

ISSN: 1084-8770 (Print) 1470-1316 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cele20

Book Reviews

To cite this article: (2002) Book Reviews, , 7:3, 399-419, DOI: 10.1080/10848770220132410

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10848770220132410

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The European Legacy, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 399–419, 2002

Carfax Publishing
Taylor & Francis Group

Book Reviews

National Minorities and the European Nation-States System. By Jennifer Jackson Preece (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), x + 198 pp. £30.00 cloth.

In this thorough and highly interesting book, Preece sets out to explore the international status of "national" minorities, which she defines as groups which are numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, and which possess the kinds of characteristics normally attributed to nations (such as common ethnic, religious or cultural characteristics and collective consciousness or will). Through a combination of theory and examples, she explores the ways in which national minorities and their rights have been treated in the context of the international states system, in terms of relations between sovereign states, within international institutions and in the texts of treaties.

Early on, an entire chapter is devoted to the inherent problems of defining such national minorities in any satisfactory way. Looking firstly at various theoretical constraints surrounding a concept with both objective and subjective criteria, she then provides a detailed description of the definitions used in numerous international treaties in the twentieth century, with their strengths and weaknesses, and concludes with a discussion of the way several other academics have dealt with the problem of definition.

Preece goes on to demonstrate the links between the awkwardness of definition with the central problem of why it has been so difficult to deal with national minorities in the context of international relations, while attempting to avoid infringement upon other states' domestic concerns. At the root is the "national self-determination fudge": the fact that when territory was redistributed among nation-states according to the principle of "national self-determination," it was a "one-off," and the resulting international order was subsequently dedicated to preserving the sovereignty and stability of nation-states as they had been created, claiming that the principle of self-determination had been achieved, and downplaying any other claims from national minorities who had missed out at the first round.

Thus national minorities are an inherent problem facing the European nation-states system, and Preece proceeds to examine numerous attempted solutions in their historical contexts. She begins with a brief look at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which recognised minority religious rights; the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which first referred explicitly to "nations;" and the Congress of Berlin in 1878 where minority rights were no longer acts of goodwill on the part of states, but externally dictated. She then examines in detail the "League Minority System" developed under the League of Nations whereby an international organisation had a legal procedure for receiving minority petitions. While its success was severely limited due to the social and economic crises of the inter-war period and the willingness of states to co-operate, the process established minority concerns as a possible object of international debate and concern. During the Cold War period, national minority rights were subsumed within the Universal Human Rights regime, and belief in its adequacy combined with a fear of instability meant that in general they were ignored by international organisations until the end of the Cold War. The period 1990–95 saw renewed international concern for national minority rights, and procedures were once again set up (for example within the OSCE—the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) for an international complaints procedure which would be applicable not only to the small states, but to all states. In her treatment of each of these historical periods, the analysis and conclusions are well supported with examples and detail about specific cases, international institutions and the enforcement mechanisms.

The existence of national minorities demonstrates the practical gulf between the contemporary nation-states system and its legitimising principle. Within the context of

ISSN 1084-8770 print/ISSN 1470-1316 online/02/030399-21 © 2002 International Society for the Study of European Ideas
DOI: 10.1080/10848770220132410

international relations, the rivalry between collective and individual rights, between national minority rights and sovereign state rights emerges for discussion whenever the existence or actions of a national minority pose a threat to the order and stability of the international system. Through a balanced discussion of both the theory and the experience of international concern with national minorities, drawing upon both historical and contemporary examples, Preece's book clearly illustrates the underlying causes of such confrontations between international and domestic concerns, the gradual evolution in the practice of seeking potential solutions throughout the twentieth century, and the implications for the functioning of the nation-states system.

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Un patriota che sfidò la decadenza: F.T. Marinetti e l'idea dell'uomo nuovo fascista, 1929–1944. By Marja Härmänmaa (Helsinki: Academia Scientiarum Fennica, 2000), 379 pp. n.p.g.

Filippo Tomaso Marinetti possesses a double image in most historical recollection. In his activities, certainly before the First World War and perhaps until 1922, he is remembered as the mouthpiece of Italian futurism. Historians disagree about how serious, how malevolent, and how influential his ideas were, but few would deny his claims to be *spiritoso*, imaginative, lively, inventive, fun. Here was a figure who better than most could "épater la bourgeoisie," could get up the noses of the pompous and self-important, and could by implication remind us of the fragility of our claims to virtue, understanding and knowledge. Here was an intellectual who somehow embodied the (perhaps hackneyed) freshness, the (perhaps self-interested) bravery and the (perhaps narrow) wide-rangingness of youth.

And then there is the second, more shadowy, Marinetti, who, the servant of a Fascist dictatorship from 1922 until his death just before the end of the Second World War in December 1944, aged badly, and even disgracefully. Once he had urged that, at 30, creative life was over. Under Mussolini's rule, he seemed living proof of his own proclamation, grandstanding at this or that Fascist ceremony and photographed dressed up pompously as a member of the Fascist *Accademia* (itself an uneasy and cringing imitation of the still more pompous, but equally retrograde, French Academy). Marinetti was the man who could readily abandon futurist independence for the fleshpots of Fascist conformity. The later Marinetti was even thought to be hen-pecked by his much younger wife, he, the "Mediterranean man" who, in the *Futurist Manifesto* had talked so carelessly about contempt for women and who had thereafter regularly derided marriage. To most eyes, Marinetti had become a sad old man whose chin was ever more inclined to jut out in feeble fearsomeness (and in groveling imitation of his *Duce*).

Maybe this outliving of his greatness was not surprising after all. Youthful japes come with use-by dates attached. The youthful Marinetti, man about town, whose inherited wealth made him rich enough to finance his own publications and life-style, and Italian nationalist as a second choice after Paris had failed fully to acknowledge his genius, had always been more a superficial turner of words and images, a sort of advertising executive before his time, than a person to be taken too much at his own estimation. His intellect was brittle even before it began to age.

Or so it seems. However, in the book under review, Marja Härmänmaa promises to redress the impression that the Fascist Marinetti had nothing much to say, as well as to counter any over-critical analyses of his lifework. Influenced by the views of such major historians as Emilio Gentile and George Mosse and impressed by the new culturalist approach to Fascism, she promises a thick description of Marinetti's ideas, and especially those of the last 15 years of his life. As good as her word, she duly sets out Marinettian thought on an array of issues, from religion to cooking (the one piece of late Marinettism everybody knows is the *Futurist cookbook* of 1932, a delicious piece in which the poet solemnly argued for the Italian renunciation of spaghetti while simultaneously prefiguring many of the ideas of the *nouvelle cuisine*). Going beyond the familiar, Härmänmaa instructs her readers about Marinetti's views on sport, on the ideal, on love, on the machine and modernisation, on history, on race, nation and war,

and on everything which might be imagined to compose the "new Fascist man."

All this description is done competently and copiously enough, with photographs (including the one of Marinetti dolled up as an Academician) casting their own light on her text. As promised in her introduction, Härmänmaa, in other words, does lay out for her readers "the poetics, or, better, the ideology of Marinetti" (18). There are two problems with this project, however, one stylistic, the other intellectual. The opting for a thematic approach carries the disadvantage of obscuring the exact chronology of Marinetti's publications as well as hindering any understanding of the specific context of developments in his own life and of changes in the attitudes, practice and fate of Fascist Italy. Secondly and probably more importantly, Härmänmaa, like so many of the culturalist school, is far too given to reading Marinetti's words on their own terms. Time and again she accepts the genuineness of his commitment to Italian patriotism, and the profundity of his dedication to "disinterested art." In her last paragraph she insists on his intellectual coherence, his real patriotism, his determination to rescue "Western man" [sic] from "lethargy" and generally credits his pledge to "vitality and creativity" over and above "rationality and materialism." In sum, Härmänmaa tells us well what Marinetti thought; she is less good at explaining why he thought it. Similarly, she can narrate his ideas for his society, but she does little to plumb whether these thoughts had any connection with the reality of the many Italies. Even after reading her book, I, for one, shall not mind offering Marinetti a small posthumous salute for his occasionally effective and witty zaniness, but I still see no reason to repeat the gesture of respect towards his consistency or profundity.

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The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation. By R. Scott Appleby (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), xiii + 429 pp. $65.00 cloth; $24.95 paper.

Since the end of the Cold War, religion has increasingly entered scholarly discussions centering on war, terrorism, sanctioned murder, and reconciliation. Written under the auspices of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Appleby's scholarly and lucid study of the interaction between international relations and religion can help reveal the complexities that have made the construction of peace so difficult during the recent past. Three thematic concerns provide the framework for Appleby's study. His analysis begins by focusing on the conditions that have induced religious leaders to become violent. Then, he proceeds to lay out the socio-political environment that seems to lead religious actors to reject violence as a sacred duty. Finally, he has schematically organized the factors that historically have induced non-violent religious leaders to become agents engaged in peace-building acts. Appleby has effectively engaged his themes by using the case-study method and by focusing on such trouble spots as Israel, Ireland, and Lebanon.

