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Book Reviews

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Book Reviews

A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World. By Rana Mitter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), xix + 357 pp. £9.99 paper.

On May 4, 1919, masses of Chinese protested against the newly announced terms of the Versailles Treaty, which determined the attribution of the formerly German colonies in China not to the Chinese but to the Japanese. The “May Fourth Movement” became a political revolutionary force formulating an explicit contempt for China’s traditional values and urging the Chinese people to adopt Western ideas of equality and democracy.

Rana Mitter narrates more than eighty years of Chinese history by viewing it through the prism of the May Fourth events. While, from the 1920s onwards, the May Fourth ideas established a kind of “New Culture,” Mao’s Cultural Revolution (1966–76), though remaining indebted to May Fourth values to some extent, represented their distortion. Finally, in 1989, student leaders on the Tiananmen Square proclaimed the need for a new May Fourth movement.

Mitter’s storyline can be considered as original since it diverges from the until now commonplace tendency to describe Chinese history in terms of the most dramatic change it underwent—the 1949 take-over by the communists. Mitter delivers a compelling piece of narrated history that can serve everybody as a most useful introduction to the civilization of contemporary China. He provides exhaustive accounts of Chinese popular culture in the 1920s as well as colourful portraits of the foremost representatives of the “May Fourth generation,” like the writers Zou Taofen, Lu Xun, Ding Ling, and the entrepreneur Du Zhongyuan. Lu Xun remains a kind of

pivotal figure throughout the book because through his cynicism he manages to be morally “on the right side” even in times of change.

Mitter’s declared aim to focus on *continuity* instead of on *changes* accounts for the book’s tendency to avoid explicit engagement in the search for causal explanations. Why did such a wholesale destruction actually happen between 1966 and 1976? In principle, the book suggests it had something to do with the ghosts of May Fourth (cf. p. 212). While this can be accepted as a part of the book’s rhetoric, it might be perceived as insufficient by people who are already more informed about China. In large parts of the book, “May Fourth” appears like a virtual quantity which is present but which cannot be spelled out. Certainly, Mitter’s intention is to grasp a cultural atmosphere which is—as nobody would deny—an integral part of socio-political reality. We also understand that “May Fourth” is too general a phenomenon for it to be systematically deduced from events and data. However, once we define “May Fourth” too generally, it appears as something concerning simply everything linked to Chinese modernization.

The comparison of China’s and Japan’s relationship with Pan-Asianism is correct, but one should emphasize that the most important reason for the thriving of Japanese philosophical anti-modernism is not Buddhism’s inherent delight in logical paradoxes that are incompatible with modernity by definition (cf. p. 123), but the fact that Japan was simply more advanced on the way to modernity than China. In Japan, intellectuals felt the necessity to formulate an anti-modern criticism. In Mitter’s flowing narrative there is no space for deeper discussions of such problems. The presence of “European Romanticism” in China as well as Mao’s pre-revolutionary romanticism are mentioned without naming

any of the European authors. Still, Mitter impresses through his *esprit de synthèse* and his talent to mould such a large chunk of history into an appealing and coherent narrative.

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Imagine No Possessions: The Socialist Objects of Russian Constructivism. By Christina Kiaer (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), xvii + 326 pp. \$39.95 cloth.

Since Christina Lodder's pioneering *Russian Constructivism* of 1983 (Yale University Press), there have been numerous publications and museum exhibitions devoted to the Russian avant-garde, especially to the movements of Suprematism, Constructivism and agitational art. Most of these surveys, however, have simply repeated historical data and critical assumptions, stressing, for example, the alleged alliance between the experimental artists and the October Revolution or between Constructivist design and social justification—in broader terms, between leftist art and leftist politics. Whether or not these associations are valid is an extremely complex question, but the fact that Constructivism, for example, flourished simultaneously under other regimes, not always Socialist and certainly not always Marxist (e.g. in Holland and Poland), might lead us to query the manifest debt of Russian Constructivism to the Bolshevik coup.

In her monograph, Christina Kiaer also assumes that Russian Constructivism was born of the October Revolution and that the poster, stage, architecture and textile designs elaborated by artists such as Gustav Klutis, Liubov Popova and Aleksandr Rodchenko were prompted by their support of the Communist ideal. But even if Kiaer accepts such proximity, her study is still novel and engaging for she chooses to identify the standard Constructivist formulae (function determines form, anonymity of production, art as engineering and construction) not only with the conventional milestones of the avant-garde enquiry (such as Vladimir Tatlin's Monument to the Third International or

Rodchenko's suspended constructions), but rather with the commercial packaging that radical artists designed for the everyday objects of Mosselprom (a state industrial enterprise), such as cigarette packs, candy wrappers, beer advertisements and even posters for baby pacifiers. Here was a rampant consumerism which, if not motivated by private greed, still appealed to, and was generated by, an enormous potential market deprived of those basic commodities which the West had long taken for granted.

Some observers might argue that, ultimately, the Constructivists' promotional materials for the products of Lenin's New Economic Policy (which signaled a partial return to the free enterprise system) differed little in strategy or design from Capitalist advertising, but, as Kiaer implies, there were new and specifically Soviet attitudes towards the object and its consumption which did distinguish the Constructivist worldview. Boris Arvatov's call for the active object, for example, Tatlin's emphasis on the simplicity and economy of a stove or suit of clothes, or Vladimir Maiakovsky's and Rodchenko's evocation of a *homo sovieticus* who was to acquire, but not own, the State cigarettes, beer and cookies, were several of such attempts to offer a different product to a deviant consciousness.

Kiaer writes with verve and commitment and perhaps because of the sheer energy of her prose, certain questions remain unanswered. One wonders, for example, how Rodchenko and Varvara Stepanova could have yielded their Constructivist conviction so readily to the exigencies of Socialist Realism in the 1930s (cf. Rodchenko's photographs of Soviet meets), why so much of the Mosselprom advertisements seem to draw on pre-Revolutionary techniques (asymmetrical typography, variegated typeface) and how Kiaer might have subsumed Naum Gabo's and El Lissitzky's designs for Capitalist corporations in the 1920s and 1930s into her "Communist" narrative.

But such quibbles do not detract from the value of this new and audacious assessment of the Constructivist movement in Russia. With its six thematic sections (especially striking are "The Constructivist Flapper Dress" and "Rodchenko in Paris"), copious notes and ample bibliography,

Imagine No Possessions is a major contribution to our wider understanding of the Russian avant-garde: Kiaer's book is perspicacious, provocative and refreshing.

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De Arte Graphica. By Charles-Alphonse Dufresnoy. Translated by Christopher Allen, Yasmin Haskell, and Francis Mueske (Geneva: Droz, 2005), 560 pp. 158 Swiss francs.

Although Charles-Alphonse Dufresnoy (1611–68) was a French painter born in Paris and educated by French Jesuits, he spent most of his life in Rome, where he became well acquainted with Nicolas Poussin and other distinguished seventeenth-century French and Italian painters, and developed a deep understanding of classical and neo-classical painting and art theory. In the early 1640s, he felt the need to compose a treatise on painting that he envisaged as an extension to the graphic arts of the insights on lyric poetry expressed in Horace's very influential *Ars poetica*. Latin was still the lingua franca for learned Europeans and Dufresnoy chose to compose his *De Arte Graphica* in Latin and not in French so that he could reach scholars and painters from many different European countries. Although his Latin poem began to circulate in manuscripts as early as 1649, it was not published until 1668, the very year of Dufresnoy's death. In their very solid historical introduction to their critical edition and English translation of *De Arte Graphica*, Christopher Allen, Yasmin Haskell, and Francis Mueske describe Dufresnoy's lengthy artistic career, identify his extant paintings, and analyze well the place of this poem in neo-Latin didactic poetry of the seventeenth century and the critical reception of this treatise across Europe.

Like Horace, Dufresnoy argued that a creative artist needed to combine a mastery of technical skills with a creative and highly original imitation of respected models. Dufresnoy strove to teach young painters how to use perspective, structure, and color in order to create fully original paintings that were based on classical myths and events from

ancient Roman and Greek history with which learned viewers were well acquainted. He was sensitive to the aesthetic effect that paintings have on viewers. It is unfortunate that this book does not include color reproductions of some of the extant paintings that can be definitely attributed to Dufresnoy. It would have been very interesting for readers to see for themselves how Dufresnoy applied his theories on perspective, structure, and color in his own paintings, which are now not as well known as those of his eminent contemporary and countryman, Nicolas Poussin. This is, however, a minor reservation about an excellent contribution to art history in the early modern period.

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Athenian Democratic Origins and Other Essays. By Geoffrey E. M. de Ste. Croix (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), vii + 464 pp. £29.99 paper.

My early perception of Geoffrey de Ste. Croix (GSC, 1910–2000) was of some aristocrat, some knight of the Temple who always wrote about the Christian martyrs in Roman times—not my man, not my subject. This attitude drastically changed when I started my doctoral thesis in 1986 and discovered a highly skilled and fascinating ancient Greek and Marxist historian. From his 1981 very detailed and monumental study *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World from the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests* onwards, he and Moses Finley remained the main sparring partners in my Greek studies.

De Ste. Croix is a classic representative of the English brand of rhetorical Marxists. Although written in the 1960s, the heyday of Marxist debates, this new collection of his hitherto unpublished texts could not receive a proper critical response. One can fully disagree with GSC on the big issues—trade, nomadism/pastoralism, slavery, demographic problems, agriculture, polis—chora division and the like—with which Marxism could not deal very successfully in ancient studies.

Notwithstanding, I remained fascinated with GSC thanks to his great skill in coping with primary sources, the powerful drive behind his always valuable arguments, the destruction of (also my own) childish belief in the holiness of whatever ancient writer and the criticism of “the gloomy waste of misunderstood and incomprehensible tradition” (Niebuhr). Compared to GSC, Finley, who was attacked by GSC for his limited knowledge including Marx’s class concept or the slavery problem, is a journalist whose polished texts show a facile management of sources. The upshot of this is that GSC is not a bestseller writer as Finley is, although his *Class Struggle* and *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (1972) have become standard texts for all who study the political, juridical, military and socio-economic characteristics of ancient Greek life. This is not the place and time to renew the debate with GSC, which *Athenian Democratic Origins* will no doubt provoke after careful study.

As said, the essays collected here by Harvey, Parker, and Thonemann were mostly written in the 1960s as part of a planned book. It is remarkable that in the forty years GSC still had to live, he could not publish them. The explanation given by the editors is not convincing: his *Class Struggle* “claimed all Ste. Croix’s attention for the rest of his life.” This “rest” lasted nineteen years, enough to publish much more than the 464 pages of this book. (The editors fail to point out that GSC himself announced the publication of the first Solon essay in *Class Struggle*, 114, note 1). In my view, however, this has something to do with the incompatibility between his Marxist *Class Struggle* and, for instance, his studies on Solonian classes (*telē*) and constitution in general along with the ancient commentaries on Aristotle, Plutarch, Pollux and others.

Half of this collection is devoted to Solon’s and Cleisthenes’ constitutions. With a long commentary on Aristotle’s *Athenaion Politeia* and a long note on citizenship laws, these contributions to the political-juridical history of ancient Greece make up three quarters of the book.

Socio-economic problems are discussed in contributions about the measurement of goods (a comment on Aristotle’s remarks on the *metra*) and about the importance of trade (relative to colonisation and to the position of the upper

class in Aegina). The collection closes with a commentary on Herodotos’ dealings with King Cleomenes I of Sparta (the latter is strongly defended against Herodotos and his Arcadian spokesmen).

The editors must have had a difficult task. They have done a good job, not least by providing an excellent index and particularly by writing an afterword to every text with relevant hints about present debates. The publisher deserves praise for providing students with (rather costly) texts which can teach them how to deal with ancient writers, while giving critics the opportunity to come to terms with Geoffrey de Ste. Croix’s sharp pen again.

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Thucydides’ War Narrative: A Structural Study. By Carolyn J. Dewald (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), xiv + 258 pp. £ 32.50 cloth.

In his review of Tim Rood’s book on Thucydides’ narrative Victor Castellani warned the reader: “Novices and amateurs of ancient history beware! Only those who know Thucydides pretty well and have at least a translation at hand will enjoy reading and benefit from this book” (*European Legacy* 11.1 [2006]: 89). For Carolyn J. Dewald’s *Thucydides’ War Narrative* I have to repeat the same advice and to extend it to most if not all professionals in ancient history, philology and related disciplines. The author’s wish to conduct a quantitative analysis of how Thucydides’ war history is written already took shape in 1972–75 in her dissertation but was, apparently, not fulfilled since she now uses a new quantitative method to do the same. In between she has also written shorter studies of the organization of Thucydides’ history.

The question is whether Thucydides professionals and amateurs alike will be impressed by this quantitative treatment of ‘their’ subject. They will certainly point to the extensive commentaries of Gomme (1945–70) and Hornblower (1991ff.) or analyses of the *crème de la crème* of English historiography like

de Ste. Croix (1972), Dover (1973) and again Hornblower (1987) as most outstanding examples of the present Thucydides scholarship; adding to their results something new and interesting would be a nearly hopeless task. This apart from the fact that the debate about the “composition” of Thucydides’ history was a hot topic that “dominated all studies, in particular German studies” (de Romilly) long before World War II. This debate concerned even “*The Thucydides Problem*” (de Ste. Croix), but it was perceived at last as “a perfect example of a vain and insoluble problem.” (*The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* [London: Duckworth, 1972], 51ff. and 295ff. The last quote is also given by Dewald, n. 8, p. 194). It should be interesting to know the solution(s) given by a quantitative approach to the “narrative arrangement” of Thucydides’ history. What is the difference between this arrangement and a “composition” of his history?

Reactions like these are similar to those to the activities of the so-called cliometrics in earlier times, while the quantitative approach was never very popular in classical studies. In the case of Dewald the method is even more rigorous than usual in modern analytical historiography, sociology, etc. while not a period or situations but the historian’s own work, even of one of the holiest in the profession (Nicole Loraux: he is “not a colleague”), is filleted by purely quantitative means. However, whatever the approach, the result should at least bring some new understanding, and in an optimistic mood, a better one of, in this case, Thucydides and/or his famous history. That should also be the criterion by which Dewald’s book is judged.

Dewald, in fact, is not interested in Thucydides’ reasons behind his historiography or the correctness of his judgments; no investigation is conducted on his reliability, on the value of his writings as a historical source, nor on its literary features and impact on other (ancient) historiography, nor on how to decipher the message written between the lines, or how to cope with ethical or moral problems raised by extreme demonstrations of the most cruel *Realpolitik*, and so on. Dewald’s analysis is strictly of a technical linguistic nature written in the shadow of a “linguistic turn”: she simply counts subjects, verb types, and the distribution of place or time formulae in

introductory sentences or self defined “units.” This is in need of a specific justification.

