep roots on the continent; and the rest of Europe rested easier. Of course, World War II followed, changing Europe and the rest of the world forever. And part of that change included the rise of anticommunist regimes, the German and Russian invasions of Poland, redrawn borders at the end of the war, and the imposition of communism to control several falsely so-called “sovereign” countries, including Poland. Even the fall of communism could be traced to this conflict. Zamoyski ends

the book by claiming that “The democratic and civic instinct in that part of Europe today is largely the product of the two decades of freedom secured by Piłsudski and his armies on the Vistula in 1920” (138).

This is a very well-written, enjoyable, insightful, and masterful book. The narrative is fast-paced, exciting, and presented in clear, enviable style. The major personalities involved in the story come to life as intelligent, talented, flawed, daring, and mistrusting. This work will be valuable to anyone interested in military strategy, Central and Eastern European history, Polish politics, or current trends in international relations.

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Ian McEwan. By Lynn Wells (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), xi + 171 pp. £9.99 paper.

A review of an academic’s assessment of a writer’s oeuvre can be written by a reader comparatively well versed in that body of work, or quite the reverse, by a reader like myself new to the oeuvre, curious about what the assessment makes of it, and intrigued by what might be learned before choosing from the oeuvre itself.

This paperback is part of a New British Fiction series focused on contemporary writers judged by the editors “today’s most vitally interesting British novelists.” Each volume, as on Julian Barnes, Salman Rushdie, Martin Amis, and Kazuo Ishiguro, seeks to “interpret their work, assess their influences, and explore their relationships to the times in which they live” (viii).

Regarded by Lynn Wells, Associate Professor of English at the University of Regina, Canada, as “a talented artist with an ethical stake in the human endeavor,” she pays special attention to moral philosophy in selected novels of the prolific McEwan. Having left behind the grotesque and macabre focus of his early works, marked by stark moral relativism, McEwan now offers a clear moral focus “both more complex and more problematic” (12). His fiction underlines, for

example, the “negative consequences that come from choosing self-interest over caring for the other,” and this challenges readers to achieve greater moral awareness. Some may be able to improve their imaginative understanding of others, and behave towards them with “genuine compassion” (15).

Active in the 1970s and 1980s in the feminist and antinuclear movements, and now in the climate change controversy, McEwan “clearly subscribes to the view that artists have an ethical obligation to act for the public good, and that the production of art, however morally enlightening, is not sufficient in and of itself to respond to the world’s problems” (28).

Lynn Wells focuses on nine of eighteen novels, and delves into the plot and complexities of each, tracing linkages among them, and sharing informed compliments, doubts, and reservations; e.g., in the novel, *The Child in Blue*, “McEwan insists on a divide between a fantasized moral life and a ruthlessly contemporary reality, without offering any means of reconciling them” (55). Quite different is his novel, *On Chesil Beach*, wherein he “offers a model for compassionate treatment of others still relevant to our contemporary situation...[and] shows the way to a more benevolent society in any period” (96–97).

The paperback would itself be a much finer read but for a profusion of esoteric “insider” words and terms that hinder understanding; e.g., alterity, amanuensis, binartistic, diachronic accrual, hermeneutic role, Saussurian linguistics, etc., even though the series seeks general readers as well as students, and puts “accessibility at a premium.” Likewise, a reader will feel blindsided by the all too many paragraphs that go on and on and on (see pages 12, 16, 26, 27, 61, 69, 74, 77, 91, 101, 102, 137–38, 144, 145, etc.).

These severe limitations notwithstanding, the book rewards with an insightful chapter that traces connections of McEwan’s personal story with key ideas and characters in his short stories, novels, screen plays, and so on. As well, it includes an interview that has McEwan offer quite illuminating responses, the type you wish were at the length of the worse of Well’s paragraphs. In sum, while the volume suffers much from the failure of the series editors to do their job, it does help to bring forward the richness of McEwan’s contribution—and leaves

one drawn to engage with his narrative artistry and moral philosophy.

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Getting Darwin Wrong: Why Evolutionary Psychology Won't Work.

By Brendan Wallace (Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2010), 187 pp. \$29.90/£14.95 paper.

Brendan Wallace argues in *Getting Darwin Wrong* “that human beings are not digital computers. Instead they are biological entities who are . . . embodied and social, like all other animals” (164). Happily, Wallace presents his argument in sufficiently complex terms to challenge his readers if not convince them that “the cognitivist model simply won’t work as a model of human cognition” (98).

Wallace takes a feisty and circuitous path to makes his case. Wallace asserts that “cognitivism arose as a direct result of (and reaction to) behaviourism” (15), and “EP [evolutionary psychology] is merely cognitivism with . . . Darwinian bells on” (149). The “cognitive revolution [thus] was a ‘revolution’ against behaviourism onto which . . . a classic Western debate, between rationalism and empiricism, was foisted” (151). Wallace, thus, “accounts for the extraordinarily aggressive tone . . . [he attributes to] the younger cognitivists. Indeed, this battle for intellectual hegemony was so violent (rhetorically speaking) that . . . many of the cognitivists have simply never got past it and have spent their careers continually watching the ‘frontiers’ of cognitivism, nervously looking for hypothetical invading hordes of behaviourists on the outside, and quivering backsliders from the true gospel of cognitivism on the inside” (18). Wallace supports his claim for “hostility” with abundant examples. In fact, the word, ‘hostility’ is common throughout the

text (“This helps to explain, I think, the hostility the cognitivists had to the behaviourists: it mirrored . . . the hostility the behaviourists had shown to the structuralists” [28]).

Ironically, Wallace’s argument is an inversion of the argument of creationists: instead of attributing purpose to the Creator and seeking evidence for purposefulness in His works, Wallace accuses cognitivists of ascribing purpose to the mind and searching for evidence in the digital computer. (Thus, “it is now not too difficult to see how natural selection could have created . . . [a rheostat] and how purpose can arise from blind materialist forces” [155]).

The goal of EP, Wallace asserts, is “to turn psychology into a ‘true’ science via computer models of cognition” (70). Regrettably, Wallace understands neither evolution (that he pawns off as “fitness *costs* . . . balanced by the fitness *advantages*” [134]) nor science. Instead of science being a progressive struggle to understand how things work, Wallace portrays science in terms of threat and counterthreat, attack and counterattack, hostility, contempt, and fear (“there was always . . . the vague fear that when neuroscientists started to make real discoveries, the cognitivists wouldn’t like what was discovered” [107]). Consequently, Wallace is prone to confusion about science (“The fact that the evidence is currently so poor is not a good omen for its development as any kind of science” [125]) and evolution (169):

Psychology will not be and should not be reducible to biology. Nevertheless an evolutionary viewpoint might well be another worthwhile weapon in the psychologist’s armoury. But this would have to be a *genuinely* evolutionary psychology, based on biology, as opposed to EP’s attempts to create a psychology based on computer science and then graft some Darwinian rhetoric onto it.

His noble effort escapes his grasp.

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