Discursive Persons and the Limits of Translation

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Introduction (2008)

“How do you translate a signature?”, asked Derrida, famously (1985: 248). The question points to the limits of translatability or to the impossibility invested in all translation. It is one of those questions now used to position translation beyond an affair of languages, in a far wider space of interpersonal and intercultural exchange, in the dynamic vagaries of what is sometimes called “cultural translation”. The signature, you see, like the “voice” sought in the early Derrida (1967), does not concern separate languages in the narrow sense; it is a problem of all writing, of all utterance, always in relation to the anterior other.

The question thus announces one of the main current problems in Translation Studies: Are we to restrict ourselves to “translations” in the narrow sense (pairs of texts in separate languages, linked in some way), or do we jump into the greater adventures of all communication, all cultures, all shifting meanings and dynamic hybridities as our object and state?

Our answer to that disciplinary question is clear and unfashionable: We prefer a Translation Studies that focuses on translations in a narrow sense, operating with a wider Intercultural Studies ideally able to address the general issues of cross-cultural communication (see Pym 2008). Our position has developed over the years, and is by no means strong or inflexible. It appears to concern the way one wants to use the term “translation”, but it is a little more than that. From our early work published in 1992 (which forms the basis of the text below), we came to believe that translation has specific phenomenal forms. For us, its contemporary Western form can be defined in terms of two maxims: first-person displacement (The person who says “I am translating”, as an instantaneous present, cannot be the translating translator”), and quantity (“the receiver believes that if the text is shorter or longer than the previous text that it represents, those differences are insignificant”) (Pym 2004a). The first of those maxims is the object of the research presented below. We return to that material (also rewritten in Pym 2004b)

The answer to Derrida’s question is also fairly clear. Sworn translators in the European tradition are trained to write “[signature illegible]”, no matter how clear the signature.

The problem (1992)

The qualitative limits of equivalence-based translation may be associated with names, which sometimes appear to be in no need of translation, and with first-person pronouns, which are of interest because the utterance I am translating cannot be true in the moment of translation. The role played by these phenomena as border markers can be approached through the following examples:
Example A: A student attempting consecutive translation had some difficulty locating appropriate pronouns. The speaker was making repeated references to notre Centre (in fact the Centre Pompidou in Paris of which she was one of the directors—); the translator consecutively grasped this as our Centre (adding “I am speaking for her”) and her Centre (adding “the Centre where she works”), before settling on the Pompidou Centre and the Centre (without addition). The problem of first-person pronouns was happily resolved by retreat to the neutral space of an unattributed third, a name. The target text Pompidou Centre belongs neither to the source-text speaker, nor to the translator, nor indeed to Georges Pompidou.

Example B: In film dubbing from English into Spanish, code-referring utterances like Do you speak English? are commonly rendered as ¿Hablas mi idioma? (“Do you speak my language?”). Here the problem of self-reference in translation is solved by avoiding the third-person name (“English/inglés”) and retreating to the neutral if highly ambiguous space of a first-person pronoun. No one can really say if the “I” of the resulting “my language” speaks Spanish, English or, in a vaguely utopian projection, all languages at once.

These examples suggest that certain first and third persons can produce peculiarly translational worlds, apparently neutral in that they can be ascribed to neither source nor target cultures. Here we propose to investigate this phenomenon through a non-technical analysis of translated texts in terms of the first, second and third persons of discursive macrostructures. Our purpose is to identify certain functionalist misunderstandings about the limits of equivalence-based translation.

