On inculturation

Anthony Pym
Intercultural Studies Group
Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Tarragona, Spain

Draft for a talk at the Nida School of Translation Studies, New York, September 14, 2011.
Version 1.4.

1. Hajji Baba

In the picaresque novel *The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan*, printed in Persian in 1905, we read:

اگر اینجا حاست، پس ایران کجاست؟ اینجا دارالنعمت است، اینجا دارالحرکم: اینجا دارالعمل، اینجا عزت

If this is a place, then what is Persia? This is heaven, Persia is hell; this is a pleasant house,

that is a mourning house; here we find honor and treasure, here degradation and suffering;

here governance and cleanliness, there dervishes and dirt; here the theater, there *takīyeh*;

here a game, there *shabih*; here the life of pleasure, there *taziyeh*; here song, there *ruzeh*.

Remembering the Ottomans’ life of pleasure and Persians’ round-the-clock life of mourning,

I decried my bad luck [at having been born in Persia].

As in all good epics (Hajji Baba became a 1954 Hollywood film), the foreign fades away, as if by

magic, to reveal what we want to know. The Iranian translation scholar Esmaeil Haddadian

Moghaddam (forthcoming), from whose work we borrow liberally here, gives a version of the

above:

If this is a place, then what is Persia? This is heaven, Persia is hell; this is a pleasant house,

that is a mourning house; here we find honor and treasure, there degradation and suffering;

here governance and cleanliness, there dervishes and dirt; here the theater, there *takīyeh*;

here a game, there *shabih*; here the life of pleasure, there *taziyeh*; here song, there *ruzeh*.

Remembering the Ottomans’ life of pleasure and Persians’ round-the-clock life of mourning,

I decried my bad luck [at having been born in Persia].

Much as the traditional picaresque hero is supposed to dissect society from below, here the

critique works through comparison. Constantinople, where Hajji Baba has just arrived, has all

things good; Persia, from whence he has come, has all things bad. Note, though, that the

badness in this case is remarkably clerical: *takīyeh* is an Islamic theater, *shabih* is a religious

drama; *taziyeh* is an indigenous religious play; *ruzeh* is religious song; so Persian institutional

religion does not score well. Neither, in general terms of the novel, does the despotism with

which the Qajars maintain unjust social hierarchies. Here, as in many moments since, what is

now Turkey might be the model of a modernizing Islamic state.

So why the comparison? The above text was presumably penned in Constantinople by

Mirza Habib Isfahani (henceforth “Mirza”), who had been exiled from Persia because of his

opposition to the Qajar regime. The manuscript is then reported as having been taken into

Persia by Hājī Shaikh Ahmad Ruhi Kirmānī (henceforth “Ahmad”), who was murdered along the

way, presumably for similar political dissent. The editor of the above 1905 text was then not

particularly Persian: he was Major Douglas Craven Phillott, “23rd Cavalry F.F, Secretary to the

Board of Examiners, Calcutta, Translator for the Government of India”, and the text was

printed in Kolkata, ostensibly as a textbook to entertain learners of Persian.
In his Introduction, Phillott makes it clear that the text is actually a translation, which he mistakenly attributes to Ahmad, whom he says was helped by Mirza. Phillott then recounts how the manuscript circulated in pre-print form in Persia, presumably in the days when Phillott was there:

When an MS. copy of Sheikh Ahmad’s translation first reached his native city, it was looked on as an original work: it was copied with eagerness; it was read with excitement. [...] Was it not the first novel that had ever been written in Persian? The Persians, who have nearly as much wit as they have vanity, had no objection to be satirized by one of their own people. The skill with which their countryman had depicted certain noble characters and well-marked types, filled them with pride [until] one sad day some copies of the English original reached me from India, and Haji Baba ceased to be popular: “Faranani tu-yi kuk-i ma rafta” [“Our legs have been pulled by a European”], said the Persians: “this author has overstepped the bounds; he has made fun of everyone from the Shah downwards.” *Haji Baba* was no longer an original work by a Persian. (1905: 6)

The comparisons originally accepted as self-reflection from within became unacceptable when seen as translation from abroad – the picaresque hero should not speak with a foreign voice.

