Schleiermacher and the Problem of Blendlinge

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Friedrich Schleiermacher’s lecture ‘On the Different Methods of Translating’ was delivered to the Royal Academy of Science in Berlin on 24 June 1813.1 Energetic, systematic and fecund, it has become a locus classicus for much thought on translation. Numerous subsequent theories have echoed the German preacher’s central and conclusive dictum: ‘Either the translator leaves the author in peace, as much as possible, and moves the reader toward him. Or he leaves the reader in peace, as much as possible, and moves the author toward him’.2 The first movement could crudely be called foreignizing or literalist (more word-for-word); the opposed movement involves the domesticating or naturalizing functionalism of ‘doing what the author would have done if he had belonged to the target culture’ (more sense-for-sense). Whatever the terms, Schleiermacher’s clear preference was for the first method, that of moving the reader by applying relative literalism. His ideal translation should retain something of the source text’s foreignness. Most of those who have since used or referred to Schleiermacher have expressed the same basic choice, preferring relative foreignizing to relative naturalization.

My purpose here is not to disagree with the preferences of Schleiermacher and his followers. Nor do I have any real dispute with those who favour naturalization. I am not overly interested in sizing up one method against the other. What really concerns me is the basic binarism of the choice itself. Why did Schleiermacher recognize only two substantial methods? Why did this geometry of pairs exist before him? Why has it survived after him?

These are my questions. They could be asked of many other theorists. I raise them now with respect to Schleiermacher precisely because his text is energetic, systematic and fecund. It might yield answers with the same qualities. But what is at stake here is not particularly complicated. My basic hypothesis is that Schleiermacher’s two opposed methods suppress a hidden middle term, the living translator, and that the whole of Schleiermacher’s text is designed to silence that middle term. If I can break open the text, the resulting vision might then be projected onto the entire line of binary translation theories, ending with the most recent, found in Venuti. All the binarisms might thus be seen as silencing middle terms. The project is simple yet not without ambition.

My aim requires a special kind of reading, sometimes focusing on Schleiermacher in his specific historical setting, sometimes going beyond him into the general field of binary translation theory, then seeking the unity of both moments. Let me first explain the reasons for this approach.

No great claims should be made for Schleiermacher’s originality. The basic distinction between
two movements had been formulated by Goethe some four months prior to the Berlin lecture, and
the general Germanic preference for the first method, moving the reader, had certainly been
expressed in similar terms by Herder. The lecture was very much part of a moment in German
letters, participating in a general attempt to oppose German Romantic aesthetics to the *belles
infidèles* of French Neoclassicism. If the good method was to be German (literalist, predominantly
from Greek), the not-so-good method was unmistakably French (naturalizing, more frequently from
Latin).

This nationalistic opposition was made all the stronger by the Napoleonic invasion, which
Schleiermacher opposed. The matter was quite immediate. On 24 June 1813, as the lecture was
being delivered in Berlin, the future of Europe hung in the balance. Napoleon had made
considerable advances at the battles of Lützen and Bautzen the previous month; on 4 June he had
signed the Pleswitz armistice; the Prague congress was to open on 5 July. The question in Berlin
was what kind of peace should be sought with the French. We know -Schleiermacher probably did
not know as he spoke - that Napoleon was using the armistice to build up his army; we also know
the French were to have new victories at Dresden in late August and at Leipzig in October. But for
Schleiermacher and his audience, in Berlin on 24 June 1813, the fighting might well have been over.
Theirs was a moment to debate about what kind of nation or state they wanted a humiliated Prussia
to be. And Schleiermacher, to tell all, was not looking for compromises. He had little contextual
reason to look kindly upon a French translation method.

Does this mean Napoleon explains Schleiermacher? The war situation was certainly pertinent,
but so were many other contexts. One could seek illumination in Schleiermacher’s theology, his
Protestant hermeneutics, his own translations of Plato, his work as a translation critic, his
relationship with the king, and so on. Attention should also be paid to certain juridical traditions and
ethnic tensions that we shall meet further down the track. Napoleon was only one of many factors
that we can group together as ‘local context’.

Of course, every translation theory has a similar series of local contexts. There have been many
immediate reasons for turning to a binary model of translation methods. The local reasons can
explain the turning. In this case, Napoleon can explain the specific binarism of German versus
French. Yet we must also explain how and why a whole series of translation theories has tended to
turn in terms of twos, and why Schleiermacher’s text in particular has remained pertinent - or has
become newly pertinent - well beyond anything to do with Napoleon. The local contexts exist, but
they cannot provide all the answers to our questions.

If we string historical translation theories together, we get a very different kind of context, as
vast as it is abstract. Beyond his specifically Germanic antecedents, Schleiermacher’s separation of
two alternatives connect with a network reaching back at least to Cicero’s ‘ut interpres / ut orator’.
Usually expressed as fidelity to one of two levels, the basic binarism reappears in more recent pairs
such as ‘formal’ versus ‘dynamic’ (Nida), ‘semantic’ versus ‘communicative’ (Newmark), ‘anti-
illusory’ versus ‘illusory’ (Levy), ‘adequate’ versus ‘appropriate’ (Toury), ‘overt’ versus ‘covert’
(House), ‘documental’ versus ‘instrumental’ (Nord), and ‘resistant’ versus ‘transparent’ (Venuti). Not all these twentieth-century theorists follow Schleiermacher’s preference; most of them would accept clines going from one pole to the other, with a whole series of middling strategies. Yet the basic binarism remains anyway, not just in the mode of thought but more importantly in the generalized refusal to consider the translator, or the place of the translator, as a viable third term. No great effort is needed to fit Schleiermacher into this quite contemporary context. The history of translation theory thus brings us to a second kind of local context, the translation studies of our own day and age.

This means Schleiermacher’s lecture is already embedded in our contemporary context. Although the words I have in front of me, in German, are perhaps the same as they were in 1813, their import has inevitably been modulated, for me, by what I have read from or of those words: the versions translated by Valentín García Yebra, André Lefevere or Antoine Berman; the public readings and commentaries by Ortega y Gasset, Lawrence Venuti, and several others. I cannot help but receive the text that functions, all forty odd pages of it, within the translation studies of our shared present. The two local contexts - 1813 and the present day - are thus already connected, since both are imbricated in the long history of abstract translation theory, and both bear on the text.

Of course, if I were happy about this existing connection, I would have no reason to draw attention to it. Things might as well stay as they are. Historical theories could happily go on conjugating each other, with never so much as a wink to any concrete translator in any concrete society, neither in 1813 nor now. Yet there is something fundamentally wrong with this kind of connection between historical contexts. Theories don’t do anything; people do things with theories. An alternative kind of linkage must be at work.