1. First Persons

If, in the consecutive situation, the ST Je suis fatigué is rendered as TT1 I am tired, it could be misunderstood as the translator talking about their immediate condition. One way of avoiding the ambiguity would perhaps be to jump straight to the third-person TT2 The speaker is tired. However, this could equally be misunderstood as the translator commenting on the speaker’s immediate condition. One way to make sure the utterance is overtly translational is to frame it as indirect speech, as in TT3 He says that he is tired. The objection will be raised, of course, that this solution is all too overt, since reporting is not the same thing as translating. True enough. Yet the indirect speech of TT3 might still be seen as an excessively elaborate form of the particularly unsuccessful translational utterance TT1, making explicit a certain kind of operator that is otherwise normally implicit. Although successful translation need not be transformed into indirect speech in order to be understood, this relation remains of analytical interest (as similarly appreciated in Mossop 1983 and Folkart 1991). If grammatical rules can be written for the various forms of indirect speech, it might be possible to work by analogy in to write similar rules for translational discourse. Although such an enterprise lies beyond the scope of the present paper, the general approach is not without consequences for problematic first and third persons on the limits of translation.

John Bigelow (1978) has suggested that translation is a special case of indirect speech whose specificity is based on the form “ST translates as TT”, analyzed as an operator that is at once quotational and productive of new information. The following are simplified versions of two of his examples:
(1) Ludwig said, “I must tell you: I am frightened.”
(2) Ludwig’s words translate as, “I must tell you: I am frightened.”

The step from (1) to (2) represents the basic progression from a text received as reported speech to one received as a translation. Although Bigelow draws attention to the fact that whereas (1) refers to a person, (2) refers to a linguistic entity, he then adds that “this departure from the general format for other hyperintensional sentences is of minor significance, and introduces no new problems of principle”. We beg to differ.

The fact that the translational operator refers to things (words) rather than to linguistic subjectivity (a person) is of some importance, not only because a spoken version of (1) remains as fundamentally ambiguous as the translational I am tired (one or both first persons could be attributed to the translator), but particularly in view of Example A above, where the translator was only happy when no additional words were necessary to refer to the sending subjectivity (subjectivity was in fact eliminated in the final nominalization). The transition from (1) to (2), from subjectivity to things, would represent a move from unsuccessful to successful translation.

What is the essential difference between (1) “Ludwig said” and (2) “Ludwig’s words translate as”? It is not just a difference between a person and the words said by that person. In referring to Ludwig’s action in the past tense, (1) positions a first person (non-Ludwig) in the present; it positions its I-here-now in relation to the reported speech. By contrast, (2) uses an eternal and subjectless present (“translates as”) to project its action as necessary and valid in all times and places. This seems to happen in the absence of the first person and perhaps even of all persons; its I-here-now has no relation to the reported speech.

The key difference between the two operators is thus that (1) positions an I-here-now for the reporter-translator to stand on, whereas (2) suppresses the possibility of placing the translator. This is as it should be, since if the translating subject could manifest itself in a linguistic I-here-now, the utterance “I am translating” could be true during the act of translating (think about it). If we believe that utterance to be necessarily untrue, we should accept “translates as” as the form of the translational operator.

2. Second Persons

If (1) positions a first person and (2) does not, it is to be expected that this difference will have consequences for the position and role of a macrostructural second person, the intended receiver of the indirect speech or translation. It is perhaps useful to refer here to two of Bigelow’s initial examples:

(3) Ludwig said, “Du musst wissen: ich fürchte mich”.
(4) Ludwig said, “I must tell you, I am frightened”.

Here Bigelow points out that the operator “said” is purely quotational in (3) but partly Fregean in (4) since it does not quote Ludwig’s words exactly but “reports them in a fashion closely resembling that of indirect speech”. The move from (3) to (4) is a further step towards successful translation. But why should this transformation have been introduced? In Bigelow’s example it is because a friend named Charles did not know German but wanted to know what Ludwig had said. We might thus call Charles the instigator of the translation. But the instigator could equally have been a Ludwig who did not know English but wanted Charles to know that he was frightened. Instigators can be receivers or senders, or positioned more one side than the
other. An instigatory Charles might or might not be addressed by the second person of “Du musst wissen”; a non-instigatory Charles is almost certainly so addressed but is not able to respond to that second-person position until the transition has been made from (3) to (4).