Religion as an ambivalent phenomenon is rooted in humanity's encounter with the sacred that can lead to a respect for human dignity as well as to brutal violence. Appleby notes that religious traditions memorialize and perpetuate a community's encounter with the sacred. Religious arguments draw upon the community's holy texts, ritual, and ethical practices as its members interpret the ontological values that traditionally have helped shape the concrete choices and behavior of men and women as they socially interact. To reduce or eliminate killing, Appleby notes non-violence as a religious norm has to be inculcated socially into the culture so that spiritual resources can cultivate tolerance and help to build peace. Sensitive to the fact that what is socially created can be dismantled, he has concluded his work by offering an array of strategies that can assist in religious peace-building.

Newspapers and magazines have continually highlighted the roles that religions have played in supporting violence. Appleby has also studied how and why cultural conflicts occur, but has added an analysis of peace-building initiatives that have rarely made the front page. Discussants concerned with international relations, for example, need to know that there are around 5,000 NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), which are both secular and religious non-profit agencies in the

North Atlantic countries. These NGOs transmit funds to the approximately 20,000 NGOs in the developing world, which provide effective services as well as advance a set of prosocial values that can legitimately be religiously reinforced. The Community of Sant'Egidio, an NGO, for example, helped produce the 1996 Educational Agreement for Kosovo and has assisted in peace-building activities in the Philippines and Algeria as well.

Between Appleby's description of the brutalities done in the name of faith in the first part of the book and his optimistic contention that religions can and are supporting peace-building in the final chapter, there emerges a masterful demonstration of how the main religious traditions throughout the world have entered the human rights dialogue by stressing the unacceptability of universalizing the normative standards rooted in the North Atlantic cultures. These "western" norms focus on personal and political freedoms, but not on such issues as medical care, food, and education, which are considered part of the human rights package in "non-western" parts of the world. Appleby insists, however, that it remains crucial to conceptualize some type of a cross-cultural concept of human dignity, in order to uphold an international legal order. Failure to articulate authentic, i.e. universally acceptable, human rights would essentially signify capitulation to the politics of cultural relativism and would mean abandoning persons who have been silenced within specific cultures. From this perspective, the challenge that currently has to be met by spiritual leaders is to translate into the popular idiom the perspective that religion can be non-violent, tolerant, and capable of fostering legitimate human rights.

Appleby has concluded his work by astutely diagnosing the act of reconciliation and its role in halting ongoing ethno-religious warfare. Religious leaders, he asserts, should be fostering a means toward reconciliation that can give voice to the affective truths rarely mentioned in the courtroom. Reconciliation itself is a spiritual, not a technical process, and so its progress cannot be compressed into any strict timetable. The goal is to link forgiveness to reconciliation and both to a lasting peace. Reconciliation requires such leaders as Desmond Tutu; leaders who are patient, dedicated, and are willing to sacrifice their own egos. They must command respect from both sides and be sensitive to the complex cultural issues involved. A politics of forgiveness and reconciliation would seem to be necessary to move past human rights abuses toward the achievement of a tolerant and pluralist civil society.

Appleby's book offers a unique perspective on spiritual faith, sanctioned murder, and reconciliation. Religious leaders, he contends, should struggle to formulate strategies that can move us beyond past horrors into a new millennium where the empowering of the prosocial elements of religious communities will become civic responsibilities. Religious values can be destructive, but they can also heal societies that have been torn apart by groups brutally seeking their own narrow cultural and political identities during the last century. Appleby has tried to point out that religion has certainly been an abusive force, but that it can also lead to reconciliation and pave the way for the peaceful maintenance of human rights based on human dignity. His book can help serve as a primer by those seeking to rebuild communities shattered by violence.

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Letters from Freedom. Post-Cold War Realities and Perspectives. Adam Michnik. Edited by Irena Grudzinska Gross. Foreword by Ken Jowitt (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1998), xxiii + 381 pp. $18.95/£12.95 paper; $48.00/£37.50 cloth.

This collection of articles and of interviews with and by Adam Michnik is the second Michnik volume in the series "Societies and Culture in East-Central Europe," edited by Irena Grudzinska Gross and Jan T. Gross. The former volume bore the title *Letters From Prison and Other Essays.* It was published in 1985, during one of Michnik's terms as a political prisoner in the People's Republic of Poland. However, everything that Michnik has published has been a message from freedom. Referring to the Russian writer Varlam Shalamov, who spent several years as a political prisoner in the Soviet Arctic labour camps in

Kolyma, and transferring his self-description to Michnik, one can say that Michnik has always been a free spirit, *volnyi*, even when he was not free, *svobodnyi*. This quality he shares with his country, Poland. In the post face to the present collection, Michnik even has an oblique reference to this existential experience. His explanation of the well-known habit of telling political jokes in Central Europe is that "[i]n the world of jokes, they not only felt free and sovereign, within captivity and Soviet domination, but they also laughed" (317).

Captivity has been basic to the Polish self-image ever since the time of the partitions (1795–1918). It was reinforced first by the experience of the Nazi occupation in 1939–1944 and then by the experience of Stalinist rule (1948–1956). One of Michnik's predecessors as a free Polish intellectual, Czeslaw Milosz, has analysed how some people gave in or gave up, in a book significantly called *The Captive Mind* (1953). The centrepiece in *Letters from Freedom* is a conversation between Michnik and Milosz, which was originally published in Michnik's newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza* on 8 June 1991, when Poland had been an independent and democratic state for two years after more than four decades of communist rule.

The many texts—26 in all—in *Letters from Freedom* are a kind of personal chronicle of Polish political and intellectual history from the dusk of communism and the dawn of democracy. However, Michnik's many conversations with his compatriots from different political and ideological camps, General Jaruzelski among them, deal not only or primarily with recent events, but with the experience of being a Pole. The whole book is permeated by a belief in Michnik's own assertion "that history exerts an exceptionally strong influence in Poland. This is how we experience our identity. I think Polish reality is incomprehensible unless we examine closely the last two hundred years" (296).

When Michnik writes about history, he means historical consciousness, not memory or myth. His is a rational analytical mind, inspired by the ethics of tolerance. He forges a link with the pre-partition Commonwealth, the Era of Enlightenment, the educational reforms and the spirit of the Constitution of the 3rd of May (1791). Thus it is not at all by chance that Michnik's conversation with Czeslaw Milosz starts with a discussion about the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, home, as Michnik puts it, of different nationalities, apart from Poles also Lithuanians, Belorusians, and Jews. But not only that. Milosz's Wilno/Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania which was part of Poland in the interwar period, in the 1930s was also the place where enlightened Catholics and Communists met and discussed. It is interesting to note Milosz's recapitulation of history and confront this with his own memory of the time and the place. In one of his letters to the Lithuanian poet Thomas Venclova, Milosz wrote that although Wilno was rich in both Polish and Jewish culture, the two did not really meet but led parallel lives. And, as Milosz tells Michnik, the 1st of May was the day for beating up Jews in Wilno, because the 1st of May, the socialist holiday, was considered to be a Jewish holiday. Michnik replies that anti-Semitism[1] has played a major role in Polish culture and that it continues to be present in the post-Communist debate all over Eastern and Central Europe. Michnik even hints that the next book from his pen might be *The Mind Kept Captive by Communism*.

Thus, what occupies both Milosz and Michnik is the web of Polish tolerance and anti-Semitism, Catholicism and Communism, parochialism and universalism—the latter with a European flavour. The mythology of a highly civilised Central Europe with a special mission, propagated above all by the Czech writer Milan Kundera in the 1980s is, as is the same stereotype about Poland, deconstructed by Adam Michnik who always notes that every coin has two sides. Most remarkable is Michnik's cool and unemotional assessment of General Jaruzelski's ambiguous role in Polish politics from the strikes and demonstrations in the coastal cities in 1970, crushed by Jaruzelski, through the Solidarity revolution, subdued by Jaruzelski, through his introduction of a "state of war" in December 1981, until the establishment of a democratic state with Jaruzelski as president in 1989.

The "letters" under review are political tracts, philosophical thoughts, ideological declarations and historical analyses spun around an ego, the political organiser and journalist Adam Michnik. Many of the texts were first published in his *monumentum aere perennium*, *Gazeta Wyborcza*. The daily's name bears witness to the fact that it was created by

Michnik and friends, prominently among them Helena Luczywo, as an "election newspaper" for the Solidarity movement in the spring of 1989. Long after Solidarity has split and evaporated as a political force—in spite of the emergence of *Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosci*, a somewhat populist, loose centre-right election coalition in 1997—*Gazeta Wyborcza* lives on as its remaining legacy. *Letters from Freedom* preserves and transmits this spirit. It is essential reading for anybody who happens not to be a Polish intellectual herself but has an urge to try to understand the labyrinth of "the Polish way" in European history.