How important is the relation between Schleiermacher’s lecture and its Napoleonic context of 1813? We can certainly construct an image of its original reception - its ‘implied receiver’ - , but no one in our shared present, as far as I know, is vitally interested in debating whether Berlin should have welcomed Napoleon, whether Prussia should have a French-speaking king, or how Germanic culture might best achieve cultural supremacy. The problems we bring to Schleiermacher are quite different, or should be. If anyone is to pay attention to what we are doing - and I think translation studies should be speaking to more than just translation scholars - the problems we bring to texts must be of importance to ourselves and, hopefully, to our age. And if truly important, they should not be hidden or depersonalized. If I am intimately concerned by one aspect of Schleiermacher’s text, there is a good chance that others in our shared local context will be similarly concerned. In the end, we are the only active connection between the historical contexts. Ours are the only problems that really count. If not, why read and re-read these theories of the past?

As chance would have it, a wilfully individual mode of reading is particularly well suited to Schleiermacher’s text. His arguments sheathe a series of open questions that beg personal answers. Depersonalized readings tend to sort, analyze and historicize these questions. Some ask about Napoleon so as not to talk about more recent invasions. Yet once a reasonable amount of work has
been done to understand the questions - the local context of 1813 must be respected -, one can indulge in the luxury of answering a few of them directly, as if they had been asked here and now. We can understand Napoleon but then answer on the basis of Bosnia, for example. In fact, we must do this, since the text we have before us already functions here and now. The most vital issues are already present. Schleiermacher’s questions might be an expression of his age, but some of them can be answered in our own.

This approach forces me to consider two separate things. On the one hand, I must read the text as it exists, as I find it here and now. On the other, I must relate the text to certain social logics that could make 1813 pertinent to our situation today.

I start with what the text could be about.

Armin Paul Frank has quite correctly pointed out that Schleiermacher’s binary precept does remarkably little to help empirical translation analysis. It comes with no list of text features exemplifying either translation method; we have no reference to any actual translation; and as for moving authors or readers, the empirical reality is that, as Frank puts it, ‘the reader either sits or stands or walks with a book of translations in his hand, as a rule equidistant to his eyes’.3 The idea of moving people must be a mere metaphor for translation, just one link in a long chain of metaphors strung across Schleiermacher’s text and down through the history of binarisms. Indeed, since Schleiermacher makes no reference to any actual translation, his text is perhaps nothing but a chain of metaphors, without a stable object. He gets us so involved in mobile figures that we seem never to come to grips with translation itself. On the practical level, the text is rather empty.

Yet this is an excessively unhappy conclusion. If Schleiermacher is not particularly useful for understanding translations, perhaps his profundity lies elsewhere. I suspect his text, despite its title, is not primarily about translation at all. What if its references to translation constituted a metaphor for something else? We would then have a slightly longer chain of metaphors, or perhaps a sequence of ‘metas’ in search of a ‘phor’.4 But where should we then find a resting place for the philosopher’s references?

Let us suppose Schleiermacher’s prime concern is not translation as such but something as vague and as vast as a sense of living in a community, at home, at ease with oneself and with others, in the present and in the future, but most importantly within certain limits, particularly the spatial limits of community as place. Let me summarize this complex concern as a problematic of social ‘belonging’. This is a convenient supposition because numerous exiles, displaced persons, Bosnians, Serbs and Croats are currently very interested in cultural belonging. I have even been interested enough to relate the term to translation processes.5 So there is a certain current and personal interest in making Schleiermacher talk about belonging. The result is rather curious. Rather than manipulate metaphors to say something about translation, his text can be seen as manipulating translation as a metaphor of belonging. From this perspective, the apparently metaphorical movements of readers and authors become the real movements of people from one frame of
belonging to another. After all, if people didn’t move, there would be no translation. Perhaps translation, as a metaphor, does no more than express the movements of people. When Schleiermacher talks about moving authors and readers, it is ultimately because some authors and readers - as physical people - really do move.

This could be a rather upsetting reversal of priorities. Translation is supposed to be the prime interest of those of us who willingly call ourselves translation scholars. I doubt, however, that translation is what we are most concerned about as citizens and physical people. Some of us may have been born with an innate interest in the subject - there are strange people wandering around translation studies -; some of our financing might come from institutions that see translation as an end in itself; but I suggest that belonging is a far more general and even more serious concern. Most of us are here because of discontent with non-translative modes of belonging to a literature, to a culture or to a community. I further suggest that the official bodies financing us are interested not directly in translation but in encouraging one mode of belonging or another. If this is at least partly true, our apparent reversal of Schleiermacher’s ‘meta’ and ‘phor’ is not as isolated or perverse at it could seem.

Some might still object that, as translation scholars, we study subjectivities, subject positions, and other things that should not be confused with anything as grossly naïve as ‘physical people’, neither moving nor sedentary. Two quick replies should suffice (we have a long way to go). First, anyone who says subjects cannot belong to two places at once - and we shall see how Schleiermacher says this - is already confusing physical with moral reality. If there are only two movements, it is primarily because a physical person can’t walk backwards and forwards at the same time. Second, the idea of physical people by no means excludes the analysis of subjectivities. As a physical person I can’t be in two places at one, but as a translating subjectivity I can dance over many places, simultaneously backwards and forwards, untethered to any auctorial ‘I-here-now’.

Schleiermacher does in fact develop a quite complex theory of subject positions, particularly when constructing the kind of place to which people should belong and the kinds of foreignness they should thus experience. This happens right at the core of the text, at the point where the two methods are outlined and the preferred method is explained and defended. Let us momentarily suspend the surrounding arguments. Let us see what is said at this point, and how it is said.

Schleiermacher’s literalist translator - the good translator - follows the source text as closely as possible so that readers may experience what Lefevere, translating Schleiermacher, renders as ‘a sense of the strange’, ‘this feeling of being faced with something foreign’ (‘das Gefühl des fremden’, ‘daß sie ausländisches vor sich haben’). The difficulty with this method is that such literalism (‘the translation follows the turns taken by the original’), as the highest and most difficult art, comes close to the easiest and most foolish, that of naïve translationese. Translators risk going too far, betraying themselves and their language. They risk upsetting what Lefevere labels ‘the most delicate balance’,
strangely translating what Schleiermacher calls ‘die feinste Linie’, the finest of lines.  But this balance
or line, says Schleiermacher, will be upset in any case ‘because everyone strikes that balance a little
differently’, ‘weil jeder sich diese Linie etwas anders zieht’. Lefevere’s redrawing of the line as a
balance is unfortunate for our reading, since lines tend to concern belonging in a way that balances
don’t. Yet Schleiermacher’s apparently unavoidable risk, be it upsetting a balance or crossing a line,
is in any case expressed in a number of rather peculiar ways, as a series of rhetorical questions,
each involving a metaphor of one kind or another, many of them requiring answers. Here is the way
he describes his preferred translation method:

