

## ≡ Book Reviews ≡

**Adam Ferguson: History, Progress and Human Nature.** Edited by Eugene Heath and Vincenzo Merolle (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007), vi + 256 pp, £60.00/\$99.00 cloth.

This anthology is a companion volume to Eugene Heath and Vincenzo Merolle, eds., *Adam Ferguson: Philosophy, Politics and Society* (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2008). Published as part of a series on the political and intellectual formation of the Enlightenment world in the long eighteenth-century, this two-volume set on Ferguson supplies us with a number of fresh insights into the complex mind of the Edinburgh-based Scottish thinker who had devoted his entire life to formulating a viable political solution to the erupting crisis of contemporary European society, but whose quaint *pastorale* has more often than not subsided under the pseudo-cosmopolitan *galant* style of his more famous colleagues, David Hume and Adam Smith.

The underlying revisionist outlook of all the collected essays notwithstanding, those included in the book under review in particular arch dubious eyebrows at the recent popularity of Ferguson in North America, which centres on his republican request for civic virtue against the corruptive influence of commerce. As John D. Brewer points out in the beginning of his tightly-knit analysis of Ferguson's correspondence (7–9), and as Yasuo Amoh further clarifies in his investigation into the Scotsman's vehement opposition to American independence in contrast to his circumspective attitude towards the French Revolution, to sever Ferguson's advocacy of active citizenship from its historical context is tantamount to jettisoning altogether his carefully constructed set of reform plans it undergirds.

In this regard, Iain McDaniel's contribution is particularly noteworthy. At the heart of

Ferguson's political thought, according to McDaniel, was the idea that "without a truly independent intermediary nobility between sovereign and people—a military-patriotic version of Montesquieu's *pouvoirs intermédiares*—modern politics was in danger of swinging violently from those extremes of popular anarchy and despotism manifested in the later Roman republic, and finally succumbing to a military government" (129). Read in this way, Ferguson's political project becomes a powerful warning against, in Britain, the threat of political demagoguery and the loss of military valour amongst the aristocracy, both of which, in his opinion, had resulted from decades of rapid and successful commercialisation and, in the Continent, the looming prospect of military government, which soon took shape with the rise of Napoleon out of the debris of the Bourbon monarchy. That Ferguson was not parochial but uniquely cosmopolitan in his political thinking is also persuasively demonstrated by David Allan in his analysis of Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767).

However, as is often the case with this kind of attempt, this compilation suffers badly from the lack of editorial attention. Not only are chapters awkwardly arranged—for instance, McDaniel's essay thematically should have been coupled with Amoh's, or with Craig Smith's discussion of the centrality of the republican notion of *vita activa* in Ferguson's critical examination of Roman history (164–70), rather than with Annette Meyer's article on Ferguson's historical anthropology—but also the extremely brief, if not perfunctory, editorial introduction fails to function as a helpful pointer to the overall argument of the volume, not to mention Ferguson's life and works, making it unsuitable for a general audience. For the moment, one may perhaps have to be satisfied with the fact that this book,

surprisingly, is the first collection of scholarly essays devoted to Ferguson.

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**Marcel Proust aujourd'hui 3.** Edited by Sjf Houppermans, Nell de Hullu-van Doeselaar, Manet van Montfrans, Annelies Schulte Nordholt, and Sabine van Wesemael (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005), 230 pp. €46.00/\$71.00 cloth.

*Marcel Proust aujourd'hui* is an international annual bilingual review. The third volume of the review contains mostly texts presented at the "Marcel Proust Vereniging" conferences from 2003–2004. The fourteen articles cover a wide area of research on the twentieth-century French writer.

The first section is comprised of essays that discuss Proust's major influence on other authors. Annelies Schulte Nordholt explores the role that Proust played in Modiano's first novel, *La Place de l'étoile* (1998). Anne Douaire identifies similarities between *A la recherche du temps perdu* and the works of the Martinican Edouard Glissant. Sabine van Wesemael shows how Proust's creation and preservation of memories is similarly articulated in *Les amoureux de l'hôtel de ville* by Philippe Delerm (2001).

The two next essays are dedicated to two major aspects in Proust's novels, namely society and politics. Following Michel de Certeau's "invention of the everyday," Edward J. Hughes takes a close look at the social world and the everyday life, which is minutely described in *Combray*, the first volume of *A la recherche*. Giuseppina Mecchia chooses to explore the themes of nationalism and the First World War, thus addressing the political events that had an effect on Proust's narrative.

The third segment of the book considers Proust's work outside his well-known novel. Jean-François Jeandillou discusses one of Proust's "minor" works by re-establishing the value of the *Pastiches* and takes as a starting point the critique of Paul Reboux's *Mémoires* (1956). Guillaume Pinson is interested in the journalistic activities carried out by Proust, namely in the articles which were published under the title of *Salons parisiens* in the magazine *Figaro* (1903–1904).

The fourth section of the collection deals with other writers' influence on Proust's work. Michel Brix observes the impact of Ruskin's *Bible d'Amiens* on the development of Proust's ideas that gave birth to *A la recherche*; and Richard van Leeuwen looks at the concept of night, a concept coming from *A Thousand and One Nights*, which is also to be found in Jan Potócki's *Manuscrit trouvé à Saragosse* (1992).

Mahvash Ghamini's *La réception de Proust en Iran* represents an overview of recent translations of Proust and critical literature on his work in Iran.

The last section includes reviews of recent publications that enrich the reading of the French author today. The publications that are presented are: Gaspard Koenig's *Octave avait vingt ans* (reviewed by Sjf Houppermans), Annelies Schulte Nordholt's *Le Moi Créateur* (reviewed by Manet van Montfrans), Roland Breeur's *Singularité et sujet. Une lecture phénoménologique de Proust* (reviewed by Annelies Schulte Nordholt), and *Bulletin Marcel Proust* (reviewed by Nell de Hullu-van Doeselaar).

*Marcel Proust aujourd'hui 3* will appeal to scholars, professors, and students who have an interest in Proust and in the latest research on the novelist's work.

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**Germaine de Staël, Daughter of the Enlightenment: The Writer and Her Turbulent Era.** By Sergine Dixon (New York: Humanity Books, 2007), 303 pp. \$39.00 paper.

Madame de Staël was one of the most prominent figures in French history. She exercised her multiple talents and ambition in literature, philosophy and politics, which even during the Enlightenment era, was quite exceptional. Sergine Dixon's book is a vivid and extensive biography of Germaine de Staël placed in the very complex political and cultural scene in Europe from the end of the seventeenth century to the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Madame de Staël was born in 1766 in Paris. Her education and inclinations during her early years were naturally influenced by her mother, the famous *salonnière* Suzanne Necker,

who became deeply involved with the rich cultural life of Paris. Denounced as an enemy during the years of terror and Napoleon's reign, Germaine de Staël spent a number of years in exile. Those years in exile proved to be a prolific period for her writings; later, she even managed to re-open her literary salon during the Restoration.

Germaine de Staël's texts, for which she is best remembered, include novels (such as *Delphine*, and *Corinne ou l'Italie*), as well as critical texts (like *De l'Allemagne* and *Considérations sur la Révolution Française*). Her qualities as a fine observer and analyst of the tumultuous events during the French Revolution and Napoleon's regime are also evident in her impressive correspondence.

The fifteen chapters of the book encompass the most important episodes in Mme de Staël's life. Sergine Dixon presents us not only with the life and work of this writer from her adolescence to her death in 1817, but also the whole world moving around her. *Germaine de Staël, Daughter of the Enlightenment* is a well researched study and a veritable masterwork, which highlights numerous characters of the political and literary scene, social movements, cultural trends, and, of course, one of the most accomplished women thinkers. The author of the book successfully explains why Madame de Staël is a "daughter of the Enlightenment" and why her impact as a writer and political figure is so powerful. As a study of de Staël's accomplishments and the époque she represents, this book will interest university students and professors who work on eighteenth-century France.

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**Badiou, Balibar, Rancière: Re-thinking Emancipation.** By Nick Hewlett (London: Continuum, 2007), xiv + 179 pp. £65.00 cloth.

Since well before the break-up of the Soviet Union, even grassroots activists, along with professional politicians and many intellectuals, have often argued that we must broadly speaking accept the world as it is, whilst perhaps addressing some of the worst excesses of injustice and exploitation (153).

We live in a consumerist, conformist, conservative, consensus-politics-oriented age. It is therefore unusual, remarkable and thought-provoking to encounter "radical" views such as Alain Badiou's, Jacques Rancière's, and Etienne Balibar's (the book's title lists the three names alphabetically, but the account of their views is ordered as in the line above). These three eminent French philosophers and unwavering left-wing militants have not yet abandoned: (1) the wealth of critical insight vis-à-vis the ills of capitalism and liberal democracy offered by Karl Marx and the Marxist tradition, and particularly the streak initiated by Louis Althusser, of whom they were all former students; (2) the committed revolutionary spirit and the first-person political activism stemming from the now seemingly antediluvian May 1968, which marked deeply and lastingly their personal and intellectual life; (3) the genuine hope that human communities at large may once again become the active subjects of political transformation and relinquish their subordinate role as process-determined social objects to be manipulated and commanded by marketing experts, media moguls and professional politicians.

Nick Hewlett's new volume provides a succinct, clear, informed and informative account of the political views of all three French thinkers. In it, Hewlett emphasises their common ground as progressive intellectuals, their claims for originality and uniqueness, and some of their most visible theoretical shortcomings and unresolved knots. As such, his dearly-priced book should appeal to Anglophone political scientists and philosophers who wish to acquaint themselves with three of the most influential thinkers in France today. Furthermore, the book should be of interest to specialists in Continental philosophy and social science intending to deepen their understanding of the political considerations developed over the years by Badiou, Rancière and Balibar.

In the book, Hewlett mentions repeatedly the quintessentially academic character of most of their work, especially Badiou's, which he is nonetheless willing to accept as a form of protection of honest theory from the dishonesty-inducing contingencies of political life. Similarly, he does mention repeatedly and, this time, also openly criticises their remoteness from day-to-day liberal democratic politics and,

above all, from serious economic analysis, a typical feature of Marxist scholarship. Specifically, “Badiou’s philosophy is quite un-materialist... Rancière’s... essentially aesthetic... Balibar is particularly clear in his preoccupation with the ideological sphere” (148). Thus, it is rather perplexing not to find anywhere in the book, not even in the comprehensive bibliography, any reference to Cornelius Castoriadis and John McMurtry, two major contemporary thinkers belonging to the Marxist family who have in fact tackled extensively the economic factors behind today’s consumerist, conformist, conservative, consensus-politics-oriented age.

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**Imagination, Cognition and Language Acquisition: A Unified Approach to Theory and Practice.** Edited by Clyde Coreil (Jersey City, NJ: New Jersey City University, 2007), vii + 169 pp. \$20.00 paper.

This volume, a collective effort of thirty scholars from Asia, the Americas and Europe, comprises twenty-two articles and three interviews, aimed at extending the theoretical insights on the human mind as enunciated by the two prominent twentieth-century psychologists, Lev Vygotsky and Howard Gardner, into the realm of language teaching at all levels from the school to university. The authors demonstrate that the classroom language teaching scenario becomes interesting, interactive and enriching for teachers and pupils alike when Vygotsky’s concept of the Zone of Proximal Development (the distance between a child’s actual development, determined by observing the tasks that s/he does independently, and the level of his potential development, determined by his/her ability to perform tasks under the guidance/cooperation of mature/intelligent partners), and Gardner’s concept of Multiple Intelligences (which claims that there are at least seven or eight human intelligences, hence many different potentials inside the brain) are coupled together in the choice of teaching-materials and methods. Their combined effect allows for the release of the “creative imagination” which

enables learners to reach a “higher performance score.”

The twentieth century has witnessed a tremendous expansion, enrichment, and modification of English Language Teaching (ELT) strategies. The Direct, Communicative, Audio-lingual and other methods have either eliminated or marginalized the literature component from the language teaching classroom. Pupils follow drills and exercises where the space for imagination is completely blocked. Consequently, their inborn potential to create and imagine is suppressed and their human sensibility is not allowed to flower. Pupils begin to enjoy and relish, for example, the subhuman and inhuman images/reports of wars and bombings across the globe. Theories on morality and social behaviour cannot make much headway in isolation unless pupils are fed with literary/autobiographical accounts whereby through “intense imagination” they imbibe moral and ethical values. The release of imaginative vision can create alternative explanations and perspectives that foster respect for diverse literatures and cultures. This is so because “Imagination above all else is the process of restructuring semantic fields” (59). Hence, there is a need to employ conventional as well as unconventional literary materials in the language classroom. Movies, plays, classical texts, popular magazine texts and so forth can be a powerful means to enable pupils to learn language on the one hand and to allow their creative imagination to take flight. The language classroom would not only become interactive and creative but would also build a strong foundation for fostering individuals with a sense of human, moral and ethical values.

A good example of this are the great Indian epics *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* that for millennia have been beacons of social, ethical and moral values for learners in several parts of Asia due to their continuous dissemination. Literary artists have rendered the epics into several languages and forms by creatively modifying or enriching them. The use of “L/literary texts” invariably allows the creative imagination of the young to blossom.

The book presents enriching accounts of the experience of some of the practitioners of this cognitive-imaginative teaching method. It is a refreshing piece of work and a significant contribution that should encourage language

teachers across the board to give more and more space to literary canons in the classroom.

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**On the Way to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy.** By Parvis Emad (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), xvii + 236 pp. \$55 cloth.

In this book Parvis Emad elucidates the important concepts he had translated in Martin Heidegger's *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*. Thus the first part of *On the Way to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy* is an abbreviated reiteration of the six "joinings" (not "chapters") in *Contributions to Philosophy*, comprised of the interlocking themes of Echo, Playing-Forth, Leap, Grounding, The Ones to Come, and The Last God (114). The second part deals with prevalent themes in the secondary literature on Heidegger. Emad has also recently translated Heidegger's *Mindfulness*. His comments regarding translation are interesting and important contributions to Heideggerian scholarship.

Heidegger himself stresses the difficulty of translation, claiming that dictionaries are inadequate for capturing the essence of language. In this vein Emad challenges the traditional translations of the important Heideggerian terms *Abgrund* and *Ereignis*. He notably claims that John Sallis's translation of *Abgrund* as 'abyss' was incorrect, as this word does not have the versatility of *Abgrund*, which can be broken up into *ab-grund*, *ur-grund*, and *un-grund* to illuminate its manifold meanings (34). Emad argues that 'abground' would be more suitable for capturing the sense of Heidegger's term.

More importantly, Emad argues for a re-translation of the term *Ereignis*. Others have translated Heidegger's "most crucial being-historical word" as "event," "appropriation," or "event of appropriation," but Emad argues 'enowning' would be more suitable (32). Heidegger asserts that *Ereignis* "is as untranslatable as the Greek λόγος or the Chinese Tao," both between languages and within a single language (32). These ideas do not lend themselves to being conceptually grasped and perfectly articulated. Nevertheless, Emad argues that 'Enowning' is a more

appropriate translation because "when enjoined with *owning*, *en-* conveys a different meaning of owning, an unpossessive owning with no appropriable content, as differentiated from an "owning of something" (33). This conveys the sense of *Ereignis* where the thinker experiences that she is primordially owned by being, not as an object that she possesses and can conceptually grasp, but because being throws itself towards her she can open its truth in thinking.

Enowning cannot be initiated or willed by a thinker, thus Emad argues that William Richardson errs when he divides Heidegger's work into *Dasein*-focused "Heidegger I" and being-centered "Heidegger II." He acknowledges that *Contributions to Philosophy* marks the nascence of Heidegger's being-historical thinking that is distinct from his transcendental-horizonal perspective of *Being and Time*, but this is not a stylistic "turn" or "reversal." Emad charges Heideggerian literature with misunderstanding the "turn" as merely a subjective decision on Heidegger's part (204). The "turn" is enowning whereby being turns "unto" thinking, and the thinker projects-open the truth of being. Richardson's thesis is untenable, as Emad shows the continuous concern for both humans and being throughout Heidegger's entire work.

In sum, Emad illuminates the central Heideggerian theme of *Ereignis* in his text. He places *Contributions to Philosophy* within the context of Heidegger's work as a whole, and clarifies problems within the secondary literature.

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**The Art of Deception.** By Nicholas Capaldi and Miles Smit (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), 277 pp. \$22.00 paper.

The key idea in this book—a revised edition of a textbook on fallacies and rhetoric originally written by Nicholas Capaldi and published in 1971—is that the best way to prevent being manipulated and deceived in speaking and writing is to know how to manipulate and deceive others. The justification behind this provocative approach, and an idea stated more clearly in the first edition, is that it facilitates learning by encouraging students' active

involvement rather than mere passive reception. This involvement is to take place through assignments that test the debating skills of argument and rhetoric. Though this is not noted up-front, the book is designed for a course that incorporates a major project of preparing and presenting a case, attacking the opposition, and defending a case. These topics are covered in chapters 3–5. A new chapter 1, added in the second edition, concerns recognizing arguments; chapter 2 addresses the formal analysis of arguments (and has been moved up from its old position as the last chapter); and chapter 6 concerns causal reasoning. The appendix addresses how to read a text critically.

