



The European Legacy

Toward New Paradigms

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Book Reviews

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Scientific Imagination. By Gerald Holton (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 382 pp. \$19.95 paper.

Gerald Holton's *The Scientific Imagination*, originally published in 1978, has been recently re-released with a new Introduction. A thoughtful contribution to an important period in the development of the history and sociology of science, Holton's collection of essays deserves a re-visitation 20 years later.

The essays that make up *The Scientific Imagination* represent a critical element of Holton's extended methodological inquiry which began with his earlier case studies in *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein*. As both a further engagement of case studies, as well as a more thorough articulation of his notion of "thematic analysis," *The Scientific Imagination* has been an influential contribution to the history of science.

The Scientific Imagination brings together a series of essays, most of which Holton published separately between 1971 and 1976. The essays are collected into three main parts.

The first section juxtaposes Holton's theoretical paper on themata with a close look at the Millikan–Ehrenhaft dispute, a broader essay which traces the two opposing views of scientific rationality (Dionysians and Apollonians) which, according to Holton, have failed to account for the history of science, and finally, a definitional essay which plots the rich thematic content of the terms "analysis" and "synthesis" and which helps Holton construct an alternative to the two camps.

The second section re-enforces the first by bringing together a close look at Fermi's group with essays on the problem of "measuring" science and on the psychology of scientists. Part Three shifts to look at the current public understanding of science and ends with Holton's articulation of the educational philosophy of Project Physics Course.

The essays are not seamlessly incorpor-

ated into the book, but Holton's method does not pretend to be a unified theory of the history of science and the form of the book keeps the reader tuned to the complexity of Holton's notion of thematic analysis.

In the mid-1970s, a number of sociologists and historians of science were convinced that themes shaped the way scientists did and understood science. Holton's was perhaps the most thorough articulation of the notion that thematic analysis provided a productive and insightful methodology for the history of science because themata are formed and committed to by scientists in a way that can be rationally traced and mapped. Noted sociologist of science, Robert K. Merton, in his response to Holton's important paper on the subject, suggested that Holton's "most distinctive and daring idea"¹ was that the themata that influence scientific practices often reach deep into the life history of the individual; beyond the way we have traditionally defined scientists *as* scientists. While most of Holton's colleagues agreed in the 1970s that the personal, to one extent or another, did come into play in science, few offered ways to map and traverse the divide.

In this way, like Thomas Kuhn's notion of "paradigms" and Imre Lakatos' "research programs," Holton's notion of how themata shape and influence the production of scientific knowledge is a mile-marker for the way that the history of science has understood itself in relation to the science it studies and to the fields that influence it, such as sociology and even fields that Holton himself draws upon conceptually, like "anthropology, art criticism, [and] musicology" (7–8).

The Scientific Imagination's continued relevance at the turn of the millennium comes, in large part, from the fact that the trajectories of influence—indeed, the themata—that regulate the history of science itself begin to resolve in many of Holton's important contributions. Several aspects of Holton's work of the mid-

1970s in particular have been formative for the history of science since then.

For example, Holton insists that meaning is constructed between the public and private practices of science and that individuals somehow bridge this difference. The individual that Holton explores is complex and caught up in a web of influences; a notion that has had much play in the 1980s and 1990s. Holton's method also suggests that the history of science should focus on the "event" of a conflict of ideas in order to witness how science is driven thematically. This idea, too, has been expanded upon in the history of science since then, from Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer's exploration of the Hobbes–Boyle dispute in *Leviathan and the Air Pump* (1985) to Holton's own recent work on Einstein.

There are clearly some challenges to Holton's work of the 1970s that stand perhaps in greater relief today. Holton's characteristically "scientific" rational methodology is at its weakest where science blends into the personal life. What François Jacob has termed "night science" in *The Statue Within* (1988) for example, tends to remain beyond the reach of Holton's method. There are also powerful theories affecting the history of science today that are not easily reconcilable with Holton's method such as Bruno Latour's critique of subject-oriented history of science.

On the other hand, Holton has always insisted on the importance of an interdisciplinary web of inquiry which constitutes situated truths rather than a unified theory of how scientific meaning is produced.

The "new introduction" is consistent with this notion. Though not really an introduction, Holton's recent addition is rather another case-study based chapter, written in 1996, which focuses on the quest for high-temperature superconductivity in the mid-1980s as a further example for the application of thematic analysis. Although it smacks a bit of "see, it still works," the reader is struck by the fact that, indeed, it does.

NOTE

1. Robert K. Merton, *Science* 188 (1975): 335.

PETYR BECK
Portland State University, USA

Histoire des Techniques, *Annales Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, Vol. 53, Nos 4–5 (special issue). Edited by Yves Cohen and Dominique Pestre (Paris: Armand Colin, 1998), 350 pp. Price unknown.

This special issue of the *Annales*, prompted by the enormous historical, sociological and anthropological attention paid to science and technology during the last two decades, is the first on this topic in the journal since the famous 1935 issue containing Marc Bloch's seminal paper on the water mill (hence the easily-overlooked gloss at the foot of the front cover: *Du moulin? eau au satellite*). This 1998 special issue is a substantial piece of work, including a lengthy and illuminating introduction by the editors; seven full articles; two essay reviews; and numerous book reviews (even if some of the latter are rather overdue, with some of the texts under review having appeared as long ago as the early 1990s). It is to be welcomed both in its own right, and as an opportunity to present to francophone readers an overview of recent work published mainly in English.

The full articles are grouped into two major sections. The first, entitled *From "social studies of science" to the history of technology*, contains papers by H. Otto Sibum on laboratory practice and human gesture in Joule's work on the mechanical equivalence of heat; by Nelly Oudshoorn on what she calls an "archaeology" of sex hormones in the inter-war period; and by Donald MacKenzie on the history of technology and the sociology of knowledge. This is followed by an interlude by David Edgerton, presented as "ten eclectic theses" criticising much recent work on the history of technology (particularly that of the English-speaking world) for concentrating too much on studying innovation, and not enough on analysing the *use* of technology. The remaining papers are grouped in a section entitled *Large technical systems*, and include one by Thomas Hughes on "history as evolving systems"; a study by François Caron of the development of the French railways; and an investigation by Nathalie Jas of the social, scientific and commercial context of the fertilizer trade in late nineteenth century Germany.

The editors' introduction is a wide-ranging and thorough presentation of the major themes in the new approaches to the

history of technology since the mid-1970s. They outline the contributions of the “social studies of knowledge” movement (championed by such figures as Bruno Latour and Michel Callon in France, and David Bloor, Harry Collins and colleagues in Britain), as well as the subsequent “social construction of technology” (SCOT) programme spearheaded by Donald MacKenzie, Trevor Pinch, Wiebe Bijker and others. The papers themselves fall into two distinct types. The contributions by MacKenzie, Hughes and Edgerton address historiographical and methodological issues, reviewing and reflecting upon a range of now classic work by themselves and others. So, for example, we find MacKenzie drawing upon earlier work on missile accuracy and computer hardware verification in order to illuminate the roles of authority, induction and deduction in our conceptions of “knowledge” and “truth.” Hughes, in turn, describes his seminal “system builders” approach and “reverse salient” concept (with reference to his classic works on electrification, large-scale technical systems, and the inventor Elmer Sperry), and also considers in some detail his more recent work on even larger-scale, post-war, socio-technological systems. In particular he examines techniques for planning and managing, such as critical path analysis (PERT)—the latter which he also considers as a possible tool for historical analysis itself. Those readers new to the history of technology will find in each of these three papers a thought-provoking introduction to—and, in Edgerton’s case, critique of—the various recent approaches, while even those familiar with the work of the authors should appreciate the broad sweep of the articles.

The remaining papers are much more specific, each addressing in some detail a particular topic in the history of technology: in the case of the papers by Sibum, Oudshoorn and Caron, at least, a review and revisiting of a substantial research programme published by the authors in more detail elsewhere. Thus Sibum pursues the notion of gestural practice in nineteenth century laboratories and workshops; while Oudshoorn looks at scientific, clinical, institutional and entrepreneurial influences in the construction of the “hormonal” body, and the centralising of the “hormonal enterprise” around gynaecology. Caron, in order to shed light on the develop-

ment of the railway in France during the period 1832–1870, draws from both Hughes’ approach and Bertrand Gille’s more general notion of a “technical system” that is itself predicated upon the interdependence of many other, diverse, systems. Finally, Jas reports research on the socio-scientific context of *Thomasmehl* fertilizer (a phosphate-based product derived from the Thomas–Gilchrist steel production process) in Germany during the period 1886–1914 and, in particular, the building of a consensus over an analysis/standardization procedure.

The two essay reviews by Yves Cohen form an excellent coda to the seven full papers. The first review is devoted to a comparison of A. Moutet’s “Les logiques de l’entreprise. La rationalisation dans l’industrie française de l’entre-deux-guerres” (Paris: Editions de l’EHESS, 1997) and D. R. Shearer’s ‘Industry, State and Society in Stalin’s Russia, 1926–1934’ (Ithaca–London: Cornell University Press, 1996); the second considers N. Dodier’s “Les hommes et les machines. La conscience collective dans les sociétés technicisées” (Paris: Métailié, 1995). Both are relevant to a number of the themes considered elsewhere in this special issue.

As the editors point out in the introduction, this special issue contrasts greatly with its 1935 predecessor. The close study of artefacts (water mill, rudder, etc) or individuals (Frederick W. Taylor) of 60 years ago has been replaced by a much more widely ranging analysis of complex socio-technical systems, an analysis that involves individual inventors and entrepreneurs; politics and economics; social networks; scientific and technological theory and practice; and so on. This special issue succeeds in combining reflective papers by some of the major contributors to developments in the historiography of technology in recent decades with a number of detailed expositions of case studies exploiting their ideas and approaches. It deserves to be widely read—and not only by those for whom French is a first language.

CHRIS BISSELL
Open University, UK

In Defense of Anarchism. By Robert Paul Wolff (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), 144 pp. \$12.95 paper.

In 1970, Robert Paul Wolff wrote his influential monograph *In Defense of Anarchism*. A book with such a provoking title gives certainty to any author and publisher that the book will not remain unnoticed. Indeed, this was also the case with Wolff's book: it generated a lively debate and remained over time interesting enough to have a second edition in 1998. However, the book has much more to offer apart from a challenging title. The author captures the reader's attention from the very beginning of the book with his ambitious attempt: to start with premises no one would question and to end with conclusions no one would accept (vii).

Although Robert Paul Wolff managed to make the transition from acceptable to unacceptable very smoothly in his argument, it has to be said that the transition between the book title and the book itself is not that smooth. Robert Paul Wolff's main purpose is not—as one could imply from the title—to define and then show the advantages of anarchism (or philosophical anarchism in particular) but to prove the intrinsic conflict between individual autonomy and political authority. Therefore, after reading the book, it appears that instead of *In Defense of Anarchism* a more appropriate title would have been for instance “The Impossible Conciliation between Authority and Autonomy” or “The inexistent *a priori* legitimacy,” for these titles reflect more accurately, in my view, the main argument of the book. In fact, the original titles of the essay prior to its publication were “The Fundamental Problem of Political Theory” and “The Impossibility of a Solution to the Fundamental Problem of Political Philosophy,” which certainly reflect more accurately the book content than *In Defense of Anarchism*.

Instead of reading the book constantly keeping in mind its title, a more intellectually rewarding approach for the reader would be to discover the weakest link within the very well woven net of logical deductions constructed by Wolff throughout his book. In this endeavour, a good starting point is the definitions of *autonomy* and *authority*, concepts which the book is based upon. These are in fact the two concepts to which Wolff devotes the first

chapter. Once the main question asked, the second chapter demonstrates that neither representative nor majoritarian democracy, and even less a combination of the two, are able to solve the conflict between authority and autonomy. Therefore, the only democratic solution is, in Wolff's view, the unanimous direct democracy, but unfortunately even that remains only a theoretical solution.

After this cogent refutation of any state legitimacy other than the one stemming from self-legislation, the book has little to offer. Even Wolff acknowledges that it was not his attempt to build up an alternative anarchic project which could replace the orthodox state (80). This may be a reason why there is no explicit definition of anarchism in the book, despite its title, apart from one sentence in brackets:

... anarchism—a society in which no one claims legitimate authority or would believe such a claim if it were made (79).

However, one cannot go through an entire monograph on anarchism, even philosophical anarchism, without having a clear definition of this concept. If one accepts the above definition of anarchism then there remains virtually no difference between anarchy and unanimous direct democracy, as defined by Wolff:

Under unanimous direct democracy, every member of the society wills freely every law which is actually passed (23).

The new preface to the 1998 edition contains another affirmation which sheds more light on the issue:

Autonomy, which is to say self-legislation, is the only possible ground of legitimate authority (xxiv).

What follows from this definitional confrontation is that anarchy is synonymous with unanimous direct democracy, and the latter the only situation when autonomy and legitimacy are both respected. Consequently, anarchy remains the only societal arrangement that may claim an *a priori* political legitimacy.

While this conclusion is very interesting and important in its own, *In Defense of Anar-*

chism leaves anarchy as utopian as before, for Wolff admits that unanimous direct democracy may be sustained only in a few “bizarre” situations (22–3).

When one adopts a static approach towards legitimacy, it becomes very tempting to conclude like Wolff that there is no moral authority or legitimacy for majoritarian representative democracy. An evolutionary approach vis-à-vis state legitimacy may be consistent with Wolff’s readiness to accept the necessity of a bounded individual autonomy in many areas. As Wolff himself mentions (15–6), nowadays we deal increasingly with situations when we have to forfeit our moral autonomy to external technical authorities. That is why despite the duty of moral autonomy Wolff admits that, on health matters for instance, an individual should rather follow her doctor’s advice instead of exerting her autonomy with possible tragic outcomes for her own life.

Implicitly, it follows from this that Wolff concedes in many cases that an *a posteriori* legitimacy is enough to limit one’s moral autonomy. The question is why should not a *a posteriori* legitimacy be also applicable to non-unanimous, non-direct forms of democracy? In other words, why it should be considered that representative democracy has not acquired its *a posteriori* legitimacy? Wolff’s defence of anarchism gives no answers to these questions.

We should conclude that in his book Robert Paul Wolff has reached only one valuable conclusion: apart from anarchy, there is no *a priori* political legitimacy. But if unbounded moral autonomy is incompatible with concepts like legitimacy by results or a *a posteriori* legitimacy this is not to say “Long live the anarchy!” For yet democracy remains the most successful form of government enjoying a *a posteriori* legitimacy, a performance neither anarchy nor other societal arrangements have ever been able to exceed.

LUCIAN CERNOT

Oxford University, St. Anne’s College, UK

Europe before History. By Kristian Kristiansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xxix + 505 pp. \$80.00/£50.00 cloth.

In this far reaching and original synthesis of the archaeology of Europe from the second mil-

lennium BC through the end of the first millennium, Kristian Kristiansen provides new perspectives which strike at the core of our understanding of European prehistory. Kristiansen argues against a view of European prehistory as a linear sequence of progress through stages, eventually arriving at urban societies towards the end of the first millennium. In place of a linear sequence, Kristiansen presents European prehistory as a series of oscillations between different social formations. One fundamental distinction is between settled agrarian societies and expansionist warrior societies. Kristiansen links settled agrarian societies (Halstatt D, later part of the Tumulus culture, later Urnfield culture) with stable wealth in the form of land. Archaeologically these societies are characterized by rich female burials reflecting the status attached to women and by the frequent presence of hoards which reflect ritual traditions linked to holy places. Expansionist warrior societies (early Tumulus, Urnfield, and middle La Tène) are linked to mobile wealth in the form of cattle. Archaeologically these cultures are characterized by rich male burials as a result of warrior chiefs expressing their position through burial. Marriage patterns were exogamous as women were exchanged to maintain alliances. Therefore women’s burials contain relatively few prestige goods but tend to contain non-local ornaments.

The title of this book echoes Eric Wolf’s *Europe and the People Without History*. Like Wolf, Kristiansen uses world systems theory paired with knowledge of a vast range of information to integrate people without a written history into an historical framework. Whereas Wolf was looking at non-Western societies in contact with the European core from AD 1400 to the nineteenth century, Kristiansen is looking at the interaction between the European periphery and the Near Eastern and Mediterranean core. In case after case, Kristiansen demonstrates the far-reaching impact of exchange between the Mediterranean, the Near East, and temperate Europe. In one stunning example he shows that in the middle of the second millennium there is evidence for the adoption of Greek Mycenaean chariots in southern Scandinavia. World systems theory enables Kristiansen to recognize the importance of the interaction between the Mediterranean/Near Eastern core and the

northern periphery without adopting the kind of simplistic models which were dominant in European archaeology during the first half of the century. Particularly important is his emphasis on the role of social formations in the periphery in determining the nature of interactions. It is under particular conditions of agrarian societies that a collapse in the core can have a massive destabilizing effect on the periphery which produces results in the periphery, notably the formations of groups organized around expansionist warrior chiefs, which can have a feedback effect in furthering the collapse of the core.

Departing from much recent archaeological theory, Kristiansen recognizes the importance of migrations in prehistory. However, rather than simply viewing the movement of population and conquest as an uncontrolled force he explicitly ties these processes into specific social formations, particularly the emergence of expansionist warrior chiefs.

The strength of this work is in the breadth of synthesis, ranging from Anatolia to Ireland, and the originality of the synthetic framework. The data set upon which the synthesis is constructed comes largely from burials, burial goods, hoards, and to a limited extent site distributions. This is largely a limitation imposed by the nature of the available data. However, the true value of this work will emerge as its insights are extended to other areas of the archaeological record.

In the age of the European Union, Kristiansen has written a prehistory of Europe in which change and progress were not always peaceful and in which conflict, disruption, and migration were regular features. He presents European society as a system which oscillated between different states of social formation in interaction with the Mediterranean core. He clearly sees the legacy of these structures as having a major effect on medieval European society. No claim is made for a similar effect on modern European society. What has a demonstrable effect on modern Europe is the ideas that we have about the nature of the European past. In this regard the fresh perspectives brought by Kristiansen to the synthesis of European prehistory are important and enlightening.

MICHAEL CHAZAN
University of Toronto, Canada

The Good Listener, Helen Bamber: A Life against Cruelty. By Neil Belton (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), xi + 374 pp. £18.99 cloth.