Let us suppose that the instigator is Ludwig and the second person is Charles. Until the translation is carried out, the second person “du” remains situationally unactivated. The purpose of the language change is to enable it to be activated as intended by Ludwig. Without translation, this “du” is useless.

However, if we now suppose that the instigator is a spy named Charles who wants to know what the scientist Ludwig said to his German assistant, the translation will leave the discursive content of “du” unaffected but will nevertheless direct the macrostructural utterance towards a further second person, minimally profiled as an English speaker who wants to know what Ludwig said. That is, there is a further second person addressed by the translational choice of the language itself.

Who is choosing the language? Pragmatic inquiry could probably locate Charles himself as the major force determining that selection, but the discursive logic is not quite so clear. Even when not inscribed in the reported “du”, this further second person is defined in relation to the I-here-now of “Ludwig said”: it is a second person who is not Ludwig, not the reporter, and who can refer to the same here-and-now as the reporter/translator. According to this logic it remains possible that the reporter/translator is choosing the language; indeed, that he is the morally responsible instigator of the translation.

We thus have three ways of interpreting the second person in (4):

(4a) It can be the Charles determined and addressed by Ludwig as instigator.
(4b) It can be the Charles determined as an English speaker and addressed by the choice of language (and thus most probably by Charles himself as instigator).
(4c) It can be the Charles who is not Ludwig and not the reporter/translator, but is determined and addressed by the reporter/translator.

The point to be made here is that, with the transition to the operator “translates as”, interpretation (4c) will be made implausible because of the suppression of the reporter/translator’s I-here-now. The utterance “I am translating” is no truer than is its extended form “You are reading the translation I am now doing”. The properly translational second person can only be of kind (4a) or (4b), largely depending on whether the instigator is on the sending or receiving side of the translation.

This analysis should explain why translational discourse is happier referring to words rather than to subjectivity, to neutral objects rather than to positioned first or second persons. If the translator’s position is to be hidden, so must the first and second persons of translational discourse. One might object that the uneasiness with pronouns evident in Example A was due not to the nature of translation in general but to the specific situation of consecutive work, where the translator’s physical presence induces a special risk of misattribution. The translator’s proper situation is, after all, to be invisible; unlike children (according to my grandmother), they should be heard and not seen. Yet there are many cases where purely written translation requires the same suppression of first and second person positions. In EU reports on the Spanish economy, for instance, stylistic norms require that terms like “nuestro país” or “nuestra economía” be rendered as “Spain” or “the Spanish economy”, restricting first-person pronouns to expressions of personal opinion where it is clear that the “we” is exclusive and not inclusive. Is this a purely stylistic norm? In noting that the Jerusalem Bible is a
Christianization of the Hebrew text, Meschonnic observes that the Tetragrammaton formulae “Yahve my Lord” and “Yahve your Lord” are translationally transformed into “the Lord” (1973: 419). The divinity that belonged to a people becomes a Christian God available to all, just as the economy that once belonged to Spaniards is now exposed to the neutral nouns of English-language EU policymakers. According to Meschonnic, “the religion of the Son has always wanted to kill the Father”. Perhaps. Yet surely there is also a spirit common to both, neutral ground for negotiation?

3. Third Persons

The operator “translates as” is undoubtedly a fiction. Words do not translate themselves; they are translated by humans in society. And since humans in society are historical, words are translated differently according to different times, places and situations. In suppressing the I-here-now of its first and second persons, the translational operator attains a degree of neutrality manifestly devoid of concrete correlative. Indeed, a naïve realist might doubt the value of “translates as” as the basic form of the translational operator. Surely what we normally see is more like the following:

(5) WORDS BY LUDWIG
Translated by Bigelow

Is this title-form any better as a translational operator? Its status is no doubt just as peculiar, but it is specifically a paratext, a threshold situating a translated text. It is composed of three names (Title, Author and Translator) and the connector “by”, which is not the same in its two appearances: “BY LUDWIG” is defining; “by Bigelow” might be relative (preceded by a comma) but is possibly also defining (not necessarily preceded by a comma). On the one hand, the text thus introduced can be approached as the classic WORDS in its eternal form, such that the work of the translator is merely additional “relative” information without consequence for the reader who begins from an initial “Let’s see what Ludwig has to say”. On the other, the text can be approached as Bigelow’s overt version of a known original, this second “by” then being defining and the reader asking something like “Let’s see how Bigelow translates (as opposed to some other actual or possible translator)”. On the level of the paratext, there will always be doubt as to the relative or defining nature of the translator’s presence. That is why the properly translational operator, which becomes operative within the text itself, should not be confused with the common form of translational paratexts. Reading a title page and reading a translation are fundamentally different activities.

As the reader enters the text, the named persons (author and translator, in this case) are immediately transformed into either a first person (in the case of certain modes of authorship) or absent third persons. The ambiguity of the translator’s relative or defining presence disappears. If the “relative” reading strategy has been selected and the translator is a wholly unwanted presence merely disturbing access to the eternal WORDS, the operator “translates as” becomes a wholly necessary fiction enabling that reader to forget the uncertainty of the paratext, inducing the classical willing suspension of disbelief typical of all fiction. And if, alternatively, the reader has selected the “defining” option and is reading to see how Bigelow translates, then the wholly third-person character of the operator serves at least to remove any pronominal doubt from that path. Indeed, in this non-fictional reading, nothing in the text stops the reader from pinning the operator “translates as” to an I-here-now simply by downgrading
the text to indirect discourse, adding a further hyperintensional frame to form “Bigelow says ST translates as TT”. However, the discourse is then no longer that of equivalence-based translation.

The operator “translates as” thus transforms into third persons the subjectivities involved in equivalence-based (“relative” form) translation. As Benveniste (1946) has argued, after Arabic grammarians, the third person is the one who is absent; it is a non-person, a thing and not a subjectivity.

4. Do you speak my language?

I think the first of the above examples (“the Centre”) can be analyzed fairly successfully in these terms. The neutral translational world of third persons corresponds to the need to remove all traces of the translator’s position, to maintain and enhance the operator “translates as”. On the other hand, the second example (“Do you speak my language?”), in which neutrality appears to stem from a return to the first person, is rather more difficult to grasp. Let us approach it through another borderline case where the first-person pronoun would seem to benefit from linguistic content.

In the film Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, two bank-robbing heroes, played by Robert Redford and Paul Newman, move to Bolivia and they are faced with the problem of having to learn enough Spanish to exercise their profession. Of course, in the Spanish version of the film they already speak very good Spanish. Why should they now have to learn this same language? Perhaps the translators could have made them learn English, but this part of the film is very definitely set in a visual Bolivia. So the Spanish adapters hijacked the storyline for two or three sequences: Redford and Newman now decide to learn French in the hope they won’t be recognized as Americans. When they enter a Bolivian bank the rudimentary Spanish of ST is replaced by rudimentary French in TT. The neutral space of the third term “French” conceals their identity, not from the bank officials (who take about two seconds to recognize them as Americans), but from the viewer of the dubbed film, who is spared an apparently upsetting reference to the fact of translation and thus the presence of a translator.

Use of the apparently neutral translational world “French” thus conceals two conflicting first persons: the “I” who is the English-speaking bank robber and the potential “I” who is the translator into Spanish. The solution “French” thus avoids locating the specifically translational second person who would otherwise be identified as a Spanish-speaker unaddressed by the original film.

Why might such a reference have been upsetting? After all, translated versions of Pygmalion or My Fair Lady make prolonged and repeated references to the English language, setting up the acceptable (since accepted) convention that the TT language is to be treated and named as if it were really English. The fictional “as if” of this contradictory self-reference may thus assume conventional status when structurally prolonged, when it becomes part of a fictional world where two “I”s can become one. The Butch Cassidy example, however, concerns a language that has only temporary status in its fictional context; it is not accorded sufficient narrative space to set up conventions of its own. In this sense, in-text transition is the first condition of the translational problematic to be solved. The difficulty has more to do with change than with actual content.