One would expect the preface and/or the long introduction to be the place(s) to do so by answering questions like: “the present non-quantitative analyses of Thucydides’ history have the following shortcomings and I will try to come up with a method to avoid these”; the very least one would expect is the posing of some theses from which the proof of the pudding will follow. However, preface and introduction remain rather silent in this respect.

Instead of this we find excessive name-dropping combined with self-evident expressions: “My arguments here have been shaped by those of Mink himself and by A. MacIntyre, A. Norman, D. Carr, N. Carroll, G. Spiegel, C. Roberts, and the joint work of Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, but my chief concern in thinking through this issue has remained the text of Thucydides” (14–15). Before this a host of other people are quoted at length, one after the other, with Aristotle, Foucault and Bakhtin later added to the list. Bakhtin, she believes, “could not write on history or historians, since he lived in a society in which the only history was by definition Marxist” (19). Whatever one thinks about Marxism, this kind of Cold War prejudice in 2005 demonstrates the less than superficial knowledge about her own subject.¹ Dewald does not think at all about Marxism, otherwise she would have criticized, for instance, the famous Thucydides analysis by the Marxist Geoffrey de Ste. Croix. Now his name is only dropped.

She gives us a brief summary of her argument: “that Thucydides’ *History* is organized to tell its story in a way that allows both the decisions and actions of people in the past and the historian’s own understanding of them to emerge, in tandem with one another, as coherent and credible for the reading audience” (15). The best one could say about this (and the following) non-committal sentence(s) is that all earlier generations of (non)professional Thucydides-readers and interpreters must have accepted this as self-evident, as *Binsenwahrheit* for the leading German readership before World War II.

The book is further divided into two parts following the common division of the whole war (431–404). The first part covers the “ten-years war” or the so-called Archidamian

War (II.1–V.24). In the first chapter Dewald explains the terminology used in her book; the second chapter is only devoted to the introductory sentences of each of the 119 “units of action” (in the first part of the history; 286 in total); next follows an analysis of the internal structure of each “unit”; the last chapter demonstrates the patterns formed by the “units of action.”

The second part of the book covers the rest of Thucydides’ history. The whole fifth chapter is devoted to the “Years of the Peace” (V.25–VI.7); this inconclusive Peace of Nicias divides, indeed, the war into two phases. This second phase has as its well-known topics the disastrous Sicilian adventure of the Athenians and their definite defeat in the so-called “Decelean” war ending in 404 (the short chapter 6 analyses the years 17 through 21, VI.8–VIII.109). In the last and seventh chapter of the book, the results are discussed followed by too detailed indices and a series of appendices in which most of the figures are concentrated, although throughout the text 28 tables are given.

The main text is extremely difficult to read. Page after page sentences like the following are *normal*: “In year eleven, v.35.2a, v.35.2b–7, v.36–37, and v.38 begin a chain; v.39.2–3, v.40–41, and v.42–48 continue it in year twelve. At the end of the year, v.51 stands in loose narrative connection with v.52.1” (138). No professional reader can spend the time to control these and comparable assertions; the functioning of normal scholarship is blocked by this kind of presentation. Is it worthwhile anyway? A few remarks about the content of the book can possibly give us the answer.

A first result (better: an a priori thesis, since it is told in the first sentences of the preface) is that, according to Dewald, the story of the first ten years of the war is written in a “paratactic style” (literally: *parataxis* is the style of a “military battle line”) like beads on a string. The “string” here is the thematic unity of the whole; the “beads” are like the building blocks, the “units of action” which follow each other in sequence. The story of the second phase of the war has been “modified in the direction of increasing narrative integration . . . a larger unified and complex whole.” It is a transformation into, what is called, a “hypotactic style” (from the Greek *hypotaxis*).

Probably “result” is more correct than “a priori thesis” because it is the *only* concrete

result of Dewald’s whole concern with Thucydides’ history after about thirty years of counting; a result which could be reached in three months of hard work by means of a proper computer model. Dewald must have been fascinated by the Greek word *taxis*, which also figured in the title of her dissertation. Time and again she stresses that the present book is a “version” of this (apparently unpublished) dissertation of 1975 or that the “argument remains substantially the same as it was in 1975.” This assertion is only acceptable thanks to the constancy of Thucydides’ text and, therefore, the counting of words and sentences must be, in principle, the same (but, of course, not the interpretation of the figures, let alone of the text).

Unfortunately, even the understanding and use of central concepts is rather flawed. Indeed, *parataxis* is first and foremost a military concept for “placing side by side,” “marshalling, line of battle” related to “the front rank of the phalanx” (Liddell & Scott). This must be the strongest and most impenetrable row of the whole block of close-knit soldiers. However, this has nothing to do with an image like “beads on a string” which is a line with parts regularly pushed forward, bridge-heads eventually, which—in military terms—has to counteract the (first) inimical attacks as solid immovable structures. In other words, a linguistic “solid block” approach to Thucydides’ texts instead of the adopted “line-with-blocks” approach makes a difference.

The counter concept *hypotaxis* is not properly defined. Once it concerns the integrative narrative (XII), another time it concerns the absence of an “individual scene . . . as separate and self-sufficient” (4). Dewald does not inform the reader that *hypotaxis* is also related to military affairs: literally it indicates something like “drawing up of light-armed [soldiers] behind the phalanx,” but also “subjection, submission.” What has this to do with a supposed integrative narrative of the second part of Thucydides’ story?

Apart from this, the question of the degree of integration of Part 2 is not clear. As any good lexicon will show it was Thucydides himself who insisted on regarding it as a unit (OCD, p. 1134). In this respect Dewald is not very original. However, the facts are that this second part is incomplete, while a case could be made

for “some . . . signs of drafts, at points even of sketches” (Castellani).

The most astonishing feature of Dewald’s book is that Thucydides’ whole first book (in my edition about 100 pages) is simply omitted with no further explanation than that it “was omitted from the earlier study and has not been a major focus of attention in this version either, although I have added some pages to a new conclusion suggesting possible points of connection” (2). The reference here to “some pages” gives no additional information on this deliberate amputation of the narrative.

Since my ‘*doctorvater*’ was a famous cliometric historian, I am not at all against the use of quantitative methods in historical and related analysis. On the contrary, they are often a necessary part of analyses. However, one must know what their impact is, how relevant or important they are, and one must be aware—in my view at least—that in quantitative studies, definitions/rules must be held more rigorously than in qualitative studies, otherwise scholarly communication is confined to an unhappy few or worse. I am afraid that Dewald’s contribution to the “linguistic turn” is nothing but a demonstration of the end of this hype.

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NOTE

1. It is enough to consult Elisabeth Charlotte Welskopf’s still impressive four-volume reader *Hellenische Poleis. Krise-Wandlung-Wirkung* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1974) to see how extensively soviet-Russian and GDR scholars in “Bakhtin’s time” referred to Thucydides, Herodotos, Xenophon, Plutarchus, etc. as their witnesses, sparring-partners, and sources.

The Fragility of Empathy after the Holocaust. By Carolyn J. Dean (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), ix + 203 pp. \$45.00/£25.00 cloth; \$18.95/£10.95 paper.

Carolyn Dean has brought her well-honed skills as an intellectual historian to bear on the problematic behavior of bystanders confronting the Holocaust and other incidents of brutal behavior. Earlier studies of perpetrators and victims have inevitably led to analyses of the values, attitudes, and behaviors of the bystanders who chose not to intervene to prevent such dark tragedies as the Holocaust. Her scholarly essays in this volume on the disappearance of empathy in our society is a masterpiece of scholarship that successfully illuminates how a culture of public indifference has been constructed during the last five decades. Protests against sanctioned murder illustrate our desire to stop torture and killing, but are generally followed by our refusal to commit resources to the task. Dean contends that our refusal to dedicate resources to stop state-sanctioned murder is nurtured by the complex narrative of numbness that we have constructed.

Following a masterful Introduction/Review of the Literature on questions swirling around issues of empathy, Dean presents four essays that delineate how empathy/suffering, the Holocaust, and pornography are related, to dissect Goldhagen’s contribution to the culture of numbness, to expose the pervasive language of victimization in our culture, and to try to unveil the “real” Hitler. The narrative thread that holds these essays together is designed to show how a culture of numbness has dislodged virtually any possibility of meaningful empathy with victims. Her conclusion is frightening, since there seems to be a psychological continuity between “normal” persons and monstrous perpetrators. Bystanders, therefore, have become potential or even virtual murderers.

Dean’s study of indifference challenges the liberal ethos that we possess a common humanity and so can resonate with one another’s needs and sufferings. Numbness in her study appears to be a tool for psychological self-protection and has to be seen as our own carefully constructed narrative designed to constrict moral responses to suffering. If her thesis is correct, then human unity is only a construct of the past. Theologians and moral philosophers might disagree. Whether or not we like this thesis, she does ask the correct questions.

Her essays, models of historical inquiry, develop the foundation for the dehumanization/depersonalization ethos that seems to control our culture. She examines how the Holocaust and pornography are connected, since they are both consumed with the obliteration of the humanity of others. In both pornography and in Holocaust “marketing,” humans are seen as commodities, who are re-victimized again and again. Dean also very carefully explores the enormous literature on pornography to explicate how even exhibits dedicated to understanding the dynamics behind the Holocaust may well also dull our potential for empathy and create a support for indifference toward victimization. Goldhagen’s *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* is likewise accused of spawning numbness, because it appeals to the type of voyeurism associated with pornography, at least according to Dean, who offers a very lucid evaluation of the controversy raised by this book. In her final essay, Dean treats the equation between Nazism and homosexuality, which has obsessed commentators on the *Hitlerzeit* for decades. Such a connection is insidious. Using homosexuality as a lens to examine the causes of empathic failure during the Third Reich and thereafter seems to explain mass murder by reference to a sexual orientation that can historically, at least according to the data, be situated in only a small group of actors. An extensive literature exists on this speculative connection that, Dean insists, allows us to reflect on ourselves but to assign responsibility elsewhere. Because Dean relies on a psychoanalytical model for her exploration of this psychosexual theme, many readers may find this chapter too reductionistic.

Dean’s study of western culture can help unpack the sub-currents that have nurtured our ability to dehumanize victims. All may not agree with every element that she weaves into her analysis of our numbness toward suffering, but she does challenge her readers to try yet again to construct a culture of empathy so that future policies leading to sanctioned murder can be opposed with the full resources at our disposal.

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The Access Principle: The Case for Open Access to Research and Scholarship. By John Willinsky (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), xv + 287 pp. \$34.95 cloth.

In the concluding chapter to *The Access Principle*, John Willinsky begins by supporting Elizabeth Eisenstein’s assertion that the invention of the printing press and the institution of the publishing practices that followed it represent an “unacknowledged revolution.” Via electronic and online mediums, publishing and knowledge dissemination are undergoing a similar revolution in the twenty-first century—one, as Willinsky notes, that has been well-chronicled as it has unfolded, and has more or less been acknowledged as revolutionary from the outset. Willinsky’s book represents another chapter in this collective chronicle, and one which unabashedly takes the side of the revolutionaries. In this case, it’s not the “inky life” (Willinsky’s term) of early modern scholarly authors and their publishers who are changing the face of knowledge, but rather the world of electronic publishing and multiple organizations, institutions and technologies seeking to bridge the paper-electronic publishing divide and bring a wide swath of academic materials to a broad spectrum of global institutions and reading publics increasingly interested in multiple forms of information produced in the supposed “ivory tower.”

The Access Principle is a polemic, arguing for the increasing digitalization of scholarly publishing and the highest level of effort to make broad swaths of scholarly work available to as many universities, educational institutions, libraries and other relevant institutions as possible. As such, Willinsky defines “the access principle” as the idea that “a commitment to the value and quality of research carries with it a responsibility to extend the circulation of such work as far as possible and ideally to all who are interested in it and might profit by it” (xii). Arguing for such ideas, *The Access Principle* ranges over a wide variety of publishing issues, from the role of scientific associations and organizations in publishing processes to publishing economics to bibliographical issues of reading and indexing. At the heart of the text, however, are the twin issues of digital publishing and public access to scholarly information—the latter more easily accomplished, Willinsky argues, through digital publishing.

Generally, Willinsky's vision is for universal electronic access to all scholarly journals from as many appropriate online portals as possible—again, with primary emphasis lying on universities, other higher and secondary educational institutions and libraries.

Anecdotally, Willinsky's case is convincing. Noting, for example, that the Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI) could only afford subscriptions to five medical journals in 2000, he draws attention to that facility's greatly enhanced research potential upon the arrival of the Health InterNetwork Access to Research Initiative in 2001—a database of over 2000 health science journals provided at no charge by corporate publishers to institutions in developing countries. Willinsky also notes how expanding online access at KEMRI's library from one to six computers represented an exponential improvement in research conditions.

Taking a very different tact, Willinsky also notes the decreasing lack of relevance of the paper journal in a wide number of fields. Citing the case of a paper in the field of astrophysics, for example, Willinsky notes that, while it was eventually published in the prestigious *Astrophysical Journal*, the paper had already been posted in the arXiv.org E-Print Archive—a site contributed to and checked daily by many members of the global physics community seeking the very latest updates in their field. Thus, as Willinsky notes, the paper as published in paper form, or even the electronic version of *Astrophysical Journal*, had already been read and commented upon by a large portion of the field for which it was intended. In the hyper-communicative world of the twenty-first century, Willinsky suggests, electronically-based publishing and scholarly review protocols are those which make the most sense.

It's difficult to find fault with Willinsky's rationale, or not support his social and ethical concerns—namely, that open access to scholarly information is crucial for global development and informed reading publics. As he notes, electronic publishing need not detract from quality; peer-review processes can easily be maintained, and a vast array of prestigious journals now provide some form of electronic access or another. Not surprisingly, the tricky part comes in relation to economics. On one hand, increasing numbers of publishers are

realizing the opportunities for new varieties of income based on electronic and digital mediums. On the other hand, however, subscription costs for prestigious journals continue to well-outstrip rates of inflation. As Willinsky claims, there is thus “little reason to let up in pursuit of the access principle” (79).

Two points are perhaps problematic about *The Access Principle*. First, published in 2006, the book occasionally projects the sense that it has discovered ethical, social and economic issues that have long been present for scholars in a wide variety of fields—for example, what are the challenges and benefits to changes in the basic media of scholarly publishing? Secondly, Willinsky does not extensively address the wider issue of the potentially disorienting and dehumanizing effects of fully opening the digital gates of the information highway—effects explored well, for example, by Manuel Castells in *The Information Age* (1996–98), and hinted at in Jean Baudrillard's and Paul Virilio's multiple discussions of simulacra, virtuality and the rapidity of contemporary information exchange.