In this book analyzing torture as a political weapon, Neil Belton has combined a biography and moral reflection centered on Helen Bamber, a relatively unknown actor in the political dramas emerging from the Holocaust, sanctioned murder in Augusto Pinochet's Chile, and police brutality in Israel. She also worked in Amnesty International and assumed a leadership role in the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture. Belton's book is a welcome addition to the already available scholarly contributions on genocide, sanctioned murder, and torture. Belton shows how extreme violence affected Helen Bamber as she witnessed the post-1945 results of the Holocaust and how she reacted to brutalization for the duration of her life. We see the dark times of this century through Bamber's and Belton's eyes, who both present to the reader the voices of the ordinary men and women, who were victims.

Bamber's career, rooted in her introspective reflection on the meaning of dignity, was a living work in progress. Work in Belsen, the Nazi concentration camp, immediately after the war led her to care for the young survivors of the camp, "the Boys." Subsequently, she worked at the British National Association of Mental Health. Her job there was to review the records of servicemen who had been discharged from the army on psychological grounds. The doctors suggested drugs and therapy, both of which struck her as instrumentalized brutality that did not really get to the root of the problems affecting these men. She preferred holistic, i.e. authentic, healing, that undid the work of the torturer and returned dignity to the victims. In her career, she had constantly to confront the bureaucratic institutions that seemed to prolong the victimization of the individual person. Her lifelong orientation of confronting bureaucratic systems began, then, in these early postwar years. Bamber described her approach by saying that she wanted to be grit in the wheel to slow bureaucracy before it could do harm.

Bamber's life and thought, at least as presented by Belton, offer the reader a web of nuanced discernments. The Holocaust, she in-

sisted, had created a fissure in our civilization, i.e. a discontinuity, and simultaneously was an event in the continuous emergence of the bureaucratic rationalization that has numbed ethical reflection in our century. Despite the care that Belton takes in organizing the thoughts of Helen and her colleagues, there are some difficulties for the reader. One of the problems in this otherwise fine work is the effort it takes in telling when Bamber is interacting with her contemporaries. Belton frequently seems to include the ideas of others only to give Bamber's thoughts a context. Very disconcerting is Belton's habit of quickly listing the opinions of Bamber's acquaintances and colleagues and then inserting Bamber into the middle of their comments. We get the opinions of those whom Helen knew, but we do not know how many of these opinions impacted upon her and how they shaped her position. Did these men and women speak to one another and under what circumstances? How did they interact and on what level? Because of this minor flaw, the biography does not develop smoothly. Belton has provided an array of insights from Bamber and others, for example in Amnesty International, but he does not always clearly provided a narrative that shows organically how Helen developed her ideas and techniques of rehabilitating those who had been hurt.

Similar to Mother Theresa, Bamber spoke with those who suffered, and she helped return their own sense of dignity, which, in turn, frequently led those in the medical profession to respect these victims and to treat them as human beings. In essence, she concluded by the 1990s and after decades of intimate contact with tortured victims, that what violence does to people cannot be treated simply as an illness, but should be treated as a psychological assault that has stripped them of their dignity. Through Bamber's voice, the reader feels the suffering of the victims. Her life's work expands our concept of rights beyond such areas as free speech or economic safety nets. Human rights are rooted in human dignity, which is not the prerogative of only professionals to confer. In the tradition of Dorothy Day, Helen Bamber's life has illustrated that concretizing human dignity in contemporary society is an enterprise for all of us to embrace. Belton's ability to focus on Bamber's contribution to ordinary men and

women is a tribute to Helen and suggests a model of human behavior that we all can emulate in trying to restore dignity to a humanity that has been brutalized in this century.

DONALD J. DIETRICH
Boston College

Minima Ethnographica: Intersubjectivity and the Anthropological Project. By Michael Jackson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 242 pp. \$40.00/£31.95 cloth, \$17.00/£13.50 paper.

Minima Ethnographica is not a conventional ethnography. Instead, Michael Jackson undertakes a "rapprochement between essay and story" (36) based on fieldwork in Australia and Sierra Leone. The hybrid genre offers intimacy in place of the anthropological authority typically asserted in ethnographies. The choice of voice reflects Jackson's commitment to radical empiricism and to preserving the narratives and experience from which ethnographic knowledge emerges. This engaging, elegantly written book brings together autobiographical self-disclosure, the first-hand immediacy of ethnographic narrative, and a provocative shift in theoretical perspective.

Through a series of vignettes, Jackson demonstrates that enduring existential-phenomenological challenges of intersubjectivity both animate diverse cultural phenomena long studied by anthropologists and also motivate the anthropological endeavor itself. Among other topics, he discusses the existential issues underlying kinship mores, myth, sacrifice, fears of witchcraft, sacred geography, naming, and belief in ghosts. He also demonstrates that intersubjective concerns about the relations between self and other, between autonomy and subjection, and between the particular and the universal occupy the anthropological imagination. By pointing out this parallel, Jackson achieves a rapprochement, not merely of literary genres, but also between the theoretical debates of anthropologists and the everyday existential concerns of diverse peoples. This juxtaposition simultaneously highlights the theoretical relevance of local knowledges and grounds continental philosophical inquiry by illustrating its resonance with diverse traditions of thought, prac-

tice, and poetry. Jackson avoids forcing his material to yield up experience-remote abstractions and instead strives to enrich the reader's perception of the existential import of the quotidian.

Jackson defines his primary concern, intersubjectivity, not simply as "shared experience, empathetic understanding or fellow-feeling" (4), but as the field in which subjectivity is constituted through constant interplay among individuals and between subjects and objects. He cautions that intersubjectivity includes complementary poles of compassion and conflict and that it "cannot be reduced to cognition" because "the subject recognizes the subjectivity of the other through shared bodily appearance and function" (112). An ethnographer may overcome the methodological difficulties raised by the inaccessibility of another's lifeworld—just as individuals surmount them in the practical activity of everyday life—by drawing analogies to what is familiar and by empathy built up through working and living alongside one another. Jackson writes: "Rather than pose abstract questions about how we can have *knowledge* of others as a prior condition for interaction or understanding, we begin with the obvious fact that people *do* interact despite cultural and linguistic differences" (191).

The "central human preoccupation" (21) explored by Jackson is the existential striving in intersubjective life to achieve a balance between a realm over which one can assert control and a wider world that "one relinquishes rights in and forfeits to otherness" (20). The subject struggles for a sense of autonomy with a self that, paradoxically, is constituted and sustained through interaction. "Relation is prior to relata," Jackson asserts (3). From this perspective, many cultural phenomena, exotic at first glance, can be seen to derive from familiar, even universal existential predicaments.

For example, Jackson discusses the fetish—the imputation of volition and consciousness to a fabricated object—as a "particular modality of intersubjectivity" (75). According to his analysis, the fetish objectifies the thwarted intentions of its user in social interaction so that they become tractable and responsive. The fetish facilitates the transition from impotent passivity to empowered activity by bolstering the will, embodying external

defense mechanisms that Western psychology tends to describe as intrapsychic. Jackson argues that from an existential perspective, the "rationality" of imbuing objects with consciousness is less significant than is understanding the context in which the fetish might be experienced as having a will and the pragmatic consequences of its use. He writes: "The fetish is a specific instance of a universal human tendency to ontologize experience: as the effort and desire dedicated to a thing become more intense, so the experience of its ontological substantiality and value deepens" (81). Jackson hardly needs to point out parallels with anthropologists who similarly hypostatize and ontologize the analytical categories that they deploy. Both the fetish and overly-reified analytical category arise from an "existential urge to remaster experience" (24).

Generalization and abstraction, according to Jackson, are often pernicious effects of social and experiential distance: "[The] deeper one becomes involved in the lifeworld of the people with whom one lives and works, the more hesitant one is to use the existential complexity of that particular lifeworld as a basis for generalizations about humankind" (189). Jackson asserts that the "warrant and worth" of ethnography "lie in its power to describe in depth and detail the dynamics of intersubjective life under a variety of cultural conditions" (208). Nonetheless, Jackson's own commitment to "the psychic unity of humankind" (15) leads him to pursue the anthropological project as "an exploration of the human condition, and not simply of the cultural conditioning of our humanity" (195). This universalizing tendency lends compassion and ethical weight to the text; Jackson even suggests that a vision of redemption "informs the project of existential anthropology" (204).

Jackson, however, tends to efface the location of each intersubjective field in a particular cultural milieu. His tendency to universalize "the human condition" may dilute one of the most significant contributions that anthropologists can offer to existentialist discussions: the recognition of the variety of human conditions and the distinctive local inflections of even the most commonly faced intersubjective quandaries. For example, although the existential contradiction between autonomy and dependence may be widely felt, the forums in which this struggle arises most

acutely and the modes for mitigating its intractability differ radically across cultures.

As Jackson notes, “observed remotely, human beings are diminished” (25). In *Minima Ethnographica*, Jackson recaptures the artistry of everyday life in which individuals choose the inevitable, inhabit anew the habitual, and give immediacy to the customary. His work focuses tightly on “the microcosmic field of lived interpersonal relationships” rather than resorting to “the macrocosmic language of social groups and social institutions” to explain events (153). In this way, *Minima Ethnographica* eloquently demonstrates the relevance of ethnography to contemporary thought, and the importance of existential considerations to contemporary anthropology. He asks excellent questions of anthropologists and at the same time shows the urgency that we respond.

GREG DOWNEY
Columbia University, USA

Resemblance and Disgrace: Alexander Pope and the Deformation of Culture. By Helen Deutsch (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1996), xiii + 273 pp. \$41.50/£27.50 cloth.

Alexander Pope suffered from curvature of the spine; as a result, he was only four feet six inches tall, and seldom free of pain. His enemies continually held his deformity against him, even comparing him to a spider or an ape. Helen Deutsch’s brilliant book *Resemblance and Disgrace* (the title comes from one of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu’s satires on Pope) charts a wide range of relations between his texts, such as his garden or his poetry, and his own famously deformed body. The result is a path-breaking work that gives us a sense of the kind of stimulating analysis we can expect from the very new field of Disability Studies. Any analysis of Pope’s writings has to deal with his relations to his predecessors, not least because of his many imitations of Latin poems and his translation of Homer. As becomes apparent in Deutsch’s book, the way his imitations and parodies could “deform” their classical originals is no isolated fact. Indeed, his enemies indicated that his poems imitated classical precedents just as badly as his body imitated the human figure.

The key to Deutsch’s argument is her

attempt to give neither his texts nor his body priority. For Pope, deformity is two things, “a biographical fact and a literary method” (4), and Deutsch wishes to correct those critics who have stressed one at the expense of the other; she also aims to give due regard to each “side of the couplet of form and deformity” (4). She aims to reveal how deformity is “a self-consciously created figure for Pope’s poetics patterned after the poet’s own person” (4). Her claim is that “Pope does not transform his body through his work, nor does he try to write himself out of his body, rather he silences his audience by making his body visible” (13). With Pope’s poetry in general, a literary or textual form is “brought into sharp relief by the authorial deformity which *exceeds and defines* it” (74). Often Pope deals with his deformity and with public perceptions of it by making a virtue of necessity; for example, if satirists “depicted him as deformed by excessive study,” then the poet made “the bodily mark of difficult labor into his authorial trademark” (101). Deutsch is also making an argument about how the emphases of Pope’s poetry change over his career: his mode of imitation evolves “from respectful transparency to embattled obstruction,” with his presence becoming more obtrusive, so that “his texts are increasingly marked by his own inimitable, indecipherable form” (27).

An introductory chapter discusses contemporary depictions of Pope’s body by himself and others, with an eye to how Pope’s body “remains outside, yet inexorably connected to, the orderly mirroring of his couplets” (11). The second chapter, “*The Rape of the Lock* as Miniature Epic,” analyzes how both this poem and Pope’s translation of the *Iliad* reflect his knowledge of “the ways in which transcendent classical heroism bases itself on the merely material” (47), and Deutsch relates both to “the potentially transformative perspective of an audience and a world of trivial things that Pope linked to the feminine” (41). Deutsch is building on those critics who have examined how epic poetry does not function in *The Rape of the Lock* simply as a standard by which the Belinda’s and the Baron’s world is found lacking; epic instead is implicated in the “miniaturizing” in which the poem engages. Deutsch writes that “femininity functions as the male author’s fantasy of the possibilities (both threatening and tempting) of diminish-

ment, devaluation, and objectification inherent in what he imagines as a female reader's gaze" (41). When the poem miniaturizes all persons and personifications, it not only cuts them "down to size" but also puts them "into circulation" (71), and the "monumental genre" of epic is turned into a "collectable object" (73). The poem becomes a kind of ode to the commodity. Pope in effect "challeng[es his readers] to compromise an authority which has already trivialized itself" (81); in other words, he has made himself immune, since his enemies cannot reenact effectively what he has already done.

Chapter three, "Twickenham and the Landscape of True Character," focuses not only on Pope's representations of land in his epistles to Bathurst and Burlington, but also on his garden, where he creates "a fantasy of masculine self-sufficiency defined against feminine nature and mobile property" (85). In his grotto, for example, we see a two-step process: Pope "conceive[s] of images of retirement ... that constructed both an invisible cultural authority and a transparent power over nature," and yet he "mars [this transparency] with the artful aberration of his grotto" (84). The poet's marginality, his inability either to own land or to speculate in finance, enables him to carry this out. He is, again, making a virtue of necessity: the grotto is "a paradoxically public display of the deformity that barred Pope from public life and physical exertion, and made retirement less volitional than compulsory" (131). Pope toward the end of his career championed "a counter-aesthetic of singularity" that ran contrary to dominant tendencies in contemporary aesthetics (113).

Chapters four ("Horace and the Art of Self-Collection") and five ("Disfigured Truth and the Proper Name") examine Pope's interactions with the poems of Horace during the later part of his career. Whereas the grotto in his garden allowed Pope "to figure his deformity with nature's material," Horatian poetry permitted him to do so with "the mark of print" (136). If Horace's style is a mirror that "eliminated reassuring discrepancies while preserving reassuring distinctions," then in Pope's imitations of Horace "the spots of Pope's deformity" serve to "productively disfigure" this mirror (147). Chapter five argues that in his late *Epilogue to the Satires* (1738) and *The New Dunciad* (1742–43) Pope

"evolves from the faithful translator of Homer's heroic ideal to the heroic satirist rebel against that same Horatian propriety he had espoused," fighting "in the name of a virtue which only he embodies and of which his unnatural deformity is the mark." The ground of this attack has been lost: "Any external standard, any 'nature' against which all can be measured and compared, has disappeared" (174). When Pope emphasizes the proper names of his satiric targets, a technique that is crucial to his later satires, he "deform[s] his poetry's perfect universality" (176).

Resemblance and Disgrace is not an easy read. Deutsch's writing can be forbidding, and at moments her reasoning and her sense of causation are hard to follow amidst her tropes. When she writes that "Pope's indelibly marked body functions not as his work's coherent metaphor, nor as its effect or cause, nor as its repressed opposite, but rather as its distinguishing mark" (11), I found myself wondering how a "coherent metaphor" differs from a "distinguishing mark." Sometimes her observations could be related more explicitly to distinctions that she made earlier. For example, she denies she is claiming that Pope's deformed body functions as his work's "repressed opposite" (11), yet later she says that his "deformity" is the "excluded reflection," the "remainder," of the "self" that he produced in his work (27)—his deformity is excluded, but not repressed? Deutsch emphasizes paradoxes: everything in Pope both does and undoes, both challenges and conforms. We are told that "Pope made his mark at once in the center and on the margins of a historical moment he both celebrated and deplored" (3); that something is "informed and deformed by the body" (128); that "The object thus becomes at once lost to and overcharged with meaning" (130); and so on. My point is not that Deutsch is wrong or that she contradicts herself, but that she sometimes writes as if the opposing tendencies she notes would actually overrule each other, when in fact (for example) the object is lost to meaning on *one level* while overcharged with it on *another*.

Deutsch's book is all the more impressive for her thoroughness: she seems to have read every bit of relevant primary and secondary material. Certainly her skill as an interpreter of Latin literature and the Horatian tradition serves her well. *Resemblance and Disgrace* is one

of the most exciting contributions not only to recent criticism of early eighteenth-century literature but also to the historical study of disability.

GARY DYER
Cleveland State University, USA

Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path toward America. By Norman J. W. Goda (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1998), xxvi + 307 pp. \$39.95 cloth.

In 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt warned his country that the Americas faced the threat of attack from Germany in both the Northern and Southern hemispheres. American defense policy in the early years of World War II was designed to meet an anticipated German offensive via Brazil. This attack never came, and historians generally agree with Andreas Hillgruber's assessment that Hitler took only a passing interest in the United States, principally insofar as the US might challenge his schemes for domination in Europe, and did not include the Americas in his ambitions during the war.

Norman J. W. Goda's *Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path toward America* departs significantly from the historiographical consensus by arguing that Nazi Germany did, in fact, take concrete steps toward an attack on the Americas. His case is built on evidence, compiled from sources in German, Spanish, English, French, Italian, and Portuguese, of German efforts to obtain bases on Atlantic islands and in Northwest Africa, and of German long-term military construction projects for long-range bombers and heavy battleships that could only be intended for use in a "future global struggle with the United States" (17).

It is difficult to prove a counterfactual thesis—that Germany would have attacked the United States had the war in Europe gone differently—and there is, as Goda acknowledges, no paper trail to show such planning. His reconstruction of the diplomatic maneuvering among Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Vichy France over German access to bases on the Atlantic is meticulous (occasionally to a fault, when the narrative gets lost in the minu-

tiae of what each diplomat said to the next). But the Germans' evident desire to acquire such bases is clearly demonstrated.

What is less clear is whether this proves that Hitler was looking toward an offensive in the Americas, or whether this is evidence of something else. The drive for overseas bases and big ships dates back to Wilhelmenian naval policy, as does German interest in the Western hemisphere. (One thinks of the 1902–1903 blockade of Venezuela, of the Zimmerman telegram of 1917.) Conflict of some sort with the United States must have seemed inevitable, and it would have been surprising if Germany had ignored its only viable competitor, especially given the incompatibility of the two countries' political systems and the hatred their leaders had for one another. But the expectation of future conflict is not the same as the execution of an offensive strategy.

Powerful battleships and bases around the entrance to the Mediterranean also could have fit into a defensive strategy, and Goda dismisses this argument, perhaps too brusquely. "One may as well argue, as Hitler did, that the Germans were defending themselves when they attacked Poland, France, and the Soviet Union" (196). It is unfortunate that any reference to defensive strategy is disparaged as Hitlerian apologetics. "Defensive" is not the same as "legitimate." Hitler's conquest of Europe was not legitimate, but his ambition to maintain control of the continent by establishing bases around it may well have been defensive. Ribbentrop attributed defensive thinking to Hitler in this regard (170). Bases in the Atlantic could have served against unforeseeable future challenges, whether from the United States, a resurgent Britain, or a Gaullist-style revolt in the former French colonies. That the first Allied invasion of Nazi-occupied territory was indeed a peripheral attack on North Africa suggests that a strategy of fortifying that periphery would have made some sense.

