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**Introduction**

This text reworks a series of talks I gave at the *Collège International de Philosophie* in Paris in March 1994, ten years after the seminar on “Translation and the Letter,” seminal in every sense, given at the same institution by Antoine Berman. At the time I was a perhaps-still-young scholar completing postdoctoral research in Göttingen, Germany. I had no claim to fame, and certainly no right to compare myself, no matter how implicitly, to Berman, who had died in 1991. I remain grateful to the *Collège*, and to its director at that time, Jacques Derrida, for giving me the chance to speak, and I am still fairly sure that the opportunity was due more to the intellectual intrigues of my topic, translation, than to anything I personally had to say.

Now, in 2012, things are perhaps a little different. Part of my gratitude unfortunately goes to those who are no longer with us (Derrida passed away in 2004); I no longer feel any pressing need to position myself in terms of French thought; it no longer seems quite so urgent to upset the conventional wisdom of *idées reçues*—we grow old.

The French version of this text came out in 1997. It sold well enough but never gained status as a serious statement in intellectual terms (despite much-appreciated and very critical reviews by Alexis Nouss, Daniel Simeoni, Şebnem Bahadır and Henri Meschonnic). In seeking the ethics of a profession, of the translator as a professional subject, I put myself on a collision course with a lot of armchair philosophy. That perhaps crossed too many battle-lines inscribed not just in French thought, but more profoundly in the French language: professional concerns are traditionally the stuff of *déontologie*, roughly “codes of ethics,” which is held to operate in a quite different dimension from the more philosophical *éthique*, where intellectuals strike elegiac poses and pronounce noble principles concerning solidarity, humanity, plurality, openness, justice, and sometimes a few human rights to things equally as abstract. For example, *déontologie* could talk about commerce and quantities (e.g. how much a mediator should be paid); *éthique* generally would not (as if in a world of pure qualities). That distinction was not one I wanted to make, and it is still a distinction that this text consciously refuses. The result is that some readers will inevitably think this book talks about two different things: the first chapters for philosophy and *éthique*, the last chapters for professionalism and *déontologie*. My intention, despite that progression, has been more simply to talk about the translator’s professionalism in philosophical terms.

A certain unity in the project might come from the repeated use of “extreme” case studies – sometimes real, sometimes more fictional, but the difference does not matter much. This has been traditional enough as a method of inquiry in philosophical ethics, where great negative examples or even traditional paradoxes commonly serve as ideological orientation for intellectuals: if a Hitler did something, then it is unethical; if a Nelson Mandela said it, then it stands a much better chance of passing muster – all our professional cultures are oriented by such extreme examples. Meschonnic was particularly disparaging of this methodology: “…all because a ‘Nazi translator’ of an American negationist text was sued…” (2007/2011: 40). If we follow such dismissive sarcasm, the extreme examples would be opposed to something like
everyday life, as if the extreme test case had nothing at all to do with the humdrum daily practice of the vast majority of translators. The evident danger of that opposition is that, in refusing to analyze and draw lessons from the extreme cases, we force ourselves either to quantify the masses, thus reducing ethics either to descriptive sociology, or to elaborate no more than our personal assumptions about “the translator” (as if we knew them all), or indeed about “poetics” in the case of Meschonnic (as if rhythms were enough for all). In the second case, the non-empirical ideology of practice risks doing nothing but recycle prejudices, without any complication on the basis of evidence. In the present project I seek to break with that dilemma – with the choice between sociological empiricism and the outpouring of presupposition – by working and reworking the extreme cases, pursuing their complexity, drawing out the human quandaries. This methodology hopefully escapes the reductionism by which “if Mandela did it, it was good; if Hitler did it, it was bad.” The method consciously thickens the case studies – sometimes quite perversely so –, particularly through comparing numerous readings and adopting a range of epistemological standpoints, to evince a complex humanity. If there are deceptively simple principles that can eventually be applied to everyday practice, then they must carry with them the scars of the intellectual struggles they took to achieve.