In effect, the novel was from abroad. *The Adventures of Haji Baba of Ispahan* was first published in London in 1824, translated into French in the same year, then rendered into Persian, probably from French and probably by Mirza, who was teaching at the Lycée Français in Constantinople in the 1880s, before being edited and partially corrected in accordance with the English text, as we have seen, by Major Phillott in 1905. The novel thus reached Persian print across continents, translations, and several misattributions of agency. Indeed, the whole text is a multilayered *manuscrit trouvé*: Haji Baba’s manuscript is reportedly found and translated by the narrator “Peregrine Persic,” whose text was published anonymously in London in 1824 (a reviewer actually misattributed the novel to Thomas Hope), then found by an unnamed French translator in the same year (“traducteur de Walter Scott”, says the title page, naming neither author nor translator), whose work was presumably translated in Constantinople by Mirza, whose text was reportedly transported by Ahmad, whose text was ostensibly found by Phillott, and all that prior to Mirza’s manuscript translation apparently being found in an Istanbul library by the Iranian researcher Mojtaba Minavi in 1961, thus motivating us to correct the misattributed translatorship. The details are unimportant here. The interesting thing is that no one particularly wanted to be identified as the author of this text, nor indeed is it easy to pin down the translators, much as we might presume that the novel was indeed moving through translation, even when operative as a pseudo-original.

So the text is a translation. Except, it seems, the passage we have cited, which is found in neither the English nor the French versions (where the narrator simply proclaims that the beauty of Constantinople surpasses that of Isfahan). The anti-clerical comparison of Persia with the Ottoman capital would seem to have been made by the momentarily non-translating translator Mirza, and then strangely uncorrected by the pedagogical military editor Phillott, who otherwise removed deviances from the English text. Through all the hidden detours and subterfuge of translational communication, a critical voice could nevertheless speak, from neither wholly within nor wholly without, about the values of the Persian political and religious regime.

Mirza, a political exile, presumably had reason to make the comparison. And Ahmad, the transporter of the text, was equally as oppositional. What then of Phillott, who also helped move the translation along? In his preface, the military editor states that Mirza and Ahmad both belonged to the “obnoxious” Babi sect, and that they actually sought to have the Persian religious leaders “make common cause with the Sunnis and join with Turkey in resisting the ‘oppression of foreigners’” (1905: 4). So why would a British army major reproduce the work of “obnoxious” activists who oppose foreigners? Any guess might be informed by the date of the
I recount the tale, without further details, in order to address a wider question: How does modernity spread? That is, how do people come to aspire to generalized agency? How are they moved to see science, technology, and education as ways of extending social communication, to the point where all might feel authors of their laws? The question does not concern the success of any particular brand of democracy, the necessary technologies and the concomitant alienation, nor should it be undermined by the necessary elites through which messages are moved and transformed. The question does not address postmodernism, the pre-condition of which must surely be the modernity that most of the world still awaits. My question simply concerns the aspiration. How do people come to aspire to such things? How does that modernity spread?

In a recent article, Omid Azadibougar posits that modernity cannot spread through translation. His basic argument seems to be that since modernity requires self-reflexivity, it cannot be “referential,” in the sense that it cannot be something that people believe exists somewhere else: it must always be here and now. We might find this distinction in the reported first reception Hajji Baba as a fully Persian picaresque, when it was seen as witty and perceptive self-reflection, then becoming unacceptable as soon as it was seen in a referential light, as having been transferred from abroad. Azadibougar argues that translation in such circumstances can only achieve a transfer of authoritative instances, legitimating the aspirations of a very narrow educated social class:

[...] the only significant change effected by the Iranian turn to “modernity” through translation might have been the replacement of the master religious narrative (absolute 1) by the master European narrative (absolute 2) for that so-called “progressive” class of society.

However, the culture remained fundamentally referential, locating knowledge externally, and transcendentally constructing a new organization of socio-cultural life. This would include the hypothetical condition in which translation were capable of importing knowledge completely, that is if it had managed to bring the whole of European knowledge into the Iranian cultural sphere without a trace of loss or fragmentation; even then, “modernization” would have remained referential, not having achieved the condition of the modern: critical immanent self-reflexiveness. (2010: 314)

In the more clearly reactionary part of Azadibougar’s argument, the modernizing translations into Persian would have a negative effect on cultural authenticity and unity: “translation has led to cultural instability and de-authentication of literary products” (2010: 317). Through translation, “the Persian language was hollowed out and lost touch with reality. [...] Divorcing its own reality has led to a ‘double reality’ or ‘double consciousness’: one subjected and immediate, but postponed, the other dominant and remote, but desired” (2010: 315).