*Clarity:* The revised text could be more to-the-point. For example, the introduction opens under the header “what is logic” with the claim that sometimes it is best to explain what something is by saying what it is not. This may be true, but it is not obvious why logic must be one of those cases, since simple statements of what it is are available. Moreover, the text proceeds to explain what logic is not by describing cases that are supposed to exhibit the absence or abuse of logic—e.g., the old Abbott and Costello “Who’s on First” routine. But what is non-logical or an abuse of logic in each case is not identified for the reader, nor is it easy to discover, since the discussion is intermingled with ideas, like the principle of the excluded middle, which certainly *are* logical. The summary at the end of the chapter does not say what logic is not (or what it is), leaving the reader without a clear answer to the question the text raised.

The writing in the new parts of the text could be more careful. For example, we are reminded in chapter 1 that besides arguing a point, speakers and writers sometimes have other agendas, such as distinguishing themselves and/or their audiences from a group of “disdainful people.” Though true, the point could have been made without selecting this social situation for special notice.

*Structure:* There is an uneven feeling to the revised text, as though it can’t settle on whether to address informal reasoning, formal logic, or critical reading. This is partly because the authors attempt to deal with a problem not addressed in the first edition: the problem of students who can’t read critically. Bringing in

material tangential to the focus of the book requires a lot of “scaffolding,” i.e., sentences that tell the reader the relationship of the topic to the main subject of the book, but this scaffolding is not provided, or not clearly and not often. Moreover, in this edition, the point of the book gets muffled by being moved to chapters 3–5, and energy and attention is diverted to issues like the formal analysis of arguments. Finally, the authors wait till the last page of the last chapter to note that the text is intended to facilitate a semester-long piece of debating-work. This information would be far more useful in the preface.

*Exercises:* The outlines of this work are added at the end of chapters 2–4. In each chapter there is a general assignment, broken into parts, that concerns the design and presentation of a position in a debate. For example, at the end of chapter 2 on formal analysis of arguments, the student is asked to (1) prepare a case (recommendations on finding a piece of writing are given, e.g., a transcript of a talk show or an opinion piece in a paper); (2) break it down into its arguments, determining which are valid; and (3) make a list of any issues that are tacitly involved or indirectly invoked.

Assignments are anticipatory. In the example just given, students are asked at the end of chapter 2 to prepare a case, but preparing a case is the subject of chapter 3. The authors clearly think it best to proceed this way—they say so explicitly at the end of the last chapter, when they discuss the nature of the exercises in the book—though they give no reasons. Students are likely to loath this approach and to feel that it sets them up to make unnecessary mistakes. For instructors who agree, there is a simple remedy: postpone the exercise until the relevant chapter has been completed.

Assignments are also posed in very general terms. As most students will clamor for detailed directions, especially if these are to be part of a major project, instructors will no doubt have to supply additional guidance.

There are very few problem sets of the traditional sort in the book, e.g., no “identify the fallacy” problems, probably because the authors think students do not learn from such work. Not everyone is likely to agree with this view, especially students, many of whom find precise instructions and multiple problem-sets reassuring.

*Visual appeal:* The diagrams and pictures employed are sometimes visually jarring. Not all, certainly, but some diagrams appear “stuck-on” rather than created within the same program as the manuscript, and this fact detracts from the book’s professionalism. This is particularly the case with the diagram of the square of opposition in chapter 2 and the clock problem in chapter 6.

Despite the above cautionary remarks, the book contains many interesting and useful parts, such as the discussion of statistics in chapter 3 and causal reasoning in chapter 6. Moreover, the ideas behind the book—the notion of active rather than passive learning and of learning to deceive as a means of learning how not to be deceived—are original, provocative, and useful. An inexperienced teacher may find the text difficult to use, he may even be confused by the book, but it can be recommended to the experienced and confident teacher who can take advantage of its strengths and who is prepared (if necessary) to augment the text with additional exercises. In that context, students may well relish and benefit from the sort of debate-intensive course the text encourages.

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**Art of the Everyday: Dutch Painting and the Realist Novel.** By Ruth Bernard Yeazell (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), xx + 252 pp. \$35.00/£19.95 cloth.

Living in the twenty-first century that is characterized by “a culture of images, a society of the spectacle, and a world of semblances and simulacra” (W. J. T. Mitchell, *Picture Theory* [University of Chicago Press, 1994], 5), we may view Ruth Bernard Yeazell’s book as an insightful blend of the linguistic turn of the nineteenth-century English realist novel and the pictorial turn of the seventeenth-century Dutch painting, whose final outcome is “genre” paintings (xvii).

Structured on six chapters, *Art of the Everyday: Dutch Painting and the Realist Novel* sets out to prove, on the one hand, that despite the fact that “novels are not paintings... they may aspire to evoke visual images” and, on the other hand, that despite the fact that paintings

have “a limited capacity for storytelling,” they “may incorporate words and imply narratives” (10). This necessary verbal and nonverbal interweaving is Yeazell’s hypothesis which is demonstrated using Eliot’s, Hardy’s, Balzac’s and Proust’s novels and Maes’s, Steen’s, Vermeer’s, van Ostade’s, Dou’s, Teniers the Younger’s, or Hobbema’s paintings as empirical data.

Chapter 1, “The Novel as Dutch Painting,” presents several definitions that nineteenth-century writers used when comparing a contemporary novel with Dutch paintings (8–9). A closer look at these definitions and at the examples analysed in the following chapters could be linked to three semiotic systems that Theo van Leeuwen identified in any analysis of images (*Introducing Social Semiotics* [Routledge, 2005]):

*The represented participants:* (1) the representation of ordinary or vulgar human beings (Yeazell, 9) within domestic interiors or public places (common women engaged in household activities, or low men performing daily activities, such as smoking, eating, or drinking); (2) a focus on local customs and costumes; (3) an excess of the trivial. It is the case of Eliot’s ekphrasis (97) depicting scenes of rural leisure and celebration (the pot-house or the village wedding, 99) that renders the generic nature of Dutch genre (Dou’s *Woman Eating in an Interior* or Breughel the Elder’s *The Wedding Dance*).

*Composition:* an emphasis on detail (especially on dress and furniture) through the Dutch practice of framing (127). Balzac, Eliot, and Hardy used this device in order to place their characters within domestic interiors, such as the window architrave or the doorway, the effect being a delimiting of a clear figure of the respective woman.

*Modality:* (1) the importance of light; (2) the depiction of landscapes either as literal or metaphorical flat surfaces (Hardy’s rural painting). The dramatic effect of light (128–29) is mentioned by Yeazell in the case of Hardy’s character, Fancy, whose description is proof of Hardy’s imagination and “his habit of looking for the exceptional among even the most ordinary of images” (129).

This plunging into the real world is based on a flow from a (non)verbal iconicity towards an indexicality (Charles Sanders Peirce, *Collected Papers* [Cambridge, 1931–58], 2.247,

2.248) in nineteenth-century English and French society without reaching the symbolism of the universal, of the ideal, or of the exceptional persons or events.

Yeazell's well-documented book (more than 500 endnotes and the opinions of many critics on this topic) offers strong evidence that beyond the visual imagery of nineteenth-century English and French realist novelists there lies the minute pictorial syntax of the visual images of the seventeenth-century Dutch painter.

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**The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900.**

By Duncan Bell (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), xi + 319 pp. \$45.00/£26.95 cloth.

This comprehensive intellectual history analyses the disparate ways in which the late-Victorians proposed to unite the English-speaking settler-colonies into a global “Anglo-Saxon political space.” The polity would be either federal (such as the United States and the new German federation) or unitary. The federalists drew on J. S. Mill's *Considerations of Representative Government* in arguing for the highest possible degree of political autonomy for the colonies. Those propounding a more centralised state envisaged an “Imperial Senate,” based in London, to which the colonies would send their representatives.

Duncan Bell's central argument is that Greater Britain was a natural manifestation of a period in social and political flux, and an international extension of existing debates over domestic political and social reform. In particular, technological advances revolutionised political thinking. After the advent of instantaneous communication and the steamship the influential Burkean logistical objection to colonialism—*Opposuit natura*: ‘nature cannot be overcome’—was no longer defensible. As it is decisively argued in one of the best chapters of the book, rapid time-space compression is not a uniquely twenty-first-century phenomenon.

In addition, Greater Britain embodied the anxieties which accompanied the inexorable march of democracy. The writings of Bell's

protagonists are infused with uncertainties—about national identity and political stability—which they thought would be exacerbated by an extension of the suffrage. Bell argues that these concerns, along with global competition from the European powers, were manifested in a desire to unite the Anglo-Saxon colonies (in Canada, Australia, and South Africa). Greater Britain would therefore be a “racial polity,” or in J. R. Seeley's memorable phrase, “a world-Venice with the sea for the streets” (110).

The book is organised into ten chapters, the first five of which provide much of the contextual detail. Two case studies—of the historian J. R. Seeley, “the intellectual figure-head of Greater Britain” (29) and of Goldwin Smith—are the crux of the book. Bell then provides an account of how the success of American federalism had a marked effect on imperial discourse in Britain. In the chapter “From Ancient to Modern” he seeks “to complicate” the common assumptions concerning Victorian conceptions of history. The book concludes with a warning: the lexicon of Greater Britain reverberates in contemporary visions of a global society governed by respect for human rights and other western-liberal values (in the work of Robert Conquest, for example, p. 272).

Bell's methodological contention is that “political and conceptual transformation” is of necessity a response to pre-existing social conditions and “lines of thought.” Reform is a matter of “adjustment,” “remodelling,” and “re-inscription,” rather than logic and truth (120). The idea of Greater Britain is best understood within, or at least in reference to, “the existing modes of political discourse that shape the normative architecture of society.” These maxims pervade the book, giving it explanatory and analytical authority. *The Idea of Greater Britain* is a major addition to the understanding of Victorian political thought. It will be an excellent source of information and analysis for IR and political theorists—especially those working on the history of international relations—and will be indispensable to historians of Victorian society and empire.

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**Flaubert: A Biography.** By Frederick Brown (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 628 pp. \$18.95/£12.95/€17.50 paper.

This is a fine life, possibly a definitive biography for our time. Informed by the scholarship of a lifelong reader of Flaubert, it can be appreciated both by academic and general readers. The only difficulty is how to praise it at its due. Teachers know they must write many more words on the paper of the weak than on the straight-A student's. Defects and lacunae attract wordage; excellence's reward is the brevity of superlatives.

Compared with another recent life of Flaubert, that of Geoffrey Wall (2001), Frederick Brown's is far better in all respects save one; and that one is a matter of taste. For one thing, at 100,000 words longer than Wall's, the book gives room for pertinent disquisitions on the social, intellectual and historical contexts in which Flaubert lived. Most dissatisfying in Wall is his unconcreteness, the comparative lack of action, character and detail; his book eventually resembles a commentary on the correspondence. Admittedly, the letters, abundant and rich, are a primary source for any biographer, and Brown too draws heavily upon them. However, unlike Brown, Wall too often quotes the very words and leaves it at that, as if the biographer's duty is to provide raw evidence. But evidence is little without cogent interpretation. Lawyers do not just brandish the murder weapon; they persuade the jury of its significance. Perhaps neither Wall nor Brown attends enough to the works which are Flaubert's claim to posterity's interest. And Brown's reading of some of these will be found wanting by some. The focus of Flaubert's art was the alchemy of style: between seventeen and fifty-nine he did little other than experiment in transmuting scepticism into narrative voice. Brown does focus on the importance of style to Flaubert's achievement, but I am not sure he adequately defines it for readers who have no French.

My dissatisfaction is one I have with some American translators of Flaubert who do not avoid anachronism in their English. In the 1970s, Steegmuller's use of terms such as "a pain in the ass," "bloopers" and "jacking off" made the letter writer not just an American but a man of our time. Brown's translations of

Flaubert's nineteenth-century French also figure incongruous Americanisms dating from a century later: "worst possible case scenario," "finagling," "to gun down" "feisty," "crying jags," etc. Whether this derives from a desire to make Flaubert modern, poor taste or ignorance, the result is infelicitous.

Infelicities of expression, albeit occasional, there are too: "to squelch a republican insurgency"; a ship "embarked early in the morning" (meaning it sailed). Other statements bespeak unfamiliarity with some things French (or even things Flaubertian): in *Madame Bovary*, Hippolyte "has his virile member sawed off"; Brown sees a pun between *Louis* and *lui*, where a French ear hears none; he mentions "long-stemmed *brûle-gueules*," pipes whose lack of stem explains their name.

Some will see this as nit-picking. If it diminishes Brown's achievement, it does so only as a pimple can distract the eye from a fair face.

JAMES GRIEVE

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**Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History: Imperialism, Nation, Race, and Genocide.**

Edited by Richard H. King and Dan Stone (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), vi + 282 pp. \$85.00/£42.50 cloth.

Another collection of essays on the work of Hannah Arendt will come as no surprise to those who have followed the amazing explosion in the critical reception of her writings in the last decade or so. Explanations for this posthumous popularity have been well canvassed so there is no need to regurgitate them here. However, it does prompt the question of whether there is now anything much new to be said about an author who has been so comprehensively covered. If this collection is anything to go by then I can only say that Arendt scholarship is far from exhausted and her relatively few works still provide rich perspectives for critical reflection on a wide variety of contemporary issues. Yet, this fecundity is not automatic. The editors of this collection are to be praised for especially judicious choices in respect both to the themes they have chosen and the generally high quality of the essays included.

In their introduction the editors speak of their desire to open up a new perspective on Arendt that involves shifting the focus from her as a political philosopher to the historical thinker. In this respect, it is not surprising that they should turn to her greatest work *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, which in recent years had subsided into the background of Arendt scholarship. The key to bringing Arendt's *magnum opus* back into the centre of debate for the editors was to concentrate on the historical interaction between Europe and the non-European world, especially Africa, and explore the mutual interaction between Europe and the colonial empires developed mainly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From this perspective, Arendt emerges primarily as a thinker who used the momentous historical events of her time to think through a range of issues—colonial domination and violence, the relation of racism and genocide to the European nation-state, and the historical phenomenon of evil—that still preoccupy us today. In this respect, what the editors call the “boomerang thesis”—the notion that the totalitarian disaster that was visited on Europe in the middle of the twentieth century was in large measure a “coming home to roost” of ideologies, attitudes, practices and institutions that had first been invented and honed in the exercise of colonial domination during the imperialist ventures of the European nation-states—stands at the centre of several of the essays included. However, while the primary focus of the collection is historical reflection and most of the contributors have specialist historical interests, their brief is more contemporary than simply to assess the Arendtian thesis itself.

The collection itself is divided into three parts: 1. Imperialism and Colonialism, 2. Nation and Race, and 3. Intellectual Genealogies and Legacies. It is clear from this division that Arendt's analysis of imperialism and its relation to the bourgeois nation-state will be the point of departure but the essays range widely and bring to bear knowledge of more recent episodes of violence and genocide in Algeria, Rwanda, and Yugoslavia as a way of illuminating/vindicating and contesting some of Arendt's initial claims.

Nor do the authors treat Arendt with kid gloves. Not only do they celebrate her profound insights and innovations but also

explore her own Euro-centric and racist assumptions/prejudices regarding the lack of indigenous cultural achievement in Africa. Several of the essays contest her distinction between an early “race thinking” and the subsequent ideological racism of the late-nineteenth-century imperialist phase. These argue that Arendt minimises the inherent racism evident in the earlier phases of colonialism to quarantine at least some configurations of the bourgeois world from the accusations of racism that she wanted to level at the European nation-state in crisis. Most trenchant in this respect is Robert Bernasconi's critique of Arendt's attempt to rescue the best of the western tradition from the charge of racism. While he marshals a formidable case to show that even the most esteemed representatives of the western enlightenment were not immune to racist assumptions, it is not clear just how far he thinks this argument should go. If it is true that such failures are not “anomalous” in the western tradition, as even Arendt would probably not deny, from whence do the critical value resources come to combat them?

Of the essays that make up Part 3 on intellectual genealogies, I found of particular interest Andre Duarte's bio-political reading of Arendt's thought and Steven Maloney's investigation of her debt to both Montesquieu and Tocqueville, the latter relatively neglected in the literature. Both these essays demonstrate the richness of Arendt's thought not only in its deep debt to the republican tradition but also in its vitality for the present. But in this collection it is also invidious to single out any author for special praise because they all make real contributions to the editors' envisaged “new perspective” on Arendt.

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**Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy.** Edited by Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), xii + 251 pp. \$80.00 cloth.

This collection of essays sounds the alarm about the rise of right-wing populism in recent elections in the European Union.

From Ireland to Switzerland, an ominous “spectre” is rearing its head in the cradle of western civilization. Populism, or the belief in a “virtuous people” threatened by undemocratic elites, endangers European democracy, according to the consensual judgment of this anthology’s various contributors. While they do not simplistically identify all populisms with the Right, it is obvious that the contributors fear the most nationalistic and even tribalist manifestations of giving “power to the people.” In the eyes of the contributors (most of whom live in the EU), right-wing populism threatens to unravel all that is civilized in the history of modern Europe.

One underlying premise of the contributors is that the “people” whom populist parties represent care more about blood and soil than they do about democracy and tolerance of “others” who do not share their parochial roots. Indeed, any primary concern with the survival of one’s cultural identity as a European strikes the authors as a harbinger of fascism. Of greatest concern to the contributors is that mainstream political parties have pandered to these chauvinistic forces that want the end of democracy as we know it in the EU. Apparently the only true European democrat is someone who feels indifferent or hostile to the survival of his cultural identity.