Goda has strengthened the case that Hitler's interest in the Americas went beyond mere posturing, and his book should shift the debate to just how long-term this interest was. In November 1940, months after negotiating with Vichy over gaining bases in Morocco, Hitler told Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov that the United States might pose a challenge "not in 1945, but in 1970 or 1980,

at the earliest" (112). His words do not hint at preparations to confront America in the current war, or immediately afterward; they look to a very distant horizon—yet another delusion from a man whose megalomania led him to think in terms of a thousand-year Reich.

MAX PAUL FRIEDMAN

University of California at Berkeley, USA

Pierre-Simon Laplace, 1749–1827: A Life in Exact Science. By Charles Coulston Gillispie, in collaboration with Robert Fox and Ivor Grattan-Guinness (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), xii + 304 pp. \$49.50/£35.00 cloth.

The French astronomer and mathematician, Pierre Simon Laplace, is by all accounts a towering figure in the history of Western science. His studies of the motions of celestial bodies, and the tides, were hugely significant in validating many of the theories of Isaac Newton. His work on probability theory was equally significant and influential, not least of all in many of the social sciences that have mushroomed in this century. These achievements would be sufficient to warrant the considerably existing literature about this complex thinker.

Yet, in many senses, the nature of this complexity sometimes eludes many of these respective scholars. Perhaps they came to understand it during their analyzes of Laplace's work, but it does not shine excessively from their studies. A curious omission, but a common one. It requires little speculation why science writing often prefers this bleached approach, it is enough that it is now changing.

Gillispie's efforts in particular are a fine example of how not to lose sight of the person among the equations. He also avoids the trap of overreaching into that strange landscape where every cough and trait are rehearsals for great scientific discoveries or insights. What emerges instead from his study is a highly intricate and thought-provoking account of the relation between character and discovery, between Laplace's personal beliefs and his professional practices—ambitions. It is thought

provoking not least of all because the personal side is floated in here and there in such a fashion as to suggest subtle connections without jumping to absurd conclusions that rely on simplistic causes and effects. Laplace the person emerges slowly, as perhaps it does with all acquaintances, particularly complex ones.

Having said that, it must also be noted that this is predominantly a technical book in the sense that the science of Laplace forms its central focus. Few, if any, concessions are advanced for those that modern parlance would describe as the scientifically challenged, although that is not to say that it does not hold value to the lay reader. The authors are all excellent writers and un pompous in the width and depth of their knowledges, and where they can make a technical point accessible they do so with great clarity. There is no obscurity masquerading as profundity in this book. Indeed, it is a first class piece of scholarship with an excellent bibliography and I do not hesitate to recommend it.

Gillispie's contribution forms the largest section of the study, with Fox and Grattan-Guinness supplying details about Laplacian physics and probability, and the Laplace Transform, respectively. Gillispie breaks his analysis into three sections: Laplace's "Early Career, 1768–1778;" "Laplace in his Prime, 1778–1789;" and a "Synthesis and Scientific Statesmanship." Throughout, he mounts a strong and convincing argument to prove his initial assertion that Laplace "was among the most influential scientists in all history ... (both for) his technical contributions to exact science, for the philosophical point of view he developed in the presentation of his work, and for the part he took in forming the modern scientific disciplines."

The first section details Laplace's emergence on the scientific horizon of his time, and unsurprisingly attributes to this period the formation of his basic philosophical viewpoint (a kind of skeptical conservatism tinged with a degree of overconfidence), and professional interests (namely, probability and celestial mechanics, both of which became the mainstays of Laplace's entire career).

The second section describes Laplace's growing institutional eminence and professional maturity, noting also his work with Lavoisier on the theory of heat. The final part is as its name states, an account of Laplace's

efforts to synthesize his work and the various institutional roles he played as an elder and influential statesman in his profession.

What emerges from all of this, and Fox and Grattan-Guinness' contributions also indirectly support Gillispie's findings, is that Laplace, as Gillispie eloquently concludes, was not a paradigm shifter but rather a "vindicator of the science he received." He perfected the Newtonian system by a set of discoveries and innovations, but he "was nothing revolutionary, whether in his science or his politics." Aided by an encyclopedic knowledge of science up to and including his time, his creative contribution to science was enabled by an "athletic virtuosity" at mathematics and by his noted powers of concentration. Counterbalanced to these skills and traits was his tendency to acknowledge the work of some while omitting that of others. Gillispie describes him as a "frequentist in his phenomenology and a subjectivist in his epistemology," which might have the unfortunate result of making Laplace something of a relativist determinist, none of which says much more than that Laplace was sometimes a contradiction in terms, like everyone.

However, Laplace can have the last word here:

Thus there are things that are uncertain for us, things more or less probable, and we seek to compensate for the impossibility of knowing them by determining their different degrees of likelihood. So it is that we owe to the weakness of the human mind one of the most delicate and ingenious of mathematical theories, the science of chance or probability (27).

NOËL GRAY
Venice, Italy

Painting the Heavens: Art and Science in the Age of Galileo. By Eileen Reeves (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), x + 310 pp. \$45.00/£29.95

The last few years have seen a growing number of books dealing with the complex relation

between art and science. This impetus has largely come from scholars in the Humanities who, on the whole, show a far greater understanding of science than their counterparts writing from the scientific perspective show about art. Nothing surprising in that. Science education has always been shy on extending its palette beyond a few colors. When you own the brushes of truth you can afford to save on paint.

However, putting that exhausted bee of mine aside, of those studies that focus on the emergence of the modern scientific period, Eileen Reeves' book will quickly earn a place among the best of them, not least of all because she illuminates both the scientific and art practice under her gaze. Moreover, the artistic Galileo emerges more intelligently here than any other study I know of, as does the scientific side of the various painters she uses to illustrate her argument. It is refreshing to see the scientific knowledge of artists given its proper attention and credit. Indeed, in this vein, Reeves' attention to detail and the insights she derives from them reminds me of the quality of Martin Kemp's work on the significance of optics theory and themes in painting. Both fine scholars who, in my opinion, lift academic standards to an important height, not least of all by the quality of their writing.

Reeves' argument is an interesting one, and one that can be made to spread out to many more instances. I hope she considers doing so in subsequent books. At first glance her argument appears a quiet one in its familiarity: that discoveries in astronomy influenced the way celestial bodies were depicted in painting, religious or otherwise. However, this is given a louder voice by Reeves' showing that this eddy of affect is itself contained in certain contemporaneous theological and political debates.

Of equal importance, I think, is her attention to the significance of, and the intricate play of artistic metaphors mobilized by scientists and artists alike. To make another aside: the fluidity of these metaphors, their ability to flow across arbitrary yet entrenched divides, supplies the very fuel necessary to drive the debates in question. For, ghosting in the background throughout this period is a prize of incalculable value: who will be the speaker of the truth about Nature? Thus, the ability to

commandeer the most effective metaphors and make them one's own is the first step in gaining this prize. Reeves' comments on this subject of metaphor assimilation, although understandably not preoccupied specifically with the matter of enabling discourses, are some of the many gems contained in her book.

Another is her ability to bring alive the period she is investigating. Hers is not an arid account acting like a tired breeze in the dust bin of history. To take but one instance: the quotation she employs at the very beginning—a letter from Galileo's brother demonstrating his insight and conceit regarding the proper use of the telescope—will give the reader a sense of eavesdropping through the ages. It is a clever choice with which to set the pace and character of what is to follow.

Moreover, her readings of the paintings of Peter Paul Rubens, Lodovico Cigoli, Francisco Pacheco, and Diego Velázquez, snap into focus the complexity of these works, at the same time as painting a vivid picture of the extent to which these artists were cognizant of the period's scientific discoveries and respective debates. The color prints of these artists' works are wonderful. The author, her colleagues, and her editors, are to be complimented on achieving a standard of reproduction matching the quality of the text and argument.

To my mind it is an added bonus that these images appear in chapter four. For it is here, I believe, that Reeves sets the fulcrum of her study. Briefly: the issue turns on the question of the moon's surface. Galileo's "depiction of a rough, solid, opaque, and spotted moon ... violated certain cultural propositions, ones based as much on religious conventions as on astronomical thought." The point being that the tradition of associating the Virgin Mary with a "crystalline and semidiaphanous moon" stood in stark contrast to Galileo's observations and comments.

By definition, the Virgin Mary demanded icons of purity, which in sacred painting naturally enough included the representation of celestial bodies. How Cigoli's *Immaculate* resolves this problem, how he ties the awareness of scientific discovery to the question of faith, and his intimate association with Galileo, make for illuminating reading. Indeed, the book is worth the price for this chapter alone—it would be hard to imagine any reader will ever

look at another sacred painting without recalling its many insights.

There is much more.

NOËL GRAY

Venice, Italy

Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility. By David Schmitz and Robert E. Goodin (Cambridge University Press, 1998), xviii + 222 pp. \$14.95/£10.95 paper, \$49.95/£30.00 cloth.

This book is the first in a new series with the aim of introducing philosophical issues and ideas in relation to contemporary issues. It is stressed that the ambition is to present the arguments in between journalistic and scientific presentation. I found that this first publication fulfils this ambition successfully. Its topic is furthermore highly relevant and in the core of the welfare state debate in the US as well as in Europe.

The two contributors to the book take contrasting standpoints. One (Schmitz) is arguing for a higher degree of individual responsibility, and the other (Goodin) that individual responsibility is not sufficient, and that collective responsibility is thus also needed.

Schmitz argues in traditional neo-liberal style about dependency of the welfare state, and, that only by having little or no help to the unemployed and others who might be dependent will we give them an incentive to find other solutions. His underlying moral viewpoint seems to be that if there is public economic support people will be lazy and their initiative reduced. He argues (20–1) that programmes for the poor and those living in poverty will not have any effect, as they then will fail to take responsibility. On the same line he later argues (95) that the problems would have been better solved if the welfare state had encouraged families and neighbours to rely on each other and themselves instead of the state.

He also argues that responsibility should be internalised instead of externalised as collective responsibility. This leads him also to suggest that the ability to minimise destitution depends on whether the system has an in-built demand for a person's income to be dependent

on producing something of value for other people. In this way he also seems to believe that mutual or friendly societies would be the best to guarantee a safety net. I do find that many of the arguments rest upon normative views more than pure facts about daily life. It seems that the problems of stigmatisation and dependency on others can be even more harsh if those dependent on help do not have specific legal rights, as history shows.¹

Those in favour of individual responsibility should reflect upon how they would prefer to live in case of invalidity, permanent sickness or after an accident with fatal injuries. If they logically and philosophically could argue that individual responsibility were also the best solution after taking decisions behind the veil of ignorance, as Rawls originally proposed, then they would have a stronger case. The problem being exactly that we are normally not able to do so. The only area where this seems to have been a possibility is in the area of health care, and, here most welfare states do in fact have universal solutions and a high degree of public involvement.

Goodin takes the opposite view, but starts his contribution by posing the interesting question: who can in fact be against that individual takes responsibility? Naturally, no one can be against this as long as it does not have a negative impact on other people's living conditions and welfare, but this is exactly what most of the welfare states, including intervention, are about. Negative externalities arising from individual's activities imply a need for intervention.

He also poses the question of the conflicting viewpoint between those who have difficulty in seeing the possibilities arising, and, those, like Schmidt, who focus on the failure of will. In a humorous footnote on page 125 Goodin points out that the authorities do not like the enterprising activities taking place outside the normal economy.

I also think that Goodin has a good historical comparison between Malthus' wish to let the children starve in order to shame the fathers into feeding them and the modern welfare state's proposals in many countries, notably the UK and the US, to make life harsher for lone mothers.

Finally, I would like to mention Goodin's discussion of workfare. Also this is a positively valued word. Who are in fact against being

given an opportunity to take an active part in society's development? Workfare is, however, more a "thoffer," i.e. a combination of a threat and an offer. It is not an offer one can refuse without dire consequences.

I can recommend this book as it, by presenting the reader with the viewpoints pro et con, also makes the reader more open to different ways of understanding the concepts, rhetoric and normative judgements invoked in the different areas. Coming from a small, but well developed welfare state with a mainly universal approach to welfare I do find myself more at ease with Goodin's arguments. However, I acknowledge that Schmidt's viewpoints are useful as they have often been the focus of debates on the welfare state in many western countries in recent years.

NOTE

1. Cf. Bent Greve, *Historical Dictionary of the Welfare State* (Scarecrow Press, 1998).

BENT GREVE
Roskilde University, USA

Proust, the Body and Literary Form. By Michael R. Finn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), xiii + 207 pp. £40.00/\$59.95 cloth.

This study of Proust is one of the most interesting and enlightening that I have read for some time. It shows that a cocktail of literary scholarship and originality of purpose need not befuddle a writer or bemuse a reader. Devoid of critical jargon and hence of the apistogenic pretentiousness which seems to be jargon's collateral, it starts by inspecting critically, in a manner which is as perspicuous as it is informed, the relevance to the making of *A la recherche du temps perdu* of certain facts about Proust's nervous disposition, his reading and his family relationships. Students of Proust are aware that he was deemed by himself and many of those close to him to be "neurasthenic;" that his father's views on life, nervousness and a career suitable for an eminent physician's son were informed by a hearty and ponderous positivism which was irksome to that son; that the novel can be read, as

Michael Finn says, “as a *fin-de-siècle* moral tale in which art and aesthetics conquer medical determinism.” But Professor Finn, by making us take a closer look at these facts, argues that they had a fundamental role in the development of Proust’s style, in the design and execution of the work and in the elaboration of its themes.

In this, Finn benefits from work already done by scholars such as Miguët, Milly, Fladenmüller and Yoshida. To it he adds a most readable and persuasive examination of the possible effects on the young Proust of his acquaintance with psychological ideas of the 1890s, especially as expounded by Pierre Janet and in Théodule Ribot’s *Les maladies de la volonté*. He makes a strong case for his contention that insufficient attention has been paid to the “medico-psychological” element in Proust’s “insecurity about willpower.” He is also suggestive in discussing ways in which Ribot’s observations on involuntary memory, the downgrading of conscious “intelligence” and the relationship between impression and reminiscence coincide with those which Proust would later make integral to the design of his novel. Mind you, a comparison of, say, Proust’s notions about homosexuality, generally fanciful, with those of another psychologist of that period, Sigmund Freud, would also show a striking similarity. But it would be faulty to deduce from that that either of them had read the other. The fact that two minds favour the same fantasies on such a subject shows only that, by living at the same time, they can acquire and reproduce the same unexamined pseudo-scientific *idées reçues*. However, that Proust had read Ribot seems beyond doubt. And Professor Finn, in drawing to our attention close kinships between not only certain of their ideas about the will and intelligence but also the words in which they are expressed, has done a fine job of literary archaeology.

There is much more to Michael Finn’s thesis than that, however. From one formative anxiety of Proust’s, the nervous one, he goes on to examine the writer’s “anxiety about language.” In theory, Proust excluded from his creative prose Other-orientated modes of discourse, such as conversation, through which the true self can only fritter itself away. In demonstrating how Proust’s literary practice contradicts this theory, Professor Finn finds

that he must question too another article of Proustian faith: that non-fictional writing, a voice less pure than that through which the artist speaks, has no place in the work of art. The Proust who cut-and-pasted into the later parts of the *Recherche* tracts borrowed from his own letters, criticism, pastiches or articles published in *Le Figaro* was a much more developed and self-confident writer than the tentative tyro who, a dozen years earlier, had had his first disdainful insights about Sainte-Beuve, the inferiority of workaday prose and the shared superficiality of mind which produces it. The book finishes with a discussion of coherence of form and unity of voice in the *Recherche*, which is as cogent as the parts which precede it.

The whole study, in conceptions, procedures and style, is lucid. There are few infelicities: a habit of using “literally” in ways which cannot, more’s the pity perhaps, be taken literally (“pastiches served quite literally as the trampoline ...”); and an inadvertent *lapalissade* or two in sentences showing symptoms of the post-operative shock left by IT-surgery (“Proust’s correspondence demonstrates that when Marcel and his mother were separated [...], their correspondence was rife with [etc.]”). The proof-reading, however, is generally very careful, despite this being a book from CUP, a publishing-house which has accustomed us to a sorry litter of misprints: only two caught my eye.

Michael Finn is to be twice congratulated: by enriching the critical literature on Proust, he enlivens our reading of the *Recherche*.

JAMES GRIEVE

Australian National University, Australia

The Family in Crisis in Late Nineteenth-Century French Fiction. By Nicholas White (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Cambridge Studies in French, xii + 214 pp. £40.00/\$64.95

The bulk of this book, the fifty-seventh in “Cambridge Studies in French,” is a discussion of novels by Maupassant, Zola and Huysmans. Less importantly, it discusses texts by Henneque, Bourget and one Armand Charpentier.

These fictions focus variously on heterosexual relations causing tensions within the family and on modes of resolution of these tensions: celibacy, adultery, divorce, incest, boredom, philandering.

As long as Nicholas White keeps his focus on the interactions of characters, I find his demonstrations cogent and even pertinent to an intelligent reading of his chosen texts. My difficulties begin, though, when he argues from this disparate evidence to a crisis in “family values” near the end of the nineteenth century: a different set of testimonies might show no crisis; or it might show that unfulfilling marriage was a symptom of French novels well before the late nineteenth century.

I wonder too about the peripheral presence of Flaubert. About the Introduction, which I find unclear, Flaubert hovers like a super-grass who, having turned Queen’s evidence, is excluded from the witness-box and the dock, while his lesser accomplices are arraigned on charges which should lead the investigator straight to the master-mind. White ingeniously exploits words used nowadays to avoid saying “influence:” these writers “respond” to a type of novel; they “reply” to Flaubert; they enjoy a “contrapuntal relationship” with him; they “echo,” they “reconstitute,” they are “intertexts;” they write their “own version of” *L’Education sentimentale*. To speak so often of Flaubert’s importance for *fin-de-siècle* novelists is to remind rather than to inform.