Note

1. In spelling the word in this way, I follow the recommendation by Gavin I. Langmuir, *Towards a Definition of Anti-Semitism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, original 1990), 16–7.

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Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism. A Century of Income Security Politics. By Alexander Hicks (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 256 pp. $45.00 cloth; $18.95 paper.

Alexander Hicks has set out on a tremendous and important task—trying to explain the development until the end of the 1980s of the central elements in modern welfare states: pensions, sickness, unemployment, industrial injury and family allowances. In doing so he follows the tracks of many others who, from different perspectives and different angles, have tried to follow the same path in order to see if there are any similarities between different countries and their different kinds of welfare state.

The book well presents many theories invoked in welfare state analysis, coupled with the author's own empirical analysis that is well researched and documented. I agree that the development of welfare state policies depends on a labour movement that directly or indirectly influences the decisions made. The following critical remarks could perhaps stimulate further research in the field.

Firstly, this research gives me an uneasy feeling of Boolean algebra. It seems to me that those using this method, mainly developed by Ragin, should clearly state their criteria for including a country within their scope. In many of his calculations Hicks uses the value 1 or 0 to denote within, but the criteria are not always well documented. Regression analysis based on the values 1 and 0 will, not surprisingly, often get a very high correlation. I am not as surprised by the high correlation coefficient as Hicks is.

Secondly, the choice of countries. When making such a longe durée and deciding that one of the central criteria is a GDP above $2,000 in 1980 prices in 1913 (Table A.I.2) one is left with a puzzle. Why not include Argentina, one of the ten richest countries of the world in the 1930s? Sometimes also looking at cases that don't necessarily fit into the picture could be useful.

Thirdly, the use of mainly aggregate spending, and only public spending[1] can create a problematic understanding of the development of the different welfare states. Public spending doesn't include tax-expenditures, occupational welfare, the effort by voluntary organizations, the informal economy, or the family's role, just to mention a few central elements. The OECD has started trying to calculate net social expenditure where they also take into consideration the taxation of the income transfer from the welfare state.

Fourthly, some of the explanations look as if they were invented for the purpose, and did not depict the real story. A good reason for this is, what I also myself often find difficult in comparative studies, that the tiny detail or historical knowledge of a country will not be fully reflected in the analysis. Just one example is that of Denmark since I know the Danish case best.

It is at best misleading that the reason for the late introduction of family allowances was the policy of the government during the Second World War, the case more being that after the big social reform in 1933 there was a period where it was mainly small and incremental changes which took place. Therefore, looking only at family allowances is misleading. In 1946, for example, unemploy-

ment benefits were improved. Preventive action with medical tests for children and pregnant women where introduced in 1945 and 1946, and, in 1949 an act giving higher support to persons with tuberculosis was introduced.

Fifthly, it would be good to see if the analysis still holds when looking at data for the late 1990s, when many countries in Europe were experiencing a decline in unemployment, and, when the pressures on public sector expenditures were thus less than they were at the end of the 1970s. A split of the data for the 1970s and 1980s would perhaps have revealed that it was especially in this period that unemployment benefit was important, as this period was combined with two oil-price shocks, whereas the economic development in many European countries in the 1980s was quite different. By this, I also indicate that using the business cycle as an explanation could have been important.

Sixthly, it seems to me that looking at the development in Europe, there seems to be clear convergence in the overall spending level, and also that it is levelling out, but at the same time there are clear differences in the priorities of this spending. An analysis using more specifically the different contingencies and their development could have been important.

Despite these critical remarks I do find that the book has many merits, in particular the author's very good and precise description of very different strands in the analysis of welfare state developments deserves merit. The book is, at the same time, very readable, although for people not familiar with Boolean algebra and regression analysis it might be difficult to follow all the arguments.

Note

1. For a discussion of tax-expenditures, see Bent Greve, "The Hidden Welfare State, Tax Expenditure and Social Policy," *Scandinavian Journal of Social Welfare* 3 (1994): 203–11; and for historical references and definitions of core concepts, such as, occupational welfare, see Bent Greve, *Historical Dictionary of the Welfare State* (Lantham: Scarecrow Press, 1998).

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Justice is Conflict. By Stuart Hampshire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), xiii + 98 pp. $18.95/£11.95 cloth.

Stuart Hampshire's book is a collection of his Tanner lectures on human values given in 1996–97. It is a pleasure to read. Its message is clear and its sentences polished.

His position is close to Hume's that "reason both is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions" or in contemporary philosophical idiom "In moral and political philosophy one is looking for adequate premises from which to infer conclusions already and independently accepted because of one's feelings and sympathies" (xiii). Following this definition, moral philosophy might be a fairly conservative and apologetic enterprise, but not so in Hampshire's hands.

When we realise that our conclusions most often differ we face the choice between dictatorial harmony and conflict. Hampshire settles for conflict and for civilising procedures of conflict, even the physical test of force. "To be killed in a duel, as were Pushkin and Lassalle, is different, and it has always been felt to be different, from just being killed in a pub brawl, as was Christopher Marlowe" (19). The further civilising of conflict occurs in the procedures of law, in parliament, and in the inward deliberation and weighing of pros and cons.

The alternative to conflict is any doctrine of social and political values that claims universal validity, such as the rational harmony in the soul and in the city from Plato's Republic, or in universally enforceable substantial human rights of the present age. He criticises Plato and Aristotle for their fear of conflict and claims that their desire for harmony defines social justice rather than the other way round, and that this vision of harmony governed by reason persists in Christianity, in the Enlightenment, in Liberalism, in utilitarian or deontological ethics, and in—eschatological—Marxism.

The modest plea for civilising conflict by means of procedures turns out to be controversial because Hampshire is so attentive to differences; even procedures of conflict resoution differ from one society to another. There is no better reason than habit for preferring one. Local conventions are "our peculiar form of governance and we cling to it" (26).

Together with memories they form the identity of societies, and it is pointless to ask people to forget them.

When it comes to opinions on substantive justice we should reasonably expect a chaos of differences and antagonisms. The only over-riding consensus could be the metaethical plea for hearing the other party and for weighing and balancing the arguments.

This position is evidently in sharp opposition to the modern development of political human rights into substantial rights.

In the chapter against monotheism we read "An intelligible and coherent account of the Creator and of his Creation carries with it the implication that there can be no inexplicable leaps or gaps in nature, rightly understood. Correspondingly, a rational person's moral theory, including her notions of substantial justice ought to be seamless and complete ..." (70). The first sentence of this remarkable statement recalls Joseph Needham's famous theory about one God ruling the world by law and the emergence of Western natural science. But Hampshire's point is that the advances of natural science in no way support a platonic mathematical model of morals or natural law. Instead of inductive and deductive reasoning, Hampshire advances the "circular processes of rationality, which requires that every proposal should provoke the consideration of its denial" (71).

The last chapter contains a critique of Kant's Protestant ethics and its stress on the individual's conscience (86) together with a plea for socialism.

The book remains on the metaethical level with almost no indication of how to argue.

If we were to follow Hampshire, we would encounter a Pandora's box of unresolved problems. If justice is socially and historically contingent then the standards governing what count as legitimate arguments are contingent also. In municipal law, for instance, the doctrines of the sources of law vary considerably. Further, the standards by which to judge whether rules of the games are foul or fair vary with the forum and over time and space. Even the adversary process as opposed to the inquisitorial may be considered historically contingent. I think the following argument need be considered.

In a duel to which the adversary process is likened the winner demonstrates his ability and the looser his lack of ability. That one is more able than another is no sure indicator of truth, or guilt, or anything else. Death in a duel was therefore considered honourable. Fair trial should be different from fair game in a duel.

If we imagine a trial where the counsel for the crown positively knows that the evidence or rules for the people's case can be countered by other evidence or rules unknown to the defendant, should not the prosecution be bound to disclose those facts that may lead to acquittal and so to speak compensate for the weaknesses of the defence? Criminal proceedings are fundamentally asymmetrical, the people and the entire state against one and due process can only modify this.

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The Withered Vine: Logistics and the Communist Insurgency in Greece, 1945–1949. By Charles R. Shrader (Westport, CT and London: Praeger Publishers, 2000), xxii + 317 pp. £48.50 cloth.