American readers will immediately recognize a parallel between this discussion and the postwar fears of the “radical right” in the United States. In each case, prominent academics on the Left have vilified any popular movement on the Right as a throwback to Hitler and Mussolini. While the contributors do not discuss America in detail, they occasionally spy ominous linkages between popular right-wing populists on both sides of the Atlantic.

There are two flaws in this analysis of the populist Right. First, the volume’s contributors, like the postwar American leftists, exaggerate the influence of right-wing populism. The draconian hate-speech laws of the EU seriously restrict the expression of ideas which these populists can practice. Indeed, hate-speech penalties are invariably applied to figures on the Right, not the Left, in Europe. Second, none of the contributors displays the slightest awareness of the possibility that these populist parties are raising legitimate questions about the democratic health of the EU. Populist worries

about centralized power in Brussels, the decline of the nation-state, and the threat of Islamic immigration receive no sympathy in this anthology. Instead, these concerns are dismissed as parochial at best and fascist at worst.

Nowhere in these pages will the reader find concern over the loss of European identity. Whereas it is legitimate for radical Islamists to assert their identity in the most strident and violent terms, European populists are not allowed to be anxious about the survival of their history in the face of this threat. Apparently, concerns about the longevity of one’s identity are the privilege of some cultures, but not others. The new European identity must meekly tolerate anti-Europeanism.

GRANT HAVERS

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**Global Political Islam.** By Peter Mandaville (London: Continuum, 2007), xv + 388 pp. £21.99 paper.

How can we best make sense of this highly complex, diverse, and sometimes even contradictory world of religion and politics? How to understand the relative importance of the multiple manifestations of Muslim politics around the world and the many competing voices claiming to speak on behalf of Islam? What is the difference between Islamist movements emphasizing jihad and those who want to make use of more democratic and non-violent means? What possible futures might we predict for political Islam?

These are a few of the questions illuminated in this book. Peter Mandaville, however, underlines that this book does not offer a so-called grand theory of Islam and politics—while ambitious in scope. The text is offered in what he calls “the spirit of a comparative, synthetic overview: a guide to the wide-ranging global landscape, an introduction to the broad ecology of thought and practice in contemporary Muslim politics, and a critical survey of some of the key ideas advanced by leading scholars in their efforts to explain the phenomenon of political Islam.”

The first introductory chapter provides a good starting point for thinking about Islam and politics in a global perspective, touching upon “the vexed question of secularism”

among other things. In addition to what Mandaville calls “the formal mode of secularism”—defined as “the cumulative outcome of several distinct but inter-related developments” like a philosophical shift in early modern Europe, the decoupling of church and state, and the emergence of liberal political values—he emphasizes a more generic and sociological understanding of the secular.

This understanding includes in short “a turning away from religion in the west over the past century” (if measured “once a week on Sundays”). The problem or the controversy thus in the Muslim world surrounding the idea of the West or “being Western” is that lack of religiosity or even hostility toward religion is often understood to be one of its defining characteristics.

When does Islam count?, he asks. In this regard, he argues, there are three points to be made. The first relates to the use of the expression “the Muslim world.” One can easily agree with the author when he questions if this lens is the most appropriate when trying to understand religion and politics in Muslim countries. We rarely find the societies in Europe and Northern America referred to in this way—that is, in terms of the Christian world. The second point relates to what has just been said: the social and political picture of religion varies greatly and it should be very risky talking about the Muslim world as a whole. Thirdly, drawing on statistics from the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Mandaville concludes that Muslims in different settings will often develop an exclusive understanding of how their religion relates to their everyday life and practical politics.

Chapter 2 presents a historical overview of politics in the Muslim world including an introduction of key concepts and terms necessary for understanding the political discourse referred to, while Chapter 3 provides a detailed overview of the emergence of modern Islamism through an examination of postcolonial state formation. The following five chapters (chaps. 5–8) include detailed case studies of Islam and politics across a range of national, regional, and transnational settings, including key countries such as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as well as transnational movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda, and less frequently covered social

formations such as Sufi brotherhoods and the Fethullah Gülen movement.

In the final chapter, “Beyond Islamism,” Mandaville’s key argument is that Muslim politics, through the effects of globalization and the emergence of a political consciousness transcending national borders, “is entering a phase in which methods, goals, and vocabularies of Islamism are undergoing considerable transformation.” The key themes in his concluding remarks are Islamist politics, religious knowledge, and Muslim identity. He is also discussing the concept post-Islamism—often associated with the so called “French School” of Islamist analysis and prominent scholars such as Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel.

Roy initiated the debate in 1992 with his book *The Failure of Political Islam*, arguing that the failure of obtaining state power demonstrated that the movement had failed. Even though many Islamists understand their goals in terms of achieving state power, Mandaville argues that “before declaring the advent of post-Islamism, we should question the assumption that Islamism was ever coherent and homogeneous.”

Mandaville has written an almost encyclopaedic book on political Islam, providing a rather fresh perspective on, and brilliant analysis of, Islam and its ideas and actors in a national as well as global setting.

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**Thinking with Shakespeare: Comparative and Interdisciplinary Essays.** Edited by William Poole and Richard Scholar (London: Legenda, 2007), ix + 143 pp. £45.00/\$69.00 cloth.

*Thinking with Shakespeare* is a collection of papers delivered to honour the recent retirement of the literary critic A. D. Nuttall, author of *Shakespeare the Thinker*. Nuttall’s untangling of the philosophical threads he claimed to find hidden in Shakespeare’s plays was published posthumously in 2007.

The very nature of the exercise—a homage to a critic, delivered in his presence, that seeks to extend his work and develop his intuitions—typically produces wonderful new insights alongside unfortunate ambiguities of

intention and infelicities of execution. The best contributions to this volume do what all good criticism should set out to achieve: stimulate the desire to re-experience the text and extract new value from it. Stephen Medcalf's very credible elucidation of the mystery concerning the differences in the endings of the two reliable texts of *King Lear* is a valuable contribution to Shakespearean scholarship. It also contains a number of other stimulating insights linking *Lear* to *Pericles*. Gabriel Jospovici manages to combine enlightened close reading of *Twelfth Night* with observations about Shakespeare's gift for "polyphonic dialogue," evoking Bakhtin, Dostoevsky, Aristotle and Mozart without veering away from Shakespeare. Jospovici's humility may be the key to his success: "we, as viewers or readers of the play, experience far more than our critical or philosophical vocabulary seems able to articulate." This can be seen as both a recognition of the limits of criticism (especially when it pursues *thinking*) and an invitation to critics to articulate as much as possible. Some of the other contributors focus only on the latter, allowing their articulation to overwhelm not only the thought but also the meaning of the text.

It can even appear to be an original form of Bardolatry, reaching a summit in an essay where the author scrupulously underscores Professor Nuttall's personal distaste for Stoicism, ups the ante by adding Sartre's existentialism to the mix and sees *Antony and Cleopatra* as a rebuttal of Sartre's nihilistic philosophy, even mobilising Simone de Beauvoir (who "believed that reality could not be summed up") for the cause. We learn that "Enobarbus agrees with her—at least when he is speaking about Cleopatra." There are several other moments like this in the collection that are embarrassing to read not only because of their anachronism but also because the authors typically seek proof of deep philosophy where a subtle form of rhetoric was clearly Shakespeare's intention. The difference is important: rhetoric, augmented by dramatic irony, often does glance at philosophy, but a glance is not always a hint and a mere hint is not a proof of intellectual conviction, by either the character or Shakespeare himself. The exercise may be fun and challenging for the enterprising critic schooled in a certain style of close reading,

but the result should be critically appraised and placed in its dramatic context rather than the history of Western philosophy.

Although the excess of philosophy may be harmful to critical health, there is much to glean for serious students of Shakespeare from the best of these essays.

PETER ISACKSON

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**Witchcraft and Belief in Early Modern Scotland.** Edited by Julian Goodare, Lauren Martin, and Joyce Miller (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), xiii + 264 pp. £50.00 cloth.

Collections of scholarly essays on a given topic can prove a disappointment to the target audience—usually academics, and, to a lesser extent, lay readers with an interest in the subject matter. This collection, a fascinating series of articles, is far from disappointing. Its success results largely from the focus, as clearly stated in the Introduction, namely, to simultaneously view and critique Scottish witchcraft as a culturally specific *and* diverse system of beliefs and practices both from a national perspective as well as a broader, European viewpoint. This approach enables the editors as well as the contributors to ensure that the specificities of Scottish witchcraft in all its manifestations (from elite magic to more general systems of folk magic) remain intact within a geographical paradigm that ensures a sense of chronology and thematic continuity throughout the collection. It also ensures that there is a variety of approaches, from general discussions that establish parameters for reading the collection *in toto* (such as Julian Goodare's "Scottish Witchcraft in its European Context") to more intricate analyses (such as "A Comparative Perspective on Scottish Cunning-Folk and Charmers" by Owen Davies).

The editors, Julian Goodare, Lauren Martin and Joyce Miller, were key members of the research team that produced "The Survey of Scottish Witchcraft," an on-line database of the major events, individuals, publications and related material pertaining to the history of witchcraft in Scotland. The database is a major academic achievement that

has made available a multifarious series of documents previously accessible only from specific collections (making research difficult for some scholars). The origins and processes involved in creating this electronic resource are described in “Some Findings from the Survey of Scottish Witchcraft” by Martin and Miller. This essay is also extremely useful in its discussion of the most profitable methodologies to employ in the use of the database.

Practices and phenomena in need of further analysis are signposted throughout the book: ghosts, familiars and shape-shifting are notable examples as is the little researched area of witchcraft and related beliefs in the Scottish Highlands. The inclusion, therefore, of Lizanne Henderson’s “Witch-Hunting and Witch Belief in the *Gàidhealtachd*” is an important contribution in relation to the magical systems in operation—or believed to have been in operation—in the area linguistically (more than geographically) defined as the Highlands.

The collection deals with belief, and while this complex and problematic word is grappled with in the Introduction, the editors and contributors do not directly address what belief actually entails. This linguistic, philosophical, theological and sociological minefield may have been avoided for the best and it is refreshing to read a work free of academic quagmires. Indeed, to read each article is to ponder belief in separate, contained environs, which in itself is academically sound.

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**New World Orders in Contemporary Children’s Literature: Utopian Transformations.** By Clare Bradford, Kerry Mallan, John Stephens, and Robyn McCallum (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), vi + 207 pp. £45.00 cloth.

A collaborative project by four highly regarded scholars, *New World Orders in Contemporary Children’s Literature* explores how the “forms and ideological positions which characterize children’s texts” (5) affect “the utopian impulse” (6) in books published between the end of the Cold War (1986–87) and 2006. Regarding utopia more as trope than as genre,

and admitting that “representations of utopian societies are virtually non-existent in children’s literature” (11), the authors focus on English-language books from Canada, the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand and a few films from United States, Japan, and Iran. Asserting that since 1990, in a pattern exacerbated by 9/11, dystopian visions have come to dominate, they take for granted that we live in a time of crisis—the first chapter’s title is “A New World Order or a New Dark Age?”

Although the authors claim that their research has made them challenge their own assumptions, they never indicate what those prior assumptions were. One such assumption may be that “texts for children lead in new directions while the existing critical paradigms lag considerably” (7). For in contrast to the previous statement, one of their conclusions is that for a variety of reasons, utopian children’s texts are rarely as “daring in their imaginings of radically different futures” as adult utopian texts (184). Another discredited assumption is the commonplace that “utopian texts are progressive and liberatory” (5); instead, they propose a more complicated picture drawing upon both liberation and constraint.

*New World Orders* is an admirably wide-ranging study of contemporary children’s literature that demonstrates how the genre expectations that govern children’s literature often work against the utopian impulse and are more likely to produce critical utopias and/or critical dystopias, the latter, “an alternative society worse than the one we know but which contains some possibility of transformation” (23). It is the possibility of transformation that drives each chapter’s analysis of topics such as globalization, postcolonialism, ecocriticism, and posthumanism. Although the book’s structure produces some unnecessary repetition, individual textual readings are exemplary and likely to inspire readers to think further on questions not only about utopia but also about the conventions governing children’s literature. Particularly insightful on the tension between utopian discourse and the maturation narratives expected in young adult fiction, the book is equally insightful on the limitations of ecocriticism in children’s books, the extent to which dystopian discourses can propose transformative agendas, and the challenges of imagining agency within a posthuman context.

The authors rightly recognize the “absurdly utopian demand” (95) made of young child readers directed by picture books to save the rainforest, but are themselves staunchly committed to the possibility of literature and film having a political impact: “It is this potential for transformation both with and outside of the text that forms the core of our discussions” (185). One transformation would be that “adults who might not normally read or study children’s texts . . . take these works seriously” (185). The desire is itself utopian but if any book can persuade scholars of the value of paying attention to children’s books, it will be *New World Orders*.

ADRIENNE KERTZER

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**Transnational Outrage: The Death and Commemoration of Edith Cavell.** By Katie Pickles (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), xii + 277 pp. £45.00 cloth.

Very well known at the time of the Great War, the story of Edith Cavell has slowly faded from popular memory in the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Who, then, was this British nurse and what made her so famous for so long? In Belgium at the beginning of the hostilities in August 1914, she was arrested by the Germans on 5 October 1915, subsequently imprisoned, tried, and ultimately shot on 12 October 1915 for “escorting troops to the enemy” (she had actively assisted men of the Allied forces who, after the defeat at the battle of Mons, had found themselves stranded behind German lines).

Not unexpectedly, Cavell’s violent death triggered simultaneous waves of admiration for her patriotism and indignation and outrage towards the barbaric and beastly Germans. It also provided British propaganda with a golden opportunity to demonize the enemy—an opportunity that it exploited to its maximum by arguing, in a chivalric and patriarchal way, that men and women were different and that it was wrong to shoot a young (she was actually 49 years old) woman, especially one who had dedicated herself to saving lives. The expectation here was that men of honour would avenge her death—a not insignificant consideration at a time when the recruitment

figures were declining. On account of these “prevalent notions of gender,” Katie Pickles rightly concludes that “she proved to be far more useful (to the Allies) dead than alive” (84–85). This exercise in representation transformed this selfless path-breaker in the field of nursing into an exemplary model of British womanhood and, furthermore, her ultimate sacrifice legitimized in the opinion of many the parallels with Florence Nightingale, Joan of Arc, and even the first Christian martyrs.

The most original part of this monograph is the second part, where the author tells the story of the transnational commemoration of Edith Cavell. Not only in Great Britain, but also in the Allied countries, her memory was celebrated through the building of monuments, statues, busts, plaques, hospitals, rest homes for nurses and for the elderly, and the naming of schools, streets, a bridge, a mountain, even horses! Interestingly, in both Great Britain and the colonies (eager to copy the example of their metropolis), elite White women played a major role in raising the money to make the plans a reality. By so doing, they promoted cultural imperialism and perpetuated Britishness (constructed out of gender, race and class identities) and Whiteness, particularly in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

This well-researched and sympathetic, yet objective book (with one exception, though: it is wrong to argue that her death “moved the United States much closer to war” [85])—an exercise in mapping on a global scale and analyzing the remembrance of a simple nurse—will likely frustrate more than one reader: it is very much conceived and structured like a doctoral dissertation and, as a result, it shares the limitations of this genre, like the narrowness of the topic and the too many repetitions of the same points. The author’s thesis—that Cavell’s sacrifice and death did much more than simply valorize the nursing profession; more importantly, it engendered a rich cultural discourse about war and society, gender (women’s status in society, in particular), memory and landscape, and the construction of civic, national, and imperial identities across the colonial and metropolitan divide—could have been easily summarized in a couple of well-focused articles, like the one Pickles published in 2006 as part of *Canada and the British World: Culture, Migration, and Identity*

(edited by Phillip Bruckner and R. Douglas Francis).

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**The EU–NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective.** By Martin Reichard (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2006), xv + 412 pp. £65.00 cloth.

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) role in Europe has become ambiguous. Starting out as a transatlantic mutual defense organization in order to face a potential Soviet threat to any of the members, NATO now has new focuses and challenges: (1) Combating terrorism is NATO's main *raison d'être*, as seen in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan after the attacks of 9/11; (2) Russia, while not posing the same threat as the Soviet Union did, is one country NATO is keeping an eye on (especially considering the events in August 2008 involving Russia's invasion of parts of Georgia, an ally of NATO countries); (3) the European Union (EU), comprising twenty-seven countries and headquartered in the same city as NATO (Brussels, Belgium), is constantly looking for ways to get involved in the security scene, something that has traditionally been left completely to NATO. In the twenty-first century, NATO will have to resolve these and more issues if it is to survive and maintain its place in Europe's political scene.

It is specifically this last challenge that Martin Reichard extensively covers in his work *The EU–NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective*. One needs to look no farther than this book to learn the basics as well as the delicate intricacies of the relationship between NATO and the EU regarding the security and defense of Europe. Reichard argues that the balance of power is still in NATO's favor, yet there are significant moves that have given the EU more influence in the realm of security and defense. For example, the EU has taken over for NATO in a peacekeeping mission in Macedonia and Bosnia.