... man muß gestehen, dieses mit Kunst und Maß zu thun, ohne eigenen Nachteil und ohne
Nachteil der Sprache, dies ist vielleicht die größte Schwierigkeit die unser Uebersezer zu
überwinden hat. [...] Wer möchte nicht seine Muttersprache überall in der volksgemäßsten Schönheit auftreten lassen, deren jede Gattung nur fähig ist? Wer möchte nicht lieber Kinder erzeugen, die das väterliche Geschlecht rein darstellen, als Blendlinge? Wer wird sich gern auflegen, in minder leichten und anmuthigen Bewegungen sich zu zeigen als er wol könnte, und bisweilen wenigstens schroff und steif zu erscheinen, um dem Leser so anstößig zu werden als nöthig ist damit er das Bewußtsein der Sache nicht verliere? Wer wird sich gern gefallen lassen, daß er für unholfen gehalten werde, indem er sich befeißiget der fremden Sprache so nahe zu bleiben als die eigene es nur erlaubt, und daß man ihn, wie Eltern, die ihre Kinder den Kunstspringern übergeben, tadelt, daß er seine Muttersprache, anstatt sie in ihrer
heimischen Turnkunst gewandt zu üben, an ausländische und unnatürliche Verrenkungen gewöhne! Wer mag endlich gern gerade von den größten Kennern und Meistern am mileidigsten belächelt werden, daß sie sein mühsames und voreiliges Deutsch nicht verstehen würden, wenn sie nicht ihr hellenisches und römisches dazu nähmen! Dies sind die
Entsagungen die jener Uebersezer nothwendig übernehmen muß, dies die Gefahren denen er
sich aussetzt, wenn er in dem Bestreben den Ton der Sprache fremd zu halten nicht die feinste Linie beobachtet [...].

... it will have to be admitted that to achieve this with good measure and in an artful manner,
without disadvantage to one’s language or oneself, is probably the biggest difficulty our
translator has to overcome. The attempt seems to me to be the strangest form of humiliation a
writer who is not a bad writer can impose on himself. Who would not like to allow his mother
tongue to stand forth everywhere in the most universally appealing beauty each genre is able
to give? Who would not rather sire children who are their parents’ pure effigy and not
bastards? Who would willingly force himself to appear in movements less light and elegant
than those he is capable of, to appear stiff and brutal, at least at times, and to shock the
reader as much as is necessary to keep him aware of what he is doing? Who would put up
with being thought clumsy by trying to stay as close to the foreign language as his own
language allows? Who would suffer being accused of bending his mother tongue to foreign
and unnatural dislocations instead of skillfully exercising it in its own natural gymnastics - not unlike parents who abandon their children to acrobats? Finally, who would like to be exposed to the compassionate smiles of the greatest masters and experts who would be unable to understand his laborious and ill-considered German if they were unable to supplement it with their Latin and Greek? These are the sacrifices every translator is forced to make, these are the dangers he exposes himself to when he fails to observe the most delicate balance in his attempts to keep the tone of the language foreign.10

The metaphors that I have put in italics seem to make the preferred translation method quite a terrible thing. But where did this plethora of negative metaphors come from? What are they doing here?

Most of the images had been slumming around translation theory for many years. Compare the central part of the above passage with Dryden’s well-known criticism of literalism (‘metaphrase’) in 1680:

‘Tis much like dancing on ropes with fettered legs: a man may shun a fall by using caution; but gracefulness of motion is not to be expected: and when we have said the best of it, ‘tis but a foolish task; for no sober man would put himself into a danger for the applause of escaping without breaking his neck.11

Like Dryden, Schleiermacher refers to unnatural movements, to the translator as a sideshow performer. He similarly recognizes these as the ‘dangers’ of literalism (‘these are the dangers he exposes himself to...’, in the above passage). And yet, since Schleiermacher ultimately supports the literalism that Dryden shuns, he ironizes these negative values in two ways. First, he mixes in a bizarre isotopic complex based on the family (mother tongue, unnatural children, children abandoned to acrobats). Second, he sneaks in a quite positive aim: ‘to shock the reader as much as is necessary to keep him aware of what he is doing’ (i.e. so readers know they are reading a translation), announcing what amounts to translative alienation effects. And then, the ‘dangers’ are described as ‘renunciations’ (‘Entsagungen’). Lefevere translates these as ‘the sacrifices every translator is forced to make’. Something peculiar is happening here.

Schleiermacher’s term ‘Entsagungen’ would normally be suited to renouncing a pleasure. It may be compared, for example, with a puritan ‘Kolonie der Entzagung’ (‘renunciation colony’) where meat, tobacco and alcohol were outlawed.12 Although Schleiermacher’s metaphors in the above passage would perhaps suggest a more erotic range of pleasures, his idea of renunciation could still be similar to that of the ‘renunciation colony’ (we will come to the important difference in a moment). This kind of renunciation is not necessarily a sacrifice. A sacrifice is a loss, determined by a balance sheet, in accordance with the long-standing idea that the translator can’t convey everything and so has to ditch something. A renunciation, on the other hand, is a more moral action, defining a line one could cross but chooses not to. As a Protestant preacher, Schleiermacher would
no doubt have preferred this second reading.

Yet we still have to define his line, the one Lefevere converts into a balance. And we have to ask what side of it Schleiermacher was standing on. Schleiermacher doesn’t do much to help us here. His mixing of metaphors in the above passage, one of the lighter moments in prose, merely uses irony to get several quite serious arguments out of the way, as if the traditional objections to literalism were a series of rhetorical questions to which we all knew the answers. Yet do we know how to answer these questions? Do the various metaphors enable us to decide one way or the other?

Schleiermacher’s text distributes values that are strongly positive or strongly negative. In the above passage, the positive paradigm comprises mother-language beauty, paternal lineage, easy and elegant movement, acceptance, naturalness, and customary exercise. These values would ideally offset as many negative values comprising an alternative paradigm, balancing the rhetorical questions (since Lefevere introduces balances). We could thus arrange the values in terms of parallel lists like the following, leaving the more problematic terms in German until we know how to translate them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Paradigm</th>
<th>Negative Paradigm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mother-language beauty</td>
<td>‘das väterliche Geschlecht’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>light and elegant</td>
<td>stiff and brutal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accepted (forgotten)</td>
<td>ridiculed (remembered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘heimische Turnkunst’</td>
<td>‘ausländische und unnatürliche Verrenkungen’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natural gymnastics</td>
<td>foreign and unnatural dislocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>greatest masters and experts</td>
<td>laborious and ill-considered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(natural)</td>
<td>(unnatural)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even limited to these few terms, the negative paradigm seems awkwardly distorted. Although Schleiermacher reminds us several times that unnatural movements can lead to ridicule, although he perturbs this negativity by associating ridicule with remembrance, with the positive values of alienation effects, he says very little about the negation of the mother language and ‘das väterliche Geschlecht’ (Lefevere’s ‘parents’ pure effigy). In fact, the only negative value he offers on this particular horizontal level is the word ‘Blendlinge’ (plural of ‘Blendling’), whatever that means. Hence two questions. First, why is Schleiermacher so silent about the negation of mother and father? And second, why are ‘Blendlinge’ here on the ‘unnatural’ side, when one sense of the German term is, as Lefevere knows, ‘natural children’? Exactly what are these ‘Blendlinge’, and where do they belong?