Nonetheless, these weaknesses may also be the strengths of *The Access Principle*. Ultimately, Willinsky's book offers a systematic presentation of concerns and ideas surely held by many scholars across both the human and natural sciences. Finally, disorienting and/or dehumanizing as the world of digital media may often seem, it is a world equally rife with opportunities both in terms of the exchange of information between scholars and in terms of the attempt of scholars to connect with public interests and problems in global development. To that extent, as Willinsky suggests, “the access principle” may no longer represent a choice. Rather, it may be a necessity for an increasingly information-based, post-industrial world.

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The Lesson of the Master: On Borges and His Work. By Norman Thomas Di Giovanni (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2004), 205 pp. £9.99 paper.

This book provides valuable insights into the life and creative process of one of the major

authors of the twentieth century. Pointedly borrowing its title from Henry James, it also gives a fascinating account of a short-lived but very intense relationship that began around 1968 between a great writer and an admiring translator who eventually turned into a friend, confidant, promoter, problem-solver, and even co-creator—a relationship that ended abruptly and not amicably in 1972.

Borges had an uncanny feeling for language—even in English. Thomas Di Giovanni cites an example when Borges, without knowing the original manuscript of a letter written by Robert Louis Stevenson, sensed that the English version's choice of one particular word was "silly" and so Borges removed it from a Stevenson quote in the Spanish edition of his own collected poems (172–73). Years later, Di Giovanni had an opportunity to consult a more recent edition of Stevenson's writings and found that the new edition had corrected the misprinted word that Borges had sensed to be "silly."

One of the more entertaining chapters in the book, "Borges and His Interpreters" (47–69), offers an amusing and enlightening anthology of linguistic ignorance and vainglorious misreadings on the part of Borges' academic interpreters. Borges would answer public professorial overinterpretations of his writings with the gently ironic "Ah, thank you! You have enriched my work!" (60). The more personal and heart-felt chapter "In Memory of Borges" (15–46) describes Borges and his translator at work, while offering snippets of the Argentinian writer's intimate and public life. Here Di Giovanni lets it all "hang out" and even includes occasions when he chose to lie to Borges or to talk to a publisher behind Borges' back. Although these actions were all done with Borges' best interests in mind and do appear to have been beneficial to his productivity and publishing, one cannot but feel a certain uneasiness while reading these pages. The other chapters—"Borges at Play: The Self and the Selves," "Evaristo Carriego: Borges as Biographer," "Borges and His Sources: *A Universal History of Infamy*," "Borges and His Autobiography," "On Translating Borges," and "A Translator's Guide"—include useful critical viewpoints and factual materials for serious students of Borges.

The book suggests, and the record of Borges' publications seems to back up, that Di

Giovanni played an important role in coaxing Borges into writing fiction again after a long creative hiatus. The first but not the last result of this renewed activity during his association with Di Giovanni was *El informe de Brodie* (1970). During this period, the Di Giovanni-Borges collaborative translations of Borges' works into English—in which Borges was fluent—are undoubtedly the closest to Borges' understanding and awareness of his own creative intentions, at least at the time when these translations took place. Unfortunately, later decisions by the Borges estate have made these collaborative efforts unavailable.

One can make a couple of minor factual corrections to the book. It is inaccurate to suggest that Comparative Literature was invented in the United States in order to study Borges (85, footnote): Comparative Literature had a long history in both the United States and Europe before Borges began to be studied in American universities; and the word *punzó* (a deep red) is used not only in Argentina (56), but in other Latin American countries as well.

Borges received many international awards, including the Cervantes Prize of the Spanish Academy of Letters. In 1961 he was honored, jointly with Samuel Beckett, with the prestigious Formentor Prize, established by six of the main Western publishing houses (Gallimard, Einaudi, Rowohlt, Seix Barral, Grove, Weidenfeld and Nicolson). However, he never received the most widely known public recognition—the Nobel Prize for literature awarded by the Swedish Academy. This omission is probably the most blatant case of academic injustice in modern times. Given Borges' stature as a writer, it can only be explained by his political views, which were unacceptable to the majoritarian sectors of academia. From their point of view, there was ample justification for this enmity.

Unlike Octavio Paz (Nobel Prize 1990), who tempered his criticism of the extreme left with unflattering comments on the United States and "capitalism," or Pablo Neruda (Nobel Prize 1971), who wrote an ode to Stalin and remained until his death a member of the Communist Party, Borges as a mature writer never hid his admiration for the United States and even cheered its war against the Viet Cong and North Viet Nam. He supported the failed CIA-backed Cuban exiles' landing at the Bay of

Pigs against the Cuban Communist regime. He supported Israel in its wars against its Muslim neighbors. While visiting Spain, he praised Franco for saving the country from the Marxist takeover, which in Russia led to millions of civilians being killed and to seventy years of oppression. He even called Federico García Lorca, an icon of the left, a “minor poet” of the Andalusian picturesque, and suggested that Lorca’s death at the hands of Franco’s Nationalists was a major factor in the growth of his reputation. Reasoning that Augusto Pinochet’s *coup* against a Marxist President had saved Chile from Cuba’s fate, Borges accepted Chile’s Order of Merit and then visited Chile to receive an honorary degree and dine with Pinochet himself. In 1963 he joined the Argentinian Conservative Party and gave a speech at the public reception celebrating the occasion. He supported the Argentinian military’s *coup* against the democratically elected Peronists, reasoning that democratic elections should not be respected if they bring to power anti-democratic parties. He supported the Argentinian military in its ruthless war against the terrorism of such organizations as the *montoneros* and the Marxist *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo*. Though he lamented the excesses of the military, Borges remained very much a viscerally anti-left wing and anti-*demos* intellectual.

Peronists accused him of befriending the big landowners, the cultural elites, and the rich, and of being an *extranjerizante* (a lover of foreign things). This last charge is undermined by Borges’ abundant use of Argentinian lore and settings. But it is true that, like James Joyce, a writer whom he resembles in some ways, Borges used the landscape and the history of his native land as a means to examine issues and themes that transcended his country’s reality. That he chose as his final resting place, apparently of his own volition, that most international of cities—Geneva—rather than his family vault in Buenos Aires, only reinforces this view. Peronists also “accused” him of being a Jew in connection with this perceived lack of Argentinian “national roots,” a charge that he answered by listing his long Christian ancestry while asserting that he would actually have been proud to be a Jew.

The attitude of Fidel Castro’s friend Gabriel García Márquez (Nobel Prize 1982) towards

Borges illustrates the insoluble problem faced by his enemies among the intelligentsia: Borges’ political views were anathema, but he could not be ignored. “He is a writer I detest,” García Márquez declared; yet he also admitted to owning Borges’ *Obras completas* and reading him regularly. Political correctness continues to haunt Borges even after his death: a recent translation of one of his works transforms a sentence like *A todo padre le interesan los hijos que ha procreado* (“Every father feels concern for the sons he has procreated”) into “Every parent feels concern for the children he has procreated.”

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Beckett’s Dantes: Intertextuality in the Fiction and Criticism. By Daniela Caselli (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2005), viii + 232 pp. \$ 50.00 cloth.

In her introduction Daniela Caselli states that she is interested in “what it means to claim that an intertextual element comes from Dante, both in terms of the project of intertextuality and in terms of the explication of Beckett’s texts in their own right” (2). The eight chapters of the volume illustrate this approach and none better than chapter 3, dedicated to the collection *More Pricks Than Kicks* in which the character of Belacqua, already encountered in earlier works, reappears as the *fil rouge* of Beckett’s stories, indeed as the protagonist: “he is not only an explicitly intertextual figure but also an intratextual one, in so far as he inherits many features of the *Dream Belacqua*” (57). In this collection Dante is particularly present not only through quotations from the *Comedy* and the repetition of his name but also through references to the *Convivio* and the *De Vulgari Eloquentia*. Caselli concludes that “*More Pricks Than Kicks* is an early example of what happens to the whole Beckett canon: intertextual and intratextual references to Dante interconnect Beckett texts and constitute them into the Beckett *oeuvre*” (77).

In *Dream to Fair Middling Women* Dante is very strongly present through the figure of Belacqua while in *Murphy* and *Watt* “Belacqua is no longer a character and Dante becomes an absence” (81). Caselli goes on to say that “Critical tradition has made Dante’s absence visible in *Murphy* not only through the name of Belacqua but also through sections of the “Whoroscope”” to which she turns her attention, analysing it as a text of its own standing in which a number of correspondences with *Murphy* are highlighted and discussed in detail. Dante is a significant discourse also in the *Nouvelles/Novellas* where the French version at times displays more humour and irony, thanks to references to other authors and to Dante, as in the passage below:

Donnez un vase de nuit, dis-je. J’ai beaucoup aimé, enfin assez aimé, pendant assez longtemps, les mots vase de nuit, ils me faisaient penser à Racine, ou à Baudelaire, je ne sais plus lequel, les deux peut-être, oui, je regrette, j’avais de la lecture, et par eux j’arrivais là où le verbe s’arrête, on dirait du Dante. Mais elle n’avait pas de vase de nuit.

Whereas the English is a bland: “Give me the chamber pot, I said. But she did not possess one” (121).

The Lost Ones/Le dépeupleur has been described as a “Dantean hellscape” for at least one reason; it reminds us of the “lost people” and the inscription on the gate of the *Inferno* in canto III: “Per me si va nella città dolente.” Quite fittingly, as an homage to Belacqua, the conclusion is entitled “Farewell to the Old Lutist” and Caselli reiterates her approach and findings in the following sentences:

The complexity ‘incompetent’ ways in which each Beckett text constructs the ‘competent’ poet as source, allusion, and a model to parody suggest that there is one Dante, or one *Comedy*, whose meaning Beckett more or less accurately and faithfully understands and reproduces, or rejects. Instead the different Dantes in Beckett are elements outside the text which question the very idea of an outside-text, thus being intratextual unifying elements which constitute the Beckett *oeuvre* as remarkably interconnected and consistent (202).

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The Present Personal: Philosophy and the Hidden Face of Language. By Hagi Kenaan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), xi + 199 pp. \$35.00 cloth.

In *The Present Personal: Philosophy and the Hidden Face of Language*, Hagi Kenaan presents himself with a provocative but seemingly impossible task, viz., “to recover the philosophical possibility of listening to language as the embodiment of a speaker’s idiosyncratic, unique presence,” which arises in an ethical focal point (the personal) that is at “the very heart of ordinary meaning” (4). The problem for Kenaan is that philosophy utilizes language and performs analyses that attempt to formulate universal claims that outstrip the personal. Hence, “the singular presence of the speaking individual” is not heard in either analytic or Continental philosophy (3–4).

I do not believe that Kenaan succeeds in getting back to the personal in this text. Instead, the personal remains hidden, perhaps due to the very nature of the personal. However, Kenaan does present a problem that philosophy needs to address, and his analyses in this book do provoke thought and are worthy of being read.

In a certain sense, Kenaan’s project is a contemporary retrieval of Kierkegaard’s project. Kierkegaard wondered what happened to the personal subject in the face of Hegelian dialectics. Kenaan wonders what happened to the personal in the face of analytic philosophy and its prioritizing of the proposition, its so-called statement of fact, that leaves the personal behind. Kenaan begins his analysis by examining some provocative statements from Wittgenstein’s *Logical Investigations* that bring the hegemony of the proposition into question within analytic philosophy. He then moves to an analysis of Kierkegaard’s view of the limits of philosophical language and the paradox of indirect communication to show how Kierkegaard saw a need to retrieve the personal. Next, Kenaan explores how J. L. Austin brought the hegemony of the proposition into question by focusing on the place of performatives in language, which is the place where Kenaan believes the personal belongs in analytic philosophy. However, he also contends that analytic philosophy diluted Austin’s idea by bringing his ideas back into the realm of proposition. From there, Kenaan moves to Heidegger, who tries to get back to a sense of

the singular in his analysis of *Dasein*. However, Kenaan faults Heidegger for disparaging everydayness as place of the *They* and for not seeing its richness, since it is in everydayness that the personal takes place. Further, he faults Heidegger for his move away from the personal in his later philosophy. Next, Kenaan undertakes a retrieval of Kant's aesthetic judgment, which he contends provides a way to get back to the personal, since reflective judgment expresses the singularity in a unique way. Finally, Kenaan tries to show how a sense of time is at work in the personal and how language manifests a sense of the personal in philosophy. For this last section, Kenaan turns to an analysis of the place of the preface in philosophy.

What I find intriguing about the book is the way Kenaan takes both analytic and Continental philosophy seriously. He tries to glean insights from both areas of philosophy, while also being critical of their disregard for the personal. I found my understanding enriched by his critical analyses, and looked forward to his new insights regarding the personal as I kept reading.

However, I was disappointed with the last chapter entitled "Personal Time." I had been led to believe that Kenaan would develop a sense of the personal out of everydayness. Instead, I found a philosopher looking for the personal in a philosophical text. The only place the personal arose for Kenaan in the philosophical text was in the preface, where a thinker gives some personal reflections about what he/she has done. Ultimately, an issue regarding time and the author's relationship to his/her project arise in the preface, and Kenaan's analysis of Wittgenstein's provocative statements are interesting, but the personal did not burst forth from these pages. Kenaan ends up reducing the personal to a search for journal-like entries that reflect more about doing philosophy than actually philosophizing.

In his own preface, Kenaan suggests that "the possibility of listening to the other person" is what makes the ethical relationship between persons possible (ix). I hope that Kenaan will go beyond this text and develop this ethical possibility in his future works.

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Tales of Old Odessa: Crime and Civility in a City of Thieves. By Roshanna P. Sylvester (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press: 2005), x + 244 pp. \$38.00 cloth.

This is a sad tale about human misery. And it is a merry tale about vibrant city life. One of the most famous songs of the eminent Soviet poet and singer Vladimir Vysotskii was called "Moskva-Odessa". The tragic-comical lyrics of this song from 1967—performed and listened to in the Soviet Union, whose borders to the West were closed to ordinary listeners—is that, whereas the airports all over Europe are open, Paris among them, Odessa's airport is closed. The reason is only bad weather conditions, but Vysotskii makes clear that all the other cities do not matter, if you cannot go to Odessa. A Western audience might be better acquainted with a similar poem about another city, "Do you know what it means to miss New Orleans?" recorded by Louis Armstrong.

Soviet power did to Odessa what Katrina did to New Orleans. After eighty years, the city has not recovered. Roshanna Sylvester has written a fascinating story about antediluvian Odessa. She has perused police reports, court material, newspapers and journals from Odessa during the decades before World War I, to become intimate with different walks of life in the city, especially life on the shadowy side of the street. Chapter headings such as "Dangertown," "Horrors of Life," "City of Thieves," and "Under the Cover of Night," live up to expectations. There is a strong Jewish flavor to all this. Vladimir Jabotinsky's remark that he would not have chosen to be born anywhere else is used as the introduction to chapter 1, "Dangertown." Jabotinsky, as is known, was the founder of revisionist Zionism. This element of modern Jewish identity was at least partially shaped in the very cosmopolitan environment of Odessa. Adding a well-known Yiddish term, the author writes in the next paragraph about the entrepreneurial *chutzpah* of the "glittering metropolis built on the profits of free trade [and] unbridled speculation" (18).