One of Reichard's strongest points is his immaculate research. Each chapter is filled with clear explanations, citations, and detailed notes,

which—coupled with Reichard's expertise due to his work experience at the Austrian Mission to NATO—make the reading interesting, detailed, and easy to understand. He dedicates considerable energy to important topics relating to the EU–NATO relationship such as the main policies each organization has regarding defense, the main agreements between the two organizations, and important questions such as which organization has the main say in each situation. The book covers many other issues as well, all of which contribute to a greater understanding of the issue.

Reichard's book is an excellent work that will help any reader understand the EU, NATO, and their relationship in greater detail. As NATO and the EU continue to define themselves and their roles in the security of the twenty-first-century world, this understanding will provide great insights into those changes and challenges. For this reason, and for expanding one's knowledge of contemporary Europe and arguably its two most important organizations, Reichard's work is a vital contribution to the discipline.

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**Common Reading: Critics, Historians, Publics.** By Stefan Collini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), ix + 368 pp. £25.00 cloth.

Ever since Edmund Burke rebuked the French *encyclopédistes* and like-minded *philosophes* for having risen to govern an empire from “the miserable servitude of the desk,” the common English attitude to such critical thinkers or “intellectuals” who meddle in social and political affairs, has been largely the same. Thus, to cite but one example, in his book *Intellectuals* (1988) Paul Johnson employs the same categorical terms to judge the character and misachievements of Rousseau, Marx, or Sartre. This was the background to Edward Said's decision to devote his 1993 Reith Lectures on Radio 4 of the BBC to “The Representation of the Intellectual.” In these lectures Said sought to show that this characteristic English antipathy to intellectuals, whom he redefined as authors who “speak

truth to power,” is not only parochial but dangerous to the literary life of the nation. His message has since been taken up and much amplified by several English writers, even when—as in John Carey’s *The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary Intelligentsia 1880–1939* (2002)—they criticized the pervasive snobbery and class prejudice that has traditionally permeated literary life in England.

Among those who have grappled with this problem, none has been more prolific than Stefan Collini. A Professor of Intellectual History and English Literature at the University of Cambridge, he has published some notable studies on *Public Moralists* (1991), *Matthew Arnold: A Critical Portrait* (1999), and most recently *Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain* (2006). In these books and in many other publications Collini has aptly diagnosed the peculiar predicament of writers, many of them critical and even radical, who had to operate in a liberal yet essentially conservative society. In the volume under review, Collini brings together twenty-four “occasional” pieces written during the last decade, most of which originated (and are here reprinted) as review-essays on biographies, collections-of-letters, new editions, or on other literary episodes with some larger cultural significance.

In the first part, under the title “Writing Lives,” Collini offers fifteen portraits of men (and one woman) of letters, all but one English, who were active, albeit not always as “intellectuals,” in the public literary life of England in the last century. The literary figures include Cyril Connolly, V. S. Pritchett, Aldous Huxley, Rebecca West, George Orwell, William Empson, Stephen Spender, and (the only outsider) Edmund Wilson, and the historians are A. L. Rowse, Arthur Bryant, E. H. Carr, Herbert Butterfield, and E. P. Thompson. There are also two essays on Perry Anderson and Roger Scruton—two maverick intellectuals, unclassifiable under any vocational category, who represent opposite political ideologies. According to Collini, in writing these essays he was primarily concerned in his protagonists “as essayists, reviewers, and contributors to general cultural and literary discussion.” And indeed, beyond each particular case, he seeks to illuminate the wider social, political, and cultural spheres in which they

worked, namely, in his term, the different “publics” that these very personal writers engaged. In the second part of the book, “Reading Matters,” consisting of nine essays, Collini deals with some of these “public” aspects of intellectual life and cultural history in contemporary England, but even in these essays his predilection for the “personal” stories and case-histories of these larger theories is evident.

Some of Collini’s judgments on his protagonists as “intellectuals” are very harsh: Huxley, Rowse, and Spender fare particularly badly, while others—Carr, Wilson, Scruton, and even—surprisingly—Thompson, barely make it. Collini singles out for praise those writers who managed to combine the personal and the communal spheres in their lives and works, writers like George Orwell or—his own personal hero—Perry Anderson, both of whom knew how to speak truth to power, and thus deserve to be recognized and eulogized as true “intellectuals.”

One major problem in this collection, however, is the fact that almost all the pieces were occasioned by the publication of a particular book or suchlike minor literary event. This might be the only reason for the inclusion of some once-famous but by now long (and duly) forgotten figures like the literary journalist Rebecca West or the popular historian Arthur Bryant, let alone the likes of Stephen Spender and A. L. Rowse, who even in their lifetime did not command much respect or importance. Moreover, having been written as critical reviews of specific books, some of the essays are mainly concerned with all-too-personal aspects of the writers’ lives and works—as, for example, with the career and letters of William Empson rather than with his more valuable hermeneutical theory, or, in the case of the Marxist historians Carr and Thompson, with their political—rather than historical—views and works.

As most of the essays were written for non-academic readers, Collini intimates that “the idea that essays of this sort try to capture [is] something of the ‘intellectual experience’ of reading, without dissolving the personal and temporal qualities of that experience into more systematic abstractions” (4–5). In this he has succeeded admirably. Readers of this volume will be grateful for essays which are

models of a critical yet clear and free-of-jargon writing—a real and rare treat in literary studies.

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**Globalization and Its Enemies.** By Daniel Cohen. Translated by Jessica B. Baker (Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, 2007), ix + 192 pp. \$14.95/£9.95 paper.

Economist Daniel Cohen's book came out in French in 2004 and is here reissued in Jessica B. Baker's English translation. Cohen charts three acts of "globalization." First, during a sixteenth-century "age of discovery," "discovered" territories suffered under European imports (of colonizers and diseases), and found themselves at the wrong end of an emerging North-South axis of inequality. Second, especially in the nineteenth century, merchants took advantage of the rapid transportation technologies which, paradoxically, further polarised wealth distribution. In the third act, our present is being reshaped as cheap communication and new media further accentuate the imbalances between economically stagnant peripheries and vibrant centres of growth. Cohen wants to understand and redirect this new globalization, not to stop it. He sees the "enemies" of globalization as those who, misunderstanding history, denounce the exploitation of poor countries (and workers) by rich ones (and capital), or those who object to the widespread imposition of Western values at the expense of traditional cultures. Cohen claims these enemies perceive a new world economy forcing a system on people who do not want it. Yet for Cohen there is neither straightforward exploitation nor cultural coercion. Rather, new communication technologies form a global consciousness in which the poor become the spectators of material prosperities they cannot attain but surely want.

In a series of interconnected essays, Cohen counters many plausible assertions about the new world economy. Large companies still dominate and newcomers still struggle to gain a foothold. The polarization of rich centres and poor peripheries is, if anything, entrenched. But where "enemies" talk of a clash of cultures,

Cohen sees global subjects united in a desire for prosperity; he finds scant place for religion (but rather more for politics) in shaping patterns of economic growth. On the subject of development demographics, Cohen finds women across cultures influenced by Western role models in the media and choosing to limit their fertility whatever local family economics might demand. From a postcolonial perspective, Cohen locates "indigenous growth" as rare in independent nations—except, that is, in those administering the right combination of authoritarian short-sharp-shock tactics; he sees it as nearly impossible to invest simultaneously in three necessary levers of growth: crudely, human capital (education), technological capital, and a global infrastructure. If the United States is, to the "enemies" of globalization the embodiment of a neo-imperialist power, to Cohen it is the key seat of global innovation in a vital Schumpeterian economy. Final chapters draw pharmaceutical pricing strategies and debt cancellation into the argument.

This timely and provocative book makes for rewarding reading and is certainly to be recommended. Historians will snipe that details and arguments are cherry-picked from grand syntheses (by Jared Diamond or Joel Mokyr) rather than being rooted in more nuanced studies by historians of technology in world culture (like Michael Adas). Cohen is also sketchy, and perhaps conflicted, on "culture" and its relationship to economics. On the one hand, local, national and religious cultures hardly affect the choice of any particular economic mode; yet the modes of life that globalization, through TV or Hollywood, advertises are desirable to all—rather than being culturally challenging, or challenged. Where is the counter culture? In this picture of the new global economy, people are economic agents waiting to take the rational decision of adopting Western capitalism, irrespective of super-added cultural attitudes. There is no need for postcolonial guilt since the assumption is that the fruits of globalization, rightly managed and packaged, would be good for all, or at least the majority.

How, then, can Western prosperity be delivered to the world's poor countries in this third act of globalization? Cohen suggests that the answer lies in the European Union: a "school of globalization," it provides a model

for global governance, despite—perhaps because of—its failure to manufacture political integration. Here, cultural difference is fostered rather than eradicated, an economic system is held in common, and differences in wealthy and poor nations have been at least in some degree removed. The European Union may fall short of democracy, but it provides the public good of prosperity.

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**Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II.** By Stanley G. Payne (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), viii + 328 pp. \$30.00 cloth.

In the grand context of a global war, relations between Hitler's Germany and Franco's Spain have traditionally been viewed as possessing at best peripheral significance. After all, for all his admiration for Hitler and his sizeable debt of gratitude for the Condor Legion's contribution to Spain's own war, Franco never quite brought himself to making a full military commitment to the Axis. Stanley G. Payne's book does nothing to overturn that modest, traditional view of Spanish-German relations, yet it nonetheless manages to make a meaningful contribution to the history of the Second World War.

At one level it is conventional diplomatic history, drawing on the official records of the powers of the day as well as an impressive range of secondary literature. In doing so Payne manages the by no means simple task of relating Spain's then limited role in world affairs to broader developments in a most dynamic international environment. As the Second World War progressed, alliances shifted and ruptured unpredictably; Payne however relates those changes both to immediate military and strategic contingencies but also to longstanding, historically-rooted patterns of relations. Thus, for example, the dilemmas confronting Franco in his negotiations with Hitler cannot be neatly extracted from an appreciation of Spain's relations with its immediate or its more distant neighbours, such as Britain or Italy. Payne does not make the case that this web or relations Franco negotiated significantly impacted on the

course of the war, but by revealing its dynamics and complexities he adds a fresh perspective to the whole.

The achievement is all the more praiseworthy because in performing his act of juggling a complex and dynamic international environment Payne manages to keep two other balls in the air. One is Spanish domestic politics. Franco's vulnerability at home might come as a surprise to some readers given that his triumph in the Civil War was followed by an uncompromising and enduring campaign against his enemies on the left. Less well known are the rivalries from both conservatives and the fascists of the FET, whom Payne wishes to distinguish from the Caudillo. The second ball is that of economics. Here too Payne's role is largely to synthesize the work of a number of historians who have uncovered the complex economic relations Spain maintained with Germany. These relations were crucial, as Payne shows, yet he also reveals that economic pressures were applied from other sources as well. As the Axis faced collapse, these pressures became irresistible.

Of a more specific interest are the two chapters dealing with Spanish Diplomacy and the Holocaust, a topic which has in the past attracted widely varying interpretations. For those who might be tempted to see bold philosemitism in Spain's actions, Payne offers a useful and balanced corrective which, as in other chapters, looks beyond the role of the great dictators and the conditions of the day to understand the apparently contradictory and morally dubious Spanish practice.

As for Franco himself, he is for the most part given the benefit of the doubt. Unlike Mussolini, he recognized his weakness and wisely stopped short of meeting Hitler's wishes, even if for some time Franco tied both his and Spain's future to German victory. Payne's Franco is cautious and reactive, yet given at times also to imprudence and megalomania. Although slow to recognize the tectonic shift in world affairs occurring in 1943–44, he did enough so secure survival. Fortunately for him, Iberia remained in the periphery in the postwar world.

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**Lectura Dantis: Purgatorio.** Edited by Allen Mandelbaum, Anthony Oldcorn, and Charles Ross. Translated by Allen Mandelbaum (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), xiv + 412 pp. \$60.00 cloth/£35.00 paper.

The thirty-three essays comprising this volume (one for each Canto of the *Purgatorio*) are written out of an awareness of the longue-durée of Dante scholarship, and provide generous guidance, valuable to any reflective reader of Dante. For many scholars, this book will be a well-thumbed companion for decades. The first volume of this series, on the *Inferno*, has already appeared, and a third, *Lectura Dantis: Paradiso* will be eagerly awaited. In the following discussion, essays are cited by author and page number.

Throughout the laborious climb of Mount Purgatory, Dante and his guide Virgil are in a hurry. At the outset, the venerable Cato shouts at them to quit dawdling: “Quick, to the mountain” (II, 122), and this becomes a steady theme. The sense of rapid movement is maintained as they ascend from cornice to cornice of the mountain. Virgil tells his pupil to stand up straight and turn his gaze toward the top of the mountain (Sara Sturm-Maddox, 200): “Let that suffice, and hurry on your way” (XIX, 61). Virgil curtly awakens the sleeping Dante: *surgi e vieni*: “rise and come” (XIX, 35). The haste and urgency of Dante and Virgil as they climb reflect the energetic tension and pace of the real Dante’s poetry. The upward glance and wakefulness mirror Dante’s own lucidity.

Dante wanted to reach a new level of artistry and to keep his poem within strictly defined limits. At certain “moments of particular importance, passages of special difficulty and depth,” he highlighted the intensity of his task by calling on the Muses or directly addressing the reader (Hermann Gmelin, 101). The “transcendent power of poetry,” which he had always attributed to his beloved Virgil, was becoming his own, but now explicitly Christian and prophetic (Christopher Kleinhenz, 249). Smarr remarks that “Dante’s crossing the threshold from philosophy to religious poetry is a moment of birth related to his own salvation” (Janet Levarie Smarr, 226). Only by surpassing his pagan teacher Virgil could Dante become a “poet of rectitude,” and thus fulfill the

prophetic charge given him by Beatrice in Canto XXXII, to return to earth and help humanity through his prophetic teaching and the grandeur of his art: “to profit that world which/lives badly . . . [and] transcribe/what [he] has seen” (XXXII, 103–6).

The essays of this formidable group of scholars are also marked by elegance and an urgent sense of conveyance. Some are deeply philological, others historically erudite. No time is wasted scoring scholarly points, and the focus is on crisp explanation and accompaniment, a restless search for *meaning*. Following the principle that “Dante gave each of his cantos a particular function” (Maria Picchio Simonelli, 56), each essay provides a complete reading of its canto, while focusing on a particular theme or structural component of the *Purgatorio*. The tone is one of admiration and friendship for Dante. Missing is the type of interpretation which “feeds on itself, with minimal interference from the object interpreted” (Leo Steinberg, quoted by Victoria Kirkham, 313). Nevertheless, it is demonstrated that in many passages “each detail resonates with multiple meanings” (Kirkham, 318). The authors are aware of the dangers lurking in such dense thickets of symbol and signal, pausing to inquire of a possible interpretation: “is it really in the text, or is it forced in there by some wishful thinking of ours?” (Lino Pertile, 271). Room is left to account for the sheer artistic play of Dante’s poem: “Not every detail . . . conveys an obvious meaning; some . . . are perhaps evocative and mystifying rather than strictly allegorical” (Peter Armour, 335).

Without scholarly mediation and commentary, our understanding of Dante’s poetic art and his message would be quite limited. The three colored stairs, the gold and silver keys, the four stars, the bearded Cato, would repel the reader. His poetry is couched in an ancient-medieval-personal forest of signs, which had to be interpreted even for his contemporaries, who set out to provide the requisite explanations, lexicons and drawings. For some seven centuries, critical commentary and learned appreciation have been provided by the scholarly tradition of the *Lectura Dantis*.

This new *Lectura Dantis* is a continuation and celebration of this tradition. The aim of the commentary, which is designed to be

used with the highly-regarded translation by Allen Mandelbaum, may be summarized as follows:

- to light up the volumes of medieval doctrine, cosmology and knowledge which undergird the poem;
- to explain the poem's ancient and medieval symbols, numerology, mythic and historical references, but without pedantry;
- to incorporate the principal achievements of the commentary tradition;
- to provide a unified and convincing reading for each Canto;
- to reveal the beauty of Dante's poetry and the character of his mind.

Commentary on the Divine Comedy began soon after Dante's death in 1321. The essays of this volume often return to the most important ancient and modern readings: Pietro di Dante (1340), Boccaccio (1373), Landino (1481), Daniello (1568), Venturi (1732), L'Ottimo (1829), Vernon (1889), and Singleton (1970). Similarly, reference is made to the modern *Lectura* tradition: *Lectura Dantis Newberriana*, *Lectura Dantis Romana*, *Lectura Dantis Scaligera*, *Lectura Dantis Turicensis*, *Lectura Dantis Neapolitana*, *Lectura Dantis Virginian*—and we are in touch with the centuries-long discussion about Dante among Lord Byron, Ruskin, Longfellow, Benedetto Croce, T. S. Eliot, Dorothy Sayers, Jacques Le Goff, Paul Ricoeur, and Martha Nussbaum.

The *Purgatorio* is political. As a condemned exile, Dante had an intense experience of the "black smoke of wrath" (Cavallo, 181). The agony of embittered political conflict was felt in all the city states of Dante's Italy as "quarrels, oppression, and the despotism of factions . . . raged on all sides" (M. Barbi, quoted by Jo Ann Cavallo, 184). The problems Dante raised in his anguish are still with us, although the cast of characters has changed. The body of the ghostly, morally ambiguous Manfred, with terrible wounds on his brow, could have been lost on any modern battlefield. Our political thinkers offer cant rather than wisdom, and our religious leaders are avidly political. Corruption pervades the highest offices: "the impotency of the law in the face of evil intentions combined with power" (M. Picchio Simonelli, 58).