In the local context of 1813, all the above rhetorical questions should probably have been answered in favour of mother-language beauty and ‘das väterliche Geschlecht’, ‘parents’ pure effigy’ for Lefevere, ‘paternal lineage’ for almost everyone else. Does the difference really matter? Everyone is supposed to like - and be like - their parents, and dad is supposed to like - and be like
The superficial receiver or even translator, superficially male, is thus supposed to cry out against the very thought of engendering ‘Blendlinge’. But how should we answer, now that we have peeked beyond Lefevere’s translation and know at least the difference between mother-language beauty and ‘das väterliche Geschlecht’, not to mention the differences that might give us a non-maternal beauty (since ‘väterlich’ should mean ‘paternal’). If mum and dad are not similarly balanced, what will the result be? If only we knew what sort of danger or renunciation these ‘Blendlinge’ actually involved. Here lies the crux of the problem, the question that results from all others. Let’s make sure we understand the question, the nature or unnaturalness of ‘Blendlinge’, before saying whether or not we would prefer to produce any.

One way of approaching difficult terms is to translate them or to see how they have been translated. García Yebra renders the ‘Blendlinge’ sentence as follows: ‘¿Quién no prefiere engendrar hijos que muestren genuinamente el linaje paterno, antes que mestizos?’.

And Berman: ‘Qui ne préfèrerait engendrer des enfants présentant avec pureté la lignée paternelle, plutôt que des sang-mêlés?’

Lefevere, as we have seen, puts things a little differently: ‘Who would not rather sire children who are their parents’ pure effigy, and not bastards?’.

All these translations are potentially justifiable. Yet they differ significantly in rhetorical force, and rhetoric is of some importance when straddling the finest of lines (or striking the most delicate of balances). Are ‘Blendlinge’ just the technical ‘children of mixed blood’ expressed in Castilian and French, or the more abrupt and less specific ‘bastards’ of English? Why does Lefevere use the verb ‘sire’, which is surely more suited to horses than to human propagation yet perhaps also underscores the presumed maleness of Schleiermacher’s interlocutor? García Yebra and Berman seem to take the question seriously; Lefevere projects rather more than Schleiermacher’s petty irony. When using these translations, much depends on the values we sow across this peculiar word ‘Blendlinge’ and its surrounding semantic field.

Lefevere’s ‘bastards’, to start with the most surprising term, is not entirely out of place. Certainly not a nice word, it does have some redeeming ambiguities. Informal expressions like ‘You lucky bastard!’ suggest it’s not all bad. Further, according to a citation from Life surfacing in Webster, ‘The nicest thing an Aussie can call you is a bloody fine bastard’.

So for Australians, of which I’m one, the ostensible insult could even convey affection, perhaps ensuing from the shared illegitimacy of ill-gotten gains or geographical dislocation. Although more specifically a child born outside of wedlock, a bastard can also be ‘a hybrid, especially an accidental or inferior one’. Yet this second frame moves the term away from semes of humanness. Hence, perhaps, Lefevere’s choice of ‘sire’, to go along with this movement, once more in the interests of balance. The kind of bastard Lefevere is talking about seems more like a crossbred horse than an illegitimate human. But the etymology of ‘bastard’ blurs even this distinction. The thirteenth-century origin is often given as the medieval Latin ‘bastum’, ‘packsaddle’, corresponding to the Medieval English ‘bast’ and the modern French ‘bât’, allowing ‘bastard’ to be read as ‘child of the packsaddle’, the child conceived while travelling and not in the marriage bed. A movement away from the marriage bed - the
marriage of mother tongue and fatherland, of balanced and similar likeness - risks producing bastards, and these might be ‘Blendlinge’.

I must confess a certain personal interest in the idea of illegitimacy ensuing from travel. I myself have sired a child, as Lefevere would have us say, well away from anything I would call home. To compound the illegitimacy, my daughter is of mixed blood. When Schleiermacher asks his rhetorical question about who would want to produce ‘Blendlinge’, when a certain implied receiver should step out from 1813 and disclaim any desire to create mixed children, bastards, acrobats, things stiff and stuck out a long way from home, how should I answer the question? Should I seek repentance for having produced a ‘Blendlingin’ (or having used the word)? But the problem is not just mine. And we still need to find out about the term.

García Yebra’s ‘mestizos’ and Berman’s ‘sang-mêlés’, perhaps less upsetting than Lefevere’s ‘bastards’, are nevertheless intriguing in their apparent neutrality. The Castilian ‘mestizo’ dates from the American conquests, probably from 1600 when it was used by Garcilaso el Inca, himself a mestizo and sometime translator from Quechua into Castilian. The Robert dates ‘sang-mêlé’ from 1798, defining it as ‘a person resulting from the crossing of different races (especially the white and black races)’.19 ‘Métis’, the closest given synonym, is a similarly late arrival in French, coming from Portuguese or Castilian at the beginning of the seventeenth century. The near synonym ‘mulâtre’, a more specific mixture of back and white, came from Castilian in the same period, bringing with it a hidden stratum of ‘young mule’, which nevertheless seems to have no relation to packsaddle bastards. The English terms ‘mestizo’ and ‘mulatto’ also came from Castilian. The further synonym ‘half-caste’ was derived from the sixteenth-century Portuguese ‘casta’, meaning ‘race, breed, ancestry’, also found in Castilian. This rich and productive semantic field, even without the most abusive terms, dates from the great colonial powers of Europe, with the individual terms following a peculiar translatio imperii from language to language, colonizer to colonizer. The terms moved because people moved and mixed. But what then of ‘Blendlinge’, from a language that, as Bismarck knew, had colonizers but no real colonies?

Grimms’ dictionary (1860) follows this general movement when it describes ‘Blendlinge’ as ‘halbschlächtige kinder [half-cast children], mulatten’. But ‘Blendling’ is also glossed as ‘nothus, hibrida, ἄβριτς, bastard [bastard] und zwitter [hermaphrodite!], wodurch die reine, natürliche art getrübt und gemischt wird, von menschen, thieren und pflanzen [of people, animals and plants, in which the pure, natural species is blurred and mixed]. in diesem wort gewahrt man deutlich den zusammenhang zwischen blenden und blanden (s. blind) [showing the relationship between the verbs ‘blenden’ and ‘blanden’].’20 This latter mixing of verbs is of some interest. The German ‘blenden’ means ‘to blind, to dazzle, to shine, to glitter like false gold (‘Blende’),’ or ‘to deceive’. The other verb, ‘blanden’, ‘to mix’, is a lost form followed through in the English ‘to blend’. The blending is somehow blinding. The line or border between pure species is blurred, obscured, made fuzzy. The ontological problem of pure categories is thus fundamentally related to the epistemological problem of perceiving purity, of defining or obscuring the (lineal) difference between categories. In 1900 we
find the Muret-Sanders German-English dictionary listing ‘Blendling’ as not just a ‘Bastard’ or ‘Mischling’ but also a ‘Blender’ (‘someone who deceives, who makes something look better than it is’) and even ‘a silly or credulous person’, presumably someone taken in by the deception. Paul’s 1992 dictionary underscores the racial readings by dating ‘Blending’ to the language of seventeenth-century dog breeders, although he also offers the rather engaging syntagm ‘Abenteurer, Müßiggänger und Blendlinge’, perhaps translatable as ‘adventurers, idlers and Blendlinge’.