In adopting this method, more than anything else, I have sought to overcome the polemical distinction Antoine Berman made between his own philosophical ethics and professional practice. Berman saw that his seminars occasionally gave rise to what he criticized as “persistent misunderstandings, especially with some participants who were ‘professional’ translators” (1984: 35), with quotation marks around the word “professional.” The tone, and the quotation marks, were not too surprising coming from Berman. His principles were decidedly not those of the professional translator: he was questioning, rightly, the many apparent certainties that attach themselves to this term “professional.” Berman tried to use philosophical discourse to move beyond the endemic principles of commercial claims; he sought to raise questions that the professionals simply did not see as questions. One might imagine a short dialogue:

– Respect the integrity and exactitude of the foreign expression? No sir, we don’t do that—we improve texts, to make them sound better, since that’s what our clients want.
– But we must receive the foreigner as a foreigner; we must open our culture to the other; we must cease to impose our voice on the rest of the world...
– We must give our clients and readers the high professional standards they demand.

We are translators, not border-guards or shapers of French culture... And if you were a professional translator [they always say that; they always assume that theorists have never translated professionally], if you were in the real world [professionals love that expression too], you would know what we are talking about.

And so on.

Now, what if those kinds of misunderstandings were in some way due to the academic, abstract nature of Berman’s ethics, or to intellectual ethics in general? Berman broadly defended foreignizing translations of great literary or philosophical works, but what if there were actually relatively few professionals working in such fields, or even interested in such strategies? In seeking to open translators to questions on a wider level, academic discourse of this kind paradoxically risks producing a narrow, marginal ethics: that of the academic. That paradox is surely not sufficient reason to drag entire professions into quotation marks, into a sort of non-authentic, socially degraded activity. Berman’s was not—and he did not intend it to be—an ethics of the profession. He had little to say about the commercial considerations that inform most professional activity; his was an ethics for translators with alternative means of
support. In that context, the prime aim of my own seminars was to show that commerce also had to be part of ethical thought. If not, how was philosophy ever going to dialogue with the profession? And to add insult to injury, I was quite prepared to draw on much the same philosophical tradition as Berman himself, denying the implicit authority of Germanic thought. The attempt certainly failed: the resulting principles were too commercial for the academics, and the discussions were simply too difficult for the professionals. But it was made nevertheless.

Now, many years later, in a different language and a new communicative situation, my doubts go in almost the opposite direction. The professionals that were once self-confident enough to reject academic criteria are now facing another threat, this time from technology. Free online data-based machine translation now enables almost everyone to produce a translation of some kind; electronic social networking is enabling a wide range of volunteers to engage in collective translation projects (“collaborative translation,” “community translation,” “crowd-sourcing,” and other names). My discussion of commerce might once have unambiguously offered to defend the translation profession; now, however, we have to address a far wider range of translation activities; we have to recognize that the translator is often not a “professional translator.” This opens up new terrain for ethical inquiry. The discussion of commerce is still very relevant, but we now have to recognize that the kind of value for which effort is exchanged is not just economic: translators also work, legitimately, for value of a social, symbolic, and cultural kind (we take the categories from Bourdieu, e.g. 1972/1977). The sense of the term “professional” has to be reconsidered, as do the assumptions of full-time dedication to the task, or some kind of exclusive competence. I have thus shifted from an “ethics of the translator,” which would normally translate the title of the French book (Pour une éthique du traducteur), to “translator ethics,” intended to embed the notion of “acting as translator” more fully into the mode of ethical thought itself, rather than stand there as an external object about with ethics just happens to talk. That syntactic shift is perhaps not as eloquent as I would like, but it does respond to a significant sea change in the problematics I want to address. In addition to upsetting philosophers, I will now probably upset a few professionals as well.