The Withered Vine examines the logistics of the communist forces during the Greek civil war of February 1945–August 1949 (the so-called "Third Round"). Using a wide variety of sources, Charles R. Shrader provides a detailed examination of the supply, acquisition, storage, issue, maintenance and disposal of equipment and supplies as well as the provision of medical services to the communist Greek Democratic Army (GDA). His study offers a thorough explanation of the factors that led to the communists' defeat in the Greek civil war, focusing on the impact of the communist leadership's strategic decision-making and emphasizing the critically-important role of external support provided by the Soviet bloc. Shrader argues that problems of supply and external support, more than any other factor, shaped the course of the war and sealed the victory for the Greek government forces. A critical element in the communists' defeat was Stalin's unwillingness to assist the Greek rebels. Contrary to the Western Cold War belief that a monolithic worldwide

communist conspiracy led from Moscow and aimed at democratic overthrow by armed force was at play around the globe, Shrader maintains that nowhere was this belief less true than in Greece. There the civil war was wholly "homegrown" and of little interest to Stalin. Even though Greek communists believed that Soviet aid would be forthcoming once the rebellion had begun and had achieved some success, the reality was that they received virtually no direct support from Moscow. In fact, Stalin, fearing that the war might provoke a direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, even desired an early end to the war and acted in ways that hindered the support of the Greek communist rebels by his Soviet satellites. In sum, according to Shrader, this unwillingness of Stalin to support the Greek communists doomed their rebellion to failure.

In the absence of Soviet aid, it was Greece's communist neighbors—primarily Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria—that provided the rebels with a degree of refuge, money, advice, material assistance, and secure facilities. Yugoslavia was particularly important, as Tito provided the Greek rebels with a large number of headquarter sites, reception and refugee centers, training camps, supply depots and other military facilities. However, support from Tito was eventually cut off as the Greek Communist Party (KKE) came to be dominated by its hardline, Stalinist wing. This ideologically pure faction, led by Nikos Zachariades, supported an independent Macedonian state under Bulgarian domination, backed Stalin and the Cominform in their dispute with Tito, and transformed the Greek rebel forces into a conventional army—all this over the objections of the more pragmatic wing led by Markos Vafiades.

Specifically, Zachariades' decision to throw Greek communist support behind Moscow on the question of Macedonian autonomy cost the Greek communists not only what little support they had among Greek nationalists, but even among their own communist supporters and rebels, making it difficult for the Democratic Army to gain further recruits and domestic support. The second fateful Zachariades' decision was his support of Stalin and the Cominform against Tito and Yugoslavia. This decision alienated Tito, the rebels' chief supporter, and led him to cut all logistical assistance to the GDA and to close his borders to the rebels. The eventual loss of Yugoslavian and, later, even Bulgarian and Albanian assistance doomed the Greek rebellion.

Finally, Zachariades' decision to turn the guerrilla GDA into a conventional-style fighting force was ill-timed and directly contributed to the rebels' defeat. Specifically, the GDA could overcome neither the logistical burdens nor the manpower requirements of such a transformation. As a conventional army, the GDA became less mobile, flexible and adept at tactical infiltration. Moreover, progressively losing its sources of external support, the resources required to raise a conventional force in the field rapidly disappeared. As Shrader argues, one of the most critical decisions that rebel leaders face is when to transform their rebel forces into a conventional army. Comparing the classic examples of successful transformations (Mao Tse-tung's victory in China and the defeat of the French by the Viet Minh in Indochina) with the unsuccessful transformations of the Greek Democratic Army and the Algerian National Liberation Front, Shrader demonstrates the consequences of making this decision before conditions are ripe.

In short, *The Withered Vine* is a comprehensive study of the factors leading to the communist defeat in the Greek civil war. Despite the paucity of Greek sources used—many Greek government records of this period remain closed and those that have been declassified are badly organized and virtually impossible to access—Shrader's study is exceptionally well-researched and documented. Relying primarily on non-Greek secondary sources and US government records (particularly Army intelligence and other reports), Shrader's study is among the most well-documented English-language histories of the Greek civil war. Shrader's study is especially welcome for its scrupulous objectivity and balance, something lacking in many (particularly Greek-language) studies of the period. For instance, he gives ample attention to the left's claim that the civil war was in large part begun as a defensive reaction to rightist, even collaborationist, persecution in the post-World War II aftermath.

Finally, *The Withered Vine* is not only a well-documented and balanced study, but it

also provides a great deal of essential historical background to the Greek civil war, focusing on its origins in the Greek resistance during World War II. Thus, potential readers should not be put off by the book's title. Despite its emphasis on logistics, those who read it will be surprised to find that this study, while focusing on the logistical requirements of the GDA, is far broader and more encompassing in focus, offering a thorough historical introduction to the Greek civil war, and analysing how particular political decisions, forces and events produced the logistical failure that helped defeat the Greek communists. Integrating a great number of factors, Shrader weaves them together in such a way as to offer a comprehensive, well-integrated explanation of the loss. In short, *The Withered Vine* is a well-written, fascinating study that deserves to be read by anyone interested in this period of Greek history or in insurgent guerrilla warfare, more generally.

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Women and Literature in Britain, 1700–1800. Edited by Vivien Jones (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), xxiii + 320 pp. £37.50/$54.95 cloth; £13.95/$19.95 paper.

The late eighteenth century is sometimes identified as a period in which a "reading revolution" occurred, as literary output multiplied and the taste for recreational fiction expanded. Reading itself became more secular, more individualised and more "extensive," as the book gradually became an object of everyday consumption. The contributors to this volume do not explicitly address the notion of the so-called reading revolution, because (with a few notable exceptions) their view of literature is too narrow to embrace reading practices and readers' responses. This is a pity, because the opportunity to make a truly innovative contribution has not been grasped.

Vivien Jones's editorial introduction stresses the enormous contribution made by women to the expanding print culture of the period. Jones emphasises the disturbing implications of this involvement for conventional ideas about gender roles. There was a great rise in the volume of women's writings in eighteenth-century England, and much of it took women out of the domestic sphere and into public life. Jones, however, promises something more than this, foreshadowing a study of women's engagement with print culture, which will re-evaluate female agency as reader and consumer. Only two contributors, Paula McDowell and Jan Fergus, are prepared to make inroads into this agenda. Although the book as a whole offers plenty of interesting discussion of women as authors, it reveals very little about their engagement with print culture, in other words about their relations with publishers, printers and booksellers, and their role as readers.

The authors do their work of recuperating the female literary presence very well. We learn something, for instance, of the Quaker printer and businesswoman Tace Soule, and of the worker-poet Mary Leapor who wrote rhyming couplets about the washing-up ("But now her Dish-kettle began/To boil and blubber with the foaming Bran./The greasy Apron round her Hips she ties,/And to each Plate the scalding Clout applies"). Harriet Guest analyses the writings of Anna Letitia Barbauld, and Felicity Nussbaum dissects Sarah Scott's 1766 novel *History of Sir George Ellison*. Ruth Perry reads *Clarissa* as a study of the disinheriting of middle-class daughters, as families strove to concentrate their assets and to empower the eldest son to spearhead the advance of the lineage. Here, however, as in some other chapters, we lose sight of the link between women and print culture. It disappears altogether in Gillian Skinner's refreshingly clear chapter on women's legal status in the eighteenth century.

This treatment of women and literature is therefore unbalanced. For one thing, it is excessively author-centred. Most writers here privilege female authors, but treat them in isolation from the world of publishing and bookselling. As Paula McDowell correctly suggests, if we look at literary history from a publisher's viewpoint, "we confront a different textual landscape than literary critics have constructed" (136). This is even more true if we look at it from a *reader's* viewpoint. But her colleagues have not listened. Isobel Grundy writes about rescuing neglected or inaccessible female authors, and incorporating them into the male-dominated canon. Yet she in no way

questions the assumptions about literature implicit in any literary canon, whoever it includes. Just like the phallocentric literary critics Grundy wants to revise, she seems to narrow down the study of literature to a series of individual authors.

This is not the only imbalance in the volume. It also places great emphasis on certain genres, especially the novel and poetry. In addition, Angela Smallwood tells us that women wrote 200 plays between 1770 and 1800. Clare Brant's witty chapter takes as its subject the sheer variety of writing genres like diaries, letters and essays, and discusses what she calls "the politics of being miscellaneous" (302). None of these authors, however, take us beyond *belles-lettres*. It is not clear that this is all that women wrote in the eighteenth century, and one suspects that this narrow focus does not do justice to the range of women's involvement with print culture. What, for example, of women and history-writing, women as biographers and travel-writers, women and religious works and as writers of pedagogical literature, women as bookbinders and book illustrators?