If this wide semantic range can be projected onto Schleiermacher, the result is more than the colonialist mix that colours our reading. ‘Blendlinge’ are most interestingly associated with a rather exotic kind of commerce, perhaps originally of fancy dogs but also of the kind carried out by people who are vagrant, idle, adventurous, deceptive, sly, cunning and showy, living off deviant skills, no doubt like travelling acrobats who make children perform all sorts of strange tricks, perhaps like bad translators. The register is decidedly suspect. Now that we know more or less what ‘Blendlinge’ means, we might as well leave the term untranslated, to maintain its polysemy.

In light of this extended range, Lefevere’s ‘bastards’ at least brings out some of the bizarre possibilities concealed in Schleiermacher’s choice of words. Although the good German receiver is probably still supposed to cry out against wayward dalliance, there remains something quite fascinating in all these movements away from home. Blendlinge might be inferior, they might mislead, but they could also offer a good deal or a good time. One wonders if Schleiermacher could entirely suppress their appeal.

As we have noted, the philosopher-preacher describes Blendlinge and their strange associates as ‘Entsagungen’, renunciations that translators must make, as well as ‘Gefahren’, risks or dangers to which translators expose themselves. But how is it that the renunciations in this case do not correspond to substantial dangers? If we were talking about meat, tobacco and alcohol, as in the ‘renunciation colony’, the danger would perhaps be the thing renounced. Yet here the danger is the act of renunciation itself, since what is renounced is none other than the pure category, the non-Blendling, be it of nature, race or language. The translator renounces good honest home life and decides to run risks. As an act of self-sacrifice on behalf of those condemned to stay at home, this is surely not all bad. It would be rather like Soviet spies risking exposure to capitalist decadence, or censorship committees risking exposure to pornography so their home societies might remain pure. A fine asceticism! These are not unambiguous forms of renunciation, and Schleiermacher appreciates the ambiguity. He admits that ‘since all good is mixed with some bad’, the translator should simply try to get as much of the good and as little of the bad as possible. Impeccable advice. But as we follow through this ethics of impurity, who can really be sure which side is good - for whom? - and which is bad. And where do the Blendlinge lie? Do they bring more good than bad? Schleiermacher is, after all, arguing in favour of a literalist translation method associated with this term. His argument must express at least some discontent with non-Blendlinge, with the natural belonging of closed family life.
Lori Chamberlain has glossed the above passage about Blendlinge (actually ‘bastards’, since she unquestioningly cites Lefevere’s translation) as if Schleiermacher were simply saying that ‘the translator, as father, must be true to the mother-language in order to produce legitimate offspring’.\textsuperscript{23} This reading is only possible if one overlooks the textual function of the rhetorical questions. Within the questions, Schleiermacher does indeed project his implied receiver as a man concerned about engendering pure children; he does indeed presuppose that legitimacy and purity are superior values. But these values are only for the non-translator, for the writer who can avoid the ambiguous dangers and renunciations of translation. Many problems ensue if we follow Chamberlain’s reading and project these values directly onto Schleiermacher’s translator, either good nor bad. Gendered readings of isolated passages are not enough. On the level of the text as a whole, Schleiermacher’s family scene certainly has German playing mother language, but then Prussia, perhaps also the Germany to be, takes up the role of fatherland. Legitimacy is a territorial as well as gendered concern. The natural product of mother and father is a child in the process of growing up, developing ‘natural’ movements by performing ‘customary’ exercises, ideally according to the nature and customs of a particular national space. But, intimates Schleiermacher in 1813 - a context of no concern to Chamberlain -, this mother is more like a nurse or a surrogate, since the German language has to be developed for intellectual activities before its family can be formed with all due propriety: ‘So lange die Muttersprache für diese noch nicht gebildet ist, bleibt diejenige Sprache die partielle Muttersprache’\textsuperscript{24}, for as long as German was not sufficiently developed for the work of real intellectuals, it was only a partial mother language. Nor, we should add, were the German states a complete fatherland in any strong political sense of the term, given their fragmentation and the presence of Napoleonic armies. Their child was necessarily ‘ein werdende Volk’\textsuperscript{25}, a people with a future, a people whose values were to be more than those inherited from the past. Since the mother is not a real mother, the father is not yet an entirely legitimate father, and the child is called upon to become rather more than a ‘pure effigy’ of its parents, there can be no question of simply opposing the impurity of Blendlinge to the unblemished virtue of any immediately happy family. Non-translation, although potentially pure, is not a viable solution in this case. The natural German child is perhaps also a bastard. Schleiermacher’s rhetorical questions, posing a choice between home and away, could not be answered clearly because neither of its terms was clear. Good and bad lay on both sides. The preacher could only state the problem and move on to more metaphors.

This is why Schleiermacher poses the question of Blendlinge but fails to recruit them into any programme of action. Although he could have good reason to include some intercultural subjects in a defence of literalism, and perhaps even a hidden inclination to do so, he does precisely the opposite. Elsewhere in the text, away from the actual site where the Blendlinge are formulated, he takes rather unnatural pains to exclude them and everything that could be associated with them. It is an interesting and informative suppression.

We have seen that the foreignizing translation method recommended by Schleiermacher -
moving the reader rather than the author - is to be German, opposing the implicitly French method of naturalizing foreign authors. Schleiermacher’s political opposition to French expansionism in Germany was entirely congruent with his arguments against French annexation through translation. His preference for the more literalist translation method is thus a preference for one particular way of constructing a national place, and an argument against another. Yet this is no simple pitting of the good German against the bad French. If there is nationalism here, it is progressive and dialectic rather than static or backward-looking. Despite deconstructionist or Benjaminian readings of Schleiermacher, no origin or fall is at stake. The goal is very clearly the future, expressed in not altogether gratuitous military terms: ‘wir können nicht zurück und müssen durch.’

Despite deconstructionist or Benjaminian readings of Schleiermacher, no origin or fall is at stake. The goal is very clearly the future, expressed in not altogether gratuitous military terms: ‘wir können nicht zurück und müssen durch.’

There was no going back for the Germans. Since the primary opposition is not between nations as such but between two ways of developing national identity, Schleiermacher’s is a second-degree nationalism, a differentiation - in something like the mathematical sense - of the moving geopolitical frontier separating France and Germany. Yet it is nationalism nevertheless. French translators are supposed to bring foreign authors into the French fold; German translators have to make their readers travel to meet foreign authors. The two methods belong to two cultures separated by a thin and much challenged line. Not a balance but a line, a border.