In response, Dante hoped fervently for the rise of a good political power able to curb mankind's thick-necked bestiality, "a guide or bridle." Such a righteous authority would combine the truth of law with sufficient force (John Scott, 171). In the *Inferno*, Dante's prophetic image for this force was the *Veltro*, the fierce Greyhound who would rule as an emperor on earth, but with a spiritual effect (Vincent Moleta, 211).

Boccaccio, writing in 1373, claimed mendaciously that Dante in exile was reduced to throwing rocks at people in impotent rage. This hardly squares with the poet we meet in the *Purgatorio*, who thirsts for justice more than revenge. His astonishing response to turmoil was to undertake a poetic and prophetic journey into absolutely new territory, in which the search for self-knowledge and salvation became the leading themes. Dante knew that political life was limited and defective. In John Scott's startling phrase, "Dante is the new Saint Paul" (John Scott, 168).

Far from a soothing politics of mediation, Dante looked for a confluence of political and spiritual liberation. Storey explains that Dante admired the "disruptive politics" and prophecies of the Spiritual Franciscans, although it is not known precisely which books he may have read in that tradition. Probably he knew the Biblical commentaries of Peter John Olivi (Storey, 362–63). Like Simone Weil in the 1930s, Dante wanted a politics of light.

What Dante was most urgently seeking in spiritual terms may be the most daunting for today's reader: he wanted to untie the knot of his own sinfulness. When at the summit of Mount Purgatory, Dante is confronted by Beatrice (and rebuked by her with a scalding reminder of his faults), he kneels in remorse and discovers his face reflected in the waters of Lethe. Here Dante becomes "an anti-Narcissus" who sees in his reflection "an image of himself, but one that he turns away from in shame" (Rachel Jacoff, 344). Now his confession and contrition are complete, and he is prepared for the visionary experience and the prophetic commission to be gained in the last three cantos. Only now could Dante serve as "witness, scribe, and prophet of the mystery of human history and the corruption of the Church" (H. Wayne Storey, 360).

Czeslaw Milosz used to say that our religious imaginations are exiled from Dante's cosmos, so rich in meaning, so appropriate. But the reasons for reading and interpreting Dante are not confined to their original cosmic setting. We learn the lesson of gratitude for our teachers, and the possibility of liberation through the art and literature of the past. Canto XXI "celebrates the soul's liberation, makes an offering of intensely loving gratitude to the unintended, unexpected, providential power of Virgil's poetry" (Janet Levarie Smarr, 234). Dante was seeking personal liberation in his attempt to establish a poetry of rectitude and prophecy. These goals are dramatized at the summit of Mount Purgatory.

The panorama of salvation, for Dante, never involves a vague, abstract humanity. We always have to do with particular historical persons, many of them known to the poet. Memory is vital to the prayerful connection between the living and the dead. The readings in this *Lectura Dantis* capture these subtleties, in a neo-humanist approach, similar to what I elsewhere proposed under the title 'Miloszan humanism'—a scholarly humanism which does not try to project an ideal humanity or a historical plan, but which attempts to preserve and declare the delicate traces of past human existence in order to humanize and liberate the self.

Historical and literary scholarship can provide a path toward self-knowledge and a philosophical therapy of the soul. In a wonderful passage, Kirkpatrick lays claim to just such a joyful approach:

our concern in reading Dante is not to command humanity but to re-create ourselves as human beings in the company of others. The courtesy required for this act is, simultaneously, an act of interpretation. The true community lies neither in Limbo nor in the sheepfold of the excommunicates but rather in our continued desire to understand others. (Robin Kirkpatrick, 37)

A scholarly approach to Dante can be an act of freedom, involving reading and writing, learned conversation and debate. The highest goal of historical and literary scholarship is personal liberation, realized in the search for knowledge and the community of kindred spirits. Liberation was also the ultimate goal of Dante's ascent of Mount Purgatory. Thus it is

possible for the avocation of the scholar to coincide with the aspiration of the poet.

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**Hobbes and Republican Liberty.** By Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), xxiii + 245 pp. \$22.99/£12.99 paper.

In this essay, adapted from a course taught at Oxford in 2002–2003, Quentin Skinner brings his deep knowledge of historical context to bear on the problem of Hobbes' conception of liberty. Skinner's central claim—solidly supported by the evidence that he presents—is that Hobbes' conception of liberty must be understood as a response to the theories of republican liberty that were circulating in England during the Civil War. However, Skinner does more than review the historical matrix within which Hobbes wrote. He also sheds new light on oft-examined texts in a style that is at once accessible and scholarly. The text will prove equally useful to students approaching Hobbes' towering achievements for the first time and to advanced scholars seeking out yet undiscovered nuances in Hobbes' body of work.

The structure of the argument is derived from Hobbes' philosophical development. Skinner documents the subtle but ultimately philosophically revolutionary changes in Hobbes' conception of liberty through his major works: *De Cive*, *The Elements of Law*, and *Leviathan*. He supports his conclusions with references to letters, lesser known minor works which formed the raw material for his major theoretical texts, as well as to Hobbes' history of the Civil War, *Behemoth*. Tying these works together, Skinner demonstrates, are two central questions: what is a free person, and what is a free state? These questions are not treated by Hobbes as free floating philosophical abstractions, but as vital questions of political practice pushed to the forefront by the explosive political context of the Civil War.

In developing his answer to these two questions Hobbes continually had before him the answers of classical and contemporary republican thinkers. For the republican tradition, liberty was essentially bound up with

independence from arbitrary authority. A free person was any person whose decisions were not limited or determined by another person's arbitrary will. A free state, it follows, is any state not ruled by arbitrary authority. Free persons are thus understood in contrast to servants or slaves, while free states are understood in contrast to tyrannies or absolute monarchies.

As Skinner demonstrates, Hobbes viewed the republican doctrine as philosophically incoherent and politically dangerous. It was philosophically incoherent, Hobbes maintained, because it relied upon a doctrine of free will at odds with material reality. Underlying the different permutations of Hobbes' conception of liberty is his materialist thesis according to which all that is real is bodies and their motions. Human action, and therefore human freedom, must be understood according to this principle. The will, like anything else in the universe, is a form of motion, and as such is always determined by antecedent efficient causes. There can be no liberty, therefore, if liberty means absolute freedom of will from antecedent causes.

Hobbes does not draw the conclusion that therefore human liberty is a contradiction in terms. On the contrary, he progressively redefines human liberty to make it accord with his underlying deterministic conception of motion. The major changes that Skinner documents between Hobbes' early and mature conceptions of liberty concern the conceptual refinements required to establish a coherent relationship between his metaphysical determinism and his understanding of liberty. Ultimately Hobbes settles on the only conception of liberty that accords with his deterministic materialism: liberty consists exclusively in the absence of physical impediment on the motions of bodies.

This conclusion had profound consequences for the subsequent history of English political philosophy. It had the effect of turning the premises of republican political theory on their head. Hobbes attacked the republicans with their own principles. For the Republicans, the essential goal of any political organization is the liberty of its citizens. If Hobbes is correct, then any political organization—monarchical, oligarchical, or republican-democratic—leaves its citizens at liberty to the extent that it leaves them literally unbound. Political liberty *cannot* mean the absence of sovereign power, for in

the absence of sovereign power there is no citizenship, and therefore no free or unfree citizens. Where there are citizens there is sovereignty, and where there is sovereignty there is law, and where there is law there is an overriding obligation on the part of citizens to obey it, regardless of whether the sovereign is a monarch or a democratic assembly. The only way to reconcile the freedom of persons with the freedom of citizens, Hobbes argues, is to accept the definition of liberty that he proposes. Otherwise the republican position would yield the conclusion that *no* citizen is ever free in any state form, since a state implies the existence of law and the existence of law imposes limits on what people may choose to do. Those are *not* limits on anyone's liberty, Hobbes argues, because the law is not a physical constraint. Thus people are always at liberty unless they are physically bound. What the republicans demanded of a democracy they always already enjoyed in a monarchy.

The lasting contribution of Hobbes to liberal political philosophy, Skinner thus makes clear, is a theory of political liberty that links it to political obligation and law. Ultimately, what is essential for Hobbes is not the person of the sovereign, but the character of the laws which the sovereign defends. People can artificially constrain their natural liberty by agreeing to be ruled by law. There can be no rule by law, however, without absolute sovereign power. All sovereign power is absolute, so it is irrelevant to the political liberty of subjects whether the form of the sovereign power is monarchical or democratic. What matters is the way in which law constrains activity. Wise sovereigns, Hobbes reminds his readers, leave as wide a social space as possible for individuals to decide how they will act, using laws like hedgerows, not to restrict the movement of people, but to safely guide them to their destination. Skinner's conclusions bring out the lasting significance of Hobbes' achievement on this score. The essay is thus not only of historical or scholarly importance, but is itself an intervention into the on-going inquiry into the relationship between human freedom, political obligation, the nature of law, and the overall value of human life.

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**Reading Sensations in Early Modern England.** By Katharine A. Craik (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), xi + 200 pp. \$69.00 cloth.

This is a welcome addition to the growing field of works on the history of reading in early modern England. Katharine Craik argues that the effect of Renaissance literature on readers' minds, bodies, and souls, led to the formulation of a new aesthetic vocabulary based on the theory of the passions. The somatic experience of reading is examined through an analysis of texts by George Puttenham, Sir Philip Sidney, John Donne, Thomas Coryat, Richard Brathwait, and Thomas Conley. Different genres were believed to touch, move, strengthen, and inflame readers in a multitude of ways. In particular Craik focuses on the effects of reading on the ideally controlled masculine body of the English gentleman. She defines this as "a series of transactions between material language and the material body of readers and writers" (3).

The author first discusses the influence of Thomas Wright's and Henry Crosse's advice on the need to not only control one's feelings when writing or reading but to crucially hide your feelings from others. Passionate arousal from an abundant reading of worthless literature could slowly poison the body causing skin rashes, digestive problems, impotence, and early death. Others could easily read such signs of moral turpitude. Puttenham and Sidney launched a defense of poetry (the primary target of Wright and Crosse) as a noble and dignified art that enables men to tell vice from virtue. Many, including the authors of books on military conduct, held this argument in disdain. They claimed that godly anger (choler) gained from reading the Bible was virtuous as it reinforced courage, but that ignoble anger gained from reading fiction led to womanly soldiers and lost battles.

Plutarch's notion of an appetite for books being similar to the appetite for food is amply addressed in Craik's discussion of Coryat and the art of indigestion. She demonstrates the connections that the early modern writer and reader made between temperance and masculinity, and overeating and effeminacy. Just like food, reading had to be broken down into manageable meals and well chewed before swallowing.

The most striking argument advanced by Craik is that we can better understand the history of pornography by examining it as a part of the early modern discussion on the stimulating effects of literature. "For if pornography is conceived as a way of writing and reading, then pornographic affect resides not only in erotic feeling but in other kinds of deracinated sensation as well" (118). Cranley's *Amanda: Or, The Reformed Whore* (1635), which Craik calls a key text in the history of pornography, is dissected to show that critics feared that a literary transport would result, whereby reader and writer were sympathetically bonded and masculine self-government would be lost. Her conclusion that books damaged readers less because they contained stories of lust, anger, and grief, than because men did not properly prepare to read them and to control their feelings inwardly and outwardly is a powerful insight into the culture of early modern England.

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**Higher Education in Europe and the United States of America: A Diverse Collection of Essays.** By Henry Wasser with Solidelle Fortier (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007), xv + 128 pp. \$24.95 paper.

This is a collection of sixteen papers presented at conferences in diverse European and North American venues. The majority of the papers are concerned with recent developments in higher education, and many have a comparative perspective. However, also included are papers dealing with such disparate topics as "Henry Adams: American Intellectual" and "The Idea of Contemporary Europe." Most of the papers are by Henry Wasser but two have been co-authored by Solidelle Fortier—one assessing the (seemingly beneficial) impact of Staten Island Community College on the local economy and the other comparing Thorstein Veblen's *Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times* and F. Scott Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby*, suggesting they are "alike in their conception of the twenties post-war American society" (64).

Several papers consider the trend to the so-called “entrepreneurial” or “corporate model” university, permeated by the values and language of the market and characterized by growing links with private business interests. The trend has been associated with the rise of a managerial culture and a concomitant decline in professorial status and power within universities. One paper includes a list of recently advertised university vacancies (e.g. “Head of Learning and Information Services,” “Marketing/Public Relations Manager,” “Senior Director of Corporate Relations”) that speaks volumes. While recognizing that the trend has been fuelled by some compelling social, political, and economic concerns, Wasser is generally pessimistic about developments which he sees as threatening a commodification of knowledge, subverting academic collegiality and calling into question the legitimacy of the university as an institution whose claim to authority has been linked to an ideal of disinterested pursuit of knowledge (however qualified in practice).

Other papers in the collection consider the role of public university trustees (as exemplified by the case of the City University of New York), the relationship between technical and general education in different national educational systems, the disciplinary backgrounds and roles of European and American university leaders, and how the relationship between university and shorter post-secondary courses of education has been organized in different countries. There are also papers (seemingly stemming from the early 1990s and not up-to-date) comparing Scandinavian university systems and developments in higher education in the European Community. Another paper briefly sketches and evaluates alternative comparative approaches to the study of higher education.

Taken collectively, the papers direct attention to a variety of developments of much interest to contemporary observers of higher education. This said, a good many of the papers deal but sketchily with the problems raised, and many have a rather provisional, unfinished quality—an impression reinforced by the many typographical errors and sometimes cryptic formulations. Many of the papers lack a scholarly apparatus, mentioning points raised by other scholars but providing no references to specific works. This limits the utility of

the collection. In short, although these papers are always interesting in the questions they pose, readers will have to look elsewhere for a systematic, in-depth account of the issues they address and the developments they describe.

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**Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant’s Response to Hume.** By Paul Guyer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), xv + 267 pp. \$39.50/£23.95 cloth.

In this book the distinguished Kantian scholar and translator Paul Guyer has assembled a collection of previously published essays in which he examines the response that Kant gives to a number of abiding philosophical issues as treated by Hume, including causation, the metaphysical status of objects and the self, reason, taste (aesthetic judgment), and purpose (teleology). His rationale for this project is that, while Kant is famously known for having written that it was Hume (in the British empirical tradition) who awakened him from his dogmatic slumber (as induced by the Germanic tradition of Leibnizian metaphysics), exactly how Kant deals with what he considers to be the unavoidable skepticism resulting from Hume’s philosophy, indeed, what works of Hume he actually knew (in translation), has hitherto not been systematically examined.

Guyer shows how important it is, if we are truly to be in a position to assess the adequacy and cogency of Kant’s response to Hume, to understand how the empiricist and the rationalist, each, seemingly from opposed points of view, conceives of skepticism. As for Hume, he denies, as is well known, that either deductive reason (logic) or inductive reason (based on experience) can provide us with certain (apodictic) knowledge. Still, Hume believes, as Guyer indicates, that it is precisely such limitation that protects us from skepticism, since, he holds, skepticism results from making our authority either reason (in its independence from contingent experience) or experience (in its independence from rational necessity). In either case authority is arbitrary—whether it be rational authority, whose necessity has no basis in contingent experience, or experiential

authority, whose contingency lacks rational necessity. According to Hume, however, we are not to worry. We do manage to get along with each other in relying on custom, habit, tradition, our common human nature, etc., and also on the fact that we can, indeed, learn to improve our behavior through education, the example of our betters, and even the impact on us of sound philosophical reasoning. It is, I might add, hardly a big step from Hume to utilitarianism, according to which the calculation of pleasure and pain, i.e. of what works for us, provides the basis of human judgment.

Kant, as is equally well known, woke up from his dogmatic slumber to discover that the verities of metaphysics, which Hume had consigned to the flames as utterly useless, had succumbed to what, in his view, was the skepticism that resulted from Hume's demonstration that neither reason nor experience can provide us with reliable knowledge. He undertook as his truly formidable challenge the reconstruction of metaphysics on grounds that were, from his point of view, invulnerable to Humean critique. While there are many famously complex elements in the critique of pure and practical reason that Kant advances in order to save (liberate) metaphysics, and so both reason and experience, from dogmatists and skeptics alike, its basis is the critical distinction that he makes between practical reason and theoretical reason, between thinking (will, desire) and knowing, between human persons (rather, all beings in possession of a will for which they are necessarily, that is, freely, responsible) and things, between ends in themselves and instrumental means. As Kant observes in the Preface to the second edition of *The Critique of Pure Reason*, he found that he had to limit, to deny, to appropriate (*aufheben*) knowledge in order to make room for faith, for faith in the rational power of human beings to unite, necessarily, that is, freely, their wills in what he calls the kingdom of ends. He writes, consequently, in the opening sentence of Section I of *The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*: "It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a *good will*." The only good in itself, the only good that is unlimited, unconditional,

infinite, absolute, necessary, free...is will (whether the will of human beings or of God).

Kant thus shows that, if we are to accept Hume's demonstration that the old dogmatic (objectivist) metaphysics is dead but if, at the same time, we are to provide a sure (necessary and liberating) basis for both the scientific knowledge of nature (as founded on experience) and reason (as identified with the practice of human willing), then we must gladly embrace the paradox (this is my term) that it is the human subject, i.e. the human will, that is the (unique and universal) source, basis, criterion, standard, principle...of the good, that is, of all value (whether within or without nature).