Jan Fergus offers us something different in her study of the archives of two provincial booksellers, who also managed circulating libraries. On the basis of this small-scale study of their clientèle, she suggests that the development of the novel after 1740 was not especially associated either with women or with a middle-class readership (157). Women did not form the majority of the audience for fiction as far as these booksellers were concerned, and those who did buy fiction tended to be widows or single women—in other words, they were women in control of their own expenditure. On the other hand, Fergus argues, her records do show a marked expansion in women's magazine subscriptions (another form of literature and of reading omitted by this volume).

Paula McDowell is the only other contributor who is prepared to see female authors as part of Robert Darnton's communications circuit, dependent on publishers and the market. Her chapter seems quite at odds with the author-centred studies that precede her. She sketches a broad and exciting research agenda, envisaging "de-throning" the novel to study a wider range of genres to which women might have contributed. McDowell draws attention to feminised areas of the book trade like bookbinding and retailing, not forgetting the London "mercury-women," who ran wholesale outlets for the newspaper and pamphlet press. McDowell's call for further research into women's role in the book trade is as welcome as it is in contrast to the rest of this volume.

The 14 contributions come with a chronology of women's writings, and a guide to further reading. They have stuck to the period, although many are bursting to expand it to include Aphra Behn at one end and Jane Austen at the other. They stick to Britain, too, by which they mean exclusively England, never thinking to cast a glimpse, for comparative reasons, towards Europe or North America. They provide an interesting feminist perspective on the rise of the novel, which students of literature will find useful. The volume, however, does not fulfil all its declared aims. We still need a historian of women's engagement with print culture, which treats reading and publishing as well as authors, novelists and poets. Such a historian will be glad to refer to the chapters included here by McDowell and Fergus.

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Sephardi Jewry: A History of the Judeo-Spanish Community, 14th–20th Centuries. By Esther Benbassa and Aron Rodrigue (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), lxiii + 313 pp. $19.95/ £12.50 paper.

One of the major ruptures in the history of the Jewish people came in 1492 with the expulsion from Spain of the Sephardim, among medieval Jewries heretofore the most important and populous. Many made their way east, to the Ottoman Empire, where they reconstituted a cohesive unit which lasted until the empire's fragmentation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This superb addition to the University of California's series "Jewish Communities in the Modern World" is the first serious attempt to provide a unified treatment of the Sephardic world.

Jews first moved to the Iberian peninsula during Roman times and because of their specialization in commerce, especially through

links to other Diaspora Jewish communities, made themselves indispensable for Moslem rulers, following the invasion of 711, and then later for Christian kings. But the *reconquista* brought a zeal for re-Christianization that placed intolerable pressure on Jews to convert, which many did in the late 1300s. The fidelity of these so-called New Christians was suspect from the beginning because they occurred in large waves under intimidation and was made more so because many former Jews changed their habits not at all. The introduction of the Inquisition in 1481 laid bare the resentment toward these crypto-Jews, now pejoratively labeled the "Marranos" (swine). Following a decade of official religious persecution, King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella issued the Decree of Expulsion. By the end of July 1492, the great bulk of Jews, whether true converts or not, had been expelled from Spain, with the best estimate of their number between 100,000 and 150,000.

Some of the Sephardim took refuge in Western Europe, especially in Bordeaux, Amsterdam, and Hamburg, where they constituted a successful commercial element and a specific Jewish cultural entity that would eventually be overwhelmed by Ashkenazi immigration. Others made their way to North Africa, and with the existing Maghreb Jewry created a particular Judeo-Arab society. By far the majority went east, especially the area of the Balkans. There, because the Ottoman Empire divided up its subjects on a religious basis, the Jews were one more group to be governed by the *dhimma*, the pact by which non-Moslem "people of the Book" had the free practice of their religion and a certain measure of self-government regarding their rites and customs in return for the payment of taxes. And just as had been the case under Moslem rule earlier in the Iberian Peninsula, Jewish commercial expertise was appreciated and rewarded.

Two intellectual currents among the Sephardim were directly related to their experience of expulsion. First, there was the efflorescence of religious law, *halakhah*, to deal with the problems related to Jews who had converted to Christianity and wished to return to Judaism, and to family issues—marriages and kinship—that were put in disarray by the geographical displacements. Second, there was the Jewish messianism associated with the life of Sabbetai Zevi that was especially appealing to people who had experienced expulsion and exile.

The cultural and political context of the Sephardim changed as they and the Ottoman Empire confronted westernization. The successful example of Jews in France could be imitated through the Alliance Israélite Universelle, which provided a modernizing and secular education and which encouraged greater social integration and thus ironically the learning of languages other than French. The slow disintegration of Ottoman power in the Balkans meant that Jews had to confront new governing masters, most of whom were less tolerant than the Ottomans because of the ethnic nationalism that made the new states possible.

How complicated the situation could become is best illustrated by the example of Bulgaria, which won its independence from the Ottomans in 1878. Three years later, pogroms in Russia combined with the ideology of nationalism to raise the issue among Bulgarian Jews of a homeland for the "Jewish nation" in Palestine, the *Hibat Zion* ("Love of Zion") movement. Bulgaria's rulers were themselves anti-Semites, but they were even more anti-Ottoman and therefore gave their encouragement to this Zionism. Yet in Palestine itself, Jews, relatively content with Ottoman rule, were unwilling to support a cause that could bring governmental hostility. The contradiction was resolved only upon the collapse of Ottoman power in the midst of World War I.

World War II destroyed much of the Sephardim as it did the Ashkenazim of Europe. In the German-occupied portion of the Balkans, Serbia and northern Greece, the Final Solution was imposed with terrible efficiency, and in Croatia, the fascist Ustacha regime was as brutal. By contrast, the Italians, occupying southern Greece, refused to cooperate with Nazi demands, and in Bulgaria, despite its alliance to Germany, there were also no deportations. Most of the Sephardim survivors emigrated to Israel, where what specific culture they had remaining has been largely submerged, ending a long tradition.

Esther Benbassa and Aron Rodrigue have brought to this history a truly admirable breadth of vision and depth of research. Because they are working in new territory, filling

a long-neglected lacuna in the record, some of their conclusions must be considered provisional. Each chapter, even some paragraphs, will be starting point for monographs to come. For now, they have laid out the map.

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Fins de Siècle: How Centuries End, 1400–2000. Edited by Asa Briggs and Daniel Snowman (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), £27.50 cloth; £10.95 paper.

Edited by two historians long associated with the BBC, this book is a specimen of a genre now current in English and British culture: the energetic study of national and popular history at a level which may, without patronising, be termed polytechnic rather than academic. Stimulated by the promotion to university status of many technical and community colleges—an action almost certainly taken with malignant intentions towards academic and critical study—this historical culture nevertheless flourishes and promotes vigorous and original thinking, which will mingle fruitfully with that undertaken in universities in the proper meaning of the term. Represented by the admirable journal *History Today*, it keeps alive a sense of the past neither deferential nor compulsively iconoclastic, and to a surprising degree national without being nationalistic. Ruling structures are surveyed with the beady eye of those not fully, or not at all, included in them, and there is a healthy dialogue between rulers and ruled.

Fins de Siècle belongs to this genre, and operates in the borderlands between enquiry and entertainment. There is really no need to ask the question which the sub-title purports to answer: centuries don't end in any way worth enquiring into, and not before 1700—when John Dryden wrote his *Secular Masque*—was it suggested that the turning-points of Christian chronology might coincide with phases in secular history. As for the connotations of the term, the "*fin de siècle* mood" is no more than one century old, being in England an invention of minor poets and artists wishful of being taken for Parisian decadents. The millennium has a respectable religious history, thanks to the Apocalypse of John of Patmos; the century has none. Why then—since it sets out to answer a non-question—has this book succeeded in containing a series of essays worth reading?

The answer depends on a series of coincidences, partly manufactured and partly accidental. It so happens that in England—to which the volume is entirely confined—there has been and persists a recognised national historiography, in which climactic events are recorded as having occurred in 1399, 1485, 1603, 1688, 1789, and 1901; we do not yet know what if any event we shall choose to define as climactic in or about the year 2000. Now as every schoolboy once knew—and still knows if, as is not uncommon, he knows any history at all—every one of these events is dynastic in character, consisting in the death or deposition of a monarch and its effects on the structure of government. Even 1789, overshadowed though it was by the remarkable events taking place in Paris, is in Roy Porter's essay the year of George III's first illness and his prime minister's triumph over the Whigs in the matter of the unenacted Regency Bill. It would seem that we cannot ask how the 20th century will end without imagining if not compassing an event which we pray God long to postpone.