Perhaps one should not say “lesser?” The author genuflects often enough towards cultural studies for one to wonder whether the criteria which defined Flaubert as more important still apply. But he genuflects towards other ideologies and systems of critical concepts, making one wonder whether he is coherent. Genuflecting in so many directions, he must hedge his bets: mentioning a “phallic mother—as Freudians might put it,” he implies that, though using Freudians’ terminology, he is not of them; but a little later, mentioning a *sac à outils*, he notes “the phallic connotation of *outil*,” implying that he is of them. A paragraph begins “It is perhaps most useful for critics attuned to the potential of social theory ...,” which could be advice to such critics or a judgment on their work; but “perhaps,” robbing the statement of declarative force, makes it more tentative than advice

or judgment. Is the author’s eclecticism a feature of unsureness or an effect of the erstwhile thesis-writer’s need to demonstrate familiarity with everything ever said on the subject?

White’s dialect often obstructs easy comprehension. He makes much metaphorical use of the verb “to map,” usually obscuring rather than clarifying his idea: Georges Duroy is “mapped by Clotilde’s fury onto the very subject-position of the woman from the Folies-Bergère he has seduced;” “this novel maps military disaster onto decadence;” “her unmappable hysteric’s desire,” etc. Unclearness comes too from his use of Gallicisms garbed in quasi-English by professional (mis)translators—“to recuperate” and “to reclaim;” “to inscribe in;” “at the level of the writing;” and the dire “ludic”—and of idiosyncrasies such as “foregrounds the interface” and “testament to” used throughout for “testimony to”.

Sometimes one wonders whether one is reading a work poorly corrected or an impenetrable style. The fact is that small confusing errors abound, both in the English and the French, an acne disfiguring the pages’ fair face. Characters’ names change. This Cambridge series has, alas, accustomed us to slipshod proof-reading.

While on the question of features of text which can thwart fluent reading, is French punctuation less integral to French prose than circumflex accents? Is it not incongruous that an academic publisher, specializing in things French, does not require its authors to use French punctuation in the passages of French they quote? If we teach students the few simple differences between French and English punctuation, should we not require that publishing houses also observe them? I speak of the form of French quotation marks; of rules governing hyphenation at the end of lines; of the fine space left between word and sign in using quotation marks, colons, semicolons, exclamation marks and question marks; of the use of square brackets to disambiguate ellipsis points; of the space inserted in numbers of more than three figures and before the percentage sign. This volume, typical of British publishers of French series, observes none of those conventions. It is the main reason why its French looks so unFrench.

JAMES GRIEVE
Australian National University, Australia

The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt's Concept of the Social. By Hanna Fenichel Pitkin (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998), vi + 365 pp. \$35.00 cloth.

Few philosophers have received more attention in recent years than Hannah Arendt. The steady trickle of commentaries that followed her death in 1975 has, in the last 5 years, turned into a torrent that shows no signs of subsiding. Of course, death and access to the Nachlass can often briefly enhance the profile of a philosopher as young researchers take the opportunity to plough this still virgin soil with a summation and evaluation before the rest of the academic industry moves in and on. While there can be no question that this phenomena does account for some of the recent generally high quality commentaries on Arendt that have appeared, it cannot explain why such prominent political philosophers as Richard Bernstein or Seyla Benhabib have produced full scale studies of her in the last few years. The work under review falls into the latter category as Pitkin is another established political philosopher who has been drawn to Arendt by the intrinsic qualities of her thought. Her current attraction seems to stem from precisely those characteristics that made her an outsider and forged her position as the conscious pariah in the epoch of the Cold War. Arendt remained the unaffiliated intellectual wary of the entanglements of academia and not easily assimilable to the political categories of left and right. This position allowed her to forge perspectives, concepts and thematise issues of political action, democracy and modernity critique which have gained in appeal with the transformation of the geo-political and cultural worlds in the course of the 1980s.

Pitkin has chosen to focus her study on one of the most controversial concepts in the Arendt oeuvre. As the outlines of Arendt's political critique first emerged in the 1960s, critics were troubled by the apparently dogmatic yet arbitrary character of her distinction between the social and political. Concerned by the overwhelming predominance of economics, redistribution and service issues in modern politics, Arendt insisted that the political should be purged of this preoccupation with the topics of consumption, the service and reproduction of mere life. However, critics were quick to note that this was easier said

than done. Not only would this empty contemporary politics of most of its staple diet but also such a definitive distinction between the social and the political would freeze the ever-changing and inherently fluid character of the political itself. Despite the centrality of the concept of the social to both Arendt's critique of modernity and her critics doubts, early commentators were more preoccupied with filling out the main elements and trajectory of Arendt's most famous works and her development than in excavating the sources of her thinking on the social in her early, to that point still largely untranslated, works.

This last task forms the bulk of Pitkin's impressive study. She carefully charts the emergence of the problematic and theme of the social in Arendt's early works on St Augustine, Rahel Varnhagen and the essays on Jewish politics before it found its mature shape in the distinctions laid down in the *Human Condition*. However, Pitkin's study is more than just a beautiful reconstruction of this single, albeit important, concept in Arendt. For her this is merely the lynchpin of a full reinterpretation in which Pitkin uses Arendt's concept of the social as an example of her ultimate failure to avoid the abstraction she was so critical of in others. The analysis is masterful, rich and beautifully clear. Pitkin takes Arendt very seriously but is not under her spell. She produces a very forceful critique which culminates in a final delivery of her own reflections of the character and scope of political theorising in our time. This is where the figure of the "blob" comes in. Pitkin takes this image of the alien from a 1950s sci-fi movie as a metaphor for Arendt's characterisation of the social. The "blob" character of the social arises from the fact that the social mode of interrelationship brings individuals to think and behaviour as isolated atoms while collectively generating results that enforce homogenisation and normalisation. Arendt's intention was to awaken the post-war world to the dangers of creeping conformity but Pitkin argues that this image of self-created alienation was so overpowering in its necessity and relentlessness that it undermined Arendt's own faith in the human capacity for creative and novel action. For Pitkin, the question remains: how could a thinker like Arendt who was so sensitive to the disastrous deformations of abstraction in political thinking, herself

succumb to precisely the same sort of deformation arising from this hypothesization of the social into a “blob?” While the main reconstruction explains why Arendt came to the idea of the social and how it functioned in her work as a whole, exploration of possible answers to this paradox takes Pitkin’s enquiry beyond the bounds of an exercise in Arendt scholarship alone. Her argument is that this entanglement in the paradoxes of philosophical abstraction are not simply Arendt’s personal failure but are to be seen even in those radical modern thinkers who most ardently strove to defeat philosophical abstraction. Of course, the most famous example is Marx who, after condemning the entrapment of German philosophy in the spectres of philosophical abstraction, himself perpetrated the myth of the proletariat.

All this only goes to prove, according to Pitkin, that paradox and contradiction are a professional hazard of the political philosopher who continually wrestles with the intractable issues of “freewill,” the individual and the collective. As the political philosopher has no alternative but to persist with everyday language, to face its illusions and to think the issues of agency and causal necessity, of generality and particularity despite their apparent logical inconsistency, Pitkin counsels a dialectical thinking which allows us “to live with ambiguity and inconsistency while allowing intellectual comprehension and mastery without resolving the tensions” (247). However, it is precisely the difficulty of this task that explains the perennial seductive power of metaphors like the “social/blob” which both express and mask the problem. What is required if we are really to tackle the real problem of the social, is not to dismiss it as just a pseudo-problem of our linguistic/logical inadequacies but to rethink the meaning of the social. Pitkin understandably views this task as beyond the scope of her book. However, she uses her final chapter to deconstruct the concept of the social and show how its constitutive elements of institutions, individual character and *weltanschauung* can be rethought taking up critical insights of Arendt’s own work and infusing and mediating them with a fourth element of existential commitment to action which she takes to be her finest legacy. Of the several very good books that have appeared on Arendt in recent

years, Pitkin’s is amongst the best. Not because she offers us anything that is really startlingly new, but because what she has chosen to do she has done so well with an impressive combination of affinity and distance and command of both Arendt and modern political theory.

JOHN GRUMLEY

University of Sydney, Australia

Le réel de l’utopie: Essai sur le politique au XIXe siècle. By Michele Riot-Sarcey (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998), 309 pp. 140 FF.

Utopias have traditionally occupied very little room in French historiography, which considers them unrealized and unrealizable projects. However nineteenth-century utopias, which have concretely influenced the political scene of their times, are not understood because historical research is split into two separate domains: one that focuses on politics, namely on the transformations of the representative system, and one that analyzes social conflicts. This bifurcation of historical thought obliterates the fact that utopias stand precisely at the interface of social relations and political debates, argues Michele Riot-Sarcey in her very well-documented book that attempts to recount the concrete manifestations of utopian doctrines in France during the years 1830–1840.

Riot-Sarcey’s argument is based on methodological statements. According to her, political events are radical perturbations of the present which, at the moment of their occurrence, cannot be understood in traditional terms, namely they upset common *doxa*. In her view, with very brief reference to Benjamin and Foucault, modern historiography, which attempts to find out dominant meanings of political life through artificial reconstitution of global and linear processes, erases the peculiarity of events. To avoid such a historical “explanation,” which rules out the eruption of events, she chooses in an original way to focus on the various popular *interpretations* of individual and social struggles of the nineteenth century, before they were reduced to an official meaning by the representatives of power and, she says, by historians who reproduce their strategies.

In this context, the author argues that the

“social question” in the nineteenth century was born of interpretations of critical thinking—utopias—during the time of social conflicts. Only during the time of revolt could reforming ideas attain their full extent of meaning, and only at this time could they be spread through discussions of their meaning. Hence Riot-Sarcey sees in utopias answers to very concrete problems and not alienated philosophical models, which entered into history during short-time events. She attempts to recount the plurality of popular debates on social questions, more precisely on family and property, and she emphasizes the point of view of reformers as well as conservatives. In other words, she aims to reveal the compost from which political rules have been elaborated.

The book is divided into three parts and nine chapters, which indicates a clear—but somewhat artificial—dialectical intention. In the first part, “Cheminements vers la doctrine,” the author recounts the intellectual and political context of France from the end of the 1789 Revolution to the 1830s, and the efforts to rebuild a social order based on a very limited concept of liberty, namely on liberal values which exclude women and the working classes from the political scene. The philosophy of progress, and conservative notions of public morals, were the borderlines of the reorganized society in which immature people should be first calmed down and then educated.

In the second part of the book, “Connaissances de l’utopie,” utopias appear in the form of resistance against the new order. Still, as the author emphasizes on pp. 119–20, she is more interested in the popular “reception of [three] social reformers”—Robert Owen, Henri de Saint-Simon, and Charles Fourier—than in the content of their theories. Indeed, she does not offer any analysis of utopian theories, as if their content were of no importance. However, although the concern of the book is not socio-political theory or philosophy, a deeper understanding of utopian theories themselves would seemingly have added much to the understanding of their popular reception and interpretations. Nevertheless, Riot-Sarcey gives an interesting account of letters sent to the newspaper *Le Globe* by its readers in 1831–1832. *Le Globe* had become the main publication of Saint-Simonian adepts, and the remarks of its corre-

spondents are a good illustration of the public reception of Saint-Simonism and popular debates on the meanings of the revolt of the “Canuts” (silk workers) in 1831 in Lyon.

In “Représentations de l’utopie,” Riot-Sarcey focuses on the understanding and misunderstanding of the three social reformers’ ideas in the French press of the 1840s. At that time journalists inquired into the concrete achievements of the reformers. They reported various public debates on child labour, on equality of the sexes, and on suffrage reform. Newspapers reflected the points of view of the different parties, the disagreements between liberals and the republican opposition, as well as their accord. The author shows that despite a general demand for order by the authorities, the “seeds of criticism were sown” (255), and would flourish during the 1848 Revolution.

The book is apparently intended only for historians specializing in the period, since it focuses on *the political* and not on politics, hence it contains very few detailed accounts of the events. The problem is that with no presentation of the facts, and no analysis of the theories, the reader sometimes feels that popular interpretations of utopias in the nineteenth century were indeed an abstract reality. The author fails to give us a vivid image of utopias themselves: the final statement that they should be called “critical thoughts” (268) destroys the distinction between utopias and *other* possible critical thoughts. As a result, the specific and real influence on people of utopias is not always fully understandable.

ANNABEL HERZOG
University of Haifa, Israel

Mesmerized: Powers of Mind in Victorian Britain. By Alison Winter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), xiv + 451 pp. \$30.00/£23.95 cloth.

This remarkable book is a richly detailed study of the Victorian phenomenon of mesmerism. Winter argues that mesmerism, now forgotten, was pervasive in mid-nineteenth century British culture. It attracted much attention from scientists and physicians as well as other Victorian intellectuals, and it was enormously popular in drawing rooms, salons, and popular lecture halls. Moreover, mesmerism became

the site of controversies during which the boundaries of science and medicine were established. It was not that mesmerism as a peripheral activity was squashed by established and authoritative scientific professions, but rather that it provided occasions on which what constitutes science and medicine, and who was to control them, was debated and settled. Beyond those major issues, Winter shows, mesmerism was a window into broad questions of Victorian intellectual authority and social relations.

Mesmerism was the creation of an eighteenth-century Austrian physician, Anton Mesmer. According to Winter, it became “ubiquitous in London” by 1838 and then “took Britain by storm” in the 1840s (57 and 109). It formed part of a more general movement reflecting the Victorian exploration of the new sciences of the mind and psyche, such as phrenology, physiognomy, electrobiology, somnambulism, and clairvoyance. Mesmerism was taken up by a large number of famous Victorians, including such worthies as Charles Dickens, Thomas Arnold, and Bishops Samuel Wilberforce and Richard Whately. It was the subject of scientific experiments at University College, London in the latter 1830s, and rivaled ether and chloroform as the anesthesia of choice in the 1840s. It formed the basis of a successful surgical practice in a British charity hospital near Calcutta in the latter half of the 1840s. And subsequently, mesmerism became a favorite practice of Victorian invalids like Harriet Martineau.

In a typical mesmeric occasion (of which Winter provides numerous, vivid descriptions), a mesmerist, almost always a male, would put a subject into a trance by establishing close eye contact and passing his hands over (but not touching) his/her body. The results varied widely, which was one of mesmerism’s problems: some subjects would feel the same sensations as the mesmerist or become a puppet to the mesmerist’s will; many became impervious to pain, including the sometimes shocking efforts of skeptics to prove mesmerism a fraud; and some appeared to have clairvoyant powers. Chronically ill patients occasionally reported that mesmerism had cured them. Two well-publicized subjects of John Elliotson of University College, London, appeared to reverse the power relationship between themselves and their eminent

mesmerist, thereby taking control over their seances.

In addition to the unpredictable results, the big problem of mesmerism was that there was no agreement about what was actually happening. As Winter says, mesmerism was “a diverse, fragile set of practices whose meaning was very much up for grabs” (10). The most common view was that “animal magnetism” was at work: the magnetic power of the superior intellect and personality, that of the mesmerist, influenced that of the subject by means of an invisible fluid. Hence mesmerism was regarded by its proponents as establishing a mysterious but fundamental contact between two individual minds or souls. Of course, many (but by no means all) physicians and scientists believed that mesmerism was either a fraud or the workings of some non-mysterious force like psychological suggestion. In any case, mesmerists were never able to establish a consensus on any theory that might explain the empirical results. On all such issues, Winter, in good post-modern manner, scrupulously suspends judgment.

Useful as mesmerism promised to be, it generated numerous controversies. Winter is especially good at depicting the intricacies of these disputes. One problem was that when a lower-class subject reversed control over the seance, or when a lower-class mesmerist succeeded in establishing control over a higher-class subject, the whole social order seemed threatened. Another was that when a male mesmerist put a female subject into a trance, the sexual overtones were often regarded as dangerous. Furthermore, because anyone could learn mesmerism, and because peripatetic lecturers made it popular in provincial halls of entertainment, it seemed to professionalizing scientists a dangerous rival to their cultural authority. Likewise, Victorian medical doctors were seeking to assert control over both the practice of medicine and sick people; hence they inevitably saw mesmerism as a competitor. And, in some cases, mesmerists appeared to claim access to supernatural power, which disturbed clergymen and scientists alike.

Eventually, the opposition to mesmerism proved to be too strong. In particular, physicians felt that although chemical anesthetics occasionally killed the patient, they worked more regularly than mesmerism, and they ren-

dered the patients docile and inert. Yet, as Winter argues, mesmerism was not so much defeated as absorbed by the less controversial practices of hypnotism and psychoanalysis; and its more mysterious attractions were taken on by late-Victorian spiritualism. By the 1860s, it had faded from the scene.

Winter's account of this strange phenomenon is extremely impressive and provocative. She has a good eye for interesting vignettes and illustrative drawings and cartoons. She is a tireless researcher and has pursued the influences of mesmerism into many surprising avenues. She has a keen sense of the wider cultural issues raised by mesmerism. Her evidence as to the centrality and pervasiveness of mesmerism to Victorian culture is not completely persuasive, since it is inevitably largely anecdotal. But this is a minor reservation about a fascinating book that says much about the processes of defining science and intellectual authority in Victorian Britain.

THOMAS WILLIAM HEYCK
Northwestern University, USA

Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, and Fascism in France. By Michel Winock, translated by Jane Marie Todd (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), viii + 352 pp. \$55.00/£35.00 cloth.

Michel Winock's book consists primarily of a collection of essays and articles previously published in a number of reviews, spanning the period 1982–87, and six chapters that have been reproduced from a previous publication, *Edouard Drumont et Cie* (Paris: Seuil, 1982). Despite the diverse origins of this collection, Winock maintains a coherence of both structure and thought in his analysis of French nationalism, its frequent flirtations with anti-Semitism, and its alleged links to fascism.

Dividing the book into four sections that clearly overlap and inter-relate, the author successfully blends material from a variety of scholarly and journalistic sources. In the first part, Winock examines the origins and current status of French nationalism, opposing the "open" nationalism that originated in the Revolution, that of Michelet's "living fraternity," to the closed, xenophobic nationalism that emerges in times of social and economic

crises. In this he reflects the difficulty of establishing any clear dichotomy between what is popularly conceived of as "good" nationalism, or patriotism, and "bad" nationalism, or chauvinism. Indeed, the first chapter provides an overview of the history of French nationalism, the constant toing and froing between open and closed forms, with a brevity that succeeds in evoking the complexity of the issues. Herein lies the strength of Winock's writing since he is able to suggest constant complexity, the absence of any clear borders, with a clarity that opens his work to both those familiar with the figures and issues of French nationalism and those seeking an introduction to the field.