The paradox, in other words, is that the only basis, the unique and universal basis, of the objective knowledge of nature, the knowledge of objects (of things), is subjectivity, the truth that the only element within or without nature that possesses intrinsic (unconditional or infinite) value is the human subject, the human being, what Kant calls human dignity, as possessed equally, freely, and collegially (fraternally) by all human beings without distinction (in terms of their natural endowments). The source or criterion of all value is practical reason, reason understood as the imperative practice of categorically subjecting (publicly communicating) our individual maxims to the critical will of others and equally of subjecting the universality of others' maxims (their public communication) to our critical will. As Hegel points out, "individual" is a concept universally true for all individuals; and "universal" is a concept that is individually true for all individuals. It is little wonder, then, that Kant finds that his concept of reason as moral practice (will) is identical with the biblical imperative of loving your neighbor as yourself: do unto others as you would have others do unto you.

But the above is not the story that Guyer actually tells. For his general approach, as if to make us wary no less of rational metaphysics (the transcendental idealism of Kant) than of empirical skepticism, is to argue that it is by no means clear that Kant successfully founds causation or knowledge of objects and the self, not to mention judgments of taste, on grounds that escape Hume's critique. Still, he typically concludes his discussion of the various

topics that he takes up with the observation that, while the final positions of Kant and Hume are closer to each other than has often been realized, Kant can be said to provide us with a richer, more nuanced conception of both reason and experience. Nevertheless, he observes near the end of his final chapter that “the distance between Hume and Kant is very great” regarding “the fundamental source of our moral principles and the conditions of the rationality of acting upon them” (252). But then he adds, quickly and surprisingly, that, while he cannot here “compare the merits of their moral theories as a whole,” he can at least “suggest that it would be welcome if we could find a way to retain Kant’s normative moral philosophy, that is, his view that human freedom is unconditionally valuable and that adherence to the categorical imperative is the way to preserve and promote that value, without taking on all of the burden of his reconstruction of teleology as well as of his metaphysics of the will” (253).

It thus becomes evident that Guyer omits dealing with a fundamental matter—that we cannot adequately assess Kant’s response to Hume without addressing the fact that it presupposes (is based on) his moral theory, on the metaphysics of morals. Guyer does not make clear that the revolution that Kant brings about in philosophy is based on the metaphysical (moral or practical) distinction that he effects between human subject (will) and natural object (thing). Reason, Kant demonstrates, is fundamentally will, thinking, practice. What he shows us, consequently, is that truly to grasp the fact that reason is the practice of free, autonomous, actively willing individuals who are collectively (universally) involved in constituting the kingdom of ends for all is to discover no less that it is solely on the basis of the truth of subjects, on the truth of subjectivity, that we can establish reliable knowledge of objects, objective knowledge. The paradox here is that objective certainty (as scientific knowledge of nature) is based on the truth of subjectivity, on the truth of subjects. Unless the human subject is held to be, as Guyer himself acknowledges, unconditionally (absolutely, infinitely) valuable, we have no basis for establishing either the *objective* certainty of the natural sciences or the *subjective*

truth of human relations (moral, political, aesthetic).

The paradox, then, to repeat, is that the only “thing” possessing unconditional (absolute) value, whether within or without nature, is the human (together with the divine) person. It is the truth of human subjects, the truth of subjectivity, that constitutes (guarantees) the validity of objective certainty. Indeed, Kant is aware, unlike most philosophers who engage his thinking, including Guyer, it appears, that, in revolutionizing metaphysics and so in endowing it with the power of overcoming not only skepticism but also dogmatism, he strips metaphysics of its dualisms (antinomies) whose source, both historical and ontological, is Neoplatonism (in its diverse historically Christian varieties). The thing-in-itself, which is not knowable as (that is, which is not reducible to) an object of nature, turns out to be nothing other than the human subject who possesses the power of thinking, of loving, of categorically willing the good universally true for all subjects.

That the thing-in-itself (as a willing, thinking human being) is *in* but not *of* the world of nature involves yet another paradox—the fact that Kant revolutionizes metaphysics by revealing its roots to have their origin in biblical ethics (as at once human and divine). When, however, Guyer claims that, according to Kant, “all laws must originate in mind—what we might think of as a profoundly Neoplatonic assumption underlying Kant’s entire philosophy,” he is misleading both historically and ontologically (216). He fails to make clear here (as elsewhere in his book) that “mind” for Kant is fundamentally practical reason (will or thinking), not theoretical reason (“thought thinking itself,” to recall Aristotle’s “Platonic” formulation). To “originate in mind” simply means for Kant that mind, human reason or will, is the origin, the unique and the universal principle, of all value. Value is not natural, as a conditional given. Rather, value is willed, as an unconditional (a necessary or free) gift (traditionally called grace). We find, then, that, if we are to have an adequate understanding of Kant’s response to Hume, we must address the fact that it is founded on the metaphysical power of practical reason to constitute the world, both the objective world of nature and the

subjective world of human beings, on the truth of subjectivity, on the subjectivity of truth.

I want to thank Avron Kulak and Mohamed Khimji for reading my review and providing me with critical comments on it.

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**In Spite of Partition: Jews, Arabs, and the Limit of Separatist Imagination.** By Gil Z. Hochberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), xiii + 192 pp. \$35.00/£19.95 cloth.

This book attempts to carve out a new path for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The author contends that the partition idea, which increases the tension between Jews and Palestinians, as they constantly haggle over the exact demarcation lines of their combined territorial space, can be overturned by bridging the cultural gap between them.

Gil Hochberg's hypothesis is that if Jew and Arab can be forged into a hybrid identity, the 'Arab Jew' as "an example of the first, the genuine citizen of the future unified Arab-Jewish state" (140) will have been born, and it is upon such an Arab Jew, that the author relies to mediate the Middle East conflict. Its resolution will thus be achieved by the total transformation of the separate Jewish and Arab national identities into one identity.

The only trouble with this hypothesis is that it does not work on any level of analysis, including that of literature to which Hochberg has turned in order to find an alternative to the logic of partition. My reasoning begins with the fact that it is actually in the literary writings of the Bible and the Koran that the Middle East conflict first begins, for it is there that the formation of the Israeli and Palestinian identities were initially forged into being and so it is there that the connection between signifier and signified breaks down in the Arab-Israeli discourse over the Middle East conflict resolution. With reference to Jacques Derrida's theory of deconstruction, concerning the instability of language, to which the author does allude, it becomes clear that Jew and Arab cannot be brought together into one identity, unless they resolve first and foremost their

conflicting cultural narratives that continue to this day to define their different and at times diametrically opposed paradigms of thought. For example, to the Palestinian "Temple Mount" will mean the sacred space from which the Prophet Mohammed ascended to heaven, whereas to the Israeli it will mean the locus of religious identity for the believer in the God of Israel. The holy site is thus recognized by both religions, but there is no limit to their separatist imagination when it comes to sovereignty over it.

Hochberg's appeal to secularization and democratization as a system of values does not in itself bring the identities of Jew and Arab closer together, for it must be understood that the vast majority of Jews and Arabs in Israel/Palestine resist vehemently such a hybrid national identity. They simply do not want to be "the first, the genuine citizen" in a future minded unified Arab-Jewish state, as proposed by the author. Like in the case of the European Union, here in the Middle East, each linguistic community, be they Hebrew speakers or Arab speakers, aspires to greater cultural autonomy so much so that Hochberg should recall the words of her own mentor: Edward Said's warning against the attempt by the west to dominate, restructure and have authority over the Orient, to create for it an identity—western style (*Orientalism* [1978], 3).

Unfortunately, *that* is exactly what Hochberg does when she proposes to Arab and Jew to adopt either a *transnational* identity in accordance with the American model, where peoples of different cultural backgrounds willingly assume their American identity, or a *supranational* identity in accordance with the European model, where separate national identities are subsumed under a single European Union identity.

Finally, Hochberg's attempt to use the literary works by Israeli and Arab authors, including Albert Memmi, Mahmoud Darwish, Anton Shammas, Orly Castel-Bloom, Ronit Matalon, and Albert Swissa, to influence and promote a perception of life that is not confined by religion, traditional values and ancient beliefs, also fails. It fails because this secular and pluralistic perception of life in a Middle Eastern society is not a part of the Orient's legacy. Here life is perceived through the prism of eschatological literature; it is the Hebrew written Bible and Arab written Koran

that fire the imaginations of Jews and Arabs respectively. These sanctified literary works cannot be replaced by modern day Hebrew and Arab literature, nor can the separate Jewish and Arab identities be replaced by a 'Jew Arab,' who in terms of cultural identity never was, nor, in my opinion, ever will be, despite Hochberg's profound wishes to the contrary.

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**Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment.** By A. W. Carus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), xiv + 346 pp. £50.00 cloth.

Rudolf Carnap was one of the most prominent members of the Vienna Circle of logical positivists, and the best-known and most successful exponent of Logical Empiricism, the more sophisticated successor approach that flourished in the United States, after the philosophers in question had been forced to leave Europe by the Nazis. Out of all the most important twentieth-century philosophers, Carnap is perhaps the one who has taken the longest to be accorded significant critical appreciation. In recent years, though, American scholars such as Alan Richardson, Michael Friedman, Thomas Ricketts, and Warren Goldfarb have produced books and articles on Carnap, as have German scholars such as Thomas Mormann. Cambridge University Press has also recently published a *Cambridge Companion to Carnap*. These works are now joined by this book, whose author, A. W. Carus, is affiliated to the Department of Economics at the University of Cambridge. Carus says that he aims partly to assemble what others have recently done into a connected story, but also to add an extra dimension of archival work on unpublished sources.

Carus's book concentrates on Carnap's early work, although it is written from the perspective of his *later* work. Its opening chapters are on Carnap's intellectual context and *Bildung* (education, formation, development), his intellectual inheritance of positivism and various forms of neo-Kantianism, and the influence of Gottlob Frege. Carus then moves on to consider which form of neo-Kantianism Carnap adopted in his early writings, and how

this was related to the views of the 'Marburg School' of neo-Kantians, as well as to those of Hermann von Helmholtz, Henri Poincaré, and Hugo Dingler. The influence of Bertrand Russell and of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the fortunes of the Vienna Circle's programme of "rational reconstruction" are examined in some detail. The book's last three chapters concern how Carnap came to make the breakthroughs that resulted in his own later project of "explication" in the 1940s. In these later chapters, though, Carnap's own words serve mainly as the jumping-off point for Carus to expound the conception of explication that he thinks is implicit (but largely undeveloped) in Carnap's later work.

Carus's fundamental idea is that Carnap's work falls into two broad phases: an early phase of "rational reconstruction," and a later, "syntax platform." Carus not only prefers the latter to the former, but explicitly writes his book from the standpoint of the latter, calling his approach "unashamedly teleological" (40). In other words, it's whig history, reading the earlier Carnap through the lens of the later. (Why is it only philosophers that consider this acceptable any more? Historians have regarded it with suspicion since the 1930s, but historians of *philosophy* are apparently free to carry on with it regardless).

While Carus allows that Carnap's early "rational reconstruction" phase was both assimilated by his colleagues in the Vienna Circle and well-understood by others, he insists that the very different platform of Carnap's later "syntax" view, which led to the idea of explication, was not. It was only partially thus assimilated by the Vienna Circle (33), and even the English-speaking philosophers who were Carnap's closest interlocutors then had an insidious influence (34), misrepresenting fundamental aspects of his mature view (8, 35). These rotters either ignored the syntax platform (A. J. Ayer, in *Language, Truth and Logic*), or critiqued dogmas that Carnap had long left behind (W. V. O. Quine in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"), or completely failed to address Carnap's devastating objections to their views (Karl Popper, in his life's work beyond 1936). As a result of their work, the "logical empiricism" rejected by recent philosophy "was never propounded by any of its leading figures, whose actual doctrines have largely been ignored" (7).

Carus's book, though, by focussing principally on Carnap's *early* work, is not best-placed to make this case. Its last three chapters concentrate on arguing that explication is a suitable vehicle for enlightenment (and comparing this with alternatives suggested by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas). But one learns significantly less here about Carnap's actual work during the 1940s and 1950s than one learnt from the earlier chapters about the previous phases of his work. What is more, although Carus's detailed chronology of Carnap's work is persuasive, I'm not convinced that the way he characterises the distinction between the two broad phases of that work is right. Carus recognises that the initial trend of Carnap's work was towards "the *rejection* of all vestigial inherited ordinary-language concepts" (x, emphasis added), under the rubric of "rational reconstruction," but he insists that a *contrary* motion set in within his later work (xi). This will, I think, come as a surprise to any reader of Carnap's *Logical Foundations of Probability* (1950), the book in which he set out most explicitly the "mature" views Carus wholeheartedly endorses. It is notable that the very example of rational reconstruction that Carus gives (15), of the replacement of our intuitive sense of "hot" and "cold" with the precise quantitative concept of temperature, is precisely the one Carnap uses to explain his method of explication in 1950 (§4)! And Carnap there says explicitly that the explication of an ordinary-language concept involves its *replacement* (*Logical Foundations of Probability*, p. 3). The contrast Carus tries to draw is not clearly present.

Carus deals in some detail with four objections that he envisages might be made to Carnap's method of explication (chap. 11). But it is notable that Peter Strawson's objection to this method is not among them. Strawson objected that Carnap's method could not *solve* philosophical problems, but only ignore them, since to move from an ordinary-language concept to its more precise "explication" is to *change the subject*. If a concept is philosophically problematic, one does not solve the problem (or even dissolve it) by moving to *another* concept. (I suspect that Carus ignores this objection because his focus is on how we attain *knowledge*, rather than understanding. He conceives enlightenment as a matter of knowledge. But the objection does suggest that Carnap's

method cannot do what he himself designed it to do, which was to solve philosophical problems).

Carus presents the Vienna Circle, in general, and Carnap, in particular, as trying to revive a version of the Enlightenment. But he also argues that "[t]he conceptual framework [Carnap] created is *still* the most promising instrument... for the very purpose he invented it to serve... the best basis for a comprehensive and internally consistent Enlightenment world view" (8, emphasis added). However, the version of enlightenment that Carus proposes seems clearly to fall prey to the same sort of objections raised against more familiar versions. Being enlightened, for Carus, is a matter of being part of a community that forges "purpose-built languages of mutual interaction" (308). That may indeed be part of what it is to be enlightened (i.e. both liberal and pluralistic) in a contemporary Western society. But the idea that "we are autonomous and responsible beings (both individually and as a species) *only* insofar as we construct our conceptual frameworks self-consciously rather than going complacently with the flow of our inherited concepts" (274, emphasis added) implies that the *vast* majority of the world's (past and present) population are *not* "autonomous and responsible beings." Whether or not enlightenment is the prerequisite of the educated, or even only of the scientifically educated, autonomy and responsibility are surely not. Likewise, the idea that "the language of genuine knowledge [is] starkly different from the evolved language of everyday life" (275) makes knowledge the province of the few. No doubt there are many things one simply cannot know without having a grasp on (some range of) scientific concepts, but this does not mean that no genuine knowledge can be expressed in "ordinary" language. The attitude toward everyday knowledge that Carnap shares with Popper here is inappropriately dismissive, and is an aspect of Logical Empiricism that does not deserve resuscitation.

One cannot help noticing that Wittgenstein often turns out to be the villain of Carus's account. But Carus, while acknowledging Otto Neurath's role in Carnap's conversion to "physicalism" (240), ignores the indications that Wittgenstein was also influential in this respect (notoriously, Wittgenstein broke off relations with Carnap because he

regarded Carnap as having stolen this idea from him).

The book is beautifully produced, with very few typographical errors. Despite my reservations, I think it well merits a place alongside the other works which are at last allowing us a more nuanced view of that modern *bête noire*, logical empiricism.

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**Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue, and Imagery in Conversational Discourse.** By Deborah Tannen. Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), x + 233 pp. £15.99/\$24.99 paper; £45.00/\$85.00 cloth.

This is a new edition of a 1989 milestone in the development of conversation analysis, and thereby of empirical pragmatics. At a distance of almost twenty years, one is surprised at the revolutionary simplicity of Deborah Tannen's observations and arguments, none of which ever quite amount to stating the obvious. The basic propositions might be: that language use is profoundly dialogic; that understanding requires the involvement of subjects in discourse; that creative repetition is a constitutive feature of the way involvement is created and we make sense in language; and that a whole range of iconic features similarly create involvement in discourse, such that apparently literary prosody is being used virtually everywhere. Much of that has become normal fare in empirical pragmatics, yet still surprises.

At that distance of almost twenty years, Tannen does well to add a 16-page Introduction to the Second Edition. Here she emphasizes "intertextuality" as her central concern, building an intellectual pedigree that involves, among much else, correcting Kristeva's take on Bakhtin, thus enabling conversation analysis to inherit part of twentieth-century literary analysis. The almost obvious propositions gain some intellectual weight, as if the linguist had suddenly decided to play in the big league. What is more intriguing, however, is the extent to which the intellectual references, especially the literary ones, were already there in the first edition. Tannen was always able to draw, one after the

other, on snippets of psychology, neurology, sociolinguistics, anthropology and novels. She was always writing in clear prose silhouetted by erudition. Yet none of that has ever really placed her in the kind of league where books are cited across many disciplines. And this second edition will not quite get her there either.