As a specifically “translator ethics,” the mode of thought presented here does not attempt to take position on universal principles of right and wrong causes. An “ethics for the translator” might attempt to do that, applying principles to a particular social group. In a “translator ethics,” however, any principles should ideally be involved in the activity itself and can in some way be drawn out of its discourses. This involves sketching a regional (i.e. non-universal) ethics, intended only for a particular set of social activities, and thus self-consciously unable to make grand pronouncements on any wider humanity. I thus start from the basic idea that whatever the translator does (and here I use the term “translator” to include spoken mediation), it is always grounded in a situation. The activity can only have value thanks to exchange in that situation. Nothing radically new there. However, this means that, from the outset, we cannot engage in talk about what “the (universal) translator” is or does. When George Steiner (1975) claims, for example, that the translator “seeks restitution” as the most noble ethical element of his “hermeneutic motion,” I want to know who that translator is, whom they are working for, and what their specific aim is. Or when Paul Ricœur (2004) posits, rather more provocatively, that translators are in some way schizophrenic and work out of fear or even hatred of the foreigner, I sincerely doubt that this can apply to all translators in all cultures at all times, or indeed to some supposedly universal concept of translation, unless we define things tautologically. Rather than start from ultimately facile suppositions about all possible translators, here I attempt to proceed from the kinds of situations in which translators work.
Reaching that level is not difficult. Berman partly shows us the way by asking the very question all translators ask themselves at some point: How should I translate? This fundamental, inevitable question has traditionally received two kinds of answer: one in favor of the source language-culture-text-speaker, the other in favor of the target language-culture-text-speaker. One or the other. This question and its double answers churn at the heart of many translation theories, including Berman’s. An ethics shaped exclusively by such dualism rarely fails to transcend the strangely vocational distinction between the “philosophers” on the one hand (who enjoy the privilege of serving knowledge, and thus lean more toward the source) and the “professionals” on the other (who gain their status from commerce, from exchange with those who pay for effects, and thus lean more toward the target). No matter how right the question is, the dual answers are inadequate: they return us to the facile and false opposition between thought and commerce. Worse, the supposedly ethical positions most often flow from an a priori definition of translation itself. For example, if “true translation” remains restricted to literary and philosophical works—the ‘Works’ of which Berman spoke, with the capital letter—the source will always be privileged. If, on the other hand, “true translation” is seen as an act of communication, a professional service carried out for a client and for a specific audience, then the target side will almost always receive more attention. Whenever the initial definitions are dualistic—sourciers (i.e. “water diviners”) in opposition to cibistes (“targeters”), to use the terms of Ladmiral (1986/1999), or “sorcerers” (could also be “sorcerer”) and “targeters” for Newmark (e.g. 1993: 44)—the ethical principles will also be dualistic. As noted above, if university theorists are on one side and professional translators on the other, one runs the perpetual risk of a sophisticated ethics without widespread practical application, or a widespread practice unsupported by sophisticated ethics. The dualistic question leads to a social schism.

Here I try to avoid the pitfalls of the quotation-mark “professional” and its facile duality. On the theoretical side, this is easy enough. Since at least 1984, German-language Skopos theory has been proclaiming the target-side perspective, in effect allowing the criteria and views of professional translators to erupt within academic discourse. I agree with a great deal of that enterprise, despite the reservations expressed in Chapter 4 herein. Skopos theory means that the classical dualism has been broken: whichever translation approach you choose, it depends on the purpose for which you are doing the translation, and not on the true eternal nature of translation. On the side of practice, as well, there are many reasons to doubt the dualistic models. There is now a sizeable body of research using think-aloud protocols, keystroke logging, and eye-tracking to study how translators actually produce translations. One thing that is clear from that research is that the actual choices and processes are rarely limited to anything like source vs. target, even if the translators later justify themselves in such terms. The decisions are almost always more complex; the explicit theorizing is almost always a reduction. So much for the basic question, “How should I translate?”

The fundamental aim of this book is to suggest another question, one that might shift the debate and perhaps help us think about translation a little differently, one that is more ambitious in scope and much more difficult to reduce to dualistic schemata: “Why translate?”

Why translate? The considerations here can never be a “yes vs. no,” and the content of the verb “to translate” is likely to become rather unstable as the possible reasons multiply, both for and against the decision to translate. What are the alternatives to translation? What are the available modes of translation? The question “Why translate?” is asked here at the most general level. It applies to both written and oral translation, simultaneous interpreting and consecutive interpreting, dubbing and subtitles, literary and public-service mediation, highly paid as well as voluntary work, messages sent from the source and messages sought by the target. We refer
here to all of that as “translation.” The only restriction is that here we are speaking about translatory labor being exchanged for something: for money, in a very narrow view of professionalism, or for social relations, prestige, or a learning process, in the wider vision that we accept here. Regardless of its form, in principle, translation is exchanged for something, one way or another. We cannot consider the moral or political dimensions without also looking at economic considerations, and vice versa.