Now, does “French” say anything as a positive part of a translated text? It could perhaps be interpreted as:
Redford’s words translate as French words.

This implies that the ST Redford did not speak French, but a Spanish viewer who has not seen the original film has no way of knowing this. Clearly, the import of the term “French” is not its Frenchness but its otherness. A better interpretation might then be something like:

Redford’s words translate as words in a language other than that of Redford’s previous words.

Yet this is also a defective interpretation, since Redford’s words can obviously be translated into many possible languages, including that of Redford’s previous words. To use “translates as” in this way is effectively to say nothing. This same objection applies to a more complete interpretation:

Redford’s words translate as words in a language other than that into which Redford’s previous words have been translated.

Here not even introduction of the translator’s I-here-now (implicit in “have been”) can make the interpretation anything more than a banal truism. The problem is not in the way that the operator “translates as” excludes the translator. This first-person phenomenon does not contradict the third-person limits of translation (by extension, Example B is compatible with Example A). The problem here concerns instead the terms brought together by the operator. Until now we have assumed that the translational operator had as its correlative the homogeneous content “words”, ascribed to one sole author and thus implicitly to one sole language. But this is a dangerous assumption. Derrida (1987) has correctly criticized translation theory for too readily assuming texts to be monolingual, but one needs no pseudo-cabbalistic mysticism to get the point: Maurice Blanchot some time ago pointed out the translational status of Hemingway’s characters who, by speaking Spanish in English, create a “shadow of distance” that can then be translated as such (1949: 186). Does translation only deal with words in a language? I suggest that the internal distance described by Blanchot and picked up by Derrida could be applied to our present example as follows:

Redford’s code-switching translates as code-switching from Spanish into French.

Interpreted in this way, the solution “French” is really no more astounding than the fact that the English “It’s Greek to me” translates as “Das kommt mir Spanisch vor”. The linguistic content of Redford’s first person is not in any one language, nor in all languages, but is an asymmetric interlinguistic frontier. If we now go back to the original example “Do you speak my language?”, the content of the utterance is clearly not whatever language the first person speaks, but whether or not the situation calls for code-switching. Indeed, since the question “Do you speak English?” can be rewritten as “Is this a situation requiring code-switching?”, the movement from ST to TT does not necessarily throw up any problematic first person at all. There is no translational schizophrenia, only cultural disjunction.

Once again, the translational operator overrides problematic first and second persons, and does so in order to set up a world of third-person terms.
5. Conflict between third persons

In the Spanish version of the BBC series *Fawlty Towers*, the waiter Manuel is not from Barcelona (as he is in the English version) but from Mexico. The translators strove to avoid an embarrassing reference to certain English preconceptions about Spanish culture, and were apparently unconcerned about a negative image of Mexican culture. Problems of self-reference in translation do not just concern languages or how many letters happen to be in a particular word, but entire cultural codes, the way different cultures see each other and themselves. Faced with this kind of problem, equivalence-based translation tries to seek refuge in neutral worlds where there are no first or second persons, and no marked terms that might belong to such persons. But do mere names always allow such neutrality?

Quine’s treatment of potential synonyms borrows from Schrödinger the example of a mountain-climber who has learned to apply the name “Chomolungma” to a peak seen from Nepal and “Everest” to a peak seen from Tibet (1960: 49; corrected in French translation, 1977: 87). The mountain-climber believes these names to refer to different peaks until the day his explorations reveal that they are in fact one and the same. This equation presumably solves all problems of reference. Moreover, since the two names continue to exist, “Everest” translates as “Chomolungma” in the south, “Chomolungma” translates as “Everest” in the north, and no strictly semantic problems should be expected to ensue. However, beyond the Himalayas, translators have to choose between the peak as named from the north and the same peak as named from the south. The name itself cannot be neutral. The choice of “Everest” implies that the Tibetans were authors and the Nepalese bad translators, whereas “Chomolungma” places the authors in the south and the bad translators in the north. Use of certain names (I have this problem weekly with the English names of Catalan towns; are there still German names for towns in the west of Poland?), the use of certain conflictive names necessarily positions the author of the name, and therefore its translator.