The author's approach to the material is primarily to let it speak directly. Reading through the different chapters, the reader gets increasingly acquainted with the tragic fate of a number of people. It is really the sources that

speak. This means that the past is mediated through the stark language and colors of the boulevard press and the accounts of police reports. The story of Odessa is one of a dynamic port city with rags and riches existing side by side. An important part of the story is about ethno-social mobility. Enlightened Jewish entrepreneurs and intellectuals become carries of urban culture, and a class of modern Jews emerges in the midst of a secularizing Christian society.

One aspect of life in early-twentieth-century Odessa, as it is reflected in the press, is how important it was to learn the correct mode of behavior, etiquette. One theme is what the author calls “anxieties about women’s public roles.” Much of the book deals with the misery of prostitution. It is evident from many of the stories told by the police and newspaper reports that trafficking was as much a part of life in Odessa in those days as it has become in the present time.

The last chapter of *Old Odessa* starts with a quotation from Isaak Babel from 1919 to the effect that the golden days are gone and now the city is fading away. It is appropriate to frame the story about Odessa’s two decades in the sun with quotations from Jabotinsky and Babel. Moreover, between these two poles of Sylvester’s story, one is confronted with the “city of thieves” which was to remain the legacy of the place in early Soviet days, in the novels by Ilf and Petrov. These two also belong to secularized Jewish cultural history. Sylvester’s entertaining presentation of daily—and nightly!—life in the cosmopolitan Russian port city of Odessa before the Great War leaves the reader in a state of reflective nostalgia or melancholy. However, a more upbeat conclusion is that this teeming Jewish modern city life did continue, but not on the shores of the Black Sea. It was continued on the shores of the Mediterranean, in Tel Aviv.

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Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology, and the Brain. Edited by Gary D. Fireman, Ted E. McVay, Jr., and Owen J. Flanagan (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003), 252 pp. £61.00 cloth; £19.99 paper.

Based on a conference held by the Program of Comparative Literature at Texas Tech University, *Narrative and Consciousness* consists of ten chapters divided into five parts. The three editors provide a comprehensive introduction, arguing that narratives not only pervade our lives but are essential to conscious experience because the personal stories we construct about experience allow us to reflect upon our self-identity and communicate with others. In explaining how narrative relates to consciousness, this volume employs what Owen Flanagan calls the “natural method” to examine “the relations among the findings, concepts, and methods of phenomenological, psychological, and neurobiological analyses of narrative and consciousness, recognizing that each line of analysis has legitimate aims” (3). In their approach to narrative and consciousness, the authors intend to “corral consciousness by paying attention to how it seems (its phenomenology), what mental labor it does (its psychology), and how it is realized (its neurobiology)” (4). The editors, however, conspicuously omit any mention of consciousness by itself, focusing instead mainly on the content of consciousness. In support of twentieth-century Western philosophers of mind such as Daniel Dennett who take an intellectual as opposed to a first-hand experiential approach to consciousness, the book agrees with the stance that “the portions of human consciousness beyond the purely somatic—self awareness, self-understanding, and self-knowledge—are products of personal narratives” (4). The editors and contributors contend, therefore, that narrative not only allows us to describe, communicate or examine the self, but that in fact “narrative constructs the self” (5). In contrast to the stance held by perennial psychologists such as Robert K. C. Forman and Jonathan Shear, this approach implies that the self has no extra-linguistic dimension, that it does not extend beyond the conscious content of mind as rendered through narratives.

In order to avoid subjectivism, the editors explain how narratives are a public medium that can be observed, shared and influenced by their cultural contexts. Any time we tell a personal story, we are influenced by an audience, either present or anticipated, which results in tensions between real events and how we rhetorically re-present them to others in an

effort to persuade. Following the work of Owen Flanagan, the book presents an interdisciplinary approach to narrative and consciousness sensitive to a “phenomenological seeming” yet restricted by the intellect through the empirical findings of psychology and cognitive science (6). In one sense, therefore, the book focuses on already established research based on “credible naturalistic analysis” (6). To its credit, the book attempts to coordinate phenomenological and scientific approaches, in spite of what some philosophers claim to be the incommensurability of science and phenomenology. The book challenges this conventional view, although in coordinating science and phenomenology it restricts itself to that realm of experience available through narrative. This leads to an analysis not so much of narrative and consciousness per se, but to an analysis of narrative and the contents of consciousness.

The first section of the book, “The Role of Narrative in the Development of Conscious Awareness,” critically examines how narrative promotes the emergence of consciousness as related to the self. In “Narrative and the Emergence of a Consciousness of Self,” Katherine Nelson argues that communicative discourse and the disposition to narrated events that impose meaning on behavior has the effect of expanding a child’s consciousness. Narrative in this case belongs to the developmental stage of the child’s entry into a linguistic community. It helps the child develop a sense of self and become aware of the social world of subjective experience. Nelson concludes that “a new level of consciousness emerges in the early childhood years that is based on the differentiation of the self-awareness of the early years and the self-and-other awareness of the transition period” (33). This new consciousness depends on language and communication with others. Similarly, in “The Development of the Self,” Valerie Gray Hardcastle argues that not only does narrative foster the emergence of consciousness in childhood but that a child’s selfhood emerges through continuous narrative activity that promotes linguistic and cognitive development. A child from the beginning attempts to understand the world by assigning meaning to it. This meaning-making process fosters a child’s affective development by enhancing his or her conscious awareness of the surrounding world. Hardcastle shows how “memory and cognition become instrumental processes in the service of creating a

self... As we tell and retell stories of ourselves either to ourselves, as part of rehearsing our life events in memory, or to others, as part of our social nature, we are in effect shaping our memories of these events, making them more and more a part of who we are” (47). As we see, both Nelson and Hardcastle focus on the content of consciousness, a Western approach that does not address the nature of consciousness itself as the witness of language, self and meaning.

In the next section, “Narrative and Autobiographical Memory,” David C. Rubin and Daniel L. Greenberg explore the role of narrative in autobiographical memory, while Sidonie A. Smith defines the self as a social construct. Both chapters examine individuals with neurological impairments such as autism in order to understand the relationship between bodily structure and its cultural context. Rubin and Greenberg analyze how the recollection of personal events by adults involves two things: narrative reasoning and the support of multiple neural systems in the brain. Any “full-blown” autobiographical narrative depends on the integration of neurological and psychological elements. The authors illustrate this by comparing normal adults to those suffering from damaged neural systems vital for recollection to succeed. They conclude that “for research on autobiographical memory and recollection, the relative role of the brain as a metaphor is shrinking in relation to the role of the brain as physical entity about which a great deal is known” (77). In a sense, Rubin and Greenberg, like the other authors of this volume, tend to reduce the narrative self to brain functioning and behavior rather than examining the self in terms of consciousness as a state of being.

Similarly, Sidonie Smith takes a constructivist approach to identity, but instead of relating the self solely to its neural or subatomic quantum level she examines autobiographical memory in terms of its socio-cultural, historical and political context. In exploring the connection between autobiographical memory and scientific studies, Smith analyzes the interrelation between narrative and its material context in the case of an autistic woman. The elements that constitute autobiographical subjectivity such as language, experience, and culture may, as Smith argues, relate to our socially induced identity, but no evidence suggests that they

constitute consciousness per se. Although she emphasizes how the storied self is situated in culture, she, like the other authors in this volume, does not tackle the question of how the self can also escape its cultural context.

The third section, "Autobiographical Narrative, Fiction, and the Construction of Self," looks at how autobiographical narrative blends fiction and nonfiction in the process of giving life additional form and meaning. In "Rethinking the Fictive, Reclaiming the Real: Autobiography, Narrative Time, and the Burden of Truth," Mark Freeman argues that, even though autobiographical narrative may falsify experience through its literary elements, this reconstruction of the past does not undermine the capacity of narrative for depicting reality or historical truth. The aesthetics of fiction, in other words, does not obviate narrative reality. Freeman argues that "we do not live only in the time of clocks. We also live in the time of stories, and through this time it is sometimes possible to see things and to feel things that could not be seen or felt earlier on" (125). He thus concludes that autobiographical narrative is quite complicated, more so than "the fiction/reality opposition tends to convey" (127). This position at least hints at the unbounded nature of consciousness and the ability of the self to transcend the limits of language and narrative.

In "Dual Focalization, Retrospective Fictional Autobiography, and the Ethics of *Lolita*," James Phelan expands upon this narrative fusion between fiction and nonfiction, focusing on the ethics of representing the content of consciousness. In analyzing the retrospective pseudo-autobiography of Vladimir Nabokov's *Lolita*, he focuses on the dual identity of the protagonist Humbert Humbert who is a represented character as well as a representing character with the conscious agenda of trying to persuade the audience to be sympathetic toward his relationship with Lolita. Humbert's design reveals a conflict within him regarding the ethics of being both a character and the narrator of his surreptitious activity. Phelan argues that Humbert is "a horrible pedophile who uses his stylistic virtuosity and his theory of nymphets both to induce his audience to participate in his lust and as someone who realizes, albeit imperfectly, how much pain and suffering he has caused As a result, his story evokes both

our sympathy and our reproach" (142), both of which Phelan believes are well justified.

The authors of the fourth section, "Narrative Disruptions in the Construction of Self," explore how a breakdown in the construction of self results in a corresponding disruption in personal narrative. Lawrence L. Langer, in "The Pursuit of Death in Holocaust Narrative," analyzes how the suffering of Holocaust survivors affected their autobiographical narratives. The intensity of such suffering causes the victims to be obsessed with death long after their trauma, as if they had died in the concentration camps yet paradoxically continued to live a semblance of life. In one example, Langer shows how a victim has to find "a way of expressing the idea that the meaning of one's life can no longer be separated from the meaningless death of others" (163).

Similarly, Robert A. Neimeyer and Finn Tschudi, in "Community and Coherence: Narrative Contributions to the Psychology of Conflict and Loss," examine how people who experience troubles and conflicts tend to express themselves through disrupted narratives. Improved coherence in personal narrative, they argue, results in improved well-being, particularly in a clinical setting. They suggest that such therapeutic techniques would benefit the Western criminal system. They argue that "the social construction of crime in Western cultures reinforces a dominant narrative of conflict as an offense against the state and the appropriate societal response as one of retribution" (185), and hope that their study will encourage others to understand human engagement with losses and conflicts.

The final section, "The Neural Substrate of Narrative and Consciousness Realization (or the Naturalist Model)," returns to the relation between narrative and neurobiological functioning. In the first essay, "Empirical Evidence for a Narrative Concept of Self," John Bickle makes the connection between brain functioning and personal narratives. He interprets narrative-self-control as a narrative fiction because practice turns out to be more effective than instruction when it comes to narrative. Bickle thus concludes that "the old refrain 'do as I say, not as I do' gets effective moral training exactly wrong" (207). Gillian Einstein and Owen Flanagan, in "Sexual Identities and Narratives of Self," extend this argument by

showing how the body and especially the brain strongly influence the narrative of self. One's sexual self-identity clearly depends on biology, which along with culture determines whether one is gay, straight, transsexual, eager or asexual. Like several other authors in this collection, they propose that our understanding of identity can be enhanced by neurophysiological research in general but also in terms of "sexual and gender identity" (228).

Overall, *Narrative and Consciousness* presents a lucid and well-documented case in support of the link between narrative and the development of self-identity. In a wide variety of approaches that include literary theory, philosophy, psychology and neuroscience, the authors demonstrate that the content of consciousness lends itself to and benefits from narrative expression. Through a reciprocal relationship, the mind becomes increasingly orderly and coherent through narrative, which plays an important role in sharpening our conscious awareness of phenomenological experience. This book will appeal to a wide audience extending from the general public to scholars in the humanities and social sciences as well as students in a wide range of disciplines.

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American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the Twenty First Century. By Kevin Phillips (New York: Viking Penguin, 2006), xvi + 462 pp. \$31.95 cloth.

As a former adviser to Republican presidents on political strategy, Kevin Phillips speaks with authority on the history of the Grand Old Party. In the late 1960s, Phillips advised President Nixon to rebuild the GOP on the mushrooming votes of disaffected white (and conservative) Southerners, disenchanted with the liberalism of the Democrats. Forty years later, Phillips not only presents a history of this Republican embrace of Dixie, but also warns of its future consequences for both America and the world.

In Phillips's analysis, the "Southernization" of the Republicans has led to a fatal three-headed hydra: (1) an unhealthy dependence on dwindling oil supplies (due to the power of Texas); (2) the party's embrace of religious fundamentalism with militaristic overtones (due to the power of the Southern Baptists); and (3) an irrational (that is, religious) indifference to the mounting debt-load (both private and public) of the US economy. Phillips is particularly hard on the Southern version of Christianity, whose adherents presumably seek war with Islam, expect God to provide endless gushers of oil, and possess a dangerous false optimism about America's invincibility. Phillips warns that the American imperium will share the fate of other empires (Britain, Holland, Spain) whose own religious zealotry contributed to their decline and fall.

While Phillips marshals impressive evidence to show that the Republicans are ignoring the oil and debt problems, he often employs the same hyperbole as the most fanatical critics of President Bush on religious issues. Occasionally, Phillips compares Bush's religiosity with that of Bin Laden (206), and accuses the GOP of posing the worst threat to science since Rome imprisoned Galileo (xv, 217). More significantly, it is not obvious that synthesizing faith and politics is anything new for US politics, despite Phillip's thesis that the GOP is the "first religious party" in American history (vii). In the last years of his presidency, Lincoln regularly invoked religious symbolism to justify the war against slavery, and Woodrow Wilson had no doubts that God wanted America to enter World War 1.

As a political historian of long standing, Phillips is too intelligent to be unaware of these precedents. Yet Phillips's stock explanation for these is that the South *alone* is responsible for the militaristic crusades of America's past. Amazingly, Phillips is silent on the power of the "neoconservatives" who first made the case for the Iraq war. Yet neoconservatives do not fit in with Phillips's attempt to lay the blame at the pulpits of Southern churches, since the former mostly hail from the Northern states and are secular in outlook. Indeed, Phillips, who sometimes portrays the eastern seaboard as a haven of moderation, is unconcerned with the fact that Yankee liberals and conservatives (McKinley, the Roosevelts, Kennedy, Bush Sr.) have contributed their own

support to the “chosen people” ideology of the American empire. Phillips would do well to recall that the Southern political theorist Willmoore Kendall warned over 40 years ago that secularist zealots can derail the mission of America as severely as their religious counterparts.

GRANT HAVERS

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Darwinian Conservatism. By Larry Arnhart (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005), 158 pp. \$17.90/£8.95 paper.