That dialectic is important for ethical thought, especially in an age where globalization is defined, precisely, by economics: transport and communications become cheaper; people and products move about more; the global demand for translations goes up; the very places we once considered stable (“source” vs. “target,” indeed) are themselves moving and fragmenting. There are perhaps 333,000 people in the world who would call themselves “professional translators” in a census or tax declaration (Pym et al. 2012), and many more who are more fairly considered “morally engaged” translators. As we have noted, some kinds of professionalism now feel threatened by globalization, perhaps without great cause (since the demand for translations is growing, there is a bigger pie to cut). What can an aesthetic or purist ethics do—once the good intentions and noble sentiments have been stripped out—against the key questions of exchange: who should pay for what, how, and how much? Whether we like them or not, these are the questions we must ask.

The questions of exchange, as mundane as they may appear, lead us to new paths. Why translate? That question quickly leads to another: in exchange for what? Do we have to translate? Yes, respond professional translators, professors of translation, and academic theorists, unanimously (even when they agree on nothing else)—translations are good, so the more the better! Let everyone always have as many translations as possible! After all, translation is the basis of our collective livelihood (might say the translators, professors, and theorists, myself included); they embody our deepest self-interests. For some, however, the question concerns motivations that run deeper and for longer than quick profits. Let us add a few names, next to those of past theorists: Hitoshi Igarashi, Japanese translator of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, was assassinated on July 12, 1991; Aziz Nesin, Turkish translator of the same text, saw his hotel burn on July 2, 1993, causing the deaths of 35 to 40 people; Vasyl Stus, poet and Ukrainian translator, was caught by the KGB on January 12, 1982 and died in a Soviet prison in September 1985 after continuing to translate classics of German literature under intolerable conditions; Dinh Thanh Tien, Vietnamese translator, was arrested in November 1990 for anti-government activities; Miriam Firouz, a writer and translator, was imprisoned in Iran on April 6, 1983. The list goes on, and needs serious updating. Yes, translation pays. Yet quantitative capitals are not the only measures of value. If translators pay for their work with their lives or their freedom, the stakes of their activities can sometimes be considerably higher than what can be enumerated. For all that, there is still exchange, a trade, commerce, of both livelihood and life.

Other names: Ettore Capriolo, Menlha Kyab, Merzak Baghtache, Dang Phuc Tue, Ohn Kyaing, Jorge Pomar Mantalvo, Mehdi Dibaj. Are these names known? Not really. They are all more or less obscure contemporaries. We could also mention historic names like Étienne Dolet

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1 Note that this estimate is significantly lower than the 700,000 professionals hypothesized in Beninatto and DePalma (2008).
2 See Adams (1993), periodical lists from Amnesty International, and the Writers in Prison Committee of PEN International. Ignoble wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have considerably extended the lists, which should now give far more weight to the many military interpreters, mostly untrained paraprofessionals, who have also paid with their lives.
or William Tyndale, translators who also paid with their lives. And there are many, many names to add since the French edition of this book, as translators have been caught in the clashes of iniquitous wars supposedly against terrorism. So many lives lost; so many lives at risk; so little thought for the humanity of the mediator. For each name we find, an unknown number remain anonymous. Translation, you see, also pays with anonymity, general indifference, hidden suffering, and sometimes murder without trace. Any ethics must also address that kind of exchange, trade, commerce.

Why translate? If these translators had not been translators, would they have suffered a different fate? Probably not. Very few of them were only translators. Most of them were also writers, professors, or journalists. They were professionals for whom translation was just one of several modes of expression. Do you have to translate in order to suffer? No, there are plenty of other activities rewarded with money or torment—we claim no monopoly in that department. Indeed, the high degree of multiple activities associated with translation does not allow us to suggest that translators suffer only because they translate. Many of the questions raised about translators actually concern their role as communicators between cultures, in the widest sense of the term. Rushdie’s translators were attacked not because they happened to translate Rushdie but because they ostensibly blasphemed against Islam, no matter whether it was through translation or through direct speech. It mattered little, in principle, whether they were translators or not. In this case, as in many others discussed publicly, the ethical questions concern things like a right to freedom of expression in cross-cultural situations. Those issues are not limited to the specifics of translation itself. They do not necessarily belong to translator ethics.

We need to define some parameters.