In this space, in the choice between thirds, the translator may exert some influence on the way cultures perceive each other. I do not think translators have any other voice, at least not while they are translating.

6. An economic notion of equivalence

Functionalist disinterest in the notion of equivalence (Vermeer, Nord, Snell-Hornby, Holz-Mänttäri) would perhaps reject the validity of the operator “translates as”, arguing that ST is not the sole retainer of factors determining TT, stressing the role of situational determinants like clients and/or TT-users. They have very good reasons for adopting this approach, since theirs is a professional world where translators have had to become intermediaries who are experts in a wide range of linguistic operations well beyond the limits of equivalence-based translation. From this perspective, which is very much that of the working subject, the idealist fiction of the operator “translates as” may very well be the *Noch-Nicht-Sein* of translation (Holz-Mänttäri, 1990: 72). And yet translations are eventually finished and paid for on the presumption of some kind of equivalence, however loose. And since there is no functional reason to suppose that, beyond the place of the translating subject, the notion of equivalence is not essential to the status of any translation read in ignorance of the translator’s presence, there is no reason why some kind of equivalence should not be teleologically implied in every client’s order for a translational text.
Very briefly, and as a closing remark that aspires to be more suggestive than definitive, the basic problem is that theorists have supposed equivalence to be a relation between equal values but have not sufficiently investigated how the notion of value might be applied to translation. As Aristotle knew, two independent and non-identical things cannot embody equal values in themselves. Value is not in the thing, but in an equation between two things, in the things becoming comparable as commodities. If there is no equation, there is no value. The operator “translates as” sets up an equation and thus the possibility of value. Only after the operator can one talk of values and equivalence.

Translation thus logically precedes comparative linguistics or rhetoric, since it provides the values that may then enter into subsequent comparisons and analyses. Prior to the equation, there is no basis for the comparison of values, be they positional (Saussurean), in terms of which there is no equivalence anyway, or quantitative (properly economic). This may be appreciated with respect to the two ephemeral bases of value in classical economics, labor and use.

An utterance may embody a certain quantity of labor, the sacrifice undergone by a specific first person to produce it, but if translators cannot be first persons, if they are trained to disappear, how can their discursive work be quantified within any logic of translation? More simply, since translators do not work as authors, there can be no equation of individual ST labor with individual TT labor, and thus no basis for quantitative comparison.

An utterance may then perhaps embody a certain potential for use, its usefulness for a second person. A TT is certainly useful to the extent that it saves its reader the labor of having to learn the codes of ST. But since ST and TT thus necessarily address or define different second persons, the translational equation cannot lie in mere worthiness as use-value.

The only possible equation is on the level of exchange value, on the level where TT is actually offered and accepted in the place of ST, as a relation of equivalence between non-identical commodities. The operator “translates as” produces the only kind of value that can have meaning for talk of equivalence, and does so as a fictional relation between peculiarly dehumanized third-person things, without there being any need to search for a tertium quid.

Note that this analysis calls on only the nature of exchange value; we need not presuppose any actual exchange. Indeed, translation mostly does not involve something going in one direction and something of equal value going in the other. The fact that a translation, operating as a token of the ST, embodies exchange value without actual exchange must surely be one of the secrets of its great illusory power.

This is not always seen; many theorists want translation to be rather more honest than it is. The problem with functionalist theory, for example, is that it wants to introduce first and second persons (individual labor-value, individual use-value) into a translational logic that necessarily excludes them. Although the truth of translation, from the perspective of the translator, is as a communicative act between pragmatic first and second persons, the truth of its phenomenal form, as a fact of our culture, is that it sets up a situation of exchange between things. To overlook this form is to pretend that fictions, be they economic or translational, play no role in the development and maintenance of social life.

References