The idea of different kinds of movement taking place in France and Germany is not entirely metaphorical. Over and above national preferences with respect to translation strategies, French centralism has long tended to bring foreign intellectuals into a common fold, notably Paris, whereas the lack of a German cultural capital has traditionally been a major reason for the outward journeys of many readers, writers and translators as reader-writers. Underlying or perhaps expressing such differences, the French transmission of citizenship is preferentially through *jus solis*, whereas the Germany of outward movements attaches far greater weight to *jus sanguinis*. A centralized culture associates belonging with land and takes others in; an outward-looking culture extends its belonging over distance and thus follows blood-ties rather than geography. A foreign child born in France can be French; a foreign child born in Germany will usually remain foreign. These questions are worth talking about because they are being debated and challenged as I write.

I have no desire to leave French and German cultures permanently characterized in this way. Nor do I want to suggest that Schleiermacher was expressing some essential Germanness. His ultimate aim was ostensibly to make the German language a storehouse of world literature, which could then attract foreigners in a remarkably French way. The wider historical movement should perhaps have been a *translatio imperii* from France to Germany. But my point is more mundane.

Any theory that recognizes inward and outward cultural movements must find a place for *Blendlinge*, at least in order to place the mixed children that tend to ensue from such movements. It would be difficult to ignore them. And yet exclusion is precisely Schleiermacher’s strategy. Here is his method: Rule one allows an inward directionality (movement of the author), rule two allows a superior outward directionality (movement of the reader), and there is a quite logical but rarely cited rule three. Rule three says there is no rule three: ‘Es sind nämlich nicht mehr Verfahrensarten
möglich’, there are simply no other ways of proceeding. The negation is repeated and revealing. The movement must be either inward or outward. The two cannot be mixed. The translator must work one way or the other. You can’t walk backwards and forwards at the same time. In geopolitical terms this means one cannot stay on the frontier between France and Germany. There is no neutrality, no intermediary position, no sitting on the fence, no Napoleonic Prussia, no Alsace-Lorraine, no Dreyfus, no multicultural Sarejevo (but we anticipate our local contexts). As Schleiermacher explicitly states, ‘Wie Einem Lande, so auch Einer Sprache oder der andern, muß der Mensch sich entschließen anzugehören’, just as they must belong to one country, so people must adhere to one language or another, ‘oder er schwebt haltungslos in unerfreulicher Mitte’, or they will wander aimlessly in what Lefevere terms ‘an uncomfortable middle ground’, for Berman ‘une position intermédiaire peu réjouissante’. And so, in a text supposedly about translation, we find an explicit argument against the middle ground, assumed to be a place of non-belonging. This is why I am interested in the exclusion of Blendlinge. This is why I think this text is primarily about belonging.

The bulk of Schleiermacher’s lecture, pages and pages of it, is devoted to reinforcing the exclusion of Blendlinge on several fronts. This is first done by separating translation proper from all alternative strategies for transcultural communication. Translation is to be distinguished from oral interpreting, ‘Dolmetschen’, which is suited merely to commerce, to negotiations, to situations where objects are more important than the mind or essence of a people. Roughly the same holds for paraphrase or summarizing. Further, translation proper has nothing to do with bilingualism, apparently because perfect bilinguals don’t need to read translations, regardless of the fact that such people might want to translate for others. Translation proper is moreover superior to language-learning or the use of foreign languages for special purposes, since one’s true inner thoughts are only born in the language to which one belongs. And one must belong. The king, says Schleiermacher, can write in French, but if he is German his substantial thought must first be in German then translated into French. Further, since everyone must belong on one side or the other, since there is no happy middle ground, the relations between French and German should be regulated by translation. Through translation, no matter what the method, everything written in the Germanic states should be in German and everything in France in French, and rule three says there is nothing in between. Such translation works against multilingualism, against the mixing of languages and cultures, and often against the survival of sub-national dialects. This is why a theory that distinguishes between just two national modes of belonging, between just two kinds of movement, is all the more nationalist when these modes and movements are expressed through the metaphor of translation.

Schleiermacher knew, far better than most of us, that modern translation works in the interests of national cultures. He knew that it works against middle grounds.

There are no real Blendlinge in Schleiermacher’s programme because he gets rid of what I would like to see as their privileged place. He does away with the middle ground; he refuses to legitimize intercultural commerce, negotiations, the movement of objects as merchandise, orality,
multilingual subjects, intercultural people, adventurers, idlers and bastards. Schleiermacher’s translator seems to be a good national who has learned a foreign language only well enough to experience ‘a sense of the strange’. His translator must thus belong to the same community as the reader. If this were not so, translators would risk living in the maligned middle ground, along with Blendlinge, or as Blendlinge themselves. It is safer, for a superficial reading of Schleiermacher, to recognize substantial intermediaries only as metaphors, according them a textual place in certain translations but no substantial place in the life of nations. This is why Schleiermacher’s text is mostly read as a theory of translation rather than as a campaign against interculturality.

What translators is Schleiermacher talking about in this text? Where does this ‘either/or’ logic really come from? Let me suggest a possible local context, to give our reading a little historical weight. In March 1812 - just over a year before Schleiermacher’s lecture in Berlin -, Prussian Jews were officially ‘emancipated’ by a law of Napoleonic inspiration. They were accorded economic and juridic equality as citizens, but they could not be employed in the state administration, the legal system or as military officers unless they had renounced Judaism. In these latter areas, those at the core of the nation-state, one was either a Jew or a Prussian. Any middle ground was purely for commerce, for those who had not properly renounced.

The 1812 emancipation was just one moment in the long nineteenth-century debate over the ‘Jewish question’. The ‘either/or’ structure was much repeated in the course of this struggle. It supported a whole logic of national identity that could not fail to resonate in Schleiermacher’s reasoning about translation. Yet I must tread lightly here. I have no desire to tag Schleiermacher as more anti-Semitic than most of those around him, nor to pretend that anti-Semitism underlies all dichotomies in translation theory or, indeed, all cultural opposition to the values of commerce. My argument is simply that the ‘Jewish question’ provided a local context in which this nationalistic either/or logic was peculiarly active. This logic by no means overrode or excluded anti-French sentiment: Jews were mistrusted precisely because they had welcomed Napoleon. And the either/or strategies were not always deployed in order to exclude Jews. Several pro-emancipation dichotomies can be found in Erb and Bergmann’s account of this period: In 1805 there was an argument that Jews should have either full emancipation or none at all; in 1816 it was thought that Jews must either stop living as Jews or, if not, be brought socially closer as Jews; in 1847 a further argument doubled the dichotomy, reasoning that ‘Jews are either our friend or our enemy; if they are our enemy we must either destroy them or befriend them’. All these pro-emancipation arguments were based on dichotomies reflecting those of anti-Semitic nationalism. On both sides of the argument, the Jewish question was primordially a matter of doing away with the middle ground. The proposed solutions were not unimaginative. Alongside the calls for ‘internal colonies’ (ghettoes), there were those who regretted that Germany did not have an external colony like Australia, where Britain had effectively got rid of its lowly Irish-proletarian Blendlinge. In 1892 we find a quite logical proposal that Germany ship excess Jews to its colony in New Guinea. The mind boggles. There
were complex strategic relationships between colonialism and the excluded middle ground of Europe. The two modes of interculturality were connected. And Schleiermacher’s either/or reasoning has become typical of arguments against both kinds of interculturality.