Part of the problem is that Tannen's book only really has one simple thing to say—language use creates involvement—and that thing is said with much repetition and too little complication. The kind of dialectic involvement at work in other intellectual discourses, perhaps based on the masculinity of *disputatio* as jousting with words, is a long way from the kind of constant agreement used here. For example, Tannen's long analysis of Jesse Jackson's speech to the 1988 Democratic National Convention is decidedly sycophantic, and the two-page afterword "Toward a Humanistic Linguistics" has the right title but no substance. Neither of those contributions picks up the classical ethical problem of rhetoric being used to mislead. Indeed, what is missing entirely is the great opposition between rhetoric and ethics, at a time when the British tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis was implicitly drawing on that problematic opposition to try to make people aware of what is being done to them through language. Tannen seems to miss the critical part. Here we thus find no systematic study of *failed* dialogue, of what happens when language goes wrong. The wide-ranging references all feed into the one stream—Tannen's theses cannot be wrong, since she can only find them reinforced wherever she looks. She states what is there, what is being done, and implies rather than argues that what is there, and what is being done, is good. That is not enough.

In keeping with her regime of repetition as reinforcement, Tannen makes no mention of other kinds of linguistics. Not a word about Chomsky, nothing substantial on cognitive linguistics, for example. This is not a book that speaks to debates in its discipline, but neither has it connected with other disciplines (deconstruction, for example, could pick up on most of this, especially the critique of the "conduit metaphor" since 1979). The great risk is that Tannen might be mistaken as a populist researcher with quaint empirical case studies

Tannen, along with the general development of pragmatics, has long been important in the league of linguists. Yet not enough people, beyond linguists, have paid enough attention.

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**Bach's Cycle, Mozart's Arrow: An Essay on the Origins of Musical Modernity.**

By Karol Berger (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), xi + 420 pp. £23.95 cloth.

Just as the title suggests, Karol Berger offers a broad conceptual view of the eighteenth century as a pivotal point in the history of music. His paradigm is the shape of musical time. Choosing Bach and Mozart as two poles in the approach to time and relating the first to the "ancients" and the second to the "moderns," he summarizes: "This is the story of how we, educated Europeans, exchanged time's cycle for time's arrow, and why. In their thinking about both the moral and the natural realms, the moderns shifted the balance of their esteem decisively from eternity, rest, and immutability—which had been privileged by the ancients and by the medieval Christians—toward time, motion, and change. Modernity, scientific as well as moral-political, is at bottom an attempt to emancipate linear time" (16). Berger claims that "this change in the shape of musical time was not a development internal to music alone but rather, with the onset of modernity, part of a larger transformation" (9). In order to explore the cause of this change he builds "a lengthy Interlude . . . which is at once the physical and intellectual center of this book. The Interlude tells the story of transition from the pre-modern Christian moral-political outlook to the modern post-Christian worldview" (16).

While the common antinomy between the two styles, baroque and classical, does not present a new view, the explanation of its cause and change from one pole to the other is always a challenge, open to new interpretations. The Interlude "Jean-Jacques contra Augustinum: A Little Treatise on Moral-Political Theology" is especially interesting and presents a broad spectrum of arguments. By addressing

the fundamental change in intellectual history of the Enlightenment it casts new light on this common antinomy. While every student knows that Bach's works were rooted in Christian values, while Mozart, especially in his operatic libretti, reflected revolutionary intellectual ferment, it is interesting to hear a new explanation of how this change came about. Still, the treatise and its accompanying musical analyses, like oil and water, cannot be easily mixed together. While the author claims that "the Interlude presents the perspective from which the music is seen here" (16), this perspective works only up to a point.

There are several things that prevent the material discussed here from being as broad as its conception. Any discourse on global change in the perception of musical time should cover a wider range of styles than just the major representative figures such as J. S. Bach and Mozart. What about those who came in the interval between them? What do they reflect? By narrowing down his focus, the author in fact weakens his theory. Similarly, when Berger compares Bach (*St Matthew Passion*) with Mozart (a number of operas), the objects of comparison should at least belong to the same genre. Bach, of course, did not write operas and Mozart did not write Passions. But Bach's contemporaries did write operas, and, like Bach, Mozart composed masses.

The writer discusses the eighteenth-century crisis in Christian values as if it happened only then and only once in history. Did no similar crises occur earlier in the Renaissance or later at the beginning of the twentieth century? One cannot help comparing this book with its distant model, Curt Sachs's *The Commonwealth of Art: Style in the Fine Arts, Music and Dance* (Norton, 1946). Tracing the basic dualism of *ethos* and *pathos*, which constantly alternate throughout the history of European thought, Sachs concludes: "As a consequence, no collective reaction to a certain style can be expected to be one and unequivocal, even were the reacting generation uniform and single-minded . . . The style of an age is often a purely defensive alliance of different, indeed, of opposite styles against the trends of the age before" (332). It is true that by avoiding the concept of style and "collective reaction" and limiting himself to Bach and Mozart in a specific dimension of musical time, Berger

avoids any sweeping generalization. But what if not a generalization can the reader expect from such a broad topic? The clash of expectations is further provoked by a lack of homogeneity in thought. While the topic dictates this organicism, the individual essays fail to provide it.

As always, the richer the writing the more it invites criticism. But this work is exceptionally interesting and full of insights. It teaches us a great deal. However, the genre of universal ideas, to which Berger is driven by his erudition, is perhaps a doomed genre. As Curt Sachs warned us by quoting Walter Pater: “theories which bring into connection with each other modes of thought and feeling, periods of taste, forms of art and poetry, which the narrowness of men’s minds constantly tends to oppose to each other, have a great stimulus for the intellect, and are almost always worth understanding” (Sachs, 26).

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**Falling for Science: Objects in Mind.**

Edited by Sherry Turkle (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), xii + 318 pp. \$24.95/£16.95 cloth.

The sciences and the arts are the two branches of the liberal arts university whose intellectual endeavors are least separable from practical work with specific objects. Laboratories and studios mark an institutional concession that here at least, the life of the mind requires bodily engagement with things around us. Yet an influential image of science as cerebral and unworldly persists in both cultural imagination and pedagogical practice.

For twenty-five years, Sherry Turkle asked MIT students to write about an object encountered in childhood or adolescence that influenced their path toward the sciences. This book collects selected student papers with eight additional invited essays from senior scientists (including MIT President Susan Hockfield). Turkle’s introduction laments the apparently growing disinclination of American students to study science, and asks how changes in science education might reverse this longstanding trend. Turkle clearly hopes to discourage regimented teaching to

the test, and to enable creative exploration of objects as part of early science teaching.

Alongside her hopes for pedagogical reform, the book also displays some generational shifts in childhood fascinations. Some essays recall taking things apart, before transistors and printed circuits made inner workings opaque. The first personal computers and computer networks mark another generational passage. LEGO blocks and other building toys are ubiquitous, however. Japanese pachinko and Lithuanian *siaudinukai* stand out as rare explicit markers of cultural difference amidst the pervasive material culture of suburban United States.

Objects do not stand apart in these essays, however. Most authors focus less upon things themselves, and more upon occasions for exploration and imagination. Few objects emerged unscathed, or even intact, from these encounters with incipient scientific curiosity. Recurrent disdain for what one was supposed to do with things accompanies evident joy in learning what one can do with them. I was predisposed toward Turkle’s emphasis upon scientific cognition as object-focused, but the essays made a subtly different impression. They celebrated an actively curious, unconventional cast of mind; without these particular objects that contingently entered these students’ play, others might have done just as well.

Although I find Turkle’s suggested implications for science and pedagogy plausible, readers should be cautious in generalizing. Turkle’s course, at the intersection of science studies and the MIT Media Lab, draws upon a select group of students. The career paths emerging from these forms of object-play are replete with graphic design, user interfaces, arts technologies, architecture, and computer science, with remarkably few chemists, biologists, astronomers, or physicists represented. Career paths in science are indeed diverse, and computer applications are increasingly prominent attractors for technological competence. Yet to discover what engenders the scientific creativity that guides innovative laboratory research, and especially to attract more students into basic science, these essays may mislead. One might need to ask instead what childhood experiences would attract students to courses in physical chemistry, cellular neurophysiology,

or condensed matter physics, instead of media arts or Turkle's course on "Systems and Self."

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**The Joy of Physics.** By Arthur W. Wiggins (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), 390 pp. \$26.95 cloth.

Albert Einstein spoke frequently of the great mysteriousness of the world, observing, "the most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible." Why should there be simple mathematical laws that are obeyed by physical objects as they undergo the seemingly infinite variety of transformations we observe in the world around us? It is the deepest sort of mystery.

But what joy to follow those laws wherever they may lead! To understand why a can of beef bouillon beats a can of mushroom soup in a race down an inclined plank, or why a spinning gyroscope doesn't fall over but instead precesses around a vertical axis, or why a CD produces a reflected rainbow of color—what fun indeed. Arthur W. Wiggins' new book, *The Joy of Physics*, seeks to communicate this joy to educated laypersons while sparing them much of the problem solving that "is not necessarily the most joyful part of physics," according to Professor Wiggins' students.

To manage this, Wiggins salts the presentation with amusing quotations and interesting "mini-biographies" of some of the principal characters; applications of basic principles to everyday phenomena such as golf swings, screen door closers, high-frequency hearing loss, and shake flashlights; and sketches by Sidney Harris. There are also 30 experiments you can perform with simple materials lying around the house, which seek to help readers make connections between the concepts and formulas discussed in the text and real-world stuff.

Unlike a great many books "about" physics, this one does not shy away from the mathematical symbols and equations that lie at the heart of physics. These are mostly presented as definitions and derived formulas. Important

steps in the derivations typically go missing, however, which may frustrate readers who are seeking to appreciate the special joy of physics Einstein speaks of—the joy of seeing how so much understanding flows from so modest a set of starting principles. Also, you may want to have the Greek alphabet handy as you read along, since many of the customary Greek symbols are used well before being named in the text.

My favorite aspect of the book is the applications, where we catch a glimpse of the power and the fun of physics. We learn how Newton's laws influence the design of arches and domes. We find out how keeping acceleration low is the key to surviving collisions and how UFO abductions can't possibly happen the way some depict, since the acceleration would liquefy the internal organs of the abductee. And we can experiment with chocolate chips in a microwave oven to investigate the speed of light—ending up with s'mores! Wiggins calls these nuggets of insight physics' greatest hits.

Whether there is enough development of the tissue that connects these hits to the fundamental principles—enough weaving done with us that we come to appreciate how Nature organizes her entire tapestry, as Feynman describes it—will depend on the reader's dedication, and perhaps on a teacher as affable as Professor Wiggins.

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**Energy Victory: Winning the War on Terror by Breaking Free of Oil.** By Robert Zubrin (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), 336 pp. \$25.95 cloth.

Next only to new books about China the book shelf about Green Matters (climate change, energy shortages, slow food, sustainability efforts, etc.) grows almost as fast as our sense of the seriousness of the situation.

All the more reason to appreciate singular items like the Robert Zubrin book, an argument for mandating the use first in the United States, and thereafter by choice elsewhere of flex-fuel cars and trucks. The case he makes cuts through the "fog of war" that now

has us bewildered by claims and counterclaims for alternative energy policies, all but two of which Zubrin trashes (only flex-fuel and fusion win endorsement).

Zubrin, a nuclear engineer and space exploration enthusiast, condemns as farcical the Bush Administration hydrogen project. He warns that conservation successes will not prove remotely enough to turn the tide. These and comparable current responses to the Oil Crisis ironically serve the interests of today's Middle East oil cartel, a body that promotes the growth of the international terrorist movement.

Zubrin wants the U.S. Congress to immediately require the U.S. oil industry to sell only cars capable of running on alcohol fuels. This would force OPEC to compete with methanol and ethanol, as produced from farm crops worldwide, and help marginalize petroleum exporters.

Zubrin also champions development of fusion energy, for its success "will eliminate the specter of energy shortages for millions of years to come" (214). Crippled to date by a gross failure of political leadership, its development should enable humanity to "settle other planets and, someday, travel to the stars" (219). As well, advances here will salute the idea that Humankind can endlessly progress, however unevenly.

Written clearly and forcefully, the book has an air of emergency, as Zubrin is convinced that America's growing dependency on ever-scarcer Middle East oil increasingly threatens the future of the world. We must defeat reactionary totalitarianism and at the same time raise the quality of well-being worldwide, two goals best met by rapid conversion first to an Alcohol Economy, and then, in due course, to a Fusion Economy.

Readers are likely to leave this emphatic book puzzled by the inability of Zubrin and supporters to carry the day (see their website, [setAmericafree.org](http://setAmericafree.org)). Zubrin does us all a service in making the case as well as he does: the responsibility he puts on us for choosing sides could not be greater.

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**Flower Hunters.** By Mary Gribbin and John Gribbin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), x + 332 pp. £16.99 cloth.

*Flower Hunters* is a delightfully cynical book of adventure and commerce, travel and hardship, biography and landscape, the history of mercantilism, capitalism, and colonialism (mainly British), avarice (mainly that of the burgeoning Victorian bourgeoisie), and the emergence of a naturalistic aesthetic. With an Introduction and apologies to those whose careers are only touched upon, and a Prologue devoted to John Ray, nine chapters trace the exploits and exploitation of eleven botanists: Carl Linnaeus, Joseph Banks, Francis Masson and Carl Peter Thunberg, David Douglas, William Lobb and Thomas Lobb, Robert Fortune, Marianne North, Richard Spruce, Joseph Dalton Hooker. No apology is made for lopsidedness: one woman to eleven men, one Swede to eleven Britons (mostly Scots), two (North and Hooker) born to privilege versus ten turned out to work if not bona fide members of the working class. But the flower hunters' tales compensate for the *Flower Hunters's* deficiencies.

One tastes the sardonic flavor of Mary and John Gribbin's book in several chapters, for example:

Sales of the Flowering Currant, *Riber sanguineum*, alone covered the entire outlay of the Horticultural Society on the expedition. But [David] Douglas began to become disenchanted when he discovered that his salary was less than the pay of the hall porter at the Society's office. (150)

Indeed, William Lobb, whose "great achievement was to send back to England sacks full of viable seed from many species of pine—exactly what [the entrepreneur] Veitch, and the British gardening public, wanted" (181), died in penury in San Francisco, while Thomas Lobb returned to England only to receive "no pension or other financial support from the Veitch family that he had served so well and for whom he had generated so much income" (186).

The Gribbins' description of how the East India Corporation attempted to corner the quinine market also drips with sarcasm:

An opportunity to make money while doing something that could be presented to the

world as altruism was too good to be missed, so it was inevitable that someone would soon rise to the challenge of taking *Cinchona* from South America to India and the Far East. The person who was in the right place to organize this 'rescue' of the fever-curing tree was Clements Robert Markham...and the person who was in the right place to obtain the seeds and young plants...was Richard Spruce. (250)

*Flower Hunters* is a good read, but it doesn't have anywhere near the number of pictures it might have. For example, there is no picture of the "potted Cycad (*Encephalartos altensteinii*) [brought by Francis Masson] back to Kew in 1777, where it still lives today—the oldest pot plant in the world" (104). But each chapter ends with a section, "In the Garden" listing the common and uncommon varieties of plants discovered and cultivated through the exploits of flower hunters. The Gribbins' book will thus appeal to anyone who has ever thought about biodiversity or asked where a plant came from.

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**The Origin of Speech.** By Peter F. MacNeilage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), xi + 408 pp. £25.00 cloth

*The Origin of Speech* emulates the great work invoked in the title. Like Charles Darwin, Peter MacNeilage would deduce theory from collected data (compiled with Barbara Davis). Moreover, his "frame/content" and "speech as an action" (10) theories spark controversy.

MacNeilage defines speech as "pairing of a concept with a sound pattern" (7) and analyzes acquisition of sound patterns during baby babble and first word stages of pre-speech development. His dissection of the speech apparatus allows him to discuss speech segments and errors technically for the uninitiated, and he documents his thesis that "virtually every utterance of every speaker of every one of the world's languages involves an alternation between the two opposite configurations of the vocal tract" (89). He concludes that baby babble begins at a "frame dominance"

[stage]... of *inertia*" (117) followed by "the frame/content stage... [where] segmental content elements (consonants and vowels) [are inserted] into syllable structure frames" (121) producing the "variegated successive syllables... [of] any language in the world" (122).

MacNeilage describes brain organization and correlates stroke, brain damage, electrical stimulation, and irritative-lesions with linguistic symptomatology, various aphasia syndromes, and brain imaging. He fits these parallels to his "schematic view of the organization of spontaneous speech production" (196) and discusses handedness and other evidence supporting "two complementary vertebrate-wide hemispheric specializations" (213), culminating in "a left-hemisphere specialization for the control of routine actions" (283). In MacNeilage's view, "signs of sign languages are different from syllables of spoken language" (276); "we haven't yet found any genetic effects that are specific to language" (298); although birds "seem to have song-specific innateness" (303), "the overall evolutionary trajectories of speech and birdsong were very different" (309).