As in so much narrative analysis, the categories here do not rise above static and opposed identities. Only two places operate in this reductive view of translation: here and there, home and away, the authentic and the imposed, the autochthon and the translator, as if there were never more than two options. That is, there is no place for the translating itself. Nor is there any awareness of non-narrative identity beyond that of self-characterization and justification: nothing about any identity in becoming, constructed with and through the other, in dialogue and negotiation; none of the ontogenetic processes mapped out by Gayatri Spivak in her conceptualization of translation. Instead, apparently, we have the blunt impossibility of modernity through translation, based on the precarious referential assumption that the
modernist paradise had somehow been completely perfected elsewhere in the world. Through translation, indeed through any act of comparison, modernity should simply not be able to move, by definition. *Eppur...*

Humorous picaresque will never in itself create a political or cultural modernity, not even as the first novel in a language. Yet, for all its Orientalizing misunderstanding, *Hajji Baba* and its like, along with communication technologies and the rich history of nineteenth-century travel literature from here, there, and places in between, all those pieces were parts of the general historical movements by which aspirations expanded across the globe. The problem with Azadibougar’s argument is not so much its reductively absolutist conception of modernity, which is trivial, but its simplistic understanding of translation.

So how does modernity grow? The message of *Hajji Baba* must be one of complexity, if nothing else. Was something transferred from West to East? Yes, but not simply so, since it remained in some form in the different Wests, adopted various different forms in various Easts, and evolved as it was picked up along the way. Was the relation between the Persian and British states asymmetrical and imperialistic? Yes, extremely so, but the many people in the middle were not the states, and many were beyond state laws: a Persian translator was indeed able to write critically through the translation, and to do so from exile; James Morier, the eventually named author, was born of a Swiss father in Ottoman Izmir, worked in Persia, and accompanied a Persian dignitary on his travels to England, much in the manner of Hajji Baba himself; and Phillott the editor was probably born in India, served as consul in Persia for two years, and was, among much else, the unmarried impassioned translator of a Persian treatise on falconry (*Mīrzā 1908*), dedicated to the former Persian Governor of Kirman, in memory of the time the two “mingled our tears over our exile.” If you look half closely, these intermediaries become quite ambiguous nodes in an operative intercultural network. For that matter, the Orientalist picaresque could also work in reverse, as Montesquieu had well appreciated: Morier’s sequel (1828) has Hajji Baba visit England, finding differences and faults in both cultures, and questioning the supposed perfection of English modernity.

How did modernity grow? There was more than one force at work. A literary genre meets with ethnographic Orientalism, some dissenting intellectuals in exile pick up the threads and extend the text with help from employment at the Lycée Français, with sometime protection from the Turkish sultan, and through indulgence of a British major, linguist, and enthusiast of things Persian. Many contradictory forces come together to help a text move. So is that how aspirations also travel?

My Western intellectual colleagues hasten to catalogue the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, with ongoing struggles in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, the betrayed stand in Bahrain, the much longer opposition in Iran, the quietened voices of Algeria and Morocco (such is the state of play this week). It is wilfully naïve to see the shared aspirations as springing suddenly from within, all at once, all seeking the same goal – any European historian knows the lessons of 1848. Yet it is similarly simplistic to see the movements as being rationally “managed” from without, somehow planned and executed by a supremely intelligent capitalist system, State Department, CIA, or West. My colleagues nevertheless need to believe in some such controlling intelligence, of the kind their pre-planned critiques might be able to handle. Let this be nothing but translation from the devil we know! Let us not have to think about something new! Of course others, like Bernard-Henri Lévy, no doubt err on the other side, politically proclaiming a united autochthonous uprising that requires foreign support, in an act of translation that would work in the opposite direction. In all of this, our thought is restricted by a sterile binarism: one side or the other, Western or native, as if that could explain the workings of actual translation.

How did the aspiration of modernity get there? Not just through transfer from one culture to another.
2. Inculturation

“Inculturation” is the term authorized by Pope John Paul II from 1985 to describe “the incarnation of the Gospel in autonomous cultures and at the same time the introduction of these cultures into the life of the Church” (1985: 21). Inculturation thus involves, very ideally, a double movement rather than a simple one-way translation: “Through inculturation the Church makes the Gospel incarnate in different cultures and at the same time introduces peoples, together with their cultures, into her own community” (1990: 52).