It would be foolhardy to suggest that all translators are Blendlinge, as if we knew about each of them. Yet the complex semantics of the German term can be used as a field for producing hypotheses about translators. The many practical reasons for pursuing such hypotheses are based on the idea that the translator’s knowledge of foreign languages and cultures requires a certain subjective and social displacement towards a middle ground. But the immediate interest of these hypotheses lies in the fact that binary translation theory effectively prohibits their formulation by excluding the middle ground. In historical terms, the exclusion suppresses most of the intercultural peoples that have produced great translators. It gets rid of the Zwischenstaaten that have long mediated - and translated - between France and Germany and are too easily forgotten as the gristle of the European Union. It also suppresses virtually all the conceptual tools I use to think about translation. Schleiermacher is concerned with works of the mind rather than with objects; I argue that texts are objects that only move because of materiality. He says negotiation is only for commerce; I see it as a frame for all intercultural relationships. He excludes multilingualism as a viable alternative to translation; I believe it is often a better alternative. He says middle grounds are unhappy and insubstantial; I try to find their principles, their virtues and even their joys. He establishes a metaphorical link between translation and the movement of people; I think people that move make translation happen. He ties the translator to the receiving community; I ask if translators belong to intercultural communities of traders, negotiators, diplomats, adventurers, idlers and bastards.

The tremendous ambiguity of translation studies is that if one follows Schleiermacher’s focus on textual inputs and outputs, if one sees Blendlinge as no more than textual simulacra, subject positions, points for linguistics and its forerunners and its heirs, the fact of translation can only reinforce the cultural nationalisms of separate languages, societies, cultures, systems, or minds. That is why I am suspicious of models where interculturality is merely textual, embedded in translations within one language or culture, thus presupposing the limits of languages and cultures. Such approaches play straight into the hands of those who, across eastern and southern Europe and indeed within recent debates on French and German citizenship, are fighting for the linguistic and sanguinary occupation of territory. Even when deployed in literary isolation, such approaches tend to help those who are increasingly intolerant of the less prestigious brands of Blendlinge. In this light, one might ask why contemporary translation research in Europe’s larger countries is still marked by rigorous separation of literary and non-literary translation, separating the higher works of national identity from the base exchanges of intercultural commerce, in true Schleiermacherian spirit. One might also ask why the same countries (notably France and Germany), even within the commercial sphere, invest considerable academic resources in the training of high-level conference interpreters.
but very little in community interpreting. The social function of literary translation and conference interpreting is implicitly to defend and strengthen national target languages rather than help those displaced persons caught up in the less pretty sides of interculturality. There is as much bad as good in this kind of translation studies.

On the other hand, if one focuses on Blendlinge as substantial people, as the intercultural communities to which translators could belong, translation studies might promote mediation rather than separation. Translation history could help give such communities a substantial past; translation ethics should help develop their regimes; and the training of translators could openly contribute to their ranks. Hence the importance of Blendlinge in translation studies. Hence the need at least to ask if translators really belong one side or the other. In some cases this question is highly revealing. Spain’s twelfth-century ‘School of Toledo’, for example, was the work of Jews, Conversos, Mozarabs, Italians, a small community of travelling European scientists and a few French archbishops. The thirteenth-century glory of Spain’s Alfonso X, dubbed the ‘Wise’ because of his patronage of translations, was actually due to the labours of Jews, Conversos, Mozarabs and Italians. A few questions in the right place can undo a good number of nationalist myths. Unfortunately, since the history of cultures has overwhelmingly been a history of national cultures, the place and role of intercultural communities, Blendlinge, has consistently been overlooked. Translation studies could help redress the balance, without drawing the nationalist lines.

To conclude my reading, let me answer the question even more explicitly, personally and as a translator who is ultimately unafraid of a certain binary distinction between good and bad translation studies. If I have a people of the future, ‘ein werdende Volk’, it is ideally the community of intermediaries to which I belong. Theirs is the best future in which I can participate. To produce Blendlinge is not the risk of my task. It is the condition of my people’s survival, the reproduction of my community. The most ethical birth, in this community, is a mixture of cultures. So much for belonging.

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The most recent substantial reading of Schleiermacher is Lawrence Venuti’s, presented as a long article in TTR in 1992.38 Venuti makes Schleiermacher a forerunner of his own categories of ‘fluent’ or ‘transparent’ translation, as opposed to a ‘resistant’ translation in which the reader is not fooled by a domesticated foreign text. Thus, for Venuti, ‘Schleiermacher’s concept of foreignizing translation constitutes a resistance to dominant cultural values in German at the turn [i.e. beginning] of the nineteenth century’.39 Further, this concept ‘can indeed offer a way out’ of ‘the questionable values that dominate Anglo-American and French culture’ today.40 Schleiermacher went against the grain in his day, so his preferences can help us do the same here and now. Or so the story goes.

There is an underlying methodological difference between my reading and Venuti’s. Following a line of marxist thought (elsewhere announced as Althusserian41), Venuti goes to some length to
attach Schleiermacher to a particular social class, the German bourgeoisie (thus explaining Schleiermacher’s irony at the expense of ‘great masters’ and the French-speaking aristocracy). For me, however, the work of translators and translation theorists seems more directly conditioned by intercultural relations. Hence my interest in factors like Napoleon and the Jewish question, which should at least be recognized as strong mediations overdetermining (if one wants to be Althusserian) Schleiermacher’s particular class location.

Yet this could remain a relatively minor difference in the present context. When Venuti openly characterizes Schleiermacher’s project in terms of ‘its bourgeois individualism and cultural elitism, its Prussian nationalism and German universalism’, he does so merely in order to take the wind out of most critics’ sails. All these implicitly negative values are no more than the dangers, the risks, that are apparently outweighed by the one good thing to come from Schleiermacher’s theory: Venuti goes on to state that Schleiermacher’s text ‘does contain the (inadvertent) suggestion that foreignizing translation can alter the social divisions figured in these ideologies, can promote cultural change through its work on the target language’. This is true. Schleiermacher does indeed recognize the possibility of change. But how can Venuti be so sure that the one positive value - this frustratingly empty ‘cultural change’ - outweighs the accumulative negative values of individualism, elitism, nationalism and universalism? The latter do at least look like rather heavy charges, with rather precise historical contents. And how does Venuti know Schleiermacher’s idea of change is contradictory to these ideologies? One should not forget that Hitler prohibited ‘domesticating’ translation, and did so in rather Schleiermacherian terms, not just to make German a technological Weltsprache but also to develop Nazi cultural refinement. And Nazism cannot be accused of leaving social relationships unchanged. In the end, Venuti recommends that we try a certain translation method because it might bring about a positive result in the future, even though it has been associated with a few ambiguous results in the past. What is the basis for this tremendous act of faith?