What conclusions ought to be drawn? In the first place, it is clear that centuries only end in England (and I mean England; the Unions of 1603, 1707 and 1801 are off-stage presences in this story). Whether a history of how they end could be constructed in the setting supplied by France—where there is a history of dynastic continuity as old as the English—or by Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, or anywhere where there is not, is a question which Asa Briggs and Daniel Snowman have not attempted to answer; nor is there any good reason why they should. In the second place, it is clear that the history of the political community, as defined by the government—in this case the hereditary monarchy—that holds it together, is still the organising tissue around which history is written. A series of events of real importance in the history of English government is used, in seven learned and lucid essays, to survey a series of moments in the history of English society, governed as well as the governing, and in the idioms of social and cultural as well as political history;

and these essays make excellent reading. But how centuries end is defined—if we allow Louis XVI to correct the one apparent exception—by the death of kings and queens; and this is a perfectly good way of answering the question. It is neither the question nor the answer to it, however, which make *Fins de Siècle* the entertaining, useful and stimulating volume that it is.

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Avatars of the Word: From Papyrus to Cyberspace. By James O'Donnell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998; paperback edition, 2000), $14.95 paper.

This is the paperback version of a paperback argument, addressed to "people who read books and use computers and wonder what the two have to do with each other" (ix). The argument is roughly that the age of cyberspace is understandable as a return to practices that began with the manuscript. Surfing the web is like using canon tables to jump between sites in the Gospels; clicking hypertext links is like using the bound manuscript that broke radically with the enforced linearity of papyrus scrolls; the great libraries of antiquity are no different in ambition from the Internet as a virtual library; collaborative scholarship was as common before as it should become now; a text like Casiodorus's guide for scribes can effectively be read in terms of a word-processing handbook; user-made anthologies were once the norm and may return to that status; and thus, to bring it all together, "the relative stasis of the printed book that we are familiar with is an anomaly in the history of the written word" (78).

What does this mean? On one level, O'Donnell appears to be arguing that there is no need to panic: the only thing we really risk is a return to a late classical or early medieval stage of grace. Yet the sociological differences are surely so great between our globalizing mass cultures and the isolated scholars of antiquity that few could or should take the comparisons seriously. O'Donnell is rather more productive when he uses such perspective to argue, for example, that the individual author will no longer prevail, that our information economy is now based on managing abundance rather than scarcity (thus "an economy of amusement"), that the university is becoming a youth camp with an intellectual shopping mall, that we might cheerfully abandon the restrictions of Western civilization ("not something to be cherished"), and that serious issues such as Internet copyright concern only the commercialization of Disney videos and dubious contemporary music: we must merely "look hard at the new media for ways to keep free and open economy in ideas, while letting the idea-less thrash each other with lawsuits and threats of trade wars over cartoons and noise" (98). Well written, closer to the stuff of many current debates, but not many of these reflections will provide much help to anyone making actual decisions in or about cyberspace.

The big historical hyperlinking, freely offered as stimulating comparison and fully justified in terms of this book's own approach to being a book, must inevitably be more obvious to the author than to most. As a professional classicist, an expert in Augustine and Casiodorus, co-founder of the *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* and Vice Provost for Information Systems and Computing at the University of Pennsylvania, O'Donnell is modestly self-described as "an older practitioner of the new" (89). And yet, born in 1950, he is surely not old enough to sound quite this old. Depth and nuance is all very well, but these issues merit rather more. Here there is simply too much professorial mucking about, too numerous too brief excursions to only half-developed thoughts, and too much delight in placing Augustine next to Derrida, or Nietzsche next to Sting, for anything like a substantially coherent approach or critique to emerge. For instance, McLuhan is mentioned several times and belittled for the limits of theory, but is strangely deigned unworthy of discussion on anything like the level of ideas. We are somehow expected to know and agree with our author's hidden winks. Unfortunately both the book and cyberspace hide the subtle intimations: O'Donnell might be surprised to find he reaches rather less community than his erudition presupposes.

What we have here is ultimately a series of fascinating university lectures, the relative immediacy and orality of which seems to escape theorization. The context and style is

inescapably American; the presupposed reader is a real or would-be American university professor, apparently unaware that a wider world is now catching the words. From this listener's non-American perspective, O'Donnell thus gratuitously mixes memories of books with an adventure of the self in history, family and media, devolving into first-person narrative whenever some kind of sincerity seems called for, failing to convince beyond those necessarily distant depths.

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How it all Began. By Nikolai Bukharin, translated from the Russian by George Shriver (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998), xxviii + 345 pp. $32.00 cloth; $17.95 paper.

The book starts with Bukharin's desperate appeal to Stalin not to let the novel perish. Stalin did preserve the document that Stephen Cohen with some considerable effort managed to extricate from the NKVD. Bukharin, called the "golden boy of the revolution," had considerable talent, not only as a politician but, as this work makes clear, also as a writer.

Bukharin was a leading 20th century Marxist and a founding father of the Soviet Union, executed by Stalin in 1938. The book is not only a personal testimony of a young Marxist radical in Tsarist Russia, but also a wonderful account of childhood that takes us to the eve of the failed 1905 revolution. He wrote it as an autobiographical novel but as none of the people in it were invented, nor disguised, it can more properly be seen as a memoir. The novel was apparently meant to finish in 1917 and Bukharin called it "Vremena," a novel of the times. In some ways, it is a pity that Cohen did not retain its original title, which seems particularly appropriate. As Bukharin wrote, "But to everything in this world there comes an end; there even comes an end to the torments suffered in those intermediate states of transition when the last secret tear of one's soul is bitterly swallowed, and the crisis passes, resolving itself into some sort of new phase, which even as it comes into existence is fated in turn to pass away, to disappear in the eternal changing of the times and seasons" (110). Interestingly, the novel appears in many ways, timeless, rather than a reflection of Russia at the turn of the century, although it is that as well, of course. The corrupt civil service, the greed of the merchants, its racism, and the hopelessness of those, like Bukharin's father, in the face of such times. All this is not only specific to Russia but to all states during decay and rebirth.

The young Bukharin comes through as a caring son, who gives us a wonderful picture of his family, particularly of his father. A boy who loved nature and all living creatures and who surrounded himself with animals and insects, even as an adult imprisoned in the Lubyan. The only time he swore as a boy, was when a lady tramped on a beetle in his presence. It shows him and his father, in particular, as kind to the Jews and sympathetic to the peasants whose wretchedness Bukharin movingly described.

This picture is suddenly given a rude jolt when we come to a section that is meant to give us the beginnings of Bukharin's ideology and the development of his revolutionary ideas. The suffering of the peasants is now seen as irrelevant. They are after all, not a part of the proletariat but will come into the revolution as small owners, a class, which as we now know, was not on the side of the angels. Thus here the caring Bukharin appears to accept and indeed support, the inevitability of the destruction of the peasantry. Taking his background into account, one would have expected to have him become a social democrat rather than follow the ruthlessness of the Marxists. But the book is truncated and we will never really understand what led the gentle and kind boy into the domain of Lenin and Stalin.

Bukharin remained loyal, even in Lubyanka, to Marxism and the Soviet Union. As he himself puts it, "The great cause of the USSR lives on and this is the most important thing. Personal fates are transitory and wretched by comparison." Bukharin's views were common at the time of the Great Terror, and I had hoped that the book would clarify one of the most puzzling aspects of Marxist history in the 20th century, namely the loyalty of its adherents. Loyalty, in the face of the terror which the system evoked in its

followers. Why in spite of all their suffering, did they find it impossible to condemn it?

Perhaps the clue lies in Bukharin's agreement with Dostoevsky. The latter thought that once human beings lost their faith in God and in the immortality of the soul, and if they thought that their time on earth would be short and finite, they would lavish love and affection on each other. Thus, making a new beginning for humanity. This was Bukharin's hope for the future. A hope, based on no evidence and thus as much a matter of faith as the Christianity which he so roundly condemns. Other than this insight, the book takes us no further in our understanding of what made the victims of Stalin's terror remain loyal to his ruthless regime even as it murdered them. But nonetheless, Bukharin's novel makes interesting reading.

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Selected Poems from *Les Fleurs du mal:* **A Bilingual Edition.** By Charles Baudelaire (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998), xxxiii + 209 pp. $16.00/£11.50 paper.

Translation can prove an almost hopeless task. Slavishly accurate equivalents are often unreadable, little more than the Latin "trots" schoolboys depended on in years past. Freer literary excursions stand accused of unjustly altering some sacred original. An Edward Fitzgerald gets away with what amounts to a masterpiece in its own right, but scarcely produces a true translation of Omar Khayyám. Rather let us say, a tribute. The Italians' opprobrious warning, "traduttore traditore," pretty well defines the inherent dangers.

All this said, we do need translations, even for the more commonly read languages such as Italian, French, and German. Now comes Norman Shapiro, who already has several good translations under his belt, to try his hand at Baudelaire's *Fleurs du mal*, a daunting task at best. And he succeeds, not perfectly, occasionally not even well, but at worst catching Baudelaire's meanings, at best doing full justice to a difficult source.