This interesting book delineates how Darwinian evolution is not merely compatible with conservative political and moral beliefs but is supportive of them. Issued as part of the series *Societas*, which seeks to enrich debate by publishing intellectual works for a general audience, the cover of the book displays portraits of Charles Darwin and Lord Salisbury (the late-nineteenth-century Tory Prime Minister) nestled onto a single torso. The author, a professor of political science at Northern Illinois University, has published previously on the biological bases of politics, arguing against conservative opponents of evolution.

There are, of course, various species of conservative thought, ranging from natural law conservatism, agrarian traditionalism, to the skeptically informed writing of Michael Oakeshott or to versions that reflect the inheritance of classical liberalism. There is little discussion of such distinctions in this work. For Larry Arnhart, the essential idea is that conservatives are realists who recognize the imperfectibility of humanity. The “central idea of the realist vision is evolution” (7), both the biological sort, articulated by Darwin, and the cultural kind, defended by F. A. Hayek, among others. Although some conservatives—such as those who believe that Darwinism undermines morals or who defend some version of “intelligent design”—dismiss evolutionary theory, such rejections weaken the intellectual appeal of conservative ideas.

The book is divided into ten chapters, in the first of which Arnhart contends that

Darwinism supports a conservative account of social order as the effect of natural propensities, spontaneously evolved custom, and prudential reason. This trio—the natural, social, and individual—ought to frame and guide the good and free society. As Arnhart notes in the four subsequent chapters, evolutionary science also supports the conclusion that humans share a natural moral sense, that males and females possess distinct but complementary propensities, that property is essential to a good society, and that, in light of human passion and ambition, the scope and power of government should be limited. In other chapters, the author seeks to refute conservatives who maintain that Darwinism subverts traditional morality by promoting atheism or materialism. In addition, he challenges the notion that the thesis of intelligent design rebuts that of evolution, that Darwinism has encouraged eugenics or racism, and that evolutionary science paves the way for a biotechnology of human nature.

Even though the arguments are communicated well, the brevity of the presentation—a feature of the *Societas* series—precludes a full and substantive account of how Darwinian ideas support conservatism. Even granting that the forces of evolution have exerted a significant influence on human conduct (Arnhart canvasses some twenty desires that are both natural and universal), the very fact of the spontaneous evolution of custom suggests that there is scope for diverging social norms and political standards. Thus, it remains unclear how Darwinism would allow one to make the argument for conservatism of the limited government variety, rather than libertarianism or some realist conception of social democracy. In a sense, then, the book is as much an argument about social and political *limits* as it is a brief for conservatism. Evolutionary tendencies reveal the limits to political and social reforms, limits that may be transgressed only at great human and moral cost. Thus, Darwinism (or evolutionary science) may provide grounds for countering political rationalists and social constructionists who clamor for familial communalism, the social construction of gender, the abolition of property, or political utopianism.

Yet there is another set of questions that Arnhart’s argument engenders. He suggests that there is a moral sense that supports traditional morality and that any society that espouses liberty will need individuals who possess this

moral sense. Although Arnhart appeals, in his account of society, to Hayek's notion of spontaneous order, he also dismisses too quickly (22) Hayek's view that our social and moral sensibilities, forged in an era of the small group or tribe, still incline us to "tribal emotions" of solidarity and collective purpose, tendencies that clash with the abstract and purpose-independent rules of the spontaneous order.

That quibble aside, there is a more fundamental concern. Arnhart notes that "we have been shaped by natural selection to feel the moral emotions associated with kinship, mutuality, and reciprocity" (39). A moral sense, manifest in dispositions and tendencies, and originating through natural selection, will (in conjunction with prudence and custom) influence moral judgments. However, there is a puzzle (and not just for Arnhart) as to how to reconcile the dispositions wrought through natural selection with a capacity, presumably, to recognize moral truths. Arnhart affirms that, "Moral judgments are products of human brains" (44), but our brains have been selected for reproduction and survival, not for a capacity to recognize truth. That one's brain (or a moral disposition) helps one to survive need not entail that it inclines one to recognize or discover some moral truth.

When he turns to discuss religion, Arnhart correctly asserts that evolutionary theory does not imply agnosticism or atheism (as the ideological defender of evolution unreasonably demands). He also explains that for the conservative, "it is the moral and political utility of religious belief that is decisive..." (91). However correct this statement may be as an observation of the regard that some conservatives have for religion, others may counter that the utility of religion is a function of the belief itself. Further along in the book, Arnhart also points out, correctly, that evolutionary science need not entail reductionist materialism. He outlines a view of the human soul as manifesting an "emergent complexity." Emergentism is a doctrine by which new properties (or objects) emerge out of other (e.g. physical) levels of reality. Arnhart contends that once a physical system reaches a certain complexity then new features (indeed, a soul) will emerge with their (its) own causal powers. This metaphysical position, difficult but not unreasonable, entails that physical law is necessary for generating the human soul, but the

operations of the human soul cannot be reduced to some physical explanation.

There is much to be said in defense of both the realist view of the human being and the biological basis of human conduct and society. Arnhart takes up these important issues in a judicious and informed manner, and his delivery is intelligent, careful, and devoid of posturing or special pleading. Persons of varying political views will find much to think about in this book, but it may leave them desiring a more robust and sustained account. This is, in fact, a most welcome effect of Arnhart's contribution.

EUGENE HEATH

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Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations.

Edited by Silvio Pons and Federico Romero (London: Frank Cass, 2005), viii + 237 pp., £19.99 paper.

The Cold War affected everyone very deeply until the dismemberment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As in many historical periods, it presented too many changes for all to be considered analytically, allowing various aspects to go undetected, to be neglected or exaggerated. The Cold War is thus in need of analysis from today's perspective, which is precisely what *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War* attempts to do.

Generally speaking, books based on conference or workshop papers tend to be vague in focus and incoherent. This seems not to be the case—especially with the second part of *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War*—which is based on a June 2000 conference held in Rome. The importance and perhaps the major contribution of this work stems from its willingness to discuss when and by what means the Cold War ended.

The "Introduction" offers a general insight into the necessity of the work, and the following twelve essays focus on two major historiographical questions: the timeframe and essence of the Cold War ("Long Duration, Globalization and the Changing Frame of the Cold War"; and the factors that affected its end

("The End of the Cold War and the Downfall of Soviet Communism").

The articles in the first part mainly focus on the nature of the Cold War and when exactly it ended. There is no agreement among the contributors as to when it ended, with dates ranging from 1963 to 1989 and 1991. Odd Arne Westad argues that the War ended—in not always positive circumstances—in different parts of the world in a series of different dates from 1970 to 1986. It is interesting to see the variety of readings of the Cold War—from it being an American project (Anders Stephanson), to being a case of imperialistic rivalry (Charles S. Maier), as well as being affected by the relations between Catholic and Eastern Rite churches (Agostino Giovagnoli).

The second part of the book follows a more fluent thematic course. It centres on the role played by ideas and ideology, and on those implementing them. Different approaches enlighten the reader with analyses of related themes from different angles: from an evaluation of different means of analysis from statistical data (Mark Harrison), to character analysis (Vladimir Zubok), to the ideas and intellectuals (Robert English); insights into the deeds and character of Mikhail Gorbachev and the "new thinking" school of intellectuals (Mark Kramer); and the role of the old ruling elite in the fall of the socialist regime and vis-à-vis their Gorbachev era heirs (Jonathan Haslam). These articles provide a wealth of opinions and useful considerations that are vital for understanding how the Cold War era ended. The final article, the most extraordinary of all, written by Silvio Pons and Francesco Benvenuti, questions Gorbachev's choice of remaining loyal to ideology rather than to the continuation of the Soviet Union.

In general, *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War* contains some interesting insights and is a bona fide academic plea for broader research, definitely giving a taste of it to readers.

CEM KARADELI

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Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks: New Interdisciplinary Essays*. Edited by Max Silverman (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 184 pp. \$47.50.

This collection of essays celebrates the work of Frantz Fanon, one of the most important anti-colonial and anti-racist writers in the post-war period who questioned the universalist rhetoric of French republicanism and the ideological apparatus of colonialism underlying the racialized violence of the West.

Edited by Max Silverman and including articles by D. Macey, F. Verges, J. House, B. Cheyette, R. Bernasconi, M. Silverman, V. Lebeau, and D. Marriott, this book reveals Fanon's complex and at times controversial approaches to understanding the different levels of racism that mediate the multiple yet Manichean opposition between the West and its Others.

Despite the fact that Fanon was among the first to draw attention to different forms of racism, which allowed for a more complex understanding of racial exclusion, his main concerns were with a male-centric "creolite" and the "lived experience of the black man" that challenged what he saw as the intellectual construction of a Eurocentric universalizing of difference. "Creolite" in his approach seems to be a construction based on the naturalization of white hierarchy and worldview as well as an existential experience. As Silverman points out, "His work is far from a simple denunciation of colonialism and racism. Both an intellectual critique and an existential project... [it is] a passionate cry from deep within a body alienated by a system and in search of liberation from it."

Yet the importance of this collection, published at a critical period of imperialism and ideology, when the West meets "the disappearance of the Self and the State" as we knew it, is that it takes black identity as part of broader forms of "naturalized" oppression, that is, not only about black "but also about white identity," reminding us that to a significant extent the Western concept of history and culture was based on various types of cohesion, built against a "General Different" and charging "the Other" with a variety of societal and metaphysical notions. And these notions contributed down the centuries to the "self-centric" manifestations of the Other which so powerfully shape the narrative of the self (Roger Cox, *Shaping Childhood: Themes of Uncertainty in the History of Adult-Child Relations* [London: Routledge, 1996], 127).

Considering Fanon's male-centrism and his dislocations in negotiating the various types of universalism and particularism (despite the fact he was one of the first writers and activists to see the similarities between different kinds of racism) we realize that this "General Other" confronted or, at times, creatively interacted with, an equally generalized "Western Self," also employed in other discourses. Challenging the narcissism of the French liberal gaze, Fanon never received much recognition in the Francophone world. In the Anglo-Saxon world, in contrast, his writing was first seen as a third world "scream" against exclusion and oppression, highlighting French colonialism, and was then transformed into an archetypal Negro from the deep south, to empower the Afro-American movement. The book "highlights the advantages of interdisciplinary work" on textual and cultural studies, "while [it] encourages a critical reflexiveness about its limits and possibilities."

Opening up the multifaceted and often contradictory nature of Fanon's text is still profoundly relevant today, seeing that complex "forms of oppression and power have evolved but by no means disappeared." At a time, in fact, when the economic, political and ideological power of the West to colonize the minds and bodies of Others assumes new contradictory forms.

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Elements of the Euro Area: Integrating Financial Markets. Edited by Jesper Berg, Mauro Grande and Francesco Paolo Mongelli (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), xx + 264 pp. £55.00 cloth.

This book is a timely publication. More than six years have passed since the euro was established as the single currency of eleven European countries. The number increased to twelve after Greece joined the system and new countries are now waiting to be accepted as members of the currency area. The book consists of nine chapters, unevenly divided into four parts, giving an up-to-date overview

of the changes and transformation of the euro area's financial systems.

Four chapters of the first part of the book introduce the economic and financial characteristics (chap. 1) and central banking (chap. 2) of the euro area and provide a comparison with the U.S. and Japanese counterparts. Part 1 also covers the legal framework (chap. 4) and the methodology (chap. 3) for the analysis of financial integration in the euro area. The only shortcoming of the collection for the broader public is that the integration of financial markets could have been put into the broader context of economic developments with a chapter devoted to the interrelationships of financial and other markets.

The only chapter (chap. 5) in Part 2 gives an overview of the area's financial structures and describes the developments of the financial systems before and after the establishment of the euro area in the years 1995–2002. The most important result seems to be that the bond market has undergone major changes in the euro area.

Part 3 examines the first results of integration and provides a more detailed analysis of the integration process of the euro area financial systems. The first chapter (chap. 6) examines the effects of the EMU on the integration of financial services. The analysis is developed further in the next chapter, which examines the integration of money markets. The last chapter (chap. 8) explores the integration process of bond and equity markets.

The fourth and final part contains only one chapter which examines whether the changes in the financial systems have had an impact on the relationship between the price of debt and monetary policy. Despite the fact that this chapter is called a case study in the introduction, it is more exploratory in nature, using econometric methods. The conclusions are tentative because of the short history of the EMU, but robust in applying different empirical methods that show that the interrelationship of the price level of debt and monetary policy has changed since the introduction of the euro.

The book also deals with several issues that are relevant for the future development of the euro area. Three main areas are important here—financial regulation, supervision, and financial stability. It is a useful book for all professionals studying the questions of establishing and expanding the euro currency area.

It can also serve as an important source of reference for policymakers of future member states in the process joining the euro area.

ENN LISTRA

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Louis Althusser and the Traditions of French Marxism. By William S. Lewis (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), ix + 239 pp. \$70.00 cloth.

This book is a historical survey of twentieth-century French contributions to Marxism, both theoretical and practical, in an attempt ultimately to clarify what value Marxist philosophy might hold for political philosophy and action today. It is far more successful in the former endeavour than the latter, about which it is brief and cryptic, and the title's emphasis on Althusser gives a misleading impression about the amount of discussion devoted to Althusser's theories. While the study of the development of French Marxism (for want of a better term) may be of considerable interest, William S. Lewis is not entirely persuasive when in justifying his work he argues that it offers a unique insight into the debates around Marxism during the last century. The French Communist Party's (PCF's) reading of Marx and Engels was, as Lewis argues, "crude"; yet his thorough and clear exposition of a sophisticated "French intellectual Marxism" reveals intelligent attempts to address problems in Marxism despite the stifling effects of PCF orthodoxy. By the early 1960s, according to Lewis, these two strands of French Marxism—political and intellectual—had reached a "crisis point" from which the academic philosopher and PCF member, Louis Althusser, emerged into the theoretical spotlight.

Much of the work—five of its seven chapters—is devoted to describing the development of French intellectual and political Marxism. But the growth of interest in Marxist philosophy after the Second World War and the challenges of de-Stalinization would have been enough to establish the context in which Althusser's interpretation of Marxism was forged. Althusser's re-thinking of Marxism began in 1953, was influenced

(not surprisingly) by the cataclysmic events of 1956 in the communist world, and began to see the light of published day in the early 1960s. Its high point was reached in 1965 in *Lire le Capital*. Althusser rejected the political, Hegelian and existential versions of Marxism that swirled around the PCF and advocated a return to the original Marx, complaining that French Marxism had become a "void." He is perhaps best remembered as a theorist for his reaffirmation of Marxism as a science of history, and for his insistence that between the early and late Marx was a radical break, a position that critiqued the then-popular humanist Marxism which built on the rediscovered manuscripts of the young Marx. Althusser hoped to sustain the idea that Marxism was a science that could produce true knowledge of the world and provide a non-ideological basis for political action.