For Venuti, Schleiermacher is marginally good because he opposes commerce. Schleiermacher does indeed say (through Lefevere) that ‘the interpreter plies his trade in the field of commerce; the translator proper operates mainly in the fields of art and scholarship’. Venuti glosses this as ‘opposition to capitalist economic practices’. Summarizing Venuti, Sherry Simon then quite stunningly states that ‘Schleiermacher identifies the cultural as the enemy of the commercial’ and that, as some kind of consequence, ‘work on language in all its dimensions (both at the level of the text and in international commercial publishing) can help redress the inequalities that nowadays work to the advantage of transatlantic English’. What? Schleiermacher seems to have been swept up into a Formalist argument that difficult reading will somehow improve the world. Several things are wrong here.

First, as Venuti well appreciates, Schleiermacher’s recommended method (like Hitler’s) was designed to strengthen German as a target language that could then become a major source language. And yet Venuti (like Simon) appears to believe the same method will make English and
French target languages weaker or at least closer to some unspoken ideal of fair international exchange.

Second, Schleiermacher’s rejection of commerce is entirely compatible with the ‘Romantic conception of authorship’ that Venuti elsewhere dismisses as the basis of fluid translation and the cause of the translator’s marginalization. If one takes away the Romantic primacy of original expression (the expression that is supposed to be independent of the external object), Schleiermacher has little philosophical basis for separating the cultural from the commercial. His anticommercialism is logically bound to his intellectual elitism. Venuti too easily accepts the former while refusing the latter.

Third, although Venuti makes a gesture to feminist translators (more exactly, translation theorists) as a practical and successful application of Schleiermacher to contemporary situations, he offers no figures on subsidies or sales that might relate these to quantitative social change. No attempt is made to counter the quantitative argument that the more difficult a translation is to read, the less impact it will have on the target culture. Could Venuti understand why European filmmakers complain about Americans subtitling rather than dubbing European films? Although more compatible with ‘resistant’ ideals, subtitling marginalizes films as elitist products, just as advanced feminist theory remains the privilege of a restricted and often moderately bilingual target public. Any attempt to redress economic imbalances and counter social marginalization requires that one compete directly in the economic and social fields. Playing with language alone more often means being subsidized by national governments or universities.

Fourth, Schleiermacher’s ‘translation proper’ is indifferent to any such redressing, since it is distinguished from all commerce, not just capitalism. If Venuti were really in tune with this radical anticommercialism, he could scarcely complain about translators being underpaid, as he does in a later text. Unlike Venuti, Schleiermacher’s translator is peculiarly above commercial concerns, and for reasons that Venuti leaves peculiarly unquestioned. One such reason is that, read from the perspective of Blendlinge, the exclusion of commerce is also the exclusion of the intermediaries who make commerce possible. One must be very careful to understand all the possible implications of Schleiermacher’s opposition to commerce.

In defining translation strategies in terms of good and bad, resistant and transparent, Venuti unthinkingly reproduces Schleiermacher’s exclusion of intercultural communities. Despite his political support of translators as members of a (receiving) society, Venuti fails to see that a sociology of translators themselves might be the most fruitful exit from Schleiermacher. The key to this sociological rather than theoretical genealogy is to focus on the Blendlinge, the people in the middle, the intermediaries who form intercultural communities of one kind or another. After all, the existence of such people sets up the very possibility of translation, well prior to any binarism of good and bad strategies.

Notes
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5. See Anthony Pym, Translation and Text Transfer, (Frankfurt/Main, 1992), pp. 102-120.


7. Schleiermacher, p. 56. Lefevere’s translation, p. 156.

8. Schleiermacher, p. 56. Lefevere’s translation, p. 156.


13. Lefevere’s translation has perhaps already answered this question. If ‘Entsagungen’ are ‘sacrifices’ and ‘die feinste Linie’ is ‘the most delicate balance’ - we shall soon also comment on ‘das väterliche Geschlecht’ as ‘parents’ pure effigy’ - , everything must be kept in some kind of equilibrium and ‘Blendlinge’ can summarily be dismissed as - did you notice it in the cited passage? - ‘bastards’. For Lefevere, Schleiermacher is ultimately against everything that might upset a legitimately balanced binarism. We should be very grateful that Lefevere’s translation presents this hypothesis, just as many of us are grateful to Lefevere for first introducing us to Schleiermacher’s text in his Translating Literature: the German Tradition from Luther to Rosenzweig (Assen, 1977). But we should not allow Lefevere effectively to seal up all the cracks. One eventually reaches a point of imbalance where doubts about Lefevere’s translation should become questions for Schleiermacher’s German.


16. Lefevere’s translation, p. 156. Italics mine.

17. Webster (1981) XXX

18. Collins (1986), XXX

19. Le Robert, ‘personne issue du croisement de races différentes (spécialement des races blanche et noire).’


27. In 1993-94, debates concerning the ‘Loi Pascua’ in France and ‘Asylrecht’ in Germany brought to the surface many traditional assumptions about rights to French or German nationality.


29. Schleiermacher, p. 63.


31. Schleiermacher, pp. 51, 55.

32. Schleiermacher, p. 61.

33. Schleiermacher certainly suggests that the translator is not one of these bilinguals ‘for whom translation makes no sense’ (because they have no need of it). But does he actually say the translator is not wholly bilingual? The question is raised by an interesting error in Berman’s translation of the pertinent passage as follows: ‘Si nous faisons exception de ces maîtres admirables qui se meuvent avec une égale aisance dans plusieurs langues, pour lesquels une langue
apprise parvient à devenir plus naturelle que la langue maternelle, ou pour lesquels, comme nous l’avons déjà dit, la traduction n’a pas de sens, tous les autres hommes, même s’ils lisent bien une langue étrangère, conservent face à elle la sensation de quelque chose d’étranger. Comment fera donc le traducteur pour que cette impression de se trouver face à quelque chose d’étranger \(['\text{daß sie ausländisches vor sich haben}', in fact the impression held by \textit{them}, the non-bilinguals] \) se transmette aussi à ses lecteurs, auxquels il présente la traduction dans \('\text{sa langue maternelle ['in ihrer Muttersprache', says Schleiermacher, in fact ‘in their mother tongue’]'\) ? Despite all his calls for literalism, Berman’s translation as \('\text{'sa langue maternelle' instead of 'leur langue maternelle'}\) would seem to be wilfully correcting Schleiermacher’s text, the German version of which is presented opposite Berman’s translation.

35. Erb and Bergmann, pp. 59, 60. Italics mine.
36. Erb and Bergmann, p. 62.
42. See the theory of networks and regimes outlined in \textit{Translation and Text Transfer}.