Which is never to succumb to being satisfied with a reworking in a language so different from French of poems by the acknowledged forefather of most modern Gallic verse (some would say of modern poetry in general). Any translator fights under a tremendous disadvantage: he plays another poet's game obeying rules already set down. In the present case a big problem is to remanage the 12-syllabled French Alexandrine favored by Baudelaire, providing only two major stresses per line. Shapiro answers with ten syllables and multiple accents. He must as well find rhymes and meanings to fit the original, at times being forced to employ weak enjambments: "... as she/Moves" to make a rhyme with "free" (61), "above/The," with "love" (87), or "asteep/In" with "deep" and in the same line "deep/Into" with "sweep" (91), among several more in one short poem. In general, be it noted, the more conservative French poets such as Baudelaire try to avoid enjambments, forced ones especially. A bigger problem: English is a harsher, stronger, more heavily accented language than French; its effects can scarcely be asked truly to parallel Baudelaire's.

In spite of any or all of these reservations, however justified on this reviewer's part, the 73 selections Shapiro has elected to attempt out of some 150 in *Les Fleurs* represent, all things considered, a remarkable achievement. These translations can stand on their own. They tell Baudelaire's story; they faithfully reveal his agonies, his prejudices, and his aesthetic delicacies. For the amateur lacking French, they remain a priceless substitute. Represented are examples of virtually every string in his lyre, the well-known pieces and some minor delights, from four of the better "Spleen" poems to the famous sonnet "Corréspondances" (13), to a narrative like the five-stanza "Don Juan aux enfers," to a typical hymn to his black mistress's bosom (47)—all most professionally rendered, here and there in lines Baudelaire, that perfectionist, would surely have appreciated.

Let me count some of the ways Shapiro has done his source proud. I have already quibbled at a few of the less fortunate lines. Here is a sampling of the best:

Man, creature free, forever will you keep
The sea dear to your breast: your mirror. There,
In endless swell, you see your soul laid bare,
Gaze at your spirit's bitter, briny deep
(Stanza 1 of "Man and the Sea," 25).

I'm beautiful, O mortals, as might be
A sculpted dream; my bosom fine—whereof,
Bruised, all would suckle—fires the poet's love:
Silent as stone, fixed as eternity.
(Stanza 1 of the sonnet to "Beauty," 35).

Lured by your scent, led on to charming clime,
I come upon a port, all mast and sail,
Battered and buffeted by tide and time;

And all the while green tamarinds exhale
Perfumes that fill my nostrils and my soul,
Blending with sounds of sailors' barcarole.
(The last two stanzas of the sonnet "Exotic Perfume," 47).

All Nature is a pillared temple where,
At times, live columns mutter words unclear;
Forests of symbols watch Man pass, and peer
With intimate glance and familiar air
(Stanza 1 of the sonnet "Correspondences," 13).

Like some lewd rake with his old worn-out whore,
Nibbling her suffering teats, we seize our sly
Delight, that like an orange—withered, dry—
We squeeze and press for juice that is no more.
(Stanza 5 of "To the Reader," 5).

Willis Barnstone has provided a satisfactory introduction detailing the life and *oeuvre* of the troubled genius that was Baudelaire, and David Schorr's 17 impressionistic engravings help interpret the verses.

In a word, a most satisfactory initiation into the great French poet's work, tempting the reader to try the delights of the original, made all the easier by the fact that this is a bilingual edition, the English facing the French text to its left on each set of pages.

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The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics. By Susan Friend Harding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), xvi + 336 pp. $26.95/£16.95 cloth.

This is a serious and important work. Despite the title, it is not merely an examination of a media evangelist. Instead, it is a penetrating analysis of fundamentalist language and its political effect. It is not intended to be an "exposé" of television evangelism.

Harding does provide ample evidence of Falwell's questionable ethics and overall character—"he could humiliate, deceive, and steal" (92); as a Bible-college student, when his roommate gave Falwell letters to mail to his betrothed, Falwell discarded them, substituted his own, ultimately marrying her himself (94–95); she traces Falwell's history as one of duplicity and betrayal—but this book is not an attack. Rather it is an analysis of an influential movement in American culture and politics. Harding's tone is cautious, sympathetic, and at times admiring. Frequently it reflects puzzlement; but never hostility.

Her objectivity may waver, but only to suspend critical awareness. For instance, after an intense "interview" with a minister (which he skillfully modulated into an effort to convert her), Harding felt as though she were in "some kind of daze." Driving, she nearly hit another car. "I slammed on the brakes," she wrote, "sat stunned for a split second, and asked myself 'What is God trying to tell me'?" It was her voice, she said, but not her language. "I had been inhabited by the fundamental Baptist tongue I was investigating" (33). This is but one of several examples of the power that she personally sensed in what she calls the language of conversion.

The conventional literature of conversion, Harding notes, tends to deal with "various ritual practices and psychological techniques," and "overlooks how persuasive in a quite unsensational way the recruiting rhetoric is. It overlooks the extent to which the language of conversion as such 'divides' the mind" (35). She argues that "social scientists and professed unbelievers in general do not let themselves get close enough to 'belief' to understand it, or, for that matter, even to see what it is." Rather than being something that no rational person could take seriously, "men and women convert to fundamental Christianity because they become convinced that supernatural reality is a fact, that Christ is the literal Son of God, that he did rise from the dead and is alive today, that the Holy Spirit is speaking to them, that Jesus will enter their hearts if they acknowledge their sins, that they will have eternal life, that God is really

real. To continue to think otherwise would be irrational; it is disbelief that is false and unthinking" (36). Born-again believers are convinced that unbelievers "cannot understand their faith." A student of witchcraft in France, she notes, came to the same conclusion regarding witchcraft. Harding conceded that she had been naive to think that she could "participate in the culture" she was observing without also "partaking of it" (39–40).

To the outsider, the most startling and ominous of Harding's findings is the manner in which—in a defiance of reason—contradiction actually strengthens faith. The Bible is literally true in every respect. Identifying inconsistencies simply tests faith, and (postmodernists take note) forces an acceptance of the inconsistent whole.

Although the text is "fixed and inerrant … discerning that meaning is not simple or sure or constant" (28). The preacher is a Godly man; evidence that he has sinned, that he is unscrupulous, that he is hypocritical merely forces believers to harmonize "contradictions and infelicities according to interpretive conventions that presume, and thus reveal, God's design. Their Bible, their preacher, is thus constantly creating new truth" (xi). "What makes Falwell's scandalous actions productive is that they also bound people to him" (100). He engages in a "process, both languaged and enacted, in which a preacher's … wrongdoing is productive, not a side effect; is necessary, not incidental" (103).

Convinced that they have "unequivocal knowledge of the future," adherents of biblical literalism have a "moving, thrilling sort of faith" (229). They are largely—if not completely—shielded against any challenge to their belief; shielded against inroads from the very bases of modern thought: logic and reason. Modern criticism "submitted the Bible to history and found the Bible wanting." These groups, on the other hand, "submit history to the Bible and find history wanting" (237). From the modern point of view, Harding notes, this is a "kind of madness." She argues, however, that this very madness "makes it compelling from a Bible-believing point of view" (238).

Harding distinguishes between "fundamentalists" and other related groups. "Born again" is a term including all segments of a large movement that includes diverse elements and has coalesced into the "Christian right." Although historically passive, these groups have evolved under the leadership of Falwell and others to become a potent political force.

Their goal is comprehensive: reversing "modernism," including secularism, liberalism, "evolutionism," and the social science that has led the state to permit abortion and to become neutral, rather than supportive, of religion. What is most striking to an outsider, is that they seek to counter liberal democracy with an irrationalism potentially as powerful as that which gathered force in Germany in the 1920s; one with a similar propensity to encourage the *Führerprinzip*. This particular irrationalism may be based on religion, but so was the Inquisition.

All this would be of interest only as a curiosity, except for the political power that the Christian right has developed and continues to manifest. "Fundamentalism's" strong influence is not limited to American domestic policy. Because of America's overwhelming position internationally, it also shapes policies around the world. Prohibiting such things as needle-exchange programs, thus contributing to the spread of AIDS, and family-planning programs, thus contributing to poverty, starvation, and the subjugation of women, is but a beginning.

Harding may not have intended to sound a warning. Her book, nevertheless, is vital because it does just that.

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The Invention of the Restaurant: Paris and Modern Gastronomic Culture. By Rebecca L. Spang (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 325 pp. $35.00/£23.50 cloth.