Whether Althusser's contribution represents a decisive advance for Marxism is addressed in the final chapter, but the answers are meagre. Althusser's own method is rightly turned on his own work: if Marx's works are a product of a certain confluence of historical events, then Althusser's reading of Marx is simply "the product of a later historical conjuncture" (190). Althusser drew back from a number of his more trenchant theoretical positions, and his aim to change the PCF's philosophy and policy failed. His polemical style and personal misfortunes have succeeded in marginalizing his legacy.

This is a fine account of the development of Marxism in France up to and including Althusser. The author's guiding assumption that Althusser's contribution might make Marx's philosophy relevant today, however, is not substantiated, even if Marxism were to be conceived as a "more modest project" (208). Lewis's ability to cut through jargon might eventually inform a book that will enable us to appreciate whether this assumption has substance and what a reconfigured Marxism might look like. For now, Althusser's Marxism still has the rather dated look of the once-fashionable.

DAVID W. LOVELL

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Showcasing Globalisation? The Political Economy of the Irish Republic. By Nicola Jo-Anne Smith (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 212 pp. £55.00 cloth/£14.99 paper.

This book is about Ireland and it is about globalisation. The relationship between the two is obvious if one accepts that the “Celtic tiger syndrome” in Ireland is predominantly attributable to the forces of globalisation and therefore a test case *par excellence* for illustrating how a small open economy can benefit enormously from foreign trade and inward investment. Ireland is often cited as the “most globalised country in the world” and to the extent (sometimes exaggerated) that Ireland can be a role model for transition economies, it is also a showpiece for globalisation.

The author has problems with the concept of globalisation from the outset, dismissing it early as analytically useless and dangerously misleading, not least because of its conceptually diverse characteristics. Nevertheless, she rightly sees it as a powerful *idea* on whose account governments seize opportunities or feel constrained. Her careful analysis of the factors that lie behind the Celtic Tiger correctly identifies policies, and factors that are not themselves part of what we understand by globalisation: Ireland’s demographic profile; its partnership in industrial relations; its skilful exploitation of EU structural funds. However, globalisation, in whatever way we construe it, provides the arena, or at least a *leitmotiv*, for the drama of the Celtic Tiger to be played out.

The author’s principal conclusion is that the economic and political conditions to which the Irish economic miracle is normally attributed cannot be simply conflated with globalisation—especially if the term connotes trends and forces that have a truly global reach. Thus the author is at pains to point out that factors behind Irish economic success are essentially regional (i.e. transatlantic and European) and not truly global in the strict sense of the word. However, this seems rather pedantic: the essence of globalisation (if it has an essence) is not its global reach, but rather the extent to which exogenous forces impinge upon and determine indigenous

economic and social policies within nation-states.

EDWARD MOXON-BROWNE

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Vindication: A Life of Mary Wollstonecraft. By Lyndall Gordon (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005), x + 562 pp. \$29.95 cloth.

Few feminists’ life and work have been as often scrutinized or variously interpreted as Mary Wollstonecraft’s. Lyndall Gordon’s new study takes its place in a scholarly tradition that identifies Mary’s life as her most enduring achievement. Resisting the “stale plots that leach the ‘real life’ out of us” (3), Gordon’s Mary has a modern bent for self-re-invention. She experiments with a whole range of female roles (e.g. teacher, author, wife), extending their possibilities.

Gordon’s account adds new twists to a familiar tale. Born in 1759, Mary first tried her hand at the conventional employments open to gentlewomen, including teaching. On Gordon’s reading, Mary’s pedagogy was unusual, aiming to develop girls’ sense of agency (43–44). Seeking greater independence, Mary next established herself as one of a “new genus”—women who supported themselves by writing, extending her range to include political polemics. Following an unhappy emotional entanglement with the artist Henry Fuseli, she travelled to revolutionary France in 1792. Here she met the American adventurer Gilbert Imlay, with whom she had a child out of wedlock. Gordon considers Imlay in some detail, suggesting he may have been a secret agent, and provides a good account of his sometime associate Joel Barlow (a shady speculator and disinterested patriot, who combined declarations of undying devotion to his wife with prolonged absences and infidelities). Although Imlay himself remains elusive, Gordon’s portrait of Barlow illuminates Imlay’s milieu and Wollstonecraft’s apparent misreading of her American “frontiersman.” When Imlay proved faithless, Mary, despairing, twice

attempted suicide. However, between attempts she travelled to Scandinavia on Imlay's business. Gordon includes some new evidence and much speculation about this business and Mary's involvement in it. Subsequently, in her *Letters Written During a Short Residence in Sweden, Norway and Denmark* (1796) Mary assumed a new, Romantic authorial voice and sensibility. After breaking with Imlay, Mary established a partnership with the radical philosopher William Godwin. They married after Mary became pregnant but retained an unconventional lifestyle. What Gordon (echoing Virginia Woolf) terms this "most fruitful" of Mary's experiments (334) proved short-lived. Mary died in 1797, following complications in childbirth. Consistent with her emphasis on the "staying power" of Mary's "self-making" (446), Gordon extends her story to consider how Mary's example influenced the lives of her pupil Margaret King, her daughters Fanny Imlay and Mary Shelley, and the daughters' stepsister Claire Clairmont.

Gordon's empathetic account is wonderfully effective in conveying Mary's exemplary courage, resilience, and imagination in the face of repeated defeats and disappointments. It is also highly partisan, generally viewing Mary's behavior in the most favorable possible light, and the sometimes speculative reconstructions of problematic episodes in Mary's life (e.g. her relationship with Fuseli) do not always carry conviction. Janet Todd's *Mary Wollstonecraft: A Revolutionary Life* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000) offers a more multivalent reading of Mary's life and an ampler account of the subcultures that helped support Mary's life-experiments. However, in highlighting the heroic aspects of Mary's life, Gordon's biography contributes to our understanding of why it has assumed iconic status amongst many feminists.

JOYCE SENDERS PEDERSEN

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Words, Words, Words. By David Crystal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), vii + 216 pp. £12.99 cloth.

David Crystal is an academic authority on the English language. This book, however, is

rigorously non-academic. It is a conveniently priced, attractively presented gift book, designed to foster enthusiasm for lexicography, here called "wordsmithery." Written in plain and often humorous prose, the book amply fulfils its remit. Academics and non-academics alike will discover or extend their fascination with the words of the English language.

The book offers succinct information on when and how children develop language, on the origins of English, on how words are born, grow and die, and on the complexities of defining what a word is in the first place. There is better value, however, in the countless asides, questions and observations. For example: Why are certain words thought to be more beautiful than others? Why does the name "Darth Vader" befit a baddie and not a goodie? How should we define a word like "debagonization" (coined by Crystal to describe the agony subsiding when your bags appear on the carousel at the airport)? Why did room 404 at Cern in Switzerland become the origin of the word "404 Error"? Why did the word "bling bling," part of rap culture in the 1990s, die when it was adopted by the middle classes? How is it that the word "computer," resisted by the French (*ordinateur*) in the name of national identity, actually came into English from French? Why does the word "nice" have its origins in the Latin *nescire*, "to be ignorant"? And much more, including some very moving fragments of SMS poetry (*contra* those who lament the demise of spelling rules):

Jus left th clinic
 Bstrong cheri
 Arm ok no panic
 Need u 2 promis me
 2 keep kissin
 me left breast
 cos baby next week
 me right'll b missin
 (Peter Wroe)

New technologies will not destroy this language. Its openness and creativity will remain strong, at least for as long as its speakers are prepared to engage with the language as something more than a means to an end. Crystal's serious purpose is no doubt to encourage this to happen. Readers are constantly invited to extend the book into their own lives and language, in the name of invention rather than constraint. Notes are given on how to test the

size of your vocabulary, how you can become a “word detective,” how you can keep a record of your baby’s first words, and where further information can be found on the various aspects of lexicology.

There is certain nobility in that aim. At the same time, the English language may be accused of unchecked imperialism, of killing countless minor languages, of bearing within it the scars of domestic colonizations, and of perpetuating violent class-based iniquities. Such views are somehow absent from this book. There is a certain complacency as the English professor marvels at the language, inviting his English readers to play parlor games with the language that was once theirs, like so much annotated scrabble. As they play, Professor Crystal’s multiple cries of “amazing!”, “fascinating!” are no doubt justified, and his enthusiasm deserves to be reproduced. The English have to do something on all those cold, rainy afternoons.

ANTHONY PYM

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Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. By Mia Bloom (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), xvii + 251 pp. \$24.95 cloth.

Thanks to books like Mia Bloom’s, the social science understanding of suicide terrorism has become much more sophisticated in the last few years. We no longer automatically assume that suicide bombers are pathological individuals pursuing irrational goals. Recent work has pointed out that suicide bombers are often well-adjusted, well-educated and well-integrated members of their communities. Moreover, suicide terrorists are not isolated loners: they tend to be integrated into social networks.

Bloom covers much of this material and then goes on to make a number of extremely important points. The first is to pry the discussion of suicide terrorism away from questions of religious fanaticism. She discusses in some detail a number of cases. Key among them are three separatist movements: the Tamil Tigers, the resistance in Chechnya, and the Kurds in Turkey. Each of these non-religious

movements has utilized the tactic of suicide terrorism. These cases enable Bloom to shift the discussion from abnormal psychology and religious extremism to one of organizational competition and the rational choice of tactics.

These lead to the second important point made by Bloom: the need to distinguish questions of individual motivation from organizational decisions to adopt the tactics of suicide terrorism. Bloom argues that sources of funding (whether from local populations or from an expatriate diaspora) and organizational competition (between the insurgents and the government, and between rival insurgent organizations) account for the decision to adopt (or drop) suicide bombing as a tactic. She argues, rightly in my view, that suicide attacks must be understood primarily as a convenient, low-cost, and effective tactic. An understanding of suicide attacks does not require a detour into abnormal psychology. Rather, the mundane social science explanations of social networks, organizational choice and control, and the choice of military tactics combine to provide an adequate explanation. Individuals may be motivated by death cults and religious fanaticism, but it is the organizational level that explains variation in suicide attacks.

Bloom’s third observation concerns the importance of women in the Tamil Tigers and in the Chechnya resistance. This brings her back to a discussion of individual motivations. She argues that, while male suicide bombers are often motivated by religious fanaticism, female bombers are likely to choose that path after having been raped by government soldiers. As Bloom knows, the empirical reality is much more complicated and muddy than this simple dichotomy. There is clearly a need for more research on the connections between gender, individual motivation and organizational choice of tactics.

One of the defects of the current literature on suicide terrorism is that it pays little attention to broader studies of voluntary death. Many of the analyses start from the common Western assumption that voluntary death is largely unthinkable. Hence extreme explanations are needed to account for the conscious decision to choose death. But this is surely a reflection of our own contemporary cultural limitations, rather than a sensible

social-scientific starting point. There are, or have been, societies and situations in which certain kinds of voluntary death are culturally approved: the aged Eskimo walking out into the snowy night, the Japanese soldier fighting to his death, the warrior seeking glory and reputation, the American soldier jumping on a grenade to save the lives of his comrades, and so on. Suicide terrorists frequently see themselves as soldiers: they expect to die; it is a necessary aspect of their mission and their actions are thus both meaningful and, in some sense, entirely rational. To her great credit, Bloom accepts the challenge to “think the unthinkable” and notes the widespread occurrence of voluntary death in combat. This raises a question not yet seriously entertained by writers on “suicide terrorism,” namely, the utility of the term itself. Perhaps future researchers might profitably avoid altogether a focus on “suicide terrorism,” and instead ask about the larger dynamics and tactical choices of various kinds of insurgents. It is time to stop treating this subject as if it were *sui generis*, and see it for what it is, one choice among many available to organizations engaged in political contention.

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Sacred Cow, Mad Cow: A History of Food Fears. By Madeleine Ferrières (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), xiii + 416 pp. \$29.50/£19.50 cloth.

Madeleine Ferrières has performed some excellent culinary sleuthing and laid out a smorgasbord eminently suited for today’s palate. Against a setting of Galenic humors, aerists and nutritionists, scarcity and quality, *Sacred Cow, Mad Cow* reminds us that it “would be a mistake to Consider...[past theory of causes and transmission] a prefiguration of...modern epidemiology” (27), while one is left to wonder what in today’s nosology will become tomorrow’s mythology.

Between Introduction and Conclusion, the book contains 16 chapters spanning the thirteenth to twentieth centuries and ranging from Mirepoix, France, to Chicago.

Defiantly anecdotal and context bound, the chapters reverberate, nevertheless, with relevance to the present. For example, thick slices of “Bread on Trial” (chapter 6) are interchangeable with reports of tainted burritos served in lunches at schools in the United States; mass culling, governmental inertia, rabid fear, numbing fatalism, galvanizing prejudice, cosmoteluric terror and bitter irony (“the seized meat was distributed to the poor” [225]), vividly described in chapters 9 through 15 (“Hungarian Cattle Disease” through “English Cattle Disease”) virtually anticipate accounts of recent epizootics and zoonoses (e.g., bovine spongiform encephalopathy [BSE]); but most intriguing to me are uncanny similarities between the potato’s reception in Europe, discussed in “Phobia of New Plants” (chapter 5), and contemporary reactions to genetically modified (GM) food.

In the vicinity of Quito, Peru, *papa*, “two other plants along with corn...serve[d] to sustain” (88) the indigenous population. After arriving in Europe via Spain or Naples, *papa*, *tartoufle* or *pomme de terre* became common in Tuscany, and on January 26, 1588, two tubers reached the imperial gardens in Vienna. Was *papa* a drug, a poison, or even edible? Charles de L’Ecluse (a.k.a. Clusius) had to judge. He was well aware of the poison contained in manioc, and he “also knew that what Indians could eat without risk was not necessarily safe for others. That was another trait of the ambient neophobia: the belief that certain foods were good in one’s own country ‘but, in another place, venom.’”

“In addition, Clusius was not satisfied with remote evidence. He was part of a new generation of scholars who...pressed beyond observation to performing his own experiments and to recording the results in a botanical report” (91). Moreover, “as a modern botanist, L’Ecluse distanced himself from received knowledge. That was one of the first lessons of the potato. It led ineluctably to thinking that the knowledge of the ancients was obsolete; it opened a way to naturalist observation freed of all accepted authority” (92). Clusius’ verdict was “edible,” but in 1596, the Swiss naturalist Gaspar Bauhin “cast doubt on [the potato’s] food value” (92), and subsequently the potato all but disappeared except in “rhizophagous (root-eating) Europe” (103) and Ireland.

Today, GM corn, soybeans and sweet potatoes are grown in Africa, the Americas and Asia, while stubbornly rejected in Europe. Hopefully, promoters and critics of GM food will find “food for thought” in *Sacred Cow, Mad Cow*. Artfully told, Ferrières’ unsavory tales are deliciously distressing!