The concept of inculturation is of interest here for several reasons. The first has to do with standard translation theory. In the Vatican instructions concerning the translation of the liturgy, “inculturation” has all but replaced earlier references to “adaptation.” In the 1969 “dynamic equivalence” instruction Comme le prévoit we read, for example, that a “translation of the liturgy [...] often requires cautious adaptation” (21), and the instruction then gives situations and examples where cultural and linguistic differences justify the transformation of textual references, particularly symbols and metaphors. “Adaptation” was an affair of linguistics and ethnography; it could be justified by scholarship. “Inculturation,” on the other hand, is a hermeneutic movement ideally concerning self and other, acted out on the level of cultures and justified by ecclesiastic politics that come with no small amount of theology. Although academic translation theory turned to questions of culture in the 1990s, spawning various concepts of cultural translation, the Vatican could have got there first.

A second reason for our interest here is the extent to which inculturation can incorporate a translational concept of the self. In Varietates Legitimae (1994) we find an introductory reflection on the “Process of Inculturation throughout the History of Salvation”:

The people of Israel throughout its history preserved the certain knowledge that it was the chosen people of God, the witness of his action and love in the midst of the nations. It took from neighboring peoples certain forms of worship, but its faith in the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob subjected these borrowings to profound modifications [...]. The encounter between the Jewish world and Greek wisdom gave rise to a new form of inculturation: the translation of the Bible into Greek introduced the word of God into a world that had been closed to it and caused, under divine inspiration, an enrichment of the Scriptures. (1994: 9)

And so on throughout the history of the Church. The translating institution is phylogenetically presented as a system that repeatedly transforms itself through encounters with others, growing and becoming richer even as its identity and mission is supposed to remain the same, at some level. This translational concept of identity, coupled with awareness that the prime cultural location is the translating institution itself, might profoundly alter the way one thinks about translation operating on and between cultures, for example in questions concerning the movement of modernity. Rather than two eternally opposed sides, here we have the one system of thought, belief, and action, growing and transforming through translation from others. In the official texts on inculturation, little mention is made of any rights or priorities of other cultures – they are by definition enriched by salvation, so it seems, so they might as well stay silent in their gratitude (for an early and still-valid critique of this silencing, see Simon 1987). Mention is made, however, of the transformation and enrichment of the self, and that is what remains of interest.

For as long as anyone can remember, we have been talking about translation as an affair of two sides: source and target, home and away, bearing comparison even when admittedly asymmetric. But here we find a far more honest model: Bas les masques! – translation is by and from cultures in expansion.

The Vatican instructions run from the relative openness of Comme le prévoit (1969) to the theorized caution of Varietates legitimae (1994), and to the conservative affirmation of
The work of inculturation, of which the translation into vernacular languages is a part, is not therefore to be considered an avenue for the creation of new varieties or families of rites; on the contrary, it should be recognized that any adaptations introduced out of cultural or pastoral necessity thereby become part of the Roman Rite, and are to be inserted into it in a harmonious way. (2001: 5)

Here the movement seems virtually one-way. Indeed, the main practical work of *Liturgiam authenticam* would seem to be between Latin and English alone, between two languages of the one culture, with mention of English primarily to protect the sexist pronouns of American bishops – the missionary world is relegated to peripheral jungles of potential but unexemplified error. Having opened the Pandora’s box of a translational identity, this Vatican does not want itself transformed anytime soon. Like an international advertising agency that tried localization (or adaptation) but was unable to control or trust the effects, the reactionary movement is to standardized branding, and exert central control.

Translative inculturation, with a potential double movement, was nevertheless there for a moment. As a conceptual geometry, that kind of cultural process is worth dwelling on. Is it really possible that a coherent system can envisage and legitimate the transformation of its own identity? Some comparisons might be less than flattering: this expansive, devouring, self-transforming Church might be like a virus that grows stronger as it interacts with hosts, or an imperialistic cancer taking over the world. Or again, it could be like the anthropophagic ingestion of the other, proclaimed as a translation method by the Brazilian poet Augusto de Campos (1978: 7). Is that what we are dealing with here? Not quite: the bacteriological analogies suggest a level of destruction that is clearly not desired, and it is hard to find correlates for the eclectically kleptomaniacal of Brazilian modernism (“I am only interested in that which is not mine”). Better analogies might be found in systems so close to us as to seem second-nature: free-trade capitalism theoretically allows the development of entire new markets and a subsequent shift of power to new societies; nation states with significant new immigration are similarly called upon to accept transformation of their identities; or again, meritocratic science ideally devours knowledge from whatever source, requiring its own constant reinvention; and the ideals of our own international university system, the rough ideology we will call liberal humanism, might also accept that merit, from no matter where, should be allowed to enter and transform. The same might be true of academic Translation Studies, now calling for non-Western models but actually re-inventing itself from the West. No, situations of potential inculturation are not too hard to find.