From this, he goes on to examine the persistence of anti-Semitism in certain areas of French nationalism. For Winock, this persistence is reflected in the paradigmatic significance of the Dreyfus Affair, which was reproduced in imperfect and less dichotomised models during the Popular Front and World War Two. Indeed, for Winock, the persistence of anti-Semitism in France is, in part, attributable to its ability to transcend the traditional divide between left and right. Consequently, one of the most challenging chapters is that entitled "The Left and the Jews," in which the author traces the antagonism between the French left, with its belief in universalism and ancient hostility towards all religions, and the Jew as both member of a religious community and, often in the eyes of the left, the very incarnation of modern capitalism; an antagonism that, in part, persists in the anti-Zionism of the French Communist Party of the 1970s and 1980s.

Part Three is given over to an exploration of the alleged links between Bonapartism and fascism. Of particular interest here is Winock's opposition to Zeev Sternhell's earlier assertion that the origins of fascism are to be found in French nationalism prior to World War One. Contesting this, Winock points to those areas of French nationalism that, rather than merely preparing the way for the Occupation, may have prevented the rise of French fascism, acting as an outlet for lower middle-class frustrations during the inter-war years. Opposing the structured ideological development that Sternhell has ascertained in fascism, Winock constantly points to the complexity and confusion of issues surrounding French nationalism, able to see certain resemblances without

necessarily perceiving any blueprint. In conclusion, Winock makes a strong case for distinguishing between the uniquely French tendency towards Bonapartism, reflected in the rise and fall of the likes of Boulanger and De Gaulle, and those more extreme social factors that led to German and Italian fascism.

Winock then goes on to examine the great and not so great figures of French nationalism at particular moments of national crisis. As throughout his work, the author draws his sources from a mixture of political, popular, and literary figures, pointing constantly to their communality and individual differences. Thus we move from Gustave Hervé to Drieu la Rochelle. It is in this eclectic approach that the book convinces, as it draws our attention to the ties that exist between disparate individuals whilst never losing sight of their individual significance, or even insignificance. As Winock writes of the turn-of-the-century proto-fascist, the Marquis de Morès: "Marx said of 'the nephew' Napoleon III, that events and historical figures occur as it were twice, 'the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce'. In moving from Morès to Hitler, that evolution occurred in reverse: farce preceded tragedy" (101).

It might seem that much of the subject of these essays and articles belongs to the previous decade, in particular to the debate that arose after the publication of Zeev Strenhell's works on the origins of fascism. Yet, this book represents a valuable contribution to our continued need to understand the origins, persistence and dangers of certain forms of nationalism in French cultural and political life. Its structure, overlapping without repeating itself, allows it to be read continuously or as an authoritative source of reference. However, having adumbrated the possibility of an "open" form of French nationalism early on in the book, we never fully gauge the benefits or strengths of French nationalism as that force which sustained the nation through the squalor of Verdun and helped to liberate it from the Occupation. It is this popular and persistent form of French nationalism that, along with the periodic bouts of xenophobia and racial persecution studied here, has survived since the Revolution and which, perhaps more than the rantings of the Front National, deserves our attention. Yet, this is not the task that Michel Winock has set himself. As the book's

title suggests, it is precisely the problematic elements of French nationalism and its frequent affiliations and associations with the extreme right that continue to fascinate. It is these that Winock investigates in a critical yet always lucid fashion.

MARTIN HURCOMBE
University of Bristol, UK

The Tel Quel Reader. Edited by Patrick French and Roland-François Lack (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), ix + 278 pp. £14.99 paper.

The French intellectual review *Tel Quel*, "such as it is," published some of the most prominent structuralist and poststructuralist thinkers, including Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Julia Kristeva. Co-founded in 1960 and in practice directed from 1960 to 1982 by writer Philippe Sollers, the review was also one of the most visible exporters of French ideas to the United States. It contributed to the tidal wave of French theory that flooded, since the beginning of the 1970s, the American academic scene.

At last, a portion of the articles that appeared in 1968 in the collective volume "Théorie d'ensemble" (Group Theory), *Tel Quel's* theoretical summum and one of the most important books published in *Tel Quel's* book series, have been made available here in English. In the *Tel Quel Reader*, editors Patrick French and Roland-François Lack present texts by thinkers such as Roland Barthes, Jean-Louis Baudry, Marc Devade, Michel Foucault, Jean-Joseph Goux, Julia Kristeva, Marcelin Pleynet, Guy Scarpetta, and Philippe Sollers. The editors have classified the texts according to three themes—literature, science, and art—inspired by *Tel Quel's* subtitle since 1978, *Littérature/Philosophie/Arts/Science/Politique*.

This compilation includes such articles from the beginning of the 1960s as Foucault's "Distance, aspect, origin," which originally came out in *Critique* in 1963, as well as texts from the end of the 1970s such as a "translation" of an excerpt of Sollers's Joycean "novel" *Paradis*. Foucault's text discusses the novels of telquelians Jean-Louis Baudry, Philippe Sollers, and Jean Thibaudeau in relation to Alain Robbe-Grillet's work, and more

generally contrasts the novels of the *nouveau roman* to those of the *nouveau roman*. From the 94 issues of *Tel Quel*, editors French and Lack have selected the more theoretical texts from the end of the 1960s.

The lead article is appropriately entitled "Division of the Assembly," the first article in the collection *Théorie d'ensemble*. In this programmatic collective text, its style reminiscent of André Breton's, the *Tel Quel* team spelled out its revolutionary scientific and literary program. The authors call for a return to the radical break of the end of the nineteenth century, symbolized by the names Lautréamont, Mallarmé, Marx, and Freud. This return would enable *Tel Quel* to surpass in radicalism movements such as Surrealism, the need to be radical being a perpetual concern of the French avant-garde. In the midst of the turmoil of 1968, this text was intended to demonstrate to the students that *Tel Quel* was the only true avant-garde of the moment. Competitors included reviews such as Jean-Pierre Faye's *Change* and the communist *La nouvelle critique*.

The *Tel Quel Reader* includes two texts each by Sollers, Kristeva, and Pleyner, none previously published in English. This troika led the review from the end of the 1960s. Kristeva's "Towards a Semiology of Paragraphs" in particular caused scandal in France at the end of the 1960s with its pseudoscientific and iconoclastic style. Her second text, "The Subject in Process," exemplifies her conversion to Lacanian psychoanalysis and to avant-garde literature as represented by Lautréamont and Mallarmé. This text, in which Kristeva elaborates her ideas on an asymbolic semiotic chora, and Sollers's "Bataille Act," were originally presented at an important conference, "Artaud/Bataille. Towards a Cultural Revolution," held at Cérisy-la-Salle in 1972.

Jean-Joseph Goux's "Marx and the Inscription of Labour" exemplifies the theoretical *aggiornamento* in which the telquelians were engaged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Through Saussurean and Derridean reading of Marx, Goux draws parallels between money and meaning, transposes some of Marx's ideas on use-value and exchange-value into the analysis of signs, and elaborates a general framework for analysis of economic and semiotic value. In his article "Freud and 'literary creation'" Jean-Louis Baudry, a long-time

member of *Tel Quel's* editorial board, discusses Freud's analysis of the workings of the psychic apparatus and the relationships between text and subject.

This *Tel Quel Reader* contributes to the larger dissemination of French theory into the English-speaking intellectual and academic community. This dissemination has two characteristics. First, collective works such as *Théorie d'ensemble* are cut up into smaller pieces and detached from their original textual environment. Here, however, at least the editors have provided the reader with a very useful "Chronological History of *Tel Quel*." Second, by minimizing the role of grounded knowledge in explaining the development of French theory, compilations such as this legitimize the "Great Men and Ideas"-readings of French intellectual and cultural history. In this process, the telquelians not published in this volume, authors like Jean Ricardou, Denis Roche, and Jean Thibaut, who were major figures in the French literary scene in the 1960s, become forgotten historical figures. Simultaneously, *Tel Quel's* history is cleansed of internal power struggles and political differences.

NILLO KAUPPI

Academy of Finland, Finland

The Moment and Late Writings. By Sören Kierkegaard, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), xxxi + 678 pp. \$65.00/£45.00 cloth.

In constituting Vol. XXIII in the 26 volume Princeton edition of Kierkegaard's writings, *The Moment and Late Writings* brings together 21 articles written by Kierkegaard for the newspaper *Fatherland* (1854–55), the series of 10 pamphlets that Kierkegaard entitled *The Moment* (written in 1855, with the tenth being published posthumously) and three brief pieces, "This Must Be Said; So Let It Be Said" (1854), "What Christ Judges of Official Christianity" (1855), and "The Changelessness of God," an earlier piece to which, Kierkegaard indicates, he has on several occasions returned. Together the writings comprise a direct and highly polemical attack on what Kierkegaard describes as the official Christianity of the Danish State Church (which he sharply distin-

guishes from the Christianity of the New Testament). The volume also contains various supplementary materials, including an informative “Historical Introduction” written by the Hongs, a response to Kierkegaard from Bishop Martensen (head of the Danish State Church), and selections from Kierkegaard’s journals and papers.

It is in light of the claim made by the clergy of the official Danish State Church to be witnesses for the truth that Kierkegaard initiates his attack upon Christendom. Kierkegaard holds that the category of truth-witness essentially “relates to Christianity’s heterogeneity with this world,” a heterogeneity exemplified in the demand of New Testament Christianity for self-hatred, self-renunciation, self-sacrifice, poverty, and suffering on the part of the individual who would become Christian (10). In insisting on the individual’s heterogeneity with the world, New Testament Christianity aims, Kierkegaard writes, “at a person’s total transformation and wants, through renunciation and self-denial, to wrest away from him all that, precisely that, to which he immediately clings, in which he immediately has his life” (248). The Danish State Church, however, in viewing Christianity not as a task but as the immediately given property of the self who is naturally born into Christendom, effectively reverses the teaching of New Testament Christianity that the single individual comes into existence only through willing the heterogeneity—the *collision*—with the self as naturally and immediately given. The official Christianity of Denmark thus makes “if possible, Christianity impossible” (95).

At stake in *The Moment and Late Writings*, therefore, is the very existence of both Christianity and the single individual. Yet, how is the reader to think about the enormous emphasis which Kierkegaard places on heterogeneity as fundamental to Christianity’s polemic against the individual’s naturally given existence? Kierkegaard writes that he finds his task of revealing the monstrous illusion that is Christendom “of such a distinctive nature that I quite literally have no analogy to cite, nothing corresponding in eighteen hundred years of Christianity. . . . The only analogy I have before me is Socrates; my task is a Socratic task, to audit the definition of what it is to be a Christian—I do not call myself a Christian

(keeping the ideal free), but I can make it manifest that the others are that even less” (340–1). Unlike his contemporaries, Kierkegaard is able to audit Christianity since he, at least, does not call himself a Christian. Is Socratic ignorance, however, truly the analogy for Kierkegaard’s position within Christendom?

While *The Moment and Late Writings* will chiefly be of interest to specialists among Kierkegaard scholars, it is important, in considering the above questions, to set it in the context of Kierkegaard’s classical works. Beginning with *The Concept of Irony*—whose primary thesis is that “the similarity between Christ and Socrates consists essentially in their dissimilarity” (6)—and continuing throughout his authorship, Kierkegaard is clear that the Socratic claim of ignorance does not hide a higher positive content but is utterly negative, designed to show that all claims to knowledge in the Greek world are empty. It is thus of critical importance, in assessing the nature both of Kierkegaard’s task and of the concept of heterogeneity which he makes central to Christianity, to see that what Kierkegaard is concerned with in his audit of Christianity is Christendom’s resistance to, not its ignorance of, the Christian demand for heterogeneity and the corresponding concepts of sin and offense. Kierkegaard argues, in both *The Concept of Anxiety* and *The Sickness Unto Death*, that the category of sin, upon which the very coming onto existence of the single individual rests, never emerges in the Greek world. He shows, in *Philosophical Fragments*, that the moment in which the eternal enters the temporal in order to provide the historical point of departure for human consciousness is utterly to be distinguished from Socratic recollection, in which the eternal is the contradictory vanishing point for all temporal experience (all human consciousness). (It is the concept of the moment for which Kierkegaard names his late polemical pamphlets.)

Kierkegaard thus makes clear that, if the self is to have an historical point of departure in light of which it can recognize itself as other—as having repressed the truth of Christianity—its heterogeneity cannot be understood to operate in the same way as “the principle of contradiction outside Christendom,” that is, to reflect the unremitting oppositions of Greek thought (118). If the self is to

be able to confront its otherness without vanishing in the opposition between what is worldly and what is other-worldly, its heterogeneity must ultimately express the golden rule of loving the other as self and the self as other. It is the golden rule, the unconditional love of God and neighbor, which, as Kierkegaard is supremely aware in *Works of Love*, is the great commandment of New Testament Christianity. When he thus insists that the statement that God is love has as its minor premise the corollary that God is our mortal enemy—for God hates the natural life of the individual—we must remember that he also insists, in *Fear and Trembling*, that to hate oneself and one's life can never lead the faithful individual to cease to love. In relinquishing as one's origin—as one's cause—all that one naturally possesses, the individual faithful to this life regains, rather than resigns, the world in the paradoxical coming into existence of the self whose origin resides in the love of the other (self).

AVRON KULAK
York University, Canada

L'Égypte, une aventure savante 1798–1801. By Yves Laissus (Paris: Fayard, 1998), 611 pp. 179 FF.

At the end of the twentieth century, celebrating the bicentenary of the French Revolution has encouraged the output of many books on Napoleon Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt. As former director of the library of the Paris National Museum of Natural History, in charge of the exhibition "Scientists in Egypte, 200 years ago", Yves Laissus has been able to throw much interesting light on the scientific nature of the enterprise. He reminds us of the progress science was making at the turn of the century, encouraged by the liberal atmosphere which the Revolution had created. "Napoleon Bonaparte stressed both the place of honour and the utilitarian function that science held for the State by confirming the statute and the vocation of the French Institute,"¹ of which he was himself a member.

One might not agree with Stendhal, in his "Life" of Napoleon where, after commenting on Bonaparte's sudden and rather shocking departure from Egypt in July 1801, he refused

to condemn his hero, but instead wrote: "The life of this man is a hymn in favour of human grandeur;" nevertheless, one has to admit that he was an exceptional leader of men. In tune with his time, he was interested in the most recent scientific ideas and discoveries. In Cairo he founded the Egyptian Institute with the help of some 160 men of science and letters whom he had engaged in the expedition. Often they were men he had met on earlier campaigns (such as Monge in Italy and the latter's close friend Berthollet) or through Parisian contacts, in particular at the Institute. On his return from Egypt and after the Dix-Huit Brumaire *coup d'état*, those who had not perished overseas came to be known as the "Egyptians:" the future Emperor gratified them with important functions in the government (chapter 2).

The book opens with a quotation from the *Mémoires* of Mme de Rémusat, to whom Napoleon wrote: "The time I spent in Egypt has been the best of my life, because it was the most ideal." One can well believe that here Napoleon was being honest with himself because the expedition, though brief, was undertaken in the prime of his life (age 29), when as Bonaparte he was already a successful general, at present ambitious to shine as an "enlightened" chief. François Furet refers to the undertaking as "quite useless," "but carried out as a great spectacle" which went to serve his own glory.² Useless it may have been in a military sense, and costly in human lives, however Yves Laissus brings out fully the "ideal" aspect of the adventure. By stressing "the production of scientists, technicians and artists, the learned men," he points out how they endowed this military operation with a "truly exceptional mark" (preface), thanks to Bonaparte's decision to accompany the conquest of Egypt (decided upon by the Directory, 5 March 1798) with a "vast intellectual and cultural programme" (25).

The Commission for the Arts and the Sciences of the "*armée de l'Orient*" (as it was called) covered a variety of disciplines (geometry, astronomy, botany, zoology, medical surgery, clockmaking, political economy, music, literature, sculpture, etc.) and carried with it the necessary scientific equipment. It also took a library of about 550 books, 60 of which were chosen personally by Bonaparte (35), the other titles being decided upon by some of its

eminent members (Caffarelli, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Horace and J.-B. Say). Ever anxious to maintain good relations with his army and the public, Bonaparte ordered the transportation of printing presses which in Cairo published two French newspapers: *La Décade égyptienne* (year VII and VIII, 3 vols, reprinted in Beirut, 1971) and *Le Courier de l'Égypte* (116 nos., 1798–1801).

Yves Laissus follows the men of science at close range, giving the reader a feeling of what it meant to arrive in Egypt at that time. The heat, the mosquitoes, the dirt were among the unpleasant elements they had to face before settling down to admire the beauty of ancient Egyptian monuments. Barely arrived in July 1798, the entire expedition was cut off from Europe by Nelson's destruction of the French fleet at Aboukir on 1 August 1798. Henceforth Bonaparte and his army had to make good in the country they had come to conquer, not only with weapons of war but also with French Enlightenment and revolutionary values. Bonaparte went to task very seriously as did generals Kléber and Menou after him. The Egyptian Institute was opened in Cairo on 22 August 1798; it held 62 sessions during its first short existence, the last being held on 22 March 1801. Members of the Commission for the Arts and the Sciences undertook many tasks: maps of urban and suburban areas in and around Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and the Nile delta; mission sent to Suez to explore the possible opening of a canal between the Red sea and the Nile along traces of an ancient one; a school opened for young French boys; public works engaged in the city and a windmill constructed; information collected on the functioning of the *divan* (Cairo municipality) and on the state of public opinion regarding the French presence in the country (chapter 9). In spite of danger outside of Cairo, where many scientists met mortal accidents, assassination, disease and the pest, missions were sent to investigate the pyramids, explore Upper Egypt and collect data on the arts, commerce, agriculture and irrigation system (chapter 11).

The last two chapters narrate events after Bonaparte left Egypt. Yves Laissus admires Kléber, an active member of the Egyptian Institute, whose task was not easy as Bonaparte's departure encouraged civilians to request their return home. They felt that insofar as the arts and sciences were concerned, their

mission was over, but that all the materials they had gathered and observations noted should be assembled and made ready for publication. With that aim in view, Kléber set up a committee (19 November 1799) whose report was later published under the title of *Description of Egypt* (Paris, 1809–1828, 9 vols). Kléber was also occupied on the military front where he had to fight the English and the Turks, presently allied to drive the French out of the country. In spite of his epic victory at the battle of Heliopolis (20 March 1800), Kléber had to squash the second Cairo rebellion which lasted a month (20 March–21 April 1800). When some peace was restored, he sent the scientific personnel back to work in the provinces, each with a mission to carry out. In Cairo, however, life was growing more and more difficult for the French, heartily disliked by the Moslem inhabitants.