STANLEY SHOSTAK

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The Failure of Democratic Nation Building: Ideology Meets Evolution. By

Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), xiii + 159 pp. £32.50/\$65.00 cloth.

In *The Failure of Democratic Nation Building*, Albert Somit and Steven Paterson’s “key concern... [is] the gains and losses to the United States in its role as would-be nation builder” (84). The authors argue convincingly, I believe, that nation building as “attempts to export democracy” (93) “really cannot be done” (xii), or are, at least, “demonstrably an almost hopeless undertaking, best abandoned, and the resources turned instead to strengthening and preserving democracy here at home” (60).

In order to make this case, Somit and Peterson lay out the “five deadly enemies of democracy,” as opposed to the “Enabling... [and] Requisite Conditions” for democratization, beginning with “A Viable State” (48) and score countries following their occupation by the United States on “feasibility checklists” for nation building.

When the score for Haiti is compared to that for Germany and these scores are compared to those for Iraq and Afghanistan, “the prospects for a democratic Iraq are less than encouraging—though considerably brighter than for Afghanistan” (60).

Somit and Peterson also define democracy and evaluate the claims of nation-states to have established democracies. In effect, they conclude that one (or even more) elections do not a democracy make and human rights are broadly denied to citizens in more than sixty percent of today’s macrostates. What is more,

“the momentum toward democracy from 1983 to 1993 appears to dissipate by 2003” (72), although, over the period, the world saw “an overall increase in freedom” (73).

Regrettably, Somit and Peterson claim that nation building is generally doomed to failure because “the equalitarian aspects of democratic theory run counter to our social primate inclinations” (53). Equally regrettably, the authors attempt to explain their statistics on democracy in the world by “utilizing a neo-Darwinian approach to human political behavior... that is, that authoritarian governments have been the rule... rather than the exception... because evolution has endowed our species... with an innate bias toward hierarchical, rather than democratic and egalitarian, social and political structures” (112).

These lapses into paleoanthropic speculation cannot be taken seriously inasmuch as the opposite may be true. The record left by *Homo sapiens* for most of the last 30,000 to 100,000 years may indeed be that of a peck order of brutish hunter-gatherers, but the record left by Hominids for most of the last 5 to 7 million years is that of sociable animals, preyed upon by large carnivorous mammals and rapacious crocodiles.¹ Living in herds, we would have been selected for collective defensive action in the wake of danger with leaders playing the role of sentinels. Thus, contrary to Somit and Peterson’s speculation, our “evolutionary legacy” (4) might well have prepared us for democratic institutions founded on “majority rule and the rule of law” (61).

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NOTE

1. Donna Hart and Robert W. Sussman, *Man the Hunted: Primates, Predators, and Human Evolution* (New York: Westview Press, 2005).

The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the European Integration Process. Edited by

Fiorella Kostoris Padoa Schioppa (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), xv + 242 pp., £55.00 cloth.

How to bring together a diversity of countries and populations with divergent political, legal, economic and cultural systems and how to enable them to coexist in mutual respect? This edited volume seeks to propose an answer to this question. It assesses the “principle of mutual recognition” as a possible normative legal principle as well as a policy instrument on which such a respectful coexistence can be built. The principle of mutual recognition is defined by the editor as “accepting diversity without segregating it.” The book addresses the challenge of coexistence in diversity with a focus on the national, regional and local identities (Alfonso Mattera), the European Common Market and World Trade Organization (Joseph H. H. Weiler), goods and services (Jacques Pelkmans), the free movement of professionals (Kalypso Nicolaidis), and unemployment and the welfare state (Fierolla K. P. Schioppa). The editor has also contributed a preface and a final chapter about the cultural foundations of mutual recognition. Schioppa envisages that, if perfectly applied, the principle of mutual recognition would contribute to the development of a Europe without internal boundaries, where the free movement of persons, capital, goods and services would be guaranteed. The mutual recognition principle appeared officially on the European agenda in 1979 with the European Court of Justice ruling *Cassis de Dijon*. Mattera maintains that mutual recognition has been a European heritage since Roman times and shows its veiled presence in different European Treaty articles. Weiler’s insightful summary of the changes in the ECJ jurisprudence towards “functional parallelism” can be identified as the peak of the book. Weiler also focuses on the consequences of this principle, showing with examples that the principle of mutual recognition—or “functional parallelism”—may be a hinderer rather than an accelerator in certain cases; other strategies such as harmonization would sometimes better serve the objective of free trade. Also Pelkmans underlines that the application of this principle in the area of goods and services has not been perfectly successful. Nicolaidis, on the other hand, delineates the different approaches to professional services in postwar European history and identifies four instruments by which a mutual recognition of persons’ skills and education can be achieved. Focusing on the absence of mutual recognition in the area of

labor market, Schioppa argues against labeling this principle as “social dumping.” She asserts that, if host countries recognized the worker-sending countries’ traditions and salary rates, mobility would increase and unemployment would fall.

This book takes up an important issue related to European integration. Although it operates at higher levels of aggregation, such as the “state” (legal, economic systems) and “nation” (culture, tradition), as well as “the European Union” (historically-rooted civilization), a concern for *the individual* is also present in varying degrees in the very background of its various chapters. A more explicit concern for individual lives would strengthen the book’s normative orientation. Among other things, the book can also be recommended for the valuable information it contains about the history and the consequences of the principle of mutual recognition in different policy areas.

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Antonin Artaud’s Writing Bodies. By Adrian Morfee (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 233 pp. £50.00 cloth.

Adrian Morfee’s new interpretation of what Antonin Artaud meant to say and what he should mean to us follows a good thirty previous volumes that to some extent disagree with him. Has he made his case? Yes: libraries need this book; Artaud scholars do not dare ignore it.

Basically, Morfee argues that other studies fail to grasp the elusive subtlety of Artaud’s mind. Jacques Derrida (more interested in justifying his own theories) misses it; Maurice Blanchot, Susan Sontag, even Jane Goodall (though she employs a new method) miss it, these among a baker’s dozen of other assessments Morfee decries, out of his extensive bibliography.

There actually is a 1977 study by Charles Marowitz (*Artaud at Rodez*) devoted to the years Morfee employs to sharpen our incorrect concepts of Artaud’s work (but unfortunately it does not figure in Morfee’s arguments). Our author notes that a large percentage of the final

texts (written during the years he was institutionalized at Rodez and after) were not available until 1978 or later; even some that were suffered from critics' justification of their own previously held views (cf. Derrida).

Morfee considers these late fragments, short passages and letters for the most part, to reveal a developing, coherent philosophy not always expressed before. This he argues despite some quoted passages that most critics would characterize as insane: not so much verbally (even from a writer tortured by his belief that language is incapable of expressing one's innermost thoughts) as conceptually. Artaud was pathologically obsessed with problems of sex, which he thought dulled artistic endeavor. He had visions; he displayed new personalities to which he assigned different personal names. Most would argue schizophrenia. Morfee cuts through such tragic impediments to show us a thinker and artist still with much to offer.

But we must not forget that Artaud has for many years, even during his lifetime, enjoyed enormous respect for his stage theories: the theater of cruelty (not always understood; he seems to have meant something closer to shock art), his interest in Balinese theater (and other Eastern manifestations), his work as an actor in such great films as Abel Gance's classic *Napoléon* (1927). He collaborated as well in influential dramatic experiments: Lugné-Poë's Théâtre de l'Oeuvre, and a bit later, with the poet Roger Vildrac founding the Théâtre Alfred Jarry (1926), however short-lived and controversial.

Whatever his later mental and/or artistic problems, the body of his dramatic theory truly revolutionized serious theater all over the Western world. Ronald Hayman (*Artaud and After*, 1977) could write: "The course of all recent serious theatre in Europe and the Americas can be said to divide into two periods—before Artaud and after Artaud." Although Morfee does not cite him either, he surely would agree. We are left with a certain dilemma: Does Artaud's late, troubled body of letters and bits and pieces, however cleverly and accurately Morfee untangles them, justify one more book, rather excessively priced to boot? Given Artaud's importance in the history of ideas and his often expressed need for truth in literary texts, and finally, Morfee's present volume, so clearly and beautifully written—his masterful prose, almost free of jargon literary or philosophical offers pure delight—makes us

believers. It does not hurt that while Morfee tries to excuse himself from the claim of apologist, even quoting more than one damaging passage from the later Artaud, he is deeply interested in a fairer assessment of a writer he admires fervently.

ARMAND E. SINGER
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A National Challenge at the Local Level: Citizens, Elites and Institutions in Reunified Germany. By Thomas R. Cusack (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), xiii + 265 pp. \$52.50 cloth.

Thomas Cusack's exploration of the national task of German unification implemented at the local level is an important field of study in the German political landscape. Today, with the United States enmeshed in a war for democracy in Iraq and the European Union's efforts for integration stalling, we are reminded that 'how to build democratic societies?' remains a timely question. Cusack's analysis of German unification is central to both to the European integrative effort and to Iraq. His method is to compare to what extent the values of the elite and of ordinary citizens coincide, and to evaluate the role of elites in the overarching question of how to build democratic societies.

Cusack first looks at the significant gap in the political and economic values held by the two populations in Germany, and then juxtaposes his findings with the respective values of the local elites. He bases his book on two large-scale surveys (40 cities in West Germany and 37 cities in East Germany) conducted in 1995. His survey consists of a broad range of political and administrative elites in local government (mayors, city managers, senior executives, department heads, council members, etc.), as well as of citizens in the corresponding cities (total sample size of 2,400, an average of 80 respondents in each community). Chapter 2 (following on a four-page introductory chapter) lays out the mechanics of his statistical analysis, such as the patterns of origin, age profiles, and the gender composition of these elites, after which he examines the ties of these elites to their local communities. Chapter 3

examines the ideological values of the local elites in the two parts of Germany and contrasts these to the values of the citizens within those communities. It also contextualizes these findings by comparing them to the values of elites of other democratic nations. In chapter 4, Cusack deals with the divergence of political opinion (in local government) between the local elites and the population, while the final chapter attempts to answer the question of what facilitates and hinders good performance by local governments, “at least as seen by the citizens whose lives are directly affected by these local governments.”

Cusack’s book addresses a growing and important field centered on the question of how democratic societies function at the local level. This must be taken into account in the following critique. Surprisingly, given the special case of two separately developing German societies, Cusack does not seize the opportunity to problematize the concept of “elite” or how one achieves elite status in the two parts of Germany. Yet there is much room to discuss elite theory within his exploratory framework. For example, how can Cusack dismiss traditional elite theory (where the elite is recruited from the upper reaches of society) without analysing the role of the “extensive formal educational experience” of the local elites (24)? What do we do with the fact that Eastern elites have a predominantly technical occupational training background? Is there then a technocratic version of democracy in East Germany? And how can one dismiss traditional elite theory when “more frequently than with most questions” no answer was given about “the last principal occupation of the respondent’s father” (21)?

In the fifty-three pages of chapter 2 Cusack presents 31 charts or diagrams to support common-sense findings. For instance, the cultural and social profiles of the Green party are well known, even in the popular press. Yet Cusack expresses surprise that the multicultural and highly mobile members of the Green party appear to have a low level of natives among its elites. Considering the activist roots of the young Green party, it would in fact be highly surprising if Cusack’s other revelations, such as the Greens’ “shortest number of years in office (about three)” (18), were not as he states. And so Cusack goes on for fifty pages presenting findings such as “the local government

political/administrative elites of the two regions appear to be intensively linked to their fellow citizens (see Table 2.17)” (32), or “in both East and West, the members of the Greens are most likely to be members of environmental associations with 40 per cent in the East and 56 per cent in the West holding such an affiliation” (35). For the far left party PDS, he notes, “far and away the most popular associational affiliation is with labor unions (58 per cent)” (35). Also it is not a surprise to anyone that local elites of the SPD as a “Volkspartei” would be well represented not only in unions, but in other worker oriented associations. Cusack’s revelation that “61 per cent belong to sport associations, 59 per cent are members of welfare associations, and 55 per cent belong to cultural associations” (35) is hardly on the cutting edge of research. And so it goes on in the subsequent chapters. In other words, many of his findings could have been stated in a much more condensed way saving the space for his theoretical framework. And here we put the finger on the sore spot of his book.

On close inspection his prose turns out to be a direct translation, a parallel text, to his innumerable charts and diagrams. The diagrams by themselves would have made a fine presentation of his survey work, but by explaining to readers what they themselves can glean from the charts, Cusack reveals the weakness of his book. His theoretical conception is very sketchy and is connected to the body of his work only in the fifth chapter. This is his strongest and most interesting chapter, which, coincidentally, is based on a prior publication in the *European Journal of Political Research*. Here appears, *deus ex machina*, that Cusack’s point of departure is Robert D. Putnam’s theory of social capital. Had he been more forthright and not “hidden” this source of inspiration in his *de facto* eight-page concluding chapter, he could have done much to expand on Putnam’s notion of social capital in the special case of Germany (Putnam’s pioneering work was done on regional Italian government). In his *Making Democracy Work* (1993) and subsequent publications, Putnam suggests that the success of democracies can be measured by their holdings/expenditure of *social capital*. For Putnam *social capital* is made up of a host of components such as trust (on the individual and social level), civic cooperation, mutual

respect, and so forth, and it must involve respected mechanisms of problem and conflict solving. Quoting David D. Laitin's "The Civic Culture at 30" (published in the *American Political Science Review* in 1995), Cusack comes close to reflecting on his own research: "the deeper conclusion is that democratic institutions cannot be built from the top down (or at least not easily). They must be built up in everyday traditions of trust and civic virtue among its citizens" (150). Applying this to the current ideology in the United States where democracies are to be built within the limited timeframe of an administration, Putnam's and Cusack's findings do not bode well for the top-down approach to democracy-building in Iraq.

It must be said that Cusack's labors would have yielded more dividends had his contrastive approach (East and West Germany) focused and theorized more on the new situation in East Germany, and less on the established civic culture in West Germany. Does the top-down approach to democracy in East Germany, where engineers and technocrats (a category that, as a profession, could be described as the classic elite in the former DDR), succeed in building up social capital? If yes, how does it do it when both citizens and local elites hold a view of democracy that differs from that in West Germany?