So is that how modernity moves, through inculturation, through a growing system of shared aspirations, rather than by transfer from culture to culture?

### 3. Liberal humanism and secular cooperation

The various Vatican instructions do not operate solely on the basis of their own tradition or authority: they make occasional appeals to other legitimating or supportive institutions. In the liberal *Comme le prévoit*, for example, we find an appeal to linguistic science: “To discover the true meaning of a text, the translator must follow the scientific methods of textual study as used by experts” (1969: 9), with no reference to the secular or religious status of the science or the experts. No such inquiry is contemplated in *Liturgiam authenticam*, however: “while it is useful with the assistance of historical and other scientific tools to consult a source that may have been discovered for the same text, nevertheless it is always the text of the Latin *edizio typica* itself that is to be translated” (2001: 23). So you can use all the science you want, but we already have the truth! (This is what can happen when you move everything from
linguistics to culture.) Closer to home, in the debates aroused by *Liturgiam authenticam* we find not infrequent appeals to “academic translation theory,” which apparently nowadays criticizes the ideals of dynamic equivalence and might thus support attempts to revise a politics of adaptation. Some segments of the Church – in this case conservative members of the American Catholic Church – seem to see any critique of Nida as grist to their mill, while others, opposing the conservative tendency, have turned to people like myself (cf. Pym 2011) to ask if we are all really in favor of the closed self.

To be sure, dialogue between the secular university and any church institution, even the most liberal, is liable to misunderstanding. For instance, secular academics like myself tend to assume that translation is from the foreign; some American would-be translators of the Catholic liturgy nevertheless proclaim that the Latin text is not at all foreign to them – it is the very symbol of their identity. This would seem to be a clear difference in outlook. Then again, in the domain of international secular science, translations from English have long ceased to be from a foreign culture. The model of inculturation could concern much more than the Catholic Church, and my facile assumptions of foreignness may be wrong.

Whether we like it or not, university and church both are involved in the legitimization of translations, not to mention the training of translators. As we have seen, instances of Christian churches apparently have had reasons to turn to academics, but why then should secular academics seek cooperation with any church? The answers are perhaps not all obvious.

An easy answer: Any scholar interested in promoting linguistic diversity might well seek cooperation with Christian missionary culture. In the past centuries, the various churches have probably done more to document and maintain the languages of the world than have non-religious linguists. Their wealth of linguistic and translation activity, their creation and extension of knowledge, can scarcely be ignored.

A more challenging answer: In many parts of the world, the institutions of Christianity have been inseparable from the growth of modernity, thanks largely to missionary work on linguistic standardization, education, and the promotion of community-based communication. Beyond the Islamic sphere, Christianity has not infrequently been seen as the religion of modernity, being confused, in reception and adaptation, with the technologies, economies and political cultures of the Western societies sending the ideas. If you want to extend modernity, or you are asking how it can grow, Christian institutions can scarcely be ignored, and they can rarely be seen as operating alone.

If common cause can be found on that level, then some mutual benefits might yet be available. There was such cooperation in twelfth-century Hispania, between the Order of Cluny and the translators of Arabic science (early examples of what Jacques Le Goff termed the “intellectuals of the Middle Ages”). When I attempted to analyze the regime of that cooperation, it was fairly easy to locate some top-level principles on which the two sides could agree (the technical preference for literalism plus explanation, and for teamwork), then other principles on which there remained problematic disagreement (the legitimacy of translation as conquest, and the authoritative nature of non-Christian texts). For as long as there was agreement on the top principles, and for as long as Cluny was willing to pay the translators, cooperation could proceed.

I am asking today if something similar should be happening here, between secular and religious Translation Studies, or more broadly between the liberal humanism that still survives in parts of the university system and the element of religious humanism that might underlie some missionary work. And I am asking if the cooperation is not, or should not be, between two processes of inculturation, since we are both systems that grow as we take in other cultures, and that can accept various degrees of transformation of the self. And I am asking, finally, if our main shared principles might be those of a modernity that grows.