On 14 June 1800, Kléber was assassinated and Menou took over until the end of the expedition. Neither a military genius nor a popular leader of men, Menou liked Egypt, wished to stay on in the country and to treat Egyptians as equals, having himself married a Moslem woman and adopted her religion. He did his best to encourage the Institute in the pursuit of its work: the secretary was placed in charge of the inventory of its equipment; its library was opened to the public and donated two copies of all publications appearing in Cairo; in the autumn of 1800, he requested that Paris dispatch more technicians, doctors, surgeons, engineers, etc. However, in spite of his efforts in favour of the arts and sciences, Menou succeeded in vexing his collaborators by interfering too much in their daily routine with many minute administrative regulations.

On 8 March 1801, the English landed and took Aboukir; their presence was reinforced by the Turks. In April, the pest broke out once again in Cairo and the French army lost many soldiers. Several members of the Commission for the Arts and Sciences left Cairo on 6 April for Alexandria, carrying with them their documents and collections. Yves Laissus describes at length the French departure from Egypt, stressing in particular events affecting the scientists who, on the whole, managed to save from loss or destruction the major part of their notes, drawings, collections of plants, seeds, minerals, animal and human mummies, musical instruments, fragments of

manuscripts, etc. The last issue of the *Courier de l'Égypte* appeared on 9 June 1801 and the French left Cairo for Alexandria on the following 14 July. From 23 September to 17 October 1801, the staff of the Commission for the Arts and Sciences and the Egyptian Institute, in small groups, left Egypt with the remains of the French army. On the last day of the expedition, 17 October, the medical surgeon Larrey boarded the English ship taking general Menou and his Moslem family back to Europe.

Yves Laissus' vivid description of Cairo at that time cannot fail to interest those who know the city today. If the French soldiers who first ran through its streets were shocked by the filth they saw and the sloth of its inhabitants, later they would leave with a certain feeling of nostalgia (104). Eight days after the French arrival in Cairo, Bonaparte had already ordered Monge, Berthollet and Caffarelli to find a dwelling for the printing services, the chemistry laboratory, the library and the observatory, as well as a meeting room for the Egyptian Institute (106). At the end of August 1798, the French were participating in the Moslem religious festivals in an effort to win over the population (127). These details, gleaned from a vast perusal of many sources, makes the book *Égypte, une aventure savante*, almost as exciting to read as must have been the expedition itself for those who survived. At the end of the book, the author provides the reader with a 25-page detailed chronology (1795–1918), preceded by a list of members of the Commission for the Arts and Sciences and the Egyptian Institute. There is a 27-page bibliography of original and printed sources, including 10 pages of testimonies from those who accompanied Bonaparte or who had previously travelled to Egypt, followed by three maps of the country. However, what renders the book particularly attractive, even if at times a little confusing, are the many long quotations from original sources, mentioned above, including the correspondence of Bonaparte himself, published by Napoleon III (Paris, 1858–1870, 32 vols in-8).

NOTES

1. Louis Bergeron, *Episode napoléonien, Aspects intérieurs 1799–1815* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972), 225.

2. F. Furet, "Bonaparte," in *Dictionnaire critique de la Révolution française*, ed. F. Furet and M. Ozouf (Paris: Flammarion, 1988), 220.

EDNA LEMAY

Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales-Paris

Education Yesterday, Education Tomorrow. Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Volume 127, Number 4, Fall 1998, XXIV + 258 pp.

This issue of *Daedalus* is devoted to an ongoing discussion in the United States on the quality of its educational system and the reforms needed in it. It is presented as a follow up to the fall 1995 issue of the journal, "American Education: Still Separate, Still Unequal," and intends to evaluate recent proposals for reforming elementary and secondary education. It is also said to continue the discussion on American schooling since World War II, started time and again, either because of "domestic issues" as, in the 1960s, the questions of race, deprivation, discrimination, and poverty, or because of "foreign" matters, e.g. the so-called "Sputnik effect:" the effect that the launching of the Sputnik by the Soviets in 1957 had on the debate on education in the US. To push it yet further, the entire twentieth century, ever since Dewey & co, can be considered an ongoing debate on schooling and its reform. "Those who continue to rail today against what they deem to be the hazards of educational practices that make drill all-important as pedagogy, imagining that rendering young children and adolescents obedient and docile is still the principal school objective, are in effect repeating what has been said for a century. Has there, in fact, been so little change in education?" (XVI).

This anxious question is addressed directly in the first half of the issue: what is the present condition of American schooling and how effective have recent reform proposals been? There is little agreement here. Whereas Resnick and Williams Hall (89) are quite positive in their judgment that today's education-reform movement is alive and prospering and Bromley (41) judges the effects of reform to be modest, but real, Sarasin (1) thinks that the old anxious questions are presently still very much

in place: "Why is it that as students go from elementary to middle and finally to high school that their level of boredom and disinterest increases discernibly?" is his first question, and another one, as provocative: "Why is it that despite the billions of dollars expended in the post-World War II era the results have been so meager, and some would say non-existent?" (2). This way the overall impression evolves, that there is little clarity in what reform in education is actually gaining, and that there, maybe, is little progress in the matter of education and educational reform at the end of the century that never stopped to have the concern at hand.

This indeed seems to be the idea of Wilson and Barsky, initiators of the discussion in this issue of *Daedalus*. It is against that background that they plead a radical change of perspective, needed to make headway with educational reform at long last. The discussion should not stick to the educational perspective, not even when other country's educational systems are included for comparison. It is rather the comparison with successful American systems outside education that is sought. So, at first sight quite surprising in an issue on education, contributions on health care, agriculture, communication (post, telegraph, telephone) and power systems are included: all "success stories" of a kind. In Wilson and Barski's view, it is R&D (research and development) that has made possible major changes in these various large and complex systems in this century. Education might profit from studying the systems that have successfully used scientific knowledge and technological innovation to achieve change. Wilson & Barski's own contribution that closes the issue (233) indeed concludes that the educational system is in need of R&D groups and of an applied academic research discipline (*change science*) to provide institutional support for those groups. "We see the need for the launch of a research and development initiative in education, paralleling existing national research initiatives related to AIDS or global climate change" (235).

Wilson and Barski seem to expect a particular objection to their technological approach, viz., the objection that education is a matter of human concern and, therefore, a matter of concern for the humanities rather than a matter of "R&D" and "change sci-

ence." And, certainly, such is to be expected from the readership of this very journal *Daedalus*, being the proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Wilson and Barski anticipate criticism of this type by jumping "from technology to the arts, specifically to classical music—not as it is today, but rather at the time between Bach and Mendelssohn, when classical music made the transition from performers who primarily played music they composed themselves, as Bach did, to a more institutionalized structure in which orchestras drew on a much larger repertoire that was generally not composed by the orchestra's conductor or soloists" (245). As a counter example to the objection concerning the "arts and humanities" character of education this will, however, not do. Not only is music, as compared to, e.g. poetry and history, a limiting case of the "arts and humanities" (it is, e.g. significant that it was part of the *quadrivium* in the ancient curriculum of the free arts: aritmetica, astronomia, geometria, musica, and not of the *trivium*: grammatica, retorica, dialectica). And, then, Wilson and Barski concentrate on an aspect of music that may be the most susceptible to technical and technological improvement: performance skills in classical music.

Of course, this is not the context to discuss a science-and-technology approach to education and educational reform extensively. But Wilson and Barski's apparent attempt to forestall such a discussion as to their assumptions, is, in my opinion, not successful. Some discussions simply have to be conducted again and again. The classical humanistic discourse on education (clarifying "what schools are for," to use an expression of Goodlad) nourishes awareness of what education essentially is about. It is, in my opinion, indispensable, for education and educational research, and for educational reform and educational policy alike.

WILNA A. J. MEIJER
University of Groningen, Netherlands

The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. By José Luis Bermúdez (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1998), A Bradford Book, xiv + 338 pp. \$30.00 cloth.

I believe there is general agreement that we

are all aware of ourselves as human beings, and equally able to think about ourselves. We have self-consciousness. This apparently common-sense experience presents a major paradox to some philosophers that “raises the question of how self-consciousness is even possible” (1). If self-consciousness is understood as a specific range of thoughts, then the paradox arises because of the Thought–Language Principle, i.e. the assumption that “the philosophical analysis of thought can only proceed through the philosophical analysis of language” (12). The linguistic expression of self-consciousness takes the form of sentences focusing on the personal pronoun “I.” The paradox consists in the fact that to “master the first-person pronoun, I must already have mastered the first-person pronoun” (21).

Bermúdez devotes the first chapter of this intriguing book to clearly developing and stating the paradox. Here he also indicates the basic problem with the assumptions made in the Thought–Language Principle, and charts the path he is endeavouring to take through the next eight chapters to discard it and propose an alternative which allows a solution to the paradox. It would have been comparatively straightforward to take recourse to comparative philosophy and locate self-consciousness as the basis of all other manifestations of consciousness, including the body, in, say, Indian Vedanta philosophy. However, the crux of the paradox of self-consciousness as identified and defined by Bermúdez, the Thought–Language Principle, is based on the approach predominant today in the Western mind-set, that of analytic philosophy. It is appropriately within the parameters defined by this approach that Bermúdez not only locates the paradox, but where he begins his intricate and fascinating argument to solve it.

Self-consciousness, Bermúdez argues, is not limited to conceptual and linguistic forms. He establishes the possibility of non-conceptual forms in chapter 3, refines his methodology in chapter 4, and devotes chapters 5–8 to discussing non-conceptual forms of self-consciousness with reference to the body. Taking recourse to insights from empirical psychology and cognitive science, he initially examines two logically and ontogenetically primitive building blocks of fully-fledged self-consciousness in the fields of perception and various forms of bodily awareness (chapters 5

and 6). He then introduces the “notion of experience that reflects a nonconceptual point of view on the world,” which involves “conscious or explicit memory as a condition of conscious place recognition” (193), followed by an elaboration of “oneself as moving within, acting upon, and being acted upon by, the spatial environment” (229). Chapter 9, entitled “Psychological Self-Awareness: Self and Others” extends to the mind the insights previously gained with reference to the body. Chapter 10, finally, provides the solution to the paradox of self-consciousness and ends with a section on the “Way Forward,” in which Bermúdez indicates how the structure of more sophisticated, conceptual forms of self-consciousness can be studied, and the benefit his present argument will bring to such a study.

Bermúdez received a British Academy grant allowing him to spend 3 years working on this book. The single focus of attention is obvious from the meticulous presentation of the argument. Premises are clearly set out, the ensuing arguments are precise, well-written and succinct, and the conclusions make sense. Technical terminology from the various disciplines integrated into the argument is used sparingly, and never without sufficient explanation. In-depth discussions of individual issues are always clearly placed within the broad scope of the main aim of the book, to solve the paradox of self-consciousness. At key stages of the argument, not only at the beginning or end of a chapter, Bermúdez takes stock, recapitulates the line of argument and indicates its further development. *The Paradox of Self-Consciousness* approaches a fascinating topic from an appropriately interdisciplinary perspective; in thus transcending the limits of the discipline of philosophy, in which the paradox emerged in the first place, the book is able to provide a solution that is relevant to all concerned with the study of consciousness.

DANIEL MEYER–DINKGRÄFE
University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK

Silicon Second Nature: Culturing Artificial Life in a Digital World. By Stefan Helmreich (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), xii + 314 pp. \$29.95 cloth.

Many anthropologists have turned their atten-

tion away from remote and exotic peoples to study groups whose members intermingle with them in the high street and the shopping mall. They have adopted the current preoccupations of social science and shown us, for instance, how our own workspaces are gendered and racialised. On the evidence offered by Stefan Helmreich, the Santa Fe Institute (SFI), within commuting distance of Los Alamos, also displays a strong bias towards gendered and racialised roles, workspaces and work schedules. But the SFI provides especially rich pickings for an anthropologist since one of its principle topics of research parades under the newsworthy banner of "Artificial life." Anyone who claims that they are creating artificial life must inevitably, plainly and openly inscribe their views about life and living on the products of their work which include not only their prototypes, but also their reports, presentations and conversations.

SFI specialises in the study of "complexity." They look at the way in which compactly specified individual entities can create elaborate and hard to describe behaviour when they congregate to form systems. Their work on artificial life looks at societies of individuals and embodies not only conjectures about life but also presumptions about the relationships between individuals and between individuals and their environment. SFI therefore provides an anthropologist with an accumulation of public expressions which advertise cultural assumptions.

The work at SFI has been influenced by practices in laboratories in nearby Los Alamos, where elaborate simulations of nuclear weapons using the most powerful computers have been developed. Many of the SFI's core workers, for instance, trained and worked as physical scientists. It is not surprising, therefore, that the techniques of computer simulation of physical systems have been adopted by those investigating "complex" systems at the SFI.

The SFI artificial life projects and the work on genetic algorithms focus on the evolution of data stored in a computer's memory which is presented as though it were a synthetic genetic material. These artificial genes combine, multiply and occasionally, according to a program, mutate. Some people may be uncomfortable with a view that bestows life on data retained by machines fabricated from

silicon, nevertheless the elaborate visual presentations of executing programs easily harmonise with the images projected by instruments such as body scanners, microscopes and televisions which are widely accepted as portraying life on a screen.

However, there are causes for concern. In the metaphorical soup of artificial life there appears to be little attempt to incorporate embodied experience. Life is condensed into birth, conjugation and death. Thus the field conflates gender, sex and reproduction and encourages a genetic determinism that sees genetic evolution as the only source of change, and hence implies that genetic alteration is the primary instrument of power.

Any discourse that concentrates on genetics and criteria for improvement is bound to tread on ideologically thin ice. For instance, there is an apparently widespread belief that evolution leads to better organisms, a dangerous presumption which leads to the conclusion that any kind of programmed evolutionary system that fails to generate improvements is itself defective. Thus it becomes clear that the explanations of artificial life systems, their development and their behaviour cannot avoid exposing views on race, eugenics and gender. Helmreich repeatedly draws attention to the white, masculine, Judeo-Christian bias exposed in the course of artificial life research. He chooses to highlight the match between the rhetoric of the researchers with, for example, male-birthing fables, creation stories and American frontier legends.

Work at SFI is complemented by research on artificial life on other continents; a number of European workers for instance stress the importance of embodiment, and the Japanese are working on machines with components grafted from biological creatures. However Helmreich asserts "the fact of US scientific power is inescapable" (226), that "US narrations of Artificial Life history are notorious ... for their erasure or marginalization of European and Latin American precedents and scientists" (10-1) and that consequently the SFI view of artificial life is a dominant view.

Helmreich, therefore, places the SFI researchers centre stage and privileges the SFI researchers in his treatment of his topic. He has a tendency to ignore any countermanding power relationships that might undermine the

researcher's status. By under-investigating the lives of other actors, he fails to identify their strategies for coping with power differentials, to identify whether or not they have their own domains of influence and whether or not the ways of life that encompass the SFI are parts of a consensual equilibrium rather than a hegemony. Of course, there are inevitably injustices but his portrayal of his chosen icons of power, the researchers, offers us only the unpredictability of a revolution as a remedy for countering any wolverine politics wrapped up in ovine, scientist's clothing.

His relentless concentration on exposing the ideology of the researchers makes the text seem part of a crusade, a critique of the research which he feels could have been founded in a more gallant dogma. Frequently the account looks like a collection of anecdotes that have been contorted until they ally with the author's topical agenda, however the sheer intensity and volume of evidence not only prevents the dismissal of the author's case but also serves the valuable purpose of attuning the ear and the eye to enduring myths recast in the vernacular of computer specialists, scientists and engineers and which can be found in many technical texts and popular accounts of technology.

JOHN MONK
Open University, UK

A Suburb of Europe. Nineteenth-Century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization. By Jerzy Jedlicki (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), xxvii + 307 pp. Price not listed.

The author is one of the leading Polish historians of mentality and of social structure, particularly of the intelligentsia. He is also an active member of the Polish Sociological Association, participating in many discussions on contemporary issues. Those interests show in the book. It actually is a translation of the first Polish edition (the translator's name is not given here, though) of 1988, entitled a little differently from the edition under review. The original title, in the English translation, is: "What kind of civilization the Poles need. Studies in the history of ideas and imagination of the nineteenth century." This title is itself a

travesty of a much earlier coined Polish expression "What kind of philosophy the Poles need." When the book was published in Poland, it stimulated a vivid discussion on the "Polish character" and on the Romantic and Positivist currents in the Polish culture.

The book has been abridged and very carefully tailored for the English edition. However, some of the primary sources (like Norman Davies' "God's Playground") are not even mentioned throughout the book and many significant Polish publications on the Enlightenment and Positivism can be found only in the "Selected Bibliography," but neither in the notes nor in the Index. Sometimes the author forgets that certain important problems have been already discussed for decades. The passage "The young familiarized themselves more rapidly with changing conditions and were more ready to seize new temptations and new opportunities, which meant that for the first time in history, the young could be more experienced than their elders" (viii) could have been literally taken from Margaret Mead's "Culture and Commitment" (1970) but the American classic was not even mentioned here. Jedlicki's book is a very good study of culture change, of diffusion, acculturation and counter-acculturation movements but the anthropological interpretations were not used by the author.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was one of the European superpowers. At the end of the eighteenth century, Poland as a sovereign state disappeared from the map of Europe, though, and reappeared only in 1918, after 123 years of partitions between Russia, Germany and Austria. Jedlicki discusses the Polish approaches to Western civilization from the Enlightenment period (actually from 1760—pp. 3–170) throughout Polish Positivism (until the end of the 1880s—pp. 173–291). He shows how the problem of the civilizational choice emerged in the eighteenth century and soon became, along with the issue of constitutional reforms, the most significant subject of political and ideological debate of the Enlightenment. After the fall of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the problem continued to be important but, as the author very aptly presents, it lost its primary character—it became overshadowed by the struggle for political independence and attempts of the

agrarian reform. I am of the opinion that this study of Polish, very particular indeed, history of ideas, is an outstanding intellectual achievement.

We should not forget another aspect of the book. It was not intended as a comparative study but clearly suggests some comparisons. The author presents evidence that “almost identical pro- and anti-modernization arguments occur in the documents and literary output of many nations and periods” (x). Therefore, as I have already mentioned, Jedlicki’s book is a very important contribution to sociocultural anthropology of social change. It is too bad that the author himself did not see this and did not try to put his findings into anthropological perspective.

There is no summarizing nor concluding chapter in this book. Paradoxically, the Preface to the English edition can serve as such, though. It shows how the civilizational gap between Poland and Western Europe at the times of communism resembled (but also how it differed from) that of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, how the radical transformations of the 1990s can be interpreted as the attempts to bridge this gap, how the old discussions over the paths of development have not been closed, even if their nature has changed.

I strongly recommend this book to all readers interested in Poland, in Central and Eastern Europe but also in the cultural change and culture contact as such.