Why translate? We could answer the question in several very different ways. An ethics focused on content would perhaps try to distinguish between what you should or should not translate. Some would say, for example, that you should not translate blasphemies against Islam, or indeed offensive material of any kind. Others have argued that you should not translate some texts because they would be misleading or too difficult for new readerships. In 1546, the Spanish cardinal Pedro Pacheco de Toledo handed the Council of Trent a list of books in the Bible that no one should translate into the vernaculars because, he claimed, they were unsuitable for “common people, rustics, and low-born women” (Enciso 1944). Particularly suspect were the Apocalypse, the epistles of Paul—especially the one to the Romans—Ezekiel, and other books that were so opaque that not even expert theologians could understand them. A content-based ethics of this kind might try to decide what one should not translate. An abstract ethics, on the other hand, usually attempts to formulate principles that are independent of all particular kinds of content. For example, Berman posits that “the ethical act consists in recognizing and receiving the Other as an Other” (1985: 88), whatever the origin of this Other and its content. The abstract principle moreover sees itself as universal and applicable to all areas, not just the “Works” of an elite. That is a very different kind of ethics.

Why translate? My approach here leads to an answer that perhaps seems as abstract as Berman’s but can still accommodate considerations of content and situation (including a condemnation of mindless blasphemies). I propose that you should translate in order to promote cooperation. The principle is abstract but situational, since the nature of cooperation depends on numerous factors specific to each case. The principle is thus magically above the historical and social particularities that characterize the ethics of content. Both approaches, the abstract and the historical, are necessary if we are to approach what Lukács (1948/1967) described as “ethical beauty.” In order to reach this very particular beauty, our ethics must be of a mixed breed.
There is a very practical reason that justifies this preference, a factor absent from most current ethical principles, including Berman’s. I refer to the intercultural identity of the translator.

Those who defend blunt principles of content—be it against blasphemies or outlawing democratic access to religion—usually presuppose that the translator belongs to a single culture. This is first because the principles of content are not limited to translation: they are applicable to all textual practices that use those contents. The major presupposition of any ethics of content is thus that the content belongs to the same place as the translator, and a series of established norms regulate both. In launching his fatwā, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini acted as if Rushdie, his English text, and his translators all somehow belonged to the space controlled by Islam. In the same way, Pedro Pacheco argued that the Council of Trent should adopt just one translation policy for the whole Catholic Church, since the Church should function as just one culture (in the end, no clear policy was adopted because the northern churches already depended on vernacular translations of all Biblical books). If you think about it, translators tend not to belong to just one national or confessional culture. Does not the very nature of translation imply that numerous translators operate in several primary cultures at once, or in an intercultural space, understood as an overlap or intersection of cultures? From this point of view, is it not naïve to presuppose that all translators by definition belong to one culture or another? And if they do not share a simple cultural location, how could we then hope that all translators would ever agree on what should or should not be translated? This is why it seems unrealistic to impose a simple ethics of content on the particular field of translation. In principle, contents are regulated by cultures, yet the intercultural space of the translator seems unlikely to be governed in that way.

I thus introduce a strong principle of interculturality, which I describe as follows: translators tend to be intercultural in the sense that they mostly work in the intersections woven between two or more cultures, rather than wholly within any single primary culture. This is, of course, no more than a working hypothesis, a model, a set of questions that arise from observations. Nothing guarantees that all translators belong entirely to an intercultural space, just as no one can affirm that all translators work as messengers sent by single cultures. As a working hypothesis, the principle of interculturality demands empirical testing; it presupposes socio-historical research that should eventually be able to provide a whole gamut of better-grounded models. 3 In ethical thought, however, this principle need only operate as an

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3 My thoughts on intercultures have developed a little since the publication of the French version of this book in 1997. This is largely due to my research on the history of translators (Pym 1998, 2000), especially on the Jewish and Mozarab groups that translated in Hispania during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and on the many Hispanic translators who worked in exile in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I have also spent some time tracing a few of the Belgian and Alsatian translators who carried out exchanges between French and German toward the end of the nineteenth century (Pym 1993c, 2007a). On the basis of those studies, I advance a series of hypotheses concerning professional intercultures (see Pym 2004): 1) translators may form a professional interculture with and alongside those who do not need their translations; 2) an interculture is the result of non-primary enculturation, which may take the form of access to a professional community; 3) the translations produced by professional intercultures define the lines between primary cultures; 4) members of intercultures tend to be of diverse provenance, which may be concealed; 5) texts produced within a professional interculture tend to be for financial or symbolic reward, rather than direct use value; and 6) the greater the complexity of cross-cultural communication, the greater the social agency of professional intercultures. Needless to say, there has never been any suggestion or desire that intercultures are somehow neutral, subjectless, depoliticized or given to
epistemological guide to what not to assume: despite its lack of precision, it warns that monoculturality is not a sufficient basis for translator ethics.