If cooperation is possible, what would its regime look like? The top principles might include literacy, education, access to knowledge, and the protection of linguistic and cultural diversity through and perhaps despite processes of inculturation; the middle principles could...
concern the promotion of political modernity, where there is far less certitude or concord; and
the least shared principles might then be the Christian claim to a privileged salvation, and
perhaps scientific claims to empiricism as an exclusive epistemology. In matters of translation,
cooperation is undoubtedly easiest between the parts of these institutions whose priorities are
most clearly those at the top of that list. Cooperation becomes far harder the more we affirm
our traditional, nonnegotiable identities. In matters of translation, it is probably easier to
cooperate with the 1969 or 1994 instructions than with the one-way inculturation inscribed in
Liturgiam authenticam.

A tangible sign of such cooperation might be our presence here today. Another sign is
perhaps the founding of Translation, a new interdisciplinary journal “published by St. Jerome
in Manchester and Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura in Rome”, the masthead of which proclaims
support and advice from professors Appadurai, Appiah, Apter, Arrojo, Bassnett, Bhabha,
Brodzki, Chambers, Cheung, Damrosch, Hermans, Jones, Levine, Rafael, Saraf, Spivak, Tamez,
Tymoczko, Venuti, de Vries, Willson, and Young. That swathe of secular humanist academics,
mostly Western, lends huge academic legitimacy to an enterprise largely founded and funded
by the Nida Institute for Biblical Scholarship, through its School for Translation Studies. Let us
assume all those scholars are aware of what their names are doing. And let us applaud, if that
assumption is correct, the cooperation between the secular and the Christian. Our processes
of inculturation might yet find some shared aspiration.

Even more remarkable, I suggest, is the way in which all those illustrious academics
and outreaching missionary institutions similarly lend legitimacy, in the same act, to a
publishing house that refuses to communicate with selected academics: despite the name,
“Saint Jerome” is actually the secular snake in the woodheap, and it boycotts anyone who
works for an Israeli university. That is, in signing up to this journal, you are cooperating with an
institution that divides scholarship into nation states, all with anthems and flags, and then
ousts those scholars whose state is engaged, I believe, in long-term crimes against humanity.
Let this be clear: the Saint Jerome boycott was applied quite independently of the actual
beliefs and acts of the boycotted scholars, and it is still being applied. As an act of inculturation,
the academic legitimization of Saint Jerome Publishing thus radically transforms the humanist
principles whereby scholars communicate directly with scholars no matter what the iniquities
of the states concerned, whereby knowledge is freely available to all no matter where or when
or how, and whereby the merits of the individual thinker are recognized and respected,
protected from both plagiarism and its opposite, boycott. This act of legitimization transforms,
perhaps inadvertently and almost certainly opportunistically, the very principles upon which
Renaissance humanism was built and the secular university system, borrowing from the Islamic
madrasahs and slowly separating from Church education, has helped extend waves of
modernity across the globe. That boycott is being allowed to subvert our traditional secular
identity, condemning otherwise enlightened mindsets to a pre-translational narrative of
divided worlds. (“It’s only distribution!” you protest – but the distribution of knowledge, the
widening of social communication, is precisely what modernity is all about.) One might
perhaps understand such legitimization coming from university academics latching on to
“translation,” the name of the journal, as a still-recent catchphrase, or from those hastily
duped by the prestige of names already in the hat, or from prudent cultural organizers
counting their pennies. But from scholars supposedly able to see across centuries? And from
thoughtful missionary institutions? From the very people who are supposed to place principle
above commerce?

How does modernity grow? When you are marching on streets in fear of your life,
what moves you first is no doubt the thing you oppose, the regime there in front of you, the
source of oppression. What supports you in part is perhaps the image of a wider world that
shares your aspirations. But what does not motivate, I suggest, is the idea that you are
importing foreign values. The profound movement of aspirations is the work of many
contributing and contradictory processes of which no one can really claim to be the author, and the movements are rarely one-way. The model of inculturation might apply equally well to liberal humanism and to Christianity. In both cases, part of the self is prepared to be changed. In both cases, however, there is also a part that remains non-negotiable and requires respect. For me, that part has been reached.

References