JANUSZ MUCHA
Nicholas Copernicus University, Poland

The Cambridge Apostles, 1820–1914. Liberalism, Imagination, and Friendship in British Intellectual and Professional Life.

By W. C. Lubenow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xiv + 458 pp. \$59.95/£35.00 cloth.

Few student societies have achieved such renown as the purportedly secret Cambridge Conversazione Society. Founded in 1820, the Apostles, as they came to be known, began as just another student discussion group but acquired a special cachet owing to the intellectual distinction of many members. Apostles achieved fame in many fields: Tennyson and

E. M. Forster in literature; Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein in philosophy; James Maxwell in physics; and Maynard Keynes in economics, to mention just a few. Committed to a liberal ideal of learning that was tolerant and prized the critical intelligence, the Society gathered on Saturday evenings in term time, when a paper was read and views were aired in a spirit of frankness and sincerity. The Society’s longevity contributed to its fame. Whereas other similar groups proved short-lived, the Apostles perpetuated themselves, thanks to their practice of maintaining ties with former members, who were welcomed at the weekly meetings, joined current members for an annual dinner, and sometimes acted as mentors for the younger brethren.

The Society has attracted attention from scholars interested in the part played by this intellectual elite in the cultural life of their times, as well as those interested in tracing the intellectual formation of individual Apostles. Peter Allen’s *The Cambridge Apostles. The Early Years* (Cambridge, 1978) suggested that the Society played a major part in creating a network of liberal intellectuals who promoted reforms from within the Victorian Establishment, challenging the Anglican monopoly of the ancient universities and a patronage system that limited access to desirable public and professional positions to the well-connected. Extending this interpretive tradition, W. C. Lubenow’s new study locates the history of the Apostles in the context of the rise of professional society in Britain. Drawing on personal correspondence, unpublished papers, and other archival sources, the book is in part a prosopographic exercise, in part a sustained meditation on aspects of the professional and intellectual culture of the period. The first chapters consider the nature of the Society and its membership, providing the most comprehensive account to date of the social origins, educational experiences, and careers of the 255 individuals elected to the Society before the First World War. Like their fellow students, most Apostles were from professional backgrounds and opted for professional occupations. Subsequent chapters consider the careers of individual Apostles in various professional contexts: politics, government service, and law; the metropolitan world of letters and journalism; public schools; universities; and the church. In their various professional roles,

Lubenow argues, the Apostles assisted in the creation of a “new civic culture, a new civil society” (141) rooted in a liberal professional culture. Emphasizing the importance of individual character and vocational commitment, this professional culture was closely linked to the tradition of liberal learning that the Apostles knew from Cambridge, a tradition that Apostolic dons helped make more comprehensive by promoting reforms that severed the ancient universities’ link with the Established Church and extended their range of studies. In the process, these dons created new career opportunities for dons (opportunities that Lubenow shows were seized by many Apostles) and enhanced their professional authority. Through their links with the universities, the world of government, London clubs and literary life, the public schools, and other key institutions, Apostles contributed to the diffusion of this cultural ethos to a wider public and helped found a new status order that accorded greater scope for talent and greater authority to achievement than had the old regime.

Intent upon taking “the lives of the learned classes seriously and in their own terms rather than ours” (xiv), Lubenow’s study skirts issues that have preoccupied scholars concerned with Britain’s relative economic decline (e.g. the lack of esteem accorded to applied knowledge and industrial pursuits by professional and other elites) and socio-economic inequalities (which limited access to the type of learning associated with status and power). Instead, writing at a time when social responsibility and social cohesion are again matters of urgent concern, Lubenow celebrates the Apostles as representing a civic culture which contrived to balance the claims of individuality and public life and combined openness to change with respect for order. Thus, for example, whereas critics have focused on the limitations of a tradition of liberal education that despite substantial reforms still accorded pride of place to mathematics and the classics, Lubenow emphasizes the part it played in promoting cohesion as well as a critical outlook amongst the educated elite.

Taking the Apostles on their own terms, Lubenow reconfigures issues in interesting ways. Viewing the division of Victorian intellectual life into religious and secular spheres as “an artefact of twentieth century scholarship”

(392), Lubenow suggests that Apostolic agnosticism was grounded in a spiritual impulse, noting that Apostles often endeavored to salvage spiritual values even when they despaired of saving Christianity. Positing linkages between the Apostles’ commitment to friendship, liberal learning, and civic virtue, Lubenow concludes that they represented “a kind of knowledge which was ideally suited to small groups and communities ... [and] makes civil society possible because it consolidates trust and loyalty” (411). Taking a group on its own terms, however, does not encourage close attention to the limitations of its values and influence. Thus, for example, Lubenow’s account accords little emphasis to the potential for conflict between the claims of friendship and public duty, and if friendship and liberal learning promoted trust amongst the chosen few, they served as hindrances to non-Apostolic individuals possessed of other types of potentially energizing talents.

While one may question some of its emphases, this is an absorbing study. Focusing on issues of much contemporary interest, it invites us to reorder our understanding of the intellectual and professional culture of the period. With its delightful cameos of individual Apostles, memorable quotations, and well-chosen illustrations, this attractive book is also most enjoyable to read.

JOYCE SENDERS PEDERSEN

University of Southern Denmark—Odense University, Denmark

The Scandals of Translation: Towards an Ethics of Difference. By Lawrence Venuti (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 210 pp. £15.99 paper.

The same but different. ... The phrase is not only a reasonable description of translation (repressive tradition emphasizes sameness; Venuti values difference) but also of what international publishers demand of sequels: this book extends only slightly the arguments already developed in Venuti’s *The Translator’s Invisibility* (1995).¹

Those arguments might be summarized as follows: translation has been marginalized in literary studies because it is supposed not to

exist as a legitimate mode of textual transformation; this marginalizing is institutionalized in copyright law, which does little but obscure the activity of translators and encourage the current imbalance in translation flows (huge numbers of texts are translated from English; relatively few are rendered into English); the repressive linguistic study of translation adds insult to injury by mechanizing equivalence, thus suppressing the active role that translations play in the constitution of cultures; and worse—and this is the relatively new bit—linguistic approaches only look at relations between standard languages, encouraging translators to conform to those standards rather than help develop minor cultural identities. Venuti also proposes “remedies” to this apparently scandalous situation: translations should be studied in literature courses *as translations*, dealing with the historical choices made by translators; cultural studies may then logically replace linguistics as the discipline most appropriate to the study of translation; this more liberating approach should not only value the way translations can help minoritize hegemonic cultures but should also encourage translators to use minority discourses; and remedied copyright law should allow texts to be free of translation rights from 5 years after first publication (thus encouraging more translations into English). In short, it’s all good revolutionary stuff, explicitly designed to upset readers who thought translations themselves should be the cause of scandal because they change originals. The result is a book that effectively prolongs the debates begun in Venuti’s earlier efforts; it can be expected to help set the agenda in non-linguistic translation studies. If only it were as coherent as it is well intentioned.

Here’s a shortlist of shortcomings, to add to the few I’ve mentioned elsewhere.² Venuti’s arguments rely on fundamentally binary oppositions that allow him to talk about “good” and “bad” translations in terms of hegemonic vs. minority culture, standard vs. non-standard language, critical studies vs. linguistics, and so on. This means his most powerful arguments do not really concern translation but are simply ideas about what cultures should be and how language should be used. In fact, the one pair that did concern translation in pre-scandal Venuti—the Schleiermacherian distinction between

“foreignizing” and “domesticating” translation—doesn’t seem to apply anymore, since domestication into a minority language is now okay. So we have somehow floated above translation studies and entered opinions about the world’s cultures.

Within this strange world, Venuti assumes that translation “threatens” just about everything and everyone, including traditional linguistics, Grecian cooperation, religious institutions, philosophy, and all knowledge of other cultures. This may be so. But in arguing the point Venuti demonstrates a pretty poor grasp of what has been going on in linguistics for the past 20 years (and thus the limits to his understanding of cooperation) and he comes close to the trap of automatic self-justification: because translation is a threat, it was not talked about; although one could just as easily argue that translation has been ignored precisely because it has been efficient enough or perhaps too benign to pose any threats. Further, Venuti’s anecdotal observation is considered so general in application that, were it true, there would surely be no need to change the way translators translate. And yet that’s what Venuti wants: somehow the “always threatening” has to be made the “now more threatening than ever.” How might this come about? Well, when a reviewer did not like a translation by Venuti, it was the fault of the reader, not the translator: “she refused to understand it according to the explanation presented in my introduction” (19). That sounds like a threat: read me the way I tell you, or I’ll name you in my book. If only all translators had that option.

As for Venuti’s proposed copyright solution, it is hard to see how a moratorium on translation rights would really benefit the needy: since the profit motive is considered absolute (162), Western publishers would simply wait 5 years so as to avoid paying non-Western authors anything.

And then, consider the fact that this prolonged argument in favor of minoritizing cultures and non-standard languages is all presented in perfectly standard academic English, by a major international publisher that is not particularly interested in carrying translations. This sequel did not set out to practice what it preaches: in giving more of the same, it creates rather less difference than one might have hoped for.

NOTES

1. Lawrence Venuti, *The Translator's Invisibility. A History of Translation* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995).
2. Anthony Pym, "Venuti's Visibility," *Target* 8/2 (1996): 165–77.

ANTHONY PYM

Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Spain

Germany's Second Chance: Trust, Justice, and Democratization. By Anne Sa'adah (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1998), xii + 352 pp. \$39.95 cloth.

The dissolution of one of the poles that anchored the global political–ideological universe during the second part of the twentieth century and the subsequent changes of regimes in many (East European) countries has brought about widespread political soul searching. From Latin America to South Africa to Central Europe, Germany (and even Switzerland), countries have had to work through their past. "Truth commissions," "Enquête-Kommissionen" or "Historikerkommissionen" have been set up to address the thorny issues of how a democratizing society deals with its totalitarian (or dictatorial or authoritarian) history. Anne Sa'adah's intelligent, wide-ranging, and timely book centers on, but is not limited to, the case of Germany which, as the only one among democratizing countries, has tackled these issues twice in this century: working through its Nazi past after 1945, notably in denazification, the Nuremberg and the Frankfurt trials; and again, since 1989, dealing with the communist past in the eastern parts of the country.

The task of "Vergangenheitsbewältigung" or "Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit" can be (and has been) approached very differently. In "The Truth About Dictatorship" (*New York Review*, 19 February 1998), Timothy Garton Ash poses four basic questions in connection with "working through the past" after a dictatorship: "whether to remember and treat the past at all, in any of the diverse available ways, or simply to try to forget it and look to the future; when to address it, if it is to be addressed; who should do it; and, finally,

how?" Sa'adah, without neglecting the first three aspects, concentrates on the fourth and discusses two basic strategies for bringing about a sense of reconciliation, justice, and closure to a totalitarian experience. The first is an "institutional strategy of reconciliation ... that emphasizes the ability of institutions and procedures to engender a pattern of behavior that may not correspond to the inner convictions ... of individual actors, but that can ... reshape political culture and common conceptions of justice ...;" the second is a "cultural strategy" that "tends to assign greater immediate importance to the creation of a community of conviction, in the sense of a self-conscious constitutional consensus undergirded by a democratic political culture" (3). The central difference is that "[c]ultural strategies tend to put victims first; institutional strategies tend to put order first" (5).

In her first chapter, Sa'adah draws on a broad set of historical examples of political reconciliation, from Aedanus Burke in the American Revolution, to Robert Lindet in the French; to de Gaulle, the Résistance, and Vichy. In all these examples (and later ones), she includes literature and literary figures as yardsticks or lightning rods of political debates and democratic developments: Jean-Louis Curtis, Albert Camus, Wolfgang Koeppen, and, centrally, Christa Wolf and others in the German debate.

Chapter two focuses on East Germany and the predominantly cultural strategy pursued by its intellectual elites in 1989–90, when the DDR collapsed but a "third way" out of the ensuing institutional crisis still seemed possible. The transformation toward democracy was perceived by these elites as hinging on personal and institutional trust. While these issues were still debated in Neues Forum and at roundtables and argued out by East German intellectuals, "the people" opted more and more vehemently for reunification. As this occurred, the focus of the debate inevitably shifted toward institutional strategies for "coming to terms with the past."

In chapter three, Christa Wolf's *Was bleibt* and the "Literaturstreit" that this work ignited are at the center. Sa'adah manages admirably to draw out the wider implications as the West Germans now joined the debate and reveals the "blocked learning process" that has marked German intellectual–political de-

bate since WW II. This is also the place where Sa'adah brings in Václav Havel's understanding of modern dictatorships, especially of the East European communist variety which have made, he claims, everybody complicit and have blurred the borderlines between perpetrators and victims by relying on the widespread tacit acceptance of an underlying "culture of lying."

Chapter four, "Successor Justice," following the logic of the reunification process, emphasizes institutional strategies. It opens with an extensive discussion, for comparison and contrast, of the legal strategies pursued in the post-WW II Nazi trials and brings out the inherent dangers of any legal strategy set up in pursuit of political aims.

The case of Manfred Stolpe in chapter five highlights once again cultural aspects and puts at the center the Prime Minister of Brandenburg, former DDR church leader and as such "compromised" through his—admitted—dealings with the Stasi. His case triggered "fundamentalist" reactions, for instance in Marianne Birthler's resignation from her post as education minister in the Stolpe government. She insisted that any negotiations with the DDR regime/the Stasi was tantamount to collaboration as the regime was principally not open to reform from within. But there was also a "pragmatic" reaction from defenders of institutional approaches to reconciliation who accepted "dealing with the enemy" as a viable "realpolitisch" attempt at social improvements under the circumstances. Institutional aspects also form the bulk of chapter six, the (re-) construction and shaping of the party system in former East Germany. Naturally, the chapter focuses on the role of the SED successor-party, the PDS under the leadership of Gregor Gysi, himself not an uncontroversial figure, but also discusses the process of extending the West German parties into the "neue Bundesländer."

Sa'adah concludes her book on the issue of trust, the indispensable "social capital" (Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* [Princeton, 1993]) of democracies: "No trust, no democracy: this is the position of democratizing elites who prefer cultural strategies" (277). At the same time she knows (and we know) "that institutional strategies work. We also know that they disappoint and that they are either complemented or compromised by the introduction of cultural ele-

ments" (280). "Institutional strategies create trust-as-reliability" and that is a start. What democracies really need, however, is "trust-as-trustworthiness" (281), the glue of successful communities that, as Putnam shows in his historical study of Italy, may take centuries to build. In this sense, then, it is still early to make a final judgment on the "German case." But in light of the massive changes in the articulation of politics, culture, and community in the postmodern age, trust-as-reliability may well be the best we can hope for.

Germany's Second Chance is an invaluable, broad-based contribution to the important debate about political transitions toward liberal democracy. The book, by providing both broad theoretical and historical arguments as well as the specifics of the German case, doubled as it were, in the post-WW II and the post-1989 debates, makes a stimulating social-science contribution to "cultural studies." It is especially good at integrating the persons and works of individual cultural figures in the broader issues of the debate. *Germany's Second Chance* deserves the widest readership among German (cultural) studies adherents.

HANS J. RINDISBACHER
Pomona College, USA

Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953–1991. By Yitzhak M. Brudny (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1998), Russian Research Center Studies, 91, x + 352 pp. \$45.00 cloth.

While interest in studying Russian as a foreign language has been waning for a while now, sociological, political, and historical scholarship on the Soviet Union and Russia is blossoming and has, to name but a few, produced works such as Malia's *Russia Under Western Eyes*, McDaniel's *The Agony of the Russian Idea*, Kenez's *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, as well as Yitzhak Brudny's book under discussion here.

Divided into eight chapters and an epilogue and proceeding in historical-chronological order, the book makes only brief reference in chapter one to the estab-

lished scholarship on nationalism (Deutsch, Anderson) but points to the deliberate ambiguity between concepts of the USSR as a Russian nation-state, a multi-national federation, or some form of empire. Brudny establishes a typology of Russian nationalist intellectuals (liberal, conservative, and radical) and makes clear that Russian nationalists are generally ethnically rather than institutionally oriented. He then outlines his central concept of “politics by culture” (13), typical of communist regimes, that the Soviet communist party pursued to frame its discourse with the intelligentsia. This concept highlights the key role the intelligentsia and the “thick journals” played as channels of public discourse in the articulation of politics and culture in a totalitarian society.

Chapter two discusses the “emergence of politics by culture,” the party strategy of the Khrushchev era, when de-Stalinization and political liberalization triggered a search for a new (Soviet? Russian?) historical-political identity. The village prose movement emerging in contemporary writing and extolling the great moral strength of the peasant community and its ways of life became the intellectual ally and literary expression of the conservative and increasingly the radical strand of nationalism.

Chapters three, four, and five discuss the development by the regime of the concept of “inclusionary politics,” its peak and decline between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s, and poses the key question, “why did the Soviet regime cultivate for so long the very people whose ideas represented a direct challenge to its official ideology?” (15). The three chapters provide multi-faceted, in-depth answers: as a means of reducing ideological pressure and deflecting political issues onto the cultural realm; as a useful way for the party to legitimize vast investments into the failing agricultural sector during the Brezhnev years; but also, by favoring one wing of the nationalist movement, for instance the conservative over the liberal, as a tool in the fight against the perceived corroding western (cultural) influences.

Despite considerable freedom allowed the nationalist intellectuals, however, they did not become a regime-supporting group, as chapter five shows. The regime’s overtures had raised false hopes, followed by disappointment, and hence had in fact led to growing criticism of

the regime by the intellectuals. In chapter six, therefore, Brudny outlines in more detail the increasingly heated debate on Russian national identity and the “political, social, economic, and cultural arrangements most suitable for Russia” (25) during the 1970s and early 1980s.

Chapters seven and eight cover the Gorbachev-era, when the constellation of participants in the debates on Russia’s current and future self-understanding changed rapidly and radically. The three groups of nationalist intellectuals and writers that Brudny had depicted up to this point, mostly as discussion partners of the regime but outside of it, now become directly involved as significant forces within the new, democratizing political system. In the process, they sharpen their differences and come to occupy opposite poles of the perestroika/glasnost spectrum: the conservative and radical nationalists allying themselves with the struggling communist party, the liberal nationalists with the (Gorbachev) reformers and the new democratic system.

The book’s epilogue is a “sneak preview” of a possible follow-up study that would address the questions Brudny raises at the end of chapter eight: how Russian nationalists adjusted to the postcommunist world and how, after the initial attraction of liberal democratic perestroika ideas faded, they “were able to make a remarkable political comeback” (258).