Regrettably, MacNeilage explains trends in macrometric data by appealing to Haeckelian/Piagetian metaphysics: "the ontogeny of speech recapitulates its phylogeny" (105). Thus, he speculates "that the earliest speech of hominids was very much like the babbling and early speech of modern infants, and it subsequently increased in complexity in ways very similar to the ways that speech develops in infants today" (102); "the *foundation* for both mimesis and speech in humans lies... in monkeys" (173); "what we see today as babbling patterns, evolved for the prespeech function of vocal grooming, and they have deep phylogenetic roots that far transcend hominid evolution" (302).

And equally damaging, MacNeilage falls for the seduction of Lamarckian teleology (e.g., what was "needed...arose" [100]). Indeed, MacNeilage combines teleology and recapitulation when asserting that "because of demands for production of a large message set, ... evolution... needed to expand the size of the phonological message set... An infant must telescope this progression and go from natural reduplication to unnatural variegation in a single generation" (257–58). Thus, MacNeilage's "fundamental claim about how speech itself evolved to serve

language... [namely that] parental terms of baby talk are *living fossils*... [and] the *missing link* between the prelinguistic era of hominids and the linguistic era" (313) is another 'just so story.'

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**The Riddle of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion*.** By Paul Russell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), xvi + 424 pp. £45.00 cloth.

David Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*, one of the most influential books in the history of philosophy, seems to most scholars a disjointed work at odds with itself. Over the years, reactions to its three parts, *Of the Understanding*, *Of the Passions*, *Of Morals*, have settled into two distinct camps of interpretation. During the nineteenth century, the skeptical section on understanding got the most attention and was taken to be quintessential Hume as he unfolded the logical consequences of British empiricism via Berkeley and Locke. This interpretation, focused on epistemology and metaphysics, is still very much mainstream and commonly dominates expositions of Hume in textbooks and histories of philosophy. In the twentieth century, a second interpretation by Norman Kemp Smith argued for primacy of Hume's naturalism in the section on morals where sentiment rather than reason is the basis for moral choice. So we have advocates of radical skepticism facing advocates of moral naturalism as the two leading views of Hume's great work, with nothing much in between.

Most every student of Hume seems agreed that Book 2 on the passions has no plausible connection with Books 1 and 2. There is also wide agreement that the *Treatise* has little to say about religion, with the exception of Charles Hendel, who goes on to deny that Hume is hostile to Christianity. The "riddle" that hangs over the work is the apparent "broken-backed" (Paul Russell's phrase) relation of Book 1 to Book 2. In the latter, Hume purports to establish a secular "science of man" based on experimental reasoning and common life, the program of his naturalism. In the former, however, his Pyrrhonist skepticism seems to

undermine the latter by denying or seriously undermining the possibility of science and philosophy.

Russell sets out persuasively and in much detail to answer the riddle and establish firm connection of the *Treatise* with religious issues. He argues that: (1) the three parts of the *Treatise* are complementary and form a unity (the work is *not* broken-backed); (2) that religion is indeed Hume's target long before his subsequent works address the subject; (3) that *irreligion* is motive and intent in the *Treatise* that binds the three books together; and (4) that without the overriding premise of irreligion, the riddle of the *Treatise* cannot be resolved.

The theme of irreligion can be seen in three ways: as a *weak version* consisting of scattered arguments about causation, induction, self, and the external world unfriendly to religious claims about God, man, and nature; as a *moderate version* that puts irreligion on an equal footing with skepticism and naturalism without a clear relationship; and as a *strong version* that views irreligion as the key component of the book that makes the other two components intelligible. If Hume is understood the third way, then his *Treatise* emerges as a coherent, comprehensive system of irreligion and atheism.

Influences on Hume are discussed at length. The most important is Thomas Hobbes, whose works pioneered a systematic challenge to theological systems by proposing a secular understanding of nature, man, society. At the same time, Samuel Clark was the leading Christian apologist against Hobbes. The stand-off between those two and their respective followers continued into the first three decades of the eighteenth century, with representatives of each view contending in Scotland. Hume was aware of the ongoing battle of religious systems with secular free thought. Russell's view is that Hume's *Treatise* was a systematic continuation of the latter tradition, although he believes it can stand alone without any reference to prior influences.

The overall coherence of the *Treatise* in support of irreligion is explained this way. The skeptical part shows the weakness of human understanding. It begins with an unyielding skepticism about the foundations of knowledge, with inflated theological and metaphysical claims in mind, and ends with a milder academic skepticism that allows for credible

knowledge derived from experience and probability. The purpose of the skeptical part is to squash claims of religious (i.e., Christian) apologists like Samuel Clark, but also to defuse all pretension to knowledge of absolutes. After this cleansing operation, the part on the passions analyzes sources of moral behavior in human nature, and the part on morals builds a science of man by experimental method free of religious baggage. The purpose of these parts working together is to establish a secular foundation for morality and society. The entire program of the *Treatise* is therefore irreligious in its unified goal to break free of religious assumptions in general and Christianity in particular. It turns out that Hume's contemporary critics understood very well what he was up to, while later critics lost their way and burdened philosophy with the "riddle" of the *Treatise*.

Russell explores at length whether or not Hume was an "atheist." The answer turns in part on what is meant by theism. There is "thin theism" (vague belief in a cosmic intelligence), which Hume rejects as theoretically empty and useless in practice, and "thick theism" (belief in a being clothed with attributes like omnipotence and infinite goodness), which is rejected as improbable and incredible. While Hume appears to leave the door ajar in his critique of the argument from design (i.e., there is a possible analogy between order in the world and products of the human mind), he dismisses the possibility as beyond human understanding and irrelevant to exigencies of common life. Russell prefers *irreligion* to labels like *atheist* or *agnostic* because the word expresses more broadly Hume's hostility to all forms of religious belief and practice. In short, the *Treatise* expounds a philosophy of irreligion and as such is "the jewel in the crown of the Radical Enlightenment" (278).

The volume's scholarly apparatus in five chapters divided into 20 sections includes 86 pages of close packed notes and 18 pages of bibliography. Russell has absorbed much Hume scholarship and commentary from the eighteenth century to the present. He comments in clear, informative prose on the arguments of numerous scholars, theologians, and philosophers, both well-known and obscure. There is a useful index to help readers locate individuals and topics. A mild criticism of this important book is that 300 pages of main

text might have been shortened to avoid some repetition. If a reader wants to grasp what Russell is doing in a nutshell, sections 1 and 18 provide a succinct summary of his thesis, arguments, and conclusions.

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**What Is Analytic Philosophy?** By Hans-Johann Glock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), xii + 292 pp. £15.99 paper.

This is a very good book on a topic of interest to Continental and traditional philosophers, but especially to analytic philosophers. Its genre is "applied philosophy of language," with the application being to recent History of Philosophy. It is analytic philosophy applied to the question, "What is analytic philosophy?"

Since Plato, it has been clear to many thinkers that, except in mathematics, there are very few predicates in natural languages whose application can be specified by giving necessary and sufficient conditions. "Analytic philosophy" is more than normally resistant to explication. It is clearly true that Quine is an analytic philosopher and Heidegger is a continental philosopher, so the predicate "analytic" must have some content, but it is not easy to state even necessary conditions that will distinguish "analytic" from "continental." Given that "paradigm" analytic philosophers include such diverse thinkers as Wittgenstein, Goodman, G. E. Moore, Kripke and Carnap, it is difficult to find any characterization that will apply to them all, and it is difficult to imagine a single school or "movement" they could all be said to participate in.

After arguing in the first two chapters for the importance of the topic and giving a survey of the history of analytic philosophy, Hans-Johann Glock devotes a sequence of chapters to several kinds of attempts to characterize analytic philosophy and philosophers. Many of these characterizations have some truth to them, but all, except for the final characterization that Glock offers, fail to be adequate.

In the third chapter, Glock points out that geographic and linguistic characterizations fail, since, for instance, so many founding figures of analytic philosophy are German and

Austrian. In brief, “continental” in “continental philosophy” has very little to do with continents.

The fourth chapter examines the characterization that analytic philosophy has a dismissive attitude towards the history of philosophy. This charge, while it characterizes some important analytic philosophers, is not an accurate characterization of all or even most analytic philosophers. In addition, Glock points out that philosophers, not generally taken to be analytic, such as Schopenhauer, are as dismissive of the history of philosophy as any analytic philosopher. The discussion of attitudes towards the history of philosophy is especially valuable, since Glock characteristically distinguishes several ways that “ignoring history” might be understood.

The fifth and sixth chapters show that characterizations in terms of doctrines and topics are not adequate (analytic philosophy is not a “school”), and that analytic philosophy does not have a distinctive method or style. “Clarity,” for instance, is not peculiar to analytic philosophy. (In this instance, I would add that “clarity” is relative to one’s genre of philosophy. In the mid-eighties, I gave Derrida a copy of Kripke’s *Naming and Necessity*, telling him that this was a paradigm of a transparent philosophical text. Derrida told me that he had read it, and could not understand what it was about. On the other hand, he said, Heidegger was perfectly clear.) The still-current idea that analytic philosophy dismisses metaphysics can only be held by a continental who has not read analytic philosophy of the last forty years.

The seventh chapter discusses an accusation that was surely true of some prominent figures in analytic philosophy, that ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy were dismissed as non-cognitive. Once again, this is an accusation that must ignore the last half-century of analytic philosophy.

The eighth chapter takes up what is philosophically the most interesting topic: What, according to Glock, is an accurate characterization of analytic philosophy that illuminates what “is an analytic philosopher” says about someone, and how the predicate phrase meaningfully contrasts with both “is a traditional philosopher” and “is a continental philosopher?” Glock scouts the idea that it is an “essentially contested” concept like “democracy” or “terrorist.”

He next explores the idea that “analytic philosophy” is a family resemblance concept—a term whose application rests, not on a common feature of every instance of the concept, but rather depends on overlapping patterns of resemblance. This idea, while it has some promise, would include too many philosophers who do not fit the intuitive distinction. No matter how much Plato shares with Carnap, Plato is not an analytic philosopher. The reason, clearly, is that Plato’s views did not derive from Frege, Russell, or any other founder of the analytic movement.

Glock thus develops the idea that “analytic philosophy” is a genetic, historical concept. For this idea to work, the primary notion has to be analytic philosophy as something like a movement. The idea is to start with analytic philosophy as a social and historical phenomenon within philosophy, and then characterize doing analytic philosophy and being an analytic philosopher as participating in the phenomenon. The link tying analytic philosophy together is the relation of influence. Influence alone, though, makes “analytic philosophy” trivially inclusive. Thus Glock calls in the specific overlapping resemblances of “family resemblance” to limit the influences to the ones that properly count as analytic. Thus Hegel’s influence on Brandom doesn’t qualify Hegel as an analytic philosopher.

The result is the overlapping and intertwined group of movements and traditions that is the movement “analytic philosophy.” No single thread of influence connects even every tradition in analytic philosophy. Roughly speaking, analytic philosophers are those who were trained as analytic philosophers by analytic philosophers. Who one read in graduate school, who one refers to in writing and talking philosophy, who one’s dissertation-director was, all contribute to whether one counts as an analytic philosopher. One is an analytic philosopher by being a part of some such tradition. Two analytic philosophers may have no views or topics or techniques in common, but will have some background in common. They are participants in traditions that at least overlap.

Glock’s treatment of the question of what analytic philosophy is and what it takes to be an analytic philosopher is quite perceptive and accurate. His diagnosis for the future of analytic philosophy, the topic of the ninth and last

chapter, while it deals with much that is problematic about analytic philosophy, misses an institutional fact that I think will probably end “analytic philosophy” as an intertwined set of traditions, at least in America. To be sure, this institutional fact is more visible to an American who has directed a graduate program for a few decades.

In America since the late sixties, there have been many more qualified PhDs in Philosophy generated every year than there are permanent tenure-track jobs. Thus competition for entry-level positions in philosophy departments has been intense for the past forty years. The response of graduate philosophy departments has been to urge their students to publish in journals prior to getting their degree. Early on, new PhDs with publications had a dossier that distinguished them from their competitors. By now, having multiple publications is the norm for successful job candidates.

Once a new PhD has a tenure-track job, she has five years to accumulate enough publications in peer-reviewed journals to satisfy a sequence of committees and get tenure. The “standards” for tenure at respectable universities have risen to the point where a book is required in addition to the pile of articles.

How does one publish articles in peer-reviewed journals as a graduate student or a brand-new faculty member, given that, like almost all of us, one is probably not a genius with a truly great idea? One must master a literature and find something to contribute to it. In order to do this quickly, the literature to be mastered must be focused and manageable, and contributions to it must not require deep understanding of topics outside it. So, the survival strategy for graduate students and new PhDs is to choose a narrow specialty early. After a decade, these narrow literatures themselves become by the addition of so many contributions, very large. So a successful publication strategy must be even more narrowly focused, since publication, of course, requires a thorough “knowledge of the literature.” Each formerly small literature becomes vast by this process. (In 1970, you could have read the entire twentieth-century literature on the sorites argument in a few afternoons. Now the student who wishes to write on

vagueness and the sorites needs a year of reading even to get her bearings.)

The literary venues in every field, subfield, and sub-subfield have proliferated to meet this demand. The number of philosophy journals in English has skyrocketed in the past four decades. Oxford University Press publishes hundreds of new philosophy books every year.

One result is that for graduate students, the history of philosophy is of *professional* interest (if it were rational to spend the time, most *would* find it interesting) only if they plan to become specialists in the history of philosophy. A knowledge of recent journal articles is more important for a new metaphysician who wants a job than a knowledge of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. Taking the time to read *Peri Psyche* thoughtfully is, *professionally* speaking, a waste of time for someone who intends to publish in one of the subfields of the philosophy of mind. Even a thorough knowledge of Carnap or Wittgenstein is a costly distraction.

The most important result in relation to Glock’s analysis of analytic philosophy is, briefly, that the roots of the traditions and movements that Glock uses to tie together “analytic philosophy” are more and more not part of the training and reference-set of new analytic philosophers. Students’ interests are in fact better served by focused specialization than by acquiring a broad knowledge of even one of the traditions that now are intertwined to constitute analytic philosophy.

If Glock is right that analytic philosophy is a group of intertwined traditions, and participants in a tradition must know the elements of the tradition, analytic philosophy does not have a future as such. For a tradition to continue in existence requires common texts and common knowledge. All of the traditions that at present are connected by family resemblances will, in the next several decades, have fragmented into sub-traditions that lack real connection among themselves. They will of course not be continental philosophers, but their ignorance of Heidegger will be matched by their ignorance of their own precursors.

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**Metaphysics and the End of Philosophy.**

By H. O. Mounce (London: Continuum, 2007), x +198 pp. £65.00/\$130.00 cloth.

H. O. Mounce maintains that the core of ancient and medieval philosophy was metaphysics—the study of what is most fundamental in reality (7)—which modernity has relegated to the periphery. Essential to metaphysics, as Plato saw, is a dialectical form of reasoning (abduction) that differs sharply from the deductive and inductive forms celebrated by David Hume. ‘Metaphysics’ has become a pejorative term, helping to sideline philosophy in this age of scientism, and Mounce examines the injurious role that empiricism has played in the last four centuries. He observes that empiricism has reversed the insightful scholastic maxim that being precedes thought, replacing it with the claim that “the world depends for its intelligibility on what is projected upon it by human thought” (41). He traces the ascendancy of empiricism through John Locke and Immanuel Kant, leading to a critique of logical positivism and leading figures of analytic philosophy—Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, and others.

Mounce calls into question not only the familiar empiricist principle that primary properties must be distinguished from secondary ones, but also the view that we are first acquainted in perception with the appearances of things, not things themselves. Such assumptions have made possible Kant’s distinction between the world in itself and the phenomenal world, and also the claim that the world in itself is unknowable. This relegates the role of philosophy to little more than analyzing the mental categories, such as space and time, that allow us to know the phenomenal world (50–51). Since the world is not accessible on this view, metaphysics becomes a futile task, and even the postmodern Nietzsche agrees (64).

Mounce observes that whereas the nineteenth-century positivist Auguste Comte

considered metaphysical claims unknowable, the twentieth-century positivists say that such claims are meaningless. However, even A. J. Ayer’s *Language, Truth and Logic* could not eliminate metaphysics, for its criteria of meaningfulness were sufficient to countenance theology, although Ayer did not admit this to his readers (100). Mounce observes that “the linguistic turn” has not helped these empiricists, for the problem of comparing objects with language is as difficult as the problem of comparing objects with perceptions of them (109). He argues that Rudolf Carnap’s attempt to provide a construction of the world using the tools of logic developed by Frege and Russell, and Russell’s claim that logic can reveal the inner structure of language (135) are problematic.

The least satisfactory portion of the book for me is his critique of analytic philosophy’s use of symbolic logic. His claim that for Russell “atomic facts consist of names” (129) is wrong, for atomic propositions have both predicates and name(s). Mounce’s discussion of Russell’s analysis of existential claims fails to appreciate his different explanations of why “The present king of France is more than two meters tall” and “The present queen of England is more than two meters tall” are both false. At the only point in the book where symbolic notation is used (114), the expression is flawed.

Three positive elements stand out: Mounce’s discussion of Wittgenstein’s prevailing influence upon differing forms of empiricism; Mounce’s observation that empiricism cannot account for the understanding exhibited by children, and even animals (143), which in turn suggests that classical realism gives expression to insights that a narrow empiricism cannot; and his recognition that abduction plays a vital role in science, which also allows metaphysics to have a place in philosophy.

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