Only a detached sensibility prefers philosophizing on food to savoring it. That noted, Rebecca L. Spang, in her Thomas J. Wilson prize-winning *The Invention of the Restaurant*, discourses on the history of the French institution from humble and salubrious beginnings (as a place where restoratives or bouillons were available for the "weak chested") to its modern celebrity. To explain the restaurant's genesis Spang's "interdisciplinary study" analyses the social, cultural and political changes in

eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France, which gave rise to the restaurant as we know it.

In exploring this area Spang has found a niche, providing a rationale for what might be construed as serendipitous development. From its pre-Revolutionary medicinal function through the Revolution where ambivalence toward the restaurant reigned (would it foster fraternity or elitism?) to its gradual acceptance by foreigners and Frenchmen alike, Spang meticulously charts the events which spawned an institution. To bolster her thesis, she turns to primary materials of the period: to letters, memoirs, and other accounts which describe dining experiences in Paris, as well as to literary works detailing the same. Scrupulously researched, the study expands on the 245 pages of text in 65-plus pages of notes. One has the impression that Ms. Spang has imbibed every document, ingested every shred of paper on the subject. Moreover, spread throughout the work are contemporary cartoons and other visuals which speak to and document evolving attitudes toward dining out. Statesmen (including the "father" of the French restaurant, Roze de Chantoiseau), writers (Mirabeau, Rousseau, Voltaire, Balzac), and food notables (the author of *Almanach des gourmands* Alexandre Balthasar Laurent Grimod de la Reyniére) are summoned to testify to culinary attitudinal shifts, shifts which mirrored larger social and cultural issues: "The questions surrounding nouvelle cuisine were not particularly new" they were, in fact, the familiar chestnuts of the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns, "but when the focus shifted from problems of translation of Homer to sauces and seasonings, the issues became accessible to a broader audience" (52).

A by-product of the French Revolution, restaurants into the nineteenth century, Spang explains, "were still an overwhelmingly urban phenomenon, inventions of the capital and icons of its pleasures" (172). Not representative of France at large, even so, they were by 1804 entrenched: "When Louis Prudhomme wrote a guidebook in 1804, the former editor of the radical *Révolutions de Paris* (now turned author of less overtly polemical texts) boldly stated that Paris was home to over two thousand restaurants, an indication, no matter how wildly wrong or surprisingly accurate his arithmetic, that restaurants had already by this time become a fixture of life in the capital" (172–3). On one hand, "the world of the grand Paris restaurants generalized the behaviors of the courtly grand couvert attendants followed an elaborate code of etiquette, being seen was as important as being satiated, a definite dress code determined who was admitted and who left at the door" (237). On the other, while creating an eating elite, they concomitantly and paradoxically militated against a monarchical system where the king ate and attendants watched. Now "each 'prince' in a dining room might feel royal and important" (238). Still, the pleasure of the prince-next-door depended on "somebody outside: some poor devil with his nose pressed to the window" (245).

Spang's subject whets the food lover's appetite, her thesis is unassailably argued, and her vocabulary impressive if ponderous. What, then, would render her book more palatable? Fewer Jamesian sentences, elimination of those relentless sesquipedalian words, a more judicious use of adverbs and adjectives (in this case the enemy of verb and noun): "In the first decades of the nineteenth century, American and especially British visitors identified restaurants as particularly 'French' (even if there were none to be found in most of France, and many more in the rich and heavily-touristed center of Paris than in the city's outlying districts.) If these observers were to penetrate the mysteries of 'Frenchness'" a task made much more imperative by the apparently never-ending and largely unfathomable changes of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras "restaurants offered as good a starting point as anywhere else" (175).

Hemingway may not have known much about the history of French cuisine, but he knew a lot about prose writing. Ms. Spang's work would benefit from a leaner style. As it is, she has taken the juice out of her subject, rendering it a bit *sec.*

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The Politics of Irish Drama: Plays in Context from Boucicault to Friel. By Nicholas Grene (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), xvii + 312 pp. £40.00/$59.95 cloth; £14.95/$22.95 paper.

This study is concerned with the representation

of Ireland in its drama and theatre from the 19th to the late 20th century. Nicholas Grene, professor of English literature at Trinity College, Dublin, looks at drama as part of a wider cultural nationalism, but here concentrates on its political self-interpretation. Thus about two dozen plays, from Boucicault to McGuinness and Barry, are analysed, their understanding of Irish life and society laid bare, and their interactions with audiences at home and abroad are investigated. In the process Grene discovers a "theatrical revisionism" (6) when successive playwrights try to represent the only real Ireland while mocking all previous interpretations. His approach is thematic and not chronological, so that not always are either the most representative or the best plays of any individual author necessarily chosen, but those which offer an interpretation of the country, the "state of the nation." The author shows, for instance, how three chronologically distant writers, Boucicault in *The Shaughraun*, Shaw in *John Bull's Other Island* and Friel in *Translations*, all use the problematic nature of Ireland, which requires constant reinterpretation, to appeal to both domestic audiences as well as to the wider Irish Diaspora, while the basic type of drama changes very little between these plays. Each chapter in the book deals with a different sub-theme.

By juxtaposing Yeats' and Gregory's *Kathleen ni Houlihan* and *The Shadow of the Glen* he shows how the expectation of a national ideal by Dublin's middle class audiences was, respectively, confirmed and destroyed. Similarly Synge's *The Playboy of the Western World,* which Yeats thought apolitical, demonstrates how audiences are shocked by being shown the Irish peasantry as amoral and degenerate rather than as the fondly imagined law-abiding and orderly inhabitants of an unspoilt West. Furthermore its behaviour seems to owe more to the loyalties of kinship than to the oppression of the English coloniser.

Where Synge was writing from the outside looking in on a remote community, O'Casey's plays appear to be written from within the Dublin working classes. Politics appear to be out of touch with the common man; tenements offer only communal space, not the freedom of middle class individualism, and the women in these plays are portrayed as pragmatic, down to earth and against the principled idealism of their children. This "fourth-wall naturalism" (134) has a kitchen setting, not dissimilar to Yeats and Synge, but it lacks its remoteness.

Another chapter deals with reactions to the Irish revolution, highlighting further clashes between audience expectations and the playwrights' attempts to produce drama appropriate for a post-revolutionary Ireland. O'Casey's *The Plough and the Stars* is rejected by audiences because it does not meet their nationalist expectations. While *The Plough* uses similar devices as previous plays, which had been welcomed in Dublin, its secular and mundane setting made for a revisionist interpretation of the Easter rising which tried to resist its establishment as a nationalist icon. Johnston's *The Old Lady Says "No!"* tries even harder to defy the fossilisation of Ireland's national theatre. This is taken one step further by Behan whose *The Hostage* turns the glorious national liberation into a music-hall farce with a tragic ending. Grene points to the continuation of these themes in Friel, Parker and McGuiness who are all still trying to come to terms with Ireland's troubled past.

In a comparison of Yeats' *Purgatory* and Beckett's *All That Fall* Grene looks at drama that tries to move away from a complicity with its Irish audiences and which refuses to be determined by its Irishness. These plays, he argues, attempt to transcend the post-colonial era by attempting to get to some more general truth. Another fruitful and intriguing comparison is that of Friel and Murphy whose early plays were not dissimilar in their fresh look at the rural setting, yet while the former soon became an international success, the former writer remained much less attractive to wider audiences. Grene concludes that while both dramatists write against the pastoral iconography, Friel uses the post-colonial language, while Murphy remains less optimistic and his language is often too original and opaque to translate easily to outside audiences. He devotes a whole chapter to Murphy's revisiting with a vengeance the peasantry in the country-kitchen in *Bailegangaire*. Mommo's story is written against Yeats, Gregory, and Synge; it reveals the pathology of Ireland's relations with its past in the story of three women on uneasy terms with modernity.

The last chapter, "Imagining the other," finally concerns itself with plays that recognise an existence outside a homogenous catholic

Ireland in past and presence. Here the first world war can be seen as the crucially dividing theme where "others" experienced the Easter Rising as of minimal importance. McGuinness's *Observe the Sons of Ulster Marching to the Somme* and Barry's *The Steward of Christendom* are considered here. The specific and different ethos of protestant unionism is investigated in the former, and the pathology of catholic loyalism in the latter. Both plays use the vantage point of the other's perspective on and in the past to make the present bearable and understandable.

Grene's concluding pages reflect on the marketability of Irish plays, their distinctness through their geographical origins and as recognisable by their self-analysis, their interpretation of Irish life to the outside world in their representational and formally conservative mode. There is little to criticise in this vivid yet cautiously argued account. This is, though, a serious book, and it is a pity that the publishers didn't think it deserving of footnotes rather than the nuisance that endnotes provide for any serious reader. One would also have liked to see a little more on the North whose plays and playwrights do not all fit into the themes investigated here. Overall, however, this is an intelligent and illuminating study of Irish theatre and should be read by anyone interested in the subject.

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