In the final analysis, Cusack did just about as well as one can expect given the monumental statistical and analytical task involved in studying local German governments. Merely the classification of local German governments is a nightmare. Whereas the *Süddeutsche Ratsverfassung* has a chair who is elected directly, the *Norddeutsche Ratsverfassung*, the *Unechte Magistratsverfassung*, and the *Bürgermeisterverfassung* elect their chief executive indirectly. Whereas in the *Süddeutsche Ratsverfassung* the executive has a chair and a vote, the executive in the *Norddeutsche Ratsverfassung* and the *Unechte Ratsverfassung* has neither vote nor chair. In the *Bürgermeisterverfassung* the *Bürgermeister*, of course, has both a vote and a chair. Some of these constitutional types are dualistic, some are monistic, and others trialistic. This classification of local government (and it is just the tip of the iceberg) leads to an intrinsic comparative difficulty. Furthermore, the myriad titles and classifications in local governments from

Baden-Württemberg to Thüringen pose huge problems for anyone attempting to compare the workings of local governments.

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Berlin Electropolis: Shock, Nerves, and German Modernity. By Andreas Killen (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), xi + 295 pp. \$49.95/£32.50 cloth.

Berlin Electropolis opens with the following statement:

For a long time, to be modern meant to be 'nervous,' whether that modernity was located in the emergent capitalist nations of eighteenth-century England and France or in the fully industrialized nineteenth-century Germany and United States. It meant to live in a sped-up world, one saturated with new stimuli, demands, risks, messages, and pleasures, requiring constant adaptation to a wealth of new experiences (1).

In five chapters, Andreas Killen describes some of the changes and characteristics of Germany from the end of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. In chapter 1, "Berlin Electropolis," he traces the transformation of Berlin from a late-nineteenth-century city into a "world city" and the "hidden costs" of its modernization and industrialization. The emergence of a new consciousness of accelerated changes became "crystallized" in the concept of social rupture responsible for neurasthenia and mental disorders.

In chapter 2, "Electrotherapy of the Nervous Self in Nineteenth-Century Germany," the role of electricity in body functions, derived from the research of well-known, contemporary scientists (e.g. HLF von Helmholtz), identifies neurasthenia as a "bourgeois disease," an inevitable condition of the modern age. In chapter 3, "Railway Accidents, Social Insurance, and the Pathogenesis of Mass Nervousness, 1889-1914," and chapter 4, "Electrotherapy and the Nervous Self during Wartime," the author focuses on the transformation of neurasthenia from an individual

health problem to a condition affecting a large number of people. Here, the focus is on the measures (insurances, retirement plans) taken by the government to compensate for work-related accidents as well as war-related casualties. Chapter 5, "Psychiatrists, Telephone Operators, and Traumatic Neurosis," covers the early years of the twentieth century. The case of telephone operators, the majority of whom were female, identified as victims of electricity, parallels the case of shell-shocked soldiers as victims of war. In both cases, the working conditions induced nervous disorders that required compensation from the government. The high costs of this compensation led to the revision of Germany's social insurance legislation. Simultaneously, the cause of the disease shifted from environmental factors to the role of heredity and mass psychology.

In a fast-moving narrative the author examines various aspects of medicine, politics, social welfare, retirement benefits, and insurance policies during a critical period of Germany's modernization and war. His observations reflect not only what happened in Germany but are valid for similar events and problems in other industrialized countries. Indeed, many of the arguments in favor or against state-directed social security are still relevant today. While the author focuses on the problems caused by rapid modernization in the Weimar Republic, the disastrous defeat in World War I, and its consequences, some of his conclusions are just as applicable to lingering problems in other countries. This book treats a subject of general interest and will accordingly appeal to a general readership.

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The Post-Revolutionary Self: Politics and Psyche in France, 1750–1850. By Jan Goldstein (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), xiv + 414 pp. \$45.00 cloth.

In *The Post-Revolutionary Self*, Jan Goldstein examines the psychological theories of the self in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France,

their impact on the socio-political culture of the time, and vice versa. The central psychological issue examined in the book is whether the self is unary (a Cartesian will) or fragmented (as sensationalism or phrenology may allow, or even require).

It is a book about France coming to face the perceived moral threats that the possibility of a fragmented self presents; for, lacking a unified self people cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. In so doing, Goldstein takes issue with Derrida's assertion that Western philosophy's doubt about the viability of a unary self began in the twentieth century, finding ample evidence that this doubt surfaced in the early nineteenth century, and attempts to forestall the implications which followed immediately thereafter.

The book begins with an outline of the standard psychological division of the mind in the late eighteenth century, with a particular emphasis on the different conceptualizations of imagination. Goldstein focuses on the two philosophical theories prevalent at the time: Cartesianism and sensationalism. Condillac's sensationalist epistemology, a reaction to Locke's sensationalist epistemology, brings into sharp focus the particular problem that the imagination gives rise to: falling into error. It shares this feature with Cartesianism.

Goldstein then surveys the political path to which, the establishment feared, these errors would lead: it would cause workers to imagine they did not need the trade corporations, or to rise above their *état*. He also examines the negative opinions regarding the imagination made clear in the debate over public credit (which, it was argued, is but imagined wealth), the novel, masturbation, and the instruction of the fine arts.

The Revolutionaries embraced Condillac's sensationalist epistemology, as well as his solution to curtailing the imagination: the study of rationality via language which, when done correctly, can aid people in avoiding the errors to which the imagination might otherwise incline them. The revolution's strategy for stabilizing its population included teaching Condillac's psychology, as well as stimulating the imagination of its citizens by using street signs, festivals, and costumes to promote the legitimacy of the new government. But this experiment failed and was replaced with new political structures and psychological theories.

These evolutions occupy the vast bulk of Goldstein's book.

The book then shifts from the imagination to the concept of the self, in particular to how different psychological theories account (or fail to account) for an autonomous self. A very readable survey of the philosophy of the self from 1690 to 1820 composes the third chapter, starting with Locke's difficulty in accounting for a unified self, reactions to his theory, the influence of German philosophy, and ending with Maine de Biran's positing of an a-priori self.

This survey is followed by two chapters chronicling the rise of Victor Cousin's psychological theory and its significant influence in the political realm. Blaming the "ascendancy of sensationalism" (157) for failing to account for a unified self so as to make people morally accountable for their actions, which in turn allowed for the irrational behaviours of the revolution, Cousin posited, as a solution, a psychology which emphasized an active will as the basis for a unified self. Cousin's development, metaphysics, psychology, method, theoretical tensions, and political ramifications are all detailed in a well-crafted manner.

Goldstein concludes by devoting a chapter to the tensions between Catholic dogma and the Cousinian method, and another to the negative reaction phrenology evoked among the Cousinian-indoctrinated establishment. Each chapter traces quite aptly the contours of the interplay between theory and politics.

Goldstein weaves a wonderful tale out of the relationship between psychology and politics in a France confronted by post-modern themes of identity and self-awareness. It is not overly argumentative and does not often overreach its data. Neither the politics, the philosophy, nor the psychology is likely to confound the reader. What cannot be adequately articulated here is Goldstein's nuanced presentation: he supports his arguments with a wide array of cultural sources, drawing a detailed landscape of psychology and politics in his more general picture of France. *The Post-Revolutionary Self* is a very well-crafted book well worth reading.

CHRIS TUCKER
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Democracy, Social Resources and Political Power in the European Union.

By Niilo Kauppi (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2005), xi + 211 pp. £55.00 cloth.

This interesting study is about the complex political field in the European Union in line with the structural constructivist theory of European integration, based upon the insights of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. The focus is mainly on the two semi-presidential regimes of the EU—France and Finland. Niilo Kauppi, senior research fellow at the Academy of Finland, visited France and the United States several times to collect data and to discuss his findings. His emphasis is on political, not on economic, integration.

The multileveled European political field is seen as work in progress without an ultimate goal, in which regional, national and international polities are interconnected. It is an interdependent, relatively unstable symbolic and institutional field, with many emergent developments. The political agents under study include politicians, civil activists, intellectuals and bureaucrats and their interconnections. The "domestication" of Europe, or the process of creating a symbolic European field of political action, takes a multitude of different forms in the member-states. We are thus not dealing with universal developments, but with diversity.

According to Kauppi the European Union is essentially a local phenomenon. This implies that in France, a member of the EU from the beginning, the Union means something else than in Finland, which became a member in 1995. Moreover, national cultures differ as well as social settings and meaning structures. We are confronted with the same diversity that is central in the American futurologist Jeremy Rifkin's study *The European Dream* (2004).

This kind of diversity is elaborated in the case of the elections for the European Parliament in Finland and France in 1999. Many intellectuals and politicians interpret these elections as secondary, but for Kauppi they are crucial because they provide "an ideal opportunity to consult the whole population and test the relative support of challengers and minority currents" (118).

The latter refer mainly to social movements, including ethnic minority groups and feminist movements who are interested in getting their issues on the national political agenda. But for national prestige the European Commission is more important, which implies that executive power is more important than legislative power (86). In this respect the relationship between the Commission's legitimacy and democratic politics is not yet sufficiently developed.

The study presents a lot of practical information on how the political field functions in real political life, sometimes rather too detailed with many facts and names. Nevertheless, it is an interesting report based on a detailed research programme, especially for people who are interested in the EU's political practices, its member-states, and their diversity.

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At War with Ourselves: Why America Is Squandering Its Chance to Build a Better World. By Michael Hirsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) xxii + 288pp. \$15.95 paper.

Michael Hirsh, in his insightful and thought-provoking book, argues for "full engagement" on the part of America in the "global system." The global system, according to Hirsh, is an American creation the overseeing of which is the responsibility of the American president. Hirsh maintains that this system, sometimes dubbed by Hirsh the "Permanent Quagmire" but more commonly known as the "international community," is institutionally manifested in such things as the United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal Court, and is defined by the near global convergence in thinking and values due to the democratization in access to technology, finance and information. The promise for America of working through the international community to secure its liberties and freedoms is that it would force international institutions, through

such mechanisms as the enforcement of Security Council resolutions, to take responsibility for what are in fact American actions. The brute fact of American hegemonic power would thus be concealed or at least softened, making it more acceptable to foreign governments and allowing the other great virtue of the international system to emerge: its ability to co-opt American rivals such as China, preventing it from converting its economic power into military power in the future.

What currently prevents America's full engagement in the international community, according to Hirsh, is the long war within the American "soul" itself over the nature of and proper response to the outside world. The warring factions within the American psyche have most recently been manifested by the Clinton and Bush presidencies. The Bush "hegemonists," taking Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes as their philosophical foundations, believe the world is inevitably defined by international anarchy and war in which each state seeks to increase its power over others. The only viable option in foreign policy, therefore, is the unilateral use of force in pursuit of national interest. The Clinton "internationalists," on the other hand, understand themselves as the intellectual heirs of Enlightenment thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, and believe that America's proper role in the world is to be at the center of a freedom-loving international community sustained through diplomacy, multilateral negotiation, and international law. In short, Hirsh suggests that the "Bushies" look down to restrain the base and violent passions, while the "Clintonites" look up to the hope of rational global co-operation and consensus. Hirsh argues that America must transcend this conflict within itself by merging the "realism" of the Bush hegemonists with the "idealism" of the Clinton internationalists to make U.S. economic and military might the "shadow enforcer" or hidden power behind the international system. Reaching consensus will allow America to pursue a form of "postmodern imperialism" in which it *acts* unilaterally while it *talks* multilaterally.

Hirsh provides a wealth of valuable insights into our present condition. For instance, he explains that many Americans wish to reject the international system

because it allows other countries to partake of what was once American uniqueness, resulting in the loss of its “exceptionalism” and control over the language, imagery and meaning of democracy. However, Hirsh too easily dismisses Europe as a potential rival to American power. He incorrectly equates Europe with Japan, as European nations such as Britain, France and Russia are not simply economic powers but also nuclear powers. Thus, perhaps it is more correct to say that America’s unchallenged power is not over the “world” in the complete sense, as Hirsh maintains, but rather only over those parts of the developed and developing worlds that don’t possess nuclear arsenals? In this sense we can speculate that the Bush team’s pursuit of missile defense is not simply to protect America against rogue states that have or may acquire nuclear weapons, but also European states that may eventually get tired of American hegemony and imperialism, whether concealed and postmodern or otherwise.

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Collected Works of Erasmus 84: Controversies with Alberto Pio. Edited by Nelson Minnich (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), cxlviii + 483 pp. \$175.00/£110.00 cloth.

This volume of *The Collected Works of Erasmus* project of the University of Toronto follows in the magnificent scholarly tradition of the previous volumes, the first of which was published in 1974. Nelson H. Minnich, a professor in the Department of History and in the School of Theology and Religious Studies at the Catholic University of America, has written an insightful and invaluable introduction that provides a biography of Pio, an overview of the controversy and related texts, and a bibliographical conspectus of source-texts. Daniel Sheerin, an associate professor in the Department of Classics at the University of Notre Dame, made this first wonderful English translation of the Alberto Pio controversies. Professors Minnich and Sheerin both provide

the incredibly rich and informative annotations that reach a remarkable total of 2182. The scholarship is impeccable and staggering. The volume should find a place in every university library.

Alberto Pio (1475–1531), prince of Capri and the nephew of the famous humanist and philosopher, Pico Della Mirandola, was well educated in the classical languages and literature, especially Greek studies, by his tutor Aldo Manuzio [Aldus]. Pio was also interested in scholasticism and cabbalism. Throughout his life, Pio’s title was often contested; however, he did attempt to make his court at Capri a center of learning. In addition to his patronage of artists and humanists, he had a distinguished diplomatic career. Pio was very close to the Medici, and in 1518, he married Cecilia Orsini, Leo X’s first cousin. The marriage was apparently happy, and Cecilia bore Pio two daughters who survived, and a son who died at a young age. He was an important figure in Rome with a wide circle of influential friends. Pio, who was a conservative Catholic, became disenchanted with Erasmus and criticized the great humanist for his denunciations of church practices and officials. In addition, he accused Erasmus of supporting Luther and holding dangerous and heterodox opinions. In 1525, Erasmus received reports that Pio was denouncing him in Rome. That same year Erasmus defended his actions in regard to Luther in a letter to Pio and urged him to cease his attack. Pio received the letter in November 1525, but because of the pressures of diplomacy did not complete his response until May of 1526. Erasmus received a copy of Pio’s *Responsio paraenetica* in September of the same year. In his *Responsio* (1529), Erasmus provided a detailed refutation of Pio’s charges. In turn, the latter’s rejoinder appeared in the so-called *XXIII libri* in which Pio began each chapter with a series of incriminating quotations from a variety of Erasmus’ writings. Pio then defended the church’s orthodox teachings using the scholastic method in marshalling evidence. Pio intended to revise the entire work, but only got as far as book 9 when he died on January 8, 1531. The same year, Erasmus responded to the *XXIII* with his own *Apologia brevis*. Erasmus wrote once more against Pio’s position in the *Brevissima scholia* (1532), but as Minnich points out, the work attracted little attention and said almost nothing new. Details concerning the life

of Alberto Pio as well as the theological perspectives of the two protagonists can be found in the excellent introduction. The three polemic works of Erasmus against Pio as well as the Last Will and Testament of Alberto Pio,

which are beautifully translated, comprise the major portion of this superb volume.

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