Overall, the book is a highly informative overview of a longstanding, intense political-intellectual debate within the post-Stalin Soviet Union, and it is particularly good at elucidating Russia’s current situation as the result of this debate between communism, forms of nationalism, and, most recently, democratic liberalism. Although at times tedious in its detailed discussion of the finer points between conservative/radical and liberal nationalists in their journals, the book reveals the high significance of these debates for the present. Brudny’s analysis accounts, for instance, for Zyuganov’s role as the leader of the radical nationalists’ alliance with the orthodox communists as well as for Zhirinovskiy’s alternative nationalist track which demands a strong authoritarian state, as do the radical nationalists, but seeks to realize it not in allegiance with the communists, but in opposition to them. Brudny’s book also shows Russia’s present quandary as a reflection of the fundamental struggle between the forces of cultural histori-

cal tradition (the—reformed—communists and conservative/radical nationalists) and “mere” economics (the liberal-democratic group). It points out the decisive shortcoming of the present “westernizers” and “modernizers” in their exclusive focus on the economy and their neglect of issues of nationbuilding, identity, state borders, regional ethnic minorities, Russian minorities in the newly-founded states (e.g. in the Baltic), etc. The regenerated communists and nationalists who, in turn, have no viable concept of economic reforms, now wholly own these aspects of the debate. Thus the two camps, confirming the impression of outside observers of Russian politics, do not really argue with each other, they simply talk past each other about different agendas.

Although Brudny never aims at the historical “big picture” and mentions the Slavophiles vs. Westernizers debate only in passing, his book stimulates the reader to contextualize its arguments in this classical Russian intellectual framework and in broader historical terms. In addition, it provides, for the reader inclined in that direction, quite a detailed account of the “thick journals” and their personnel politics over half a century. In *Reinventing Russia*, then, situated at the intersection of culture (specifically the literature of the village prose movement) and politics, Brudny has managed admirably to draw out the wider implications of his inquiry and has provided an extremely useful set of orientation points in the current, seemingly so chaotic, political debate in Russia.

HANS J. RINDISBACHER

Pomona College, Claremont, CA, USA

Dickens, Novel Reading, and the Victorian Popular Theatre. By Deborah Vlock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xii + 226 pp. £35.00/\$54.95 cloth.

From his first emergence to fame with *The Pickwick Papers*, Charles Dickens has been considered one of the Victorian “great men.” As G. K. Chesterton put it in 1906, “whatever the word ‘great’ means, Dickens was what it means.” Deborah Vlock agrees with this assessment implicitly, but contends that many recent critics have misunderstood a writer they celebrate, as well as Victorian novel writing

and reading generally. Specifically, she argues that insufficient notice has been taken of this literary activity’s historical and cultural context, a milieu she seeks to recover by concentrating on Victorian popular entertainment. Her careful, informed analysis discloses much about Dickens’s cultural setting; but its dependence on current critical norms obscures other relevant issues and, ultimately, a sense of Dickens’s transcendent greatness.

Pace Foucauldian scholars, Vlock posits a Victorian symbiosis between the tropes of popular entertainment and attitudes to social life. This “interchangeability of theatrical, literary and social codes” (26) created what she dubs an “imaginary text:” the framework of presuppositions about what is legitimate in letters and life, as mediated by popular culture, “the theatre of assumptions circulating among the London public” (11). Vlock’s diction is intentional, for she regards the theatre as this text’s chief author. To her, the nineteenth century had a theatrical consciousness, in which “voices and physical gestures crowded the imagination, haunting the reading and writing subject” (6). Genres besides performed dramas thus employed theatrical conventions; and generic boundaries were hence often elided as plays, novels, journalism and even social analyses shared a formal deep structure derived from popular melodrama. To Vlock, Dickens exemplifies this condition, not just because he was involved in theatre and his works were frequently dramatized, but also because “his consciousness was shaped by the representations of social life he saw on stage ... [he] frequently mixed his personal, social, and theatrical observations in this way, producing a creative genre which rarely confines itself to either the fictive or the ‘real’ ...” (140).

More particularly, Vlock asserts that novelists like Dickens and other non-dramatists employed the theatrical device of a person’s physical traits—particularly the voice—being indicative of his/her social status. Vlock centres on portrayal of patter. She contends that this logorrhea connoted social marginality and deviance to Victorian audiences. Its opacity and disjoining of word from meaning affronted the transparency and conjunction of sign and signified that bourgeois hearers considered a hallmark of truth-speaking. Although originally attributed to working-class men, by

the nineteenth century patter was ascribed more usually to celibate women. The best section of this book demonstrates persuasively how mid-Victorian journalistic discussions of “redundant” women, literary portrayals of patterning spinsters, and Dickens’s *Little Dorritt* were part of a nexus of anxiety that women outside the Victorian domestic and reproductive economy imperiled male bourgeois socio-economic dominance.

Yet for all the theatricality of Victorian culture, Vlock identifies deep ambivalence about the theatre among its bourgeois audience. If the theatrical “carnival” used devices like patter to contain transgressive impulses by ridiculing them and restricting them to that space, there was simultaneous fear that such dissenting instincts would nonetheless seem alluring and spill from the stage into society. Not surprisingly, Vlock detects a similar tension in Victorian novels, including Dickens’s (101). Her analysis of this bourgeois scepticism about theatre, however, pays little attention to the role of Puritanism and its legacy in shaping these suspicions. Not only was Puritanism central in creating the bourgeois ethos, but, as George Orwell noted, Dickens’s worldview belongs to “the English puritan tradition ... the lower-middle-class, puritan mentality.”

This shortcoming in Vlock’s treatment suggests a larger flaw. Despite its admirable effort to recover Dickens’s context, her interpretation of his work and setting is nevertheless shaped by contemporary critical concerns. Her focus on issues of social control, language, and gender produces piquant observations. Yet readers of other Dickens critics—like Chesterton and Orwell—will discern a deficient sense of why Dickens remains widely admired. To Orwell, Dickens and his milieu mattered because “a good-tempered antinomianism rather of Dickens’s type is one of the marks of Western popular culture ... in his own age and ours he has been popular chiefly because he was able to express in a comic, simplified and therefore memorable form the native decency of the common man.” It is this memorable articulation of the common things of common people that makes Dickens still command attention; and a study that neglects it, however well informed and crafted, will likely have a limited audience once its critical preoccupations are no longer fashionable.

Writing of Dickens’s enduring value, Chesterton defined an immortal author as one who “does something universal in a special manner.” Deborah Vlock’s analysis has helped illuminate the sources and components of Dickens’s distinctive manner, but the universal precepts of the moral imagination that made (and make) him a great writer are scarcely visible through the post-modern footlights.

ADAM SCHWARTZ

The Russell Kirk Center for Cultural Renewal,
USA

Romantic Poets, Critics, and Other Madmen. By Charles Rosen (Harvard University Press, 1998), xi + 257 pp. \$27.95 cloth.

Romantic Poets, Critics, and Other Madmen is a collection of critical book reviews written for the *New York Review of Books* and the *Times Literary Supplement* between 1971 and 1992 by Charles Rosen, music critic and historian, and renowned pianist. Rosen’s reputation as a musical historian and critic is beyond doubt, as the author of the classic study of the musical language of Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven, *The Classical Style*¹ and the more recent, but equally impressive *The Romantic Generation*.² This collection of essays on diverse themes confirms that Rosen’s analytical talents extend far beyond the confines of musicology.

Written in a clear, highly readable style, Rosen’s collection is divided into two sections; the first has Romanticism as its underlying theme, and it ranges over the visual arts, poetry, religious revival, textual revisions, secret codes, punctuation, cooking and madness; while the second focuses on the figure of the critic, with four essays on Walter Benjamin, on Schenker, Saussure and Jakobson, on William Empson, and finally on George Bernard Shaw’s musical criticism. In often juxtaposing two or more authors or artists, Rosen uses his vast knowledge of English, French and German cultural traditions to suggest correspondences and affinities which are always thought-provoking.

In “The Definitive Text,” Rosen considers the varied interests of Romantic artists in revising their works in later life, and the difficulties this creates for their editors in pre-

sending a “definitive” text in readable form. The discussion ranges from the evolution of Balzac’s *The Unknown Masterpiece* through its different versions, and comparisons between Wordsworth’s two versions of *The Prelude*, to the difficulties of how to present a variorum edition of Byron’s *Giaour* and which versions of Robert Schumann’s piano pieces should rightfully be performed. Against W. H. Auden’s argument that the writer’s last version should be the only one considered, Rosen adopts a characteristically pragmatic position, suggesting that disregarding earlier versions or relegating their printed form to illegible fonts in the notes section is to do both the artist and the public a disservice. Along similar lines, in a later review of Flaubert’s and Byron’s correspondence, Rosen argues in favour of preserving the original punctuation of Romantic writing, for all its norm-breaking, against editorial tinkering.

Rosen has no qualms at taking M. H. Abrams, in the review of the latter’s *Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature*, for misunderstanding Early Romanticism’s apparent return to Religion after the Revolution, as a revivification of religious notions. Rosen cites Blake’s:

But if at the church they would
give us some ale
And a pleasant fire our souls to
regale ...

Here, according to Rosen, Blake no longer uses “soul” in its traditional opposition to “body,” but fuses the two, in a radical act of exappropriation. Such a “wholesale act of seizure and destruction” is not unique to Blake, says Rosen; “Novalis, Hölderlin, and Wordsworth (at least before 1807) were no less radical” (43) in their recycling.

One underlying theme in this collection is the critical search for secret codes in an artist’s work. In his 1971 review of a Caspar David Friedrich exhibition at Dresden and its corresponding catalogue, together with Alan Walker’s *Robert Schumann: The Man and his Music*, Rosen dismantles critical attempts to detect and decode recurrent hidden symbols in these artists’ works, as if such symbols have a rich life, independent of the specific works in which they appear. Unlike words part of whose meanings can be decontextualised into dictionaries, Rosen argues that visual and mu-

sical languages’ symbols only attain their meaning in their specific context; thus, “comparison of Friedrich’s pictures will tell us *how* he conveyed meanings, not *what* meanings: only an interpretation of the forms of each work can lead us to that” (104). The critic must always return the extracted part to its original place if the essential meaning is to emerge.

Rosen raises the similar issue in a 1993 review of collections of William Empson essays. While he acknowledges Empson as having the “generosity of spirit that makes a great critic” (234)—one could say the same of Rosen himself—he also takes issue with Empson’s critical technique:

Many of Empson’s analyses of poetry were of individual lines or passages ripped from their contexts, and he seemed to take a virtuoso’s delight in bringing up the most far-fetched considerations, many of them at least at first sight very remote from the text he is looking at (216).

Rosen does not dismiss this technique out of hand, for it can give spectacular results when it pays off. It is this type of spectacular juxtaposition, a synthesis of extremes, that he also recognises at the heart of Walter Benjamin’s allusive style of criticism, in his 1977 review of a translation of Benjamin’s *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, which acts as a springboard for an excellent 50-page essay which covers Benjamin’s life and work and its relationship to Romantic aesthetics and Symbolist theory of language.

Rosen’s sympathy for the eccentric is shown in his interesting essay on madness as a creative force in Romantic writers, ostensibly covering Cowper, Smart and Hölderlin, though ranging further to include Lamb, Nerval, Jakob Lenz and Kleist. In the second part, his interest also extends to critical eccentricity, in the article which addresses the musical analysis of Heinrich Schenker, the Latin poetry investigations of Sausurre and Roman Jakobson’s interpretations of Shakespearean sonnets. Again, Rosen draws us to critics obsessed with decoding, with the search for implicit forms. In the case of Schenker, Rosen shows how Schenkerian harmonic analysis aims to uncover an underlying structure, exemplified by

“distilling” the quintessence of Chopin’s F major Study (Op. 10, n° 8) to a simple three-chord perfect cadence. He then discusses Saussure’s obsessive pursuit of encoded anagrams in Latin poetry, rationalising “to the point of insanity” (195), and Jakobson’s search for so-called “grammatical metaphors.” Rosen’s concluding remark to this article is a testimony to the common sense which is manifest throughout the book:

Criticism cannot do without these implicit forms, inner relationships, hidden significances. But they must be so presented that they not only reflect the work but also reflect back upon it, and at an oblique angle so that they can receive more in return than their own images. Criticism is not the reduction of a work to its individual, interior symmetries, but the continuous movement from explicit to implicit and back again. And must end where it started—with the surface (210).

NOTES

1. Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style* (London: Faber & Faber, 1971).
2. Charles Rosen, *The Romantic Generation* (Harvard University Press, 1998).

JOHN STYLE

Rovira i Virgili University, Tarragona, Spain

Of Flies, Mice and Men. By François Jacob, translated by Giselle Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 158 pp. \$24.00 cloth.

This book, translated from the French, concisely comments on the remarkable advances that have occurred in genetics and molecular biology from the early 1960s until now. According to the current views that Jacob himself helped to shape “... all life forms are constructed with the same molecules, distributed

in different ways...” (p. 4), and, more explicitly, “from yeast to humans, there are groups of closely related molecules that serve to assure universal life functions, such as cell division or signaling between cell membrane and the nucleus.” (p. 3). If the same fundamental molecules result in the great diversity of animal species that inhabit our planet, then it is extremely important for research to utilize, as indicated in the book title, diverse and appropriate models from the less to the more complex organisms, that is, from flies, to mice and to humans. This scope is outlined in the Introduction and discussed further in Chapter 1: The Importance of the Unpredictable. These chapters are followed by a detailed discussion with historical background of the first uses of the animal models and the major findings in genetics and molecular biology with these models: The Fly (Chapter 2); The Mouse (also including, bacteria, nematodes and cultured cells) (Chapter 3); The Erector Set (discussion in this chapter suggests that the living world resembles a giant erector set, the pieces of which can be taken apart and put together again in different ways, to produce different forms) (Chapter 4); Self and Other (Chapter 5) and Good and Evil (Chapter 6) (role of genes in normal function and human diseases, eugenics). The last chapter, Beauty and Truth (Chapter 7) emphasizes the dialectic of the world as largely a product of imagination and examines differences in models of reality for the scientist or the artist. The final Conclusion wonders “... whether there might be limits to scientific research ...” (p. 147) and whether these limits might be inherent to the very process of scientific research (which may undergo a progressive slowdown and stop of its own accord) or may be due to a failure of the power of resolution of the human brain: “The human brain might be incapable of understanding the human brain” (p. 149). “The main discovery during this century of research and science has probably been the depth of our ignorance of nature... The biggest danger for humankind is not the development of knowledge, but ignorance.” (p. 152). Jacob’s analyses are clearly formulated and understandable to readers not specialist in the subject matter. The discussion is often enlivened by mythological and literary references; it also provides an interesting description of the way in which biologic research has

been carried out in the last 50 years and the characteristics of the scientists who do it.

PAOLA S. TIMIRAS

University of California, Berkeley, USA

“A Dream of Liberty:” Constance Markievicz’s Vision of Ireland, 1908–1927. By Sari Oikarinen (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1998), 213 pp. No price given.

Constance Markievicz is surely one of the most interesting figures in twentieth century Irish history. Markievicz was a significant actor in the Irish nationalist, socialist, and early feminist movements. Her intriguing political life and the interplay between these different but to Markievicz related political movements is the subject of this brief but solid book, which is a revision of a dissertation from a Finnish author. Sari Oikarinen’s purpose is to provide an updated understanding of Markievicz’s role in the social movements that defined Irish politics from 1908 till her death in 1927 and that were part of what the author entitles “a dream of liberty.”

Unlike earlier biographies of Markievicz, this book does not spend an inordinate time exploring the details of the childhood and early adulthood of this product of the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy. While Oikarinen notes that Markievicz’s decision to join Sinn Féin in 1908 isolated her from her Anglo-Irish heritage, she does not fully explain the transition that took place in the mind and heart of Markievicz. Surely, her decision to support Irish nationalism and eventually convert to Catholicism was unusual among women of her background. While one can identify a progress to Markievicz’s conversion, the triggering mechanism is not well identified in this book and is one of the most intriguing questions that surrounds this extraordinary person. Unlike earlier biographies that tended to portray Constance as an accomplice to the major male figures of the era, Oikarinen seeks to revise this historical image and depict Markievicz as an important and multifaceted actor in the political life of Ireland in the early years of this century.

While Markievicz was engaged in many activities during her life, her greatest priority,

according to Oikarinen, was the goal of achieving an independent national state for Ireland. Her aspirations for an Irish Republic framed the other issues of concern for her. This was epitomized by the important role Markievicz played in the Easter Rising. Oikarinen convincingly demonstrated that Markievicz did not play a secondary or purely supporting role in the Rising but was one of the major leaders of this most important symbolic act on behalf of Irish nationalism. Her prowess as a political leader was again proven by her election to the Irish Dail and her selection as the first Minister of Labor. Markievicz’s role as a defender of the idea of an Irish Republic was further strengthened when she sided with De Valera and those who opposed the treaty. Her opposition to the Free State came primarily from her attempt to use propaganda against the new regime, not violence. After again being elected to the Dail in 1927, Markievicz died from complications after an appendectomy and never took her seat with those like De Valera who had come to the conclusion that they must enter the political process of the Irish Free State and no longer hold out for a thirty-two county Republic.

Primarily known for her association for her work in the nationalist struggle, Markievicz was also very active in a variety of other social movements. Oikarinen believes that for Markievicz these were all part of a singular vision of a free and independent Ireland. Creating better conditions for Irish workers and achieving greater rights for women were not isolated from her concern for the cause of nationalism. Markievicz was a very close follower and ally of James Connolly and believed in his vision of a more just and equitable distribution of wealth for the workers of Ireland. Markievicz was also very active in the Suffrage Movement. More than these traditional and existing social movements, Markievicz helped found and create Na Fianna Éireann (The Soldiers of Ireland), an Irish form of boy scouts whose purpose it was to train the youth of Ireland to work for independence and the cause of the Irish nation.

While the traditional image of Constance Markievicz is that of a caregiver to the poor and downtrodden of Dublin and a supporter of the Irish nationalist cause, Oikarinen has attempted to revise this image to that of a

modern day feminist activist. While earlier biographies may have excessively focused on her social rather than political work, Oikarinen may try to go a bit too far in revising our understanding of Markievicz. Surely, she was constrained, not only by her own Anglo-Irish upbringing but by traditional gender roles of her time. This limited her ability to play a

major political and social role in the Ireland of the first few decades of this century. In some ways these limitations make her achievements and her role as a female Irish revolutionary that much more remarkable.

TIMOTHY J. WHITE
Xavier University, USA