Such assumptions are not easy to avoid. When Berman proposed that one should “receive the Other as an Other,” the consequence was roughly that one should translate literally so that the reader understands that the source text comes from a different culture. The advice is practical and practicable, but the basic principle is irredeemably abstract: it purports to apply to all foreign texts, independent of specific contents. In fact, the founding assumption turns out to be remarkably the same as the ethics of content. After all, if what is foreign is meant to remain foreign—Berman metaphorically distributes residence permits but not citizenship—and if the translator is meant to welcome foreigners as such, there must be a clear border between the cultures concerned, and thus a clear assumption of monocultural space. In effect, Berman assumes, unempirically, that the translator belongs to the target culture, acting as a border-guard delegated to ensure the foreigner is readily distinguished from the native. According to this principle, for example, French films should always be subtitled in the United States, never dubbed, in order to guarantee not only their cultural foreignness but also their subsequent commercial marginalization. Such is the risk of an abstraction that is too pure: without variables that can adjust to contextual factors, the aphoristic principle remains difficult to apply to all possible situations.

How should we rethink this problem from the perspective of interculturality? First of all, it is not a question of just formulating principles, be they of content or formal geometries (as if the two levels could really be separated). My approach here is more a matter of looking at historical cases of interculturality and drawing out networks of considerations, strings of ideas and values that will help build a mode of thought. Far from presupposing that all translators are either bad or good, faithful interpreters or nefarious liars, members of a home culture or expatriate mercenaries, I simply offer a set of questions to ask in each particular situation.

The chapters of this book are organized around different general views of who translators are and what their purposes should be. They explore each of those personae through case studies of various kinds, usually stories involving different bundles of ideas. Since we are investigating roles in situations, the method does not involve anything like translation criticism. I am far more concerned with comparative readings of narratives and ideological texts, especially those of a certain depth and complexity, that deal with the various figures of the translator. The readings look for connections, as in a computer game full of secrets. They seek, for example, the wormhole that connects binary translation theories to assumptions of cultural sovereignty, or the link that joins the same sovereignty to the rule that messengers should not be killed. Critical comparative reading also brings us, several times, to the limits of what I call the “translation form,” a particularly humanist Western model of cross-cultural communication, for which there can be no pretense to universal jurisdiction. The method can be confusing, since it risks losing itself in labyrinths in order to bring out the surprise of discovery. I nevertheless try to mark the trees we pass, and there are several maps along the way. I have no desire to conceal the destination.

Fruit of the many years since the French version of this book, each chapter carries a brief addendum called, somewhat tenuously, an “update.” These are of a consciously polemical nature and address issues that have surfaced within Translation Studies in more recent years. I summarize my doubts about the elitism of foreignization, the ethical status of non-dialogue, the lingering resistance to democratizing technology, the ever-hopeful bets placed on translators as

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Romantic idealism (cf. the sycophantic fantasies of Krebs 2007: 26). The politicized role of intercultures can be seen in the case studies in my Negotiating the Frontier (2000), for example.
revolutionary subjects, and the widespread theoretical acceptance of translator interventions strangely without calculations of the many risks involved. Those addenda are not all well connected with the chapters that precede them; some set up plays that are hopefully suggesting or at least intriguing (what does it mean to place Spivak on the edge of a chapter on missionaries?); all at least seek to make an aging text speak to a series of new and increasingly politicized problems.

Why translate? The abstract response I am looking for would take the following form: We should translate in certain circumstances only, investing variable effort, in order to reinforce long-term cooperation between cultures. In all other cases, it would probably be better not to translate.

Is that kind of answer enough? Perhaps. After all, if we know why we translate, then we can deduce how we should translate and perhaps even what we should translate in each situation. We might thus seek to answer the fundamental question that Berman asked many years ago: if you know why, you can probably figure out how.

But it is not